Shaft. It won't.

Rights. If, therefore, an object is a corporeal composition, and this does not need anything in which it receives its being, and evil is the effect of something, and actions need something in which they receive their being, then evil will not be an object; thus, if evil is an object, and murder is evil, then murder will be an object; meanwhile, murder is the action of someone, of traces. murder is not an object; If you want to say that the agent is an object, then I agree with you; e.g., a murderer, inasmuch as he is a man, is an object, and the murder he commits is not an object, but the action of an object; and we call a person evil for murder, and on the contrary good for good deeds. Consequently, these names are ascribed to an object from its accidental appurtenances, which are not itself; for the object is neither murder, nor adultery, nor any of these evils; But just as the grammarian is so called, from grammar, and the rhetorician from rhetoric, and the physician from healing, whereas this very thing is neither healing, nor rhetoric, nor grammar, but derives its name from its accidental paraphernalia, from which it is so called, without being any of them, so it seems to me that the object derives its name from evil, without being evil itself. In the same way, reason, imagining in your mind someone else who is the cause of evil for people, that he, too, because he acts and helps them to do evil, becomes evil because of his works; for therefore he also is called evil, because he is the doer of evil; and what he does is not himself, but these are his actions, from which he receives the name of evil. For if we were to say that he himself is what he does, and he commits murder and adultery and the like, then he himself would be it. But if he himself is this, and this has existence when it is done, but when it is not done, then it ceases to be; yet this comes from men; Consequently, people are the perpetrators of these things and the authors of the existence and non-existence of all this.

If so, then neither the evil exists without beginning, nor is evil something uncreated, because, as it is said, it came from it.

Valen. the other [5]. It seems to me, friend, that you have reasoned enough with others. From what he has previously admitted in his speech, it seems that you have drawn conclusions well. Indeed, if matter was without quality, and God is the Creator of qualities, and qualities are evil, then God will be the Creator of evil. This is well said. But it seems to me false to call a substance without quality; for no object can be said to be without quality. On the contrary, by calling it qualityless, you assert that it has quality, determining what the substance is, which is the kind of quality. Therefore, if it pleases you, begin your speech again; for it seems to me that matter has qualities without beginning. In this way, in my opinion, evil flows from it, so that God is not the author of evils, but the author of all them is matter.

Rights. Thy zeal, friend, I approve of thy diligence, and I praise thy thoroughness in words; for each of those who wish to learn the truth should not simply treat the words as they happen, but carefully consider the speech. Otherwise, if the investigator by an inaccurate definition of concepts gives the interlocutor a reason to draw the conclusions he wants, this will not convince the listener, but what seems possible to him to recognize as good, he will admit; and from this one of two things will happen: either the listener will be completely frivolous inclined to what seems to him, or he will denounce the interlocutor as having told a lie. You, it seems to me, have wrongly said that matter had qualities without beginning; for if this were so, why would God be the Creator? If you say an object, then we have already assumed that it existed before; if qualities, then now we say that they also existed. And so, if both the object and the qualities existed, then it seems to me that it is in vain to call God the Creator. But answer me the following question: in what sense do you call God the Creator? Is it that He has turned those objects that previously existed into non-existence, or is it that He has preserved objects and changed their qualities?

Shaft. A friend. It seems to me that there has been no change in the objects, but only in the qualities in relation to which we call God the Creator. Just as if someone were to say that a house was built of stones, it would not be possible to conclude from this that the stones, being called a house, in their essence did not remain stones; for, I think, they have become home in terms of the quality of their build. In the same way, it seems to me, God produced a certain change in the object, which in the meantime remained an object, by which I say that the world received its existence from God.

Pravosl. If, as you say, God has made a certain change in the qualities, then I intend to ask you briefly, and you answer me as follows: Tell me, do you think that the quality of the thing is evil?

Shaft. A friend. Seem.

Rights. Has this quality always been in matter, or has it received the beginning of being?

Shaft. A friend. I assert that this quality was inherent in matter without beginning.

Rights. But do you not say that God has made a certain change in the attributes?

Shaft. A friend. I say this.

Rights. For better or for worse?

Shaft. A friend. It seems to me that it must be said that it is for the best.