The indisputable dissimilarity of this assembly, both in its form and in its composition, with subsequent councils cannot be regarded as an argument against recognizing this assembly as a council. Throughout history, the shape of the cathedral has been constantly changing. We do not find in history a single, completely stable, form of the cathedral. The councils of the third century, the era of Cyprian of Carthage, for which no one denies the conciliar dignity, differ to a considerable extent from the ecumenical councils. We are not even sure that in the event of the convocation of a large council of the Orthodox Church, its form will fully correspond to the form of previous ecumenical councils. The Russian Church, which had not had a council for many centuries, convened it in 1917 in a form that is a certain kind of innovation in the history of councils. Even a priori we have no right to expect the identity of the first council with the subsequent ones. The history of councils is the history of the development of the cathedral (especially its form), and not the mechanical reproduction of one established form. Behind the changing form of the cathedral there is a certain stable nucleus – the essence of the cathedral. Consequently, the final answer to the question of the nature of the Jerusalem assembly can be given only after the definition of the concept of a council. This definition of the concept of a council in its essence provides a stable point from which it is possible to clarify how this concept of a council found its expression in the history of councils.

3. According to the dogmatic teaching of the Orthodox Church, an ecumenical council is an assembly of bishops of the entire church to resolve issues of ecclesiastical — universal — significance. This formal feature does not exhaust the concept of an ecumenical council. The composition of an ecumenical council could change in the direction of its expansion. At the Seventh Ecumenical Council, monastics participated as full members. In addition, not every assembly with the observance of formal signs is considered an ecumenical council. History shows that some councils, while observing all the formal features, have not been recognized as ecumenical councils. Along with the true ecumenical councils, there were also false councils rejected by the Church, as, for example, the Council of Ephesus in 449, which was branded in history with the name of the "robbery" council {23}. The insufficiency of a formal attribute is compensated for by an internal attribute. Only that assembly is a council whose decisions are inspired by God. The Seventh Ecumenical Council solemnly proclaimed that all the councils that had preceded it "were enlightened by one and the same Spirit, and legitimized that which was useful" (Canon 1). This is also evidenced by the conciliar formula, which has its origin in the Jerusalem Apostolic Assembly: "It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us..." (Acts 15:28). A council proclaims the will of God through the revelation of the Holy Spirit, and only such a council is a real council, and not a false one. Thus, the internal sign consists in the truthfulness, as a revelation of the will of God, of the decrees of the council. This inner sign finds its expression in the witness of the council itself about itself: "It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us..." and in the witness of the Church, which accepts it as a genuine and valid council. The decisive factor is the recognition of the Church. To the extent that this recognition is necessary, it follows from the fact that a formally incorrect assembly can be recognized by the Church as an ecumenical council, as, for example, the Second Ecumenical Council, which had no representatives of the Western Church at all, or the Third Ecumenical Council, which was a small assembly of bishops, supporters of Cyril of Alexandria. The Church's recognition of a council is the Church's own testimony that the decisions of the council are true, that they are an expression of the will of God. The Church, recognizing the council, bears witness to herself in the Spirit, to the Holy Spirit, Who lives in her and was manifested at the council.

From the combination of the formal and internal attributes, it is not difficult to discern the very essence of the ecumenical council. It is an assembly, for only in this way does the decision of a council differ from the teaching of one person, which can be recognized by the Church as true. This assembly is an assembly of bishops, through whom the whole Church is represented in its entirety, i.e., it is an assembly of the universal Church to discuss and decide on the true solution of questions of catholic significance through the revelation of the Holy Spirit.

The modern dogmatic view of the universal church does not coincide with the apostolic one. As we have seen, each ecclesiastical community, as the empirical embodiment of the heavenly church, is the Church in all its integrity and fullness, and its ecclesiastical assembly is the assembly of the Church. However, the concept of a council cannot be applied to every church assembly. Above we have distinguished between ecclesiastical assemblies engaged in the discussion of matters whose catholicity is latent, and those for the solution of questions of an active catholic nature, which require their acceptance by other ecclesial communities. The latter fully correspond to the above definition of the essence of an ecumenical council and give us the opportunity to give a definition of a council, abstracting from the predicates "ecumenical" and "local", which are associated with the modern canonical concept of the Church. A council is an ecclesiastical assembly as a meeting of the members of the Church with Christ to discuss and decide questions of a catholic nature. If there were only one empirical incarnation of the Church in empirical reality, then its ecclesiastical assembly would be a council whenever it decided questions related to church life. However, in empirical life, the Church is manifested in a multitude of its empirical manifestations. Next to the church meeting of one church, there are church meetings of other churches. The decision of one church community on issues of a catholic nature should be the decision of the church meetings of other communities. Therefore, in empirical reality, a council is only that church assembly whose decisions have been adopted by other communities, i.e., whose decisions have an openly revealed catholic character.

4. The definition of the council in its very essence, as it is given above, allows us to finally answer the question of the nature of the Jerusalem assembly. We recognize the correctness of the Church's tradition and follow it in affirming, without any limitations, that the apostolic assembly in Jerusalem was a council. In fact, as we have seen, the Jerusalem congregation was a congregation of the Jerusalem church. This assembly discussed and decided a question of a catholic nature, and its significance and its decisions were accepted by the churches as ecclesiastical truth. This was the first known to us, and in general the first council in the history of the church. It had not only typological, but also historical and genetic significance for subsequent councils.

V {24}

1. A council is a special type of church assembly, from which it does not differ formally, but only in the nature of the issues discussed at it. The church assembly itself, as we have seen, belongs to the essence of the Church: the church is the assembly of the chosen, New Testament people of God with Christ. Collectedness, collectivity, conciliarity are inherent in the Church as such: it enters into its very essence and into its very fabric. Even before its first council, the Church was catholic. Entering into the very essence of the Church, conciliarity equally belongs to the heavenly and earthly Church. A council is a manifestation of the conciliarity inherent in the Church, but also a manifestation that is connected with the empirical existence of the Church. This latter has determined a special type of church assembly, which needs the primacy of all the diversity of its empirical existence. The Council is a concrete expression of the unity of the Church in the multiplicity of its empirical aspects. The multiplicity of empirical churches does not fragment or divide the fullness and integrity of the Church as the Body of Christ. In each individual ecclesial community, this fullness and wholeness is manifested in its Eucharistic assembly as an icon of the heavenly church on earth. For the totality of the experiential meetings of the church, this same fullness and wholeness finds expression in the council. This is the unity of the One Who is depicted on the icon of the earthly church. Therefore, the council is the Church herself in her empirical embodiment. By virtue of this, the council, although it takes place in one particular community, belongs simultaneously to all communities, since the Church is incarnated in each community. In the empirical aspect, this is revealed through church reception. Therefore, the only difference between the church community in which the council-assembly takes place and the others is that the former is given the revelation of the Spirit, while the others bear witness to this revelation. On the one hand, there is the assembly, on the other, the church reception: these are the necessary structural elements of the cathedral. The first is connected with the mystical depth of the council, the second with the empirical nature of the Church. In the council, the empirical disunity of the churches is overcome, in the plurality of churches it becomes unity: the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church.

2. For each individual church community, so for the totality of all communities, conciliarity requires "the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace" (Ephesians 4:3) {25}. This unity is not fully contained in empirical reality, since it is a unit in multiplicity, not an empirical concept. Hence the strange paradox that in no human society, in any human union, has unity been achieved with such difficulty and effort as in the empirical church. Nowhere else was there so much disagreement and disagreement as in it that almost excluded love. And where Christ's greeting of peace should always sound, curses thundered more often. This paradox can only be explained by the fact that unity in empirical society is of an empirical nature, and therefore can be more easily achieved, since empirical reality is less opposed to it. Conciliarity, realized in the empirical world, is super-empirical. It requires such unity, which in the fallen world is realized only after Golgotha. "We preach Christ crucified... the power of God and the wisdom of God." —1 Corinthians 1:23-24. God's Wisdom is revealed in the world through Golgotha, in the torments of Golgotha. "For you must have the same feelings as in Christ Jesus: He, being in the image of God, did not consider it robbery to be equal with God; but He humbled Himself, taking the form of a servant, becoming like men, and in appearance became like a man; humbled Himself, being obedient even unto death, even the death of the cross. Therefore God also exalted Him, and gave Him a name that is above every name" (Phil 2:5-9). The kenosis of the second Person of the Holy Trinity corresponds to the kenosis of the divine-human Body in the empirical church. "My children, for whom I am again in the pains of childbirth, until Christ is formed in you" (Galatians 4:19). Conciliarity is born and realized in the agony and sorrows of Gethsemane: the Eucharistic assembly is a Golgotha repeated every time.

2. When the Church was established, "... I will build My Church..." {26}, it was already conciliar. Therefore, to ask about the establishment of councils is to ask about the establishment of the Church itself. At the time of its establishment, the Church harbored a potential council. When the need arose for the solution of catholic questions, it realized the council hidden in it. Such a first historical realization was the Apostolic Council. And whenever such a need has arisen and still arises, a council can and must be held. The Church is catholic even when there is no council in it, but the council is a witness to conscious conciliarity. Thus, the question of the origin of councils, which has been and is repeatedly raised in theological scholarship, is to some extent a misunderstanding. Councils arose in the church not because they were established by the apostles at the Council of Jerusalem; still less did they arise under the influence of external historical councils or through the transfer of the ready-made institution of the Κοινά [27] {28}. They did not arise, but only appeared at a certain historical moment. Of course, this moment can be postponed for any time and it can be disputed that the first Council of Jerusalem in history was or that there was an earlier, completely unknown to us council. But this will have nothing to do with the question of the origin and origin of councils.

VI

The original form of the council, which we meet in the Jerusalem Apostolic Council, is not only unlike the modern ones, but is almost their antipode. The difference between them is so profound that the question may even arise whether we are dealing with one and the same ecclesiastical phenomenon or with different ones. In its original form, the council is the church itself, taken in a certain aspect, discussing and deciding questions of a catholic nature. In its historical development, the cathedral gradually acquired the features of a legal institution. In the council, as a church assembly, the church itself speaks directly in its entirety. The Council as an institution represents the Church, speaks and acts on its behalf as its organ. He represents the church, as a part represents the whole. Only nowadays does the cathedral become the organ of the church, constructed on the principle of representation. When the Council was transformed into an ecclesiastical institution, the voice of the Church itself fell silent, and in its place remained the voice of its supreme body.

The Council as an ecclesiastical assembly is always equal to itself, including the fullness of the Church. There is no higher or lower council, complete or incomplete—all councils are equal in dignity. The Council as an ecclesiastical institution differs in the degree (strength) of representation: metropolitan and patriarchal councils, local and ecumenical councils. Only an ecumenical council represents the church and speaks on its behalf, the rest of the councils do not speak on behalf of the whole church, but only on behalf of a part of it. In the historical process of development, the integrity of the ecclesiastical nature of the cathedral was lost. Such changes could not have occurred without a corresponding change in the dogmatic teaching on the Church and the canonical structure of the Church.

A profound dogmatic shift in church consciousness, by virtue of which the church community lost its independence and integrity, influenced the teaching on councils, although, on the other hand, the very process of the development of councils contributed to changes in the concept of the Church.

The distinction of the councils according to their merit caused a difference in the degree of binding nature of their decrees. The decisions of the councils are binding only within the limits of their competence, beyond these limits they lose their bindingness. The concept of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, completely unknown to early Christianity, is to a large extent connected with the different understanding of the binding nature of the decrees of the council. It is especially important that the nature of the binding nature of the decisions of the council as an ecclesiastical institution is different from that of the council in its original form. The binding nature of the decrees of the latter is based on the fullness of their ecclesiastical nature, the binding nature of the former is of a legal nature. These are the decrees of the highest legislative body or the holder of the highest authority in the church. In the history of the Church we encounter two legal conceptions of the council. The first, the council as the supreme legislative body, was adopted in Byzantium and partly in the West; the second is that the council as the bearer of supreme ecclesiastical authority is a product of the Modern Age. Such was the concept of the Local Council of the Russian Church of 1917-1918: "In the Russian Orthodox Church, the supreme power – legislative, administrative, judicial and controlling – belongs to the Local Council, periodically convened at certain times, consisting of bishops, clergy and laity" {29}. The Moscow Council of 1917-1918 took place under the sign of the liberation of the Church from the tutelage of the state. The Russian Church freed itself from legal dependence on the state, but the legal structure of the Russian Church, which to a large extent dates back to the beginning of the synodal period, remained the same. The change, in itself very significant, was reduced to the fact that the power of the Russian Local Council was placed in place of the supreme authority in the Church in the person of the Russian Emperor. It is interesting to note an analogy with the ideology of the Reformation Councils of the Catholic Church. These councils proclaimed the principle that the council is higher than the pope, i.e., that the highest authority in the Catholic Church belongs to the council. The thought of the leaders of the Catholic Reformation Councils was fettered by the principle of law. Liberation from power was thought differently within the legal understanding of the church. Wishing to remove the pope as the bearer of supreme power, the Reformation councils inevitably had to declare themselves the supreme authority. This is the reason for their failure – the pope turned out to be stronger than the council. Before the Moscow Council of 1917-1918, the Russian Church was a legal institution and remained so after the Council. The patriarchate in Russia in 1917-1918 was not the restoration of the Moscow patriarchate before Peter the Great, but was a continuation of the synodal period with the patriarch at its head. In the church structure, as it was conceived by the members of the Moscow Council of 1917-1918, there could be no question of recognizing the decrees of the supreme ecclesiastical authority. The Church is presented as a legal institution. The supreme power in it, the council, is built on the idea of representation. Even if we consider that the moment of ecclesiastical reception is contained implicitly in the definition of the supreme authority of the Russian Church, then it can only have a legal character. If it were needed, it would be a kind of church referendum, not a church reception.