"Escobar," replied the priest, "says in the same place that 'there are laws which forbid him on pain of very severe punishments.'

"Is he useless, then, my father?"

"Not at all," he said, "for Escobar gives in the same place the means of making it permissible, 'whenever," he says, "he who sells and buys back has profit as his main object, provided that he does not fix a price higher than the highest price of a substance of this kind when he sells, and does not give less than the lowest when he buys, and so long as they do not have an agreement about it before, either in their own terms or otherwise." But Lessius (De just., book 2, ch. 21, ed. 16) says: "Even if one were to sell with the intention of buying back at a lower price, there is no obligation to return this profit, except out of mercy, in the case when the one from whom it is obtained is in poverty, and if, moreover, in returning it, one does not hinder oneself in any way: si commode potest." That's all that can be said on this matter.

"Indeed, my father, I think that greater leniency would be vicious.

"Our fathers," he said, "know how to stop so well in time!" You see enough of all of this benefit to Mohatra.

I could teach you many other ways, but these are enough, and it remains for me to talk to you about people who are entangled in their affairs. Our fathers have contrived to help them according to the condition in which they find themselves, namely, that if they do not have sufficient means to live decently and at the same time pay their debts, they are allowed to conceal a part of their property by declaring themselves bankrupt to their creditors. This is what our father Lessius decides, and this is confirmed by Escobar (tr. 3, pr. 2, No 163): "Does a bankrupt man with a clear conscience have the right to withhold as much of his fortune as is required for the decent maintenance of his family, tie indecore vivat? I assert, with Lessius, that yes, even if he had profited by means of injustices and crimes known to all, ex injustitia et notorio delicto; although in this case he cannot retain as much as in others."

"How, my father, by what strange mercy do you wish to leave this property to him who has made it by stealing, that he may be able to live decently, and not to his creditors, to whom it rightfully belongs?"

"It is impossible to satisfy everyone," replied the priest, "and our fathers tried to help these unfortunates in particular. In favor of the poor, our great Vázquez, quoted by Castro Palao (vol. 1, tr. 6, vol. 6, p. 6 No 12), speaks in favor of the poor: "If you meet a thief who is determined and ready to rob a poor man, you can, in order to deflect him from doing so, directly point out to him some rich person whom he can rob instead." If you don't have either Vázquez or Castro Palao, you'll find the same in your Escobar; As you know, he wrote almost nothing that was not borrowed from twenty-four of our most famous fathers: this is in tr. 5, pr. 5, No 120, in The Practice of Loving Your Neighbor of our Society.

"This love is indeed extraordinary, my father: to save from the loss of one at the expense of another. But I think that it must be perfect, and that the one who gave this advice, according to his conscience, is obliged to return to the rich man the property that he lost through his fault.

"Not at all," he said to me, "for he did not steal it himself, but only advised it to someone else. And listen to the following wise decision of our Father Bonya on a case, which, of course, will surprise you still more, and where you would consider it still more obligatory to return. This is in Chapter 13 of his Summa. Here are his own expressions: "Someone asks a soldier to kill a neighbor or burn down the barn of a person who insulted him. The question arises, if a soldier does not appear, is the other who asked him to cause all these devastation obliged himself to repay the evil he caused by his request? In my opinion, no: since no one is obliged to pay if he has not broken the law. Do they violate it by asking another for a favor? Whatever request is presented to him, he is always free to fulfill or reject it. Whichever way he leaned, it was his good will; nothing compels him to do so, except the kindness, meekness, and compliance of his character. If, therefore, this soldier does not make amends for the wrong done by him, the one at whose request the soldier insulted the innocent should not be forced to do so."

I thought that our conversation would be interrupted at this point, for I was ready to burst out with laughter at the kindness and gentleness of the barn-setter, and at these strange arguments which exempt from retribution the first and true culprit of the fire, whom the judges would not have released from the death penalty. But if I had not restrained myself, the good priest would have been offended by this, for he spoke seriously and continued in the same tone:

"You ought to be convinced, after so many experiments, how unfounded your objections are;* and yet you are thereby forcing us to evade the subject of our conversation. Let us return to the insecure, for the relief of whom our fathers, including Lessias (Book 2, Chapter 12, No 12), give "permission to steal not only in extreme necessity, but also in urgent need, even if not in extremity." Escobar also cites it (tr. 1, pr. 9, No 29).

"It is surprising, my father: there are no people in the world who do not find their need urgent, and whom you do not thereby give the right to steal with a clear conscience.

Is it not in the end a violation of it and causing harm to one's neighbor, when one's neighbor is forced to lose his property in order to use it himself? Until now, I have been taught so.