"It is impossible to satisfy everyone," replied the priest, "and our fathers tried to help these unfortunates in particular. In favor of the poor, our great Vázquez, quoted by Castro Palao (vol. 1, tr. 6, vol. 6, p. 6 No 12), speaks in favor of the poor: "If you meet a thief who is determined and ready to rob a poor man, you can, in order to deflect him from doing so, directly point out to him some rich person whom he can rob instead." If you don't have either Vázquez or Castro Palao, you'll find the same in your Escobar; As you know, he wrote almost nothing that was not borrowed from twenty-four of our most famous fathers: this is in tr. 5, pr. 5, No 120, in The Practice of Loving Your Neighbor of our Society.

"This love is indeed extraordinary, my father: to save from the loss of one at the expense of another. But I think that it must be perfect, and that the one who gave this advice, according to his conscience, is obliged to return to the rich man the property that he lost through his fault.

"Not at all," he said to me, "for he did not steal it himself, but only advised it to someone else. And listen to the following wise decision of our Father Bonya on a case, which, of course, will surprise you still more, and where you would consider it still more obligatory to return. This is in Chapter 13 of his Summa. Here are his own expressions: "Someone asks a soldier to kill a neighbor or burn down the barn of a person who insulted him. The question arises, if a soldier does not appear, is the other who asked him to cause all these devastation obliged himself to repay the evil he caused by his request? In my opinion, no: since no one is obliged to pay if he has not broken the law. Do they violate it by asking another for a favor? Whatever request is presented to him, he is always free to fulfill or reject it. Whichever way he leaned, it was his good will; nothing compels him to do so, except the kindness, meekness, and compliance of his character. If, therefore, this soldier does not make amends for the wrong done by him, the one at whose request the soldier insulted the innocent should not be forced to do so."

I thought that our conversation would be interrupted at this point, for I was ready to burst out with laughter at the kindness and gentleness of the barn-setter, and at these strange arguments which exempt from retribution the first and true culprit of the fire, whom the judges would not have released from the death penalty. But if I had not restrained myself, the good priest would have been offended by this, for he spoke seriously and continued in the same tone:

"You ought to be convinced, after so many experiments, how unfounded your objections are;* and yet you are thereby forcing us to evade the subject of our conversation. Let us return to the insecure, for the relief of whom our fathers, including Lessias (Book 2, Chapter 12, No 12), give "permission to steal not only in extreme necessity, but also in urgent need, even if not in extremity." Escobar also cites it (tr. 1, pr. 9, No 29).

"It is surprising, my father: there are no people in the world who do not find their need urgent, and whom you do not thereby give the right to steal with a clear conscience.

Is it not in the end a violation of it and causing harm to one's neighbor, when one's neighbor is forced to lose his property in order to use it himself? Until now, I have been taught so.

"This is not always true," said the priest, "for our great Molina teaches us (v. 2, tr. 2, v. 328, No 8) that 'the commandment to love one's neighbor does not require that one deprive oneself of profit in order to save one's neighbor from equal loss.' He says in proof of the following thesis: "In conscience, we are not obliged to return property that was transferred to us by someone else who wanted to hide it from his creditors in this way." And Lessius, defending this opinion, confirms it with the same principle (Book 2, Chapter 20, Page 19, No 168).

You do not have sufficient compassion for those who are in distress; Our fathers showed more mercy. They are equally fair to the poor and to the rich. I will say even more: they are fair to sinners as well. Because, although they strongly oppose those who commit crimes, they nevertheless preach that property acquired by crimes can be legally withheld. This is generally preached by Lessius (Book 2, Chapter 14, Fr. 8). "No one is obliged," he says, "either by the law of nature, or by the positive laws, that is, by any law, to restore what has been received for the commission of a criminal act, as, for example, for adultery, although this act is illegal." For, as Escobar adds, quoting the words of Lessius (Tr. 1, pr. 8, No 59): "The property acquired by a woman through adultery is in fact obtained by her by illegal means, but the possession of it is lawful: quamvis mulier itticite acquirat, licite tamefi retinet acquisita." And this is why the most illustrious of our fathers establish a formal decision: that which a judge obtains from one of the parties whose rights are unfounded, for the purpose of pronouncing an unjust sentence in its favour, and which a soldier receives for the murder of a man, and all that is obtained by abominable crimes, may be justly withheld. Escobar collected this from our authors, and made a compilation (tr. 3, pr. 1, Me 23), from which he deduces the following general rule: "The possession of property acquired by shameful means, such as murder, unjust sentence, dishonorable act, etc., is lawful, and no one is obliged to restore it." And again (tr. 5, pr. 5, No 53): "It is possible to have property obtained for murder, unjust sentence, heinous crimes, etc., because the possession of it is lawful and because you acquire the right of ownership and possession of the property acquired in this way."

"Oh, my father, I have not heard anything of such a way of acquisition, and I doubt whether justice will legitimize it, and regard murder, miscarriage of justice, and adultery as the basis of the right to property.

"I do not know," said the priest, "what the books of jurisprudence say about it, but I know very well that our books, which are true guides to conscience, speak about it as I do. This is "when the money was received from those who do not have the legal capacity to dispose of their property, such as minor children and monks." For this reason our great Molina makes an exception for them (vol. 1 de Just., tr. 2, ot. 94): Nisi mulier accepisset ab eo, qui alienare non potest, ut a religiose et filiofamilias; Then they need to return their money. Escobar cites this passage (tr. 1, pr. 8, No 59) and confirms the same (tr. 3, pr. 1, No 23).

"Your Reverence," I said to him, "I see that the monks have been treated better than the rest.

"Not at all," said the priest, "has not the same been done for all minors in general, to which monks belong all their lives?" It is fair to exclude them. But there is no obligation to all others to return what has been received from them for a bad deed. And Lessius proves this in detail (Book 2 De just., ch. 14, ot. 8, Ms 52). "Because," he says, "a bad deed can be valued in money, if we take into account the benefit received by him who commissions it to be done, and the labor taken for himself by him who performs it; And therefore there is no obligation to repay what has been received for such an act, of whatever kind it may be: murder, unlawful sentence, filthy deed (for these are the examples which he uses in all his research), unless the money is received from persons who have no right to use their property. You will perhaps say that he who receives money for a bad deed will decide, and that therefore he can neither take nor keep it. But I answer that after the deed is done, there is no longer any sin either to pay for it or to receive payment for it." Our great Filiucius goes even further into the details of this practice; Thus, he remarks "that, according to conscience, they are obliged to pay differently for deeds of this kind, depending on the difference in the positions of the people who perform them, and because some are worth more than others. He confirms this with solid arguments (tr. 31, ch. 9, M® 231): Ossikae fomicariae debetur pretium in comcientia, et multo majore ratione, quam publicae. Copia enim, quam occulta facit muliersui corporis, multo plus valet quam ea, quam publica facit meretrix; nee uUa est lex positiva, quae reddat earn incapacem pretii. Idem dicendum de pretio pramisso virgini, conjugatae, moniali, et cuicumque alii. Est enim omnium eadem ratio[155].

He then showed me things of the same kind, and so abominable from his authors, that I dare not mention them, and he himself would have felt abhorrent to them (for he is a good man), had it not been for the respect he had for his fathers, which makes him receive with reverence all that comes from them. I was silent all the time, not so much from the intention of encouraging him to pursue the subject, as from amazement that the books of the monks were full of ordinances so terrible, so unjust, and at the same time so strange. Consequently, he freely continued his speech, the conclusion of which was as follows.