"This is not always true," said the priest, "for our great Molina teaches us (v. 2, tr. 2, v. 328, No 8) that 'the commandment to love one's neighbor does not require that one deprive oneself of profit in order to save one's neighbor from equal loss.' He says in proof of the following thesis: "In conscience, we are not obliged to return property that was transferred to us by someone else who wanted to hide it from his creditors in this way." And Lessius, defending this opinion, confirms it with the same principle (Book 2, Chapter 20, Page 19, No 168).

You do not have sufficient compassion for those who are in distress; Our fathers showed more mercy. They are equally fair to the poor and to the rich. I will say even more: they are fair to sinners as well. Because, although they strongly oppose those who commit crimes, they nevertheless preach that property acquired by crimes can be legally withheld. This is generally preached by Lessius (Book 2, Chapter 14, Fr. 8). "No one is obliged," he says, "either by the law of nature, or by the positive laws, that is, by any law, to restore what has been received for the commission of a criminal act, as, for example, for adultery, although this act is illegal." For, as Escobar adds, quoting the words of Lessius (Tr. 1, pr. 8, No 59): "The property acquired by a woman through adultery is in fact obtained by her by illegal means, but the possession of it is lawful: quamvis mulier itticite acquirat, licite tamefi retinet acquisita." And this is why the most illustrious of our fathers establish a formal decision: that which a judge obtains from one of the parties whose rights are unfounded, for the purpose of pronouncing an unjust sentence in its favour, and which a soldier receives for the murder of a man, and all that is obtained by abominable crimes, may be justly withheld. Escobar collected this from our authors, and made a compilation (tr. 3, pr. 1, Me 23), from which he deduces the following general rule: "The possession of property acquired by shameful means, such as murder, unjust sentence, dishonorable act, etc., is lawful, and no one is obliged to restore it." And again (tr. 5, pr. 5, No 53): "It is possible to have property obtained for murder, unjust sentence, heinous crimes, etc., because the possession of it is lawful and because you acquire the right of ownership and possession of the property acquired in this way."

"Oh, my father, I have not heard anything of such a way of acquisition, and I doubt whether justice will legitimize it, and regard murder, miscarriage of justice, and adultery as the basis of the right to property.

"I do not know," said the priest, "what the books of jurisprudence say about it, but I know very well that our books, which are true guides to conscience, speak about it as I do. This is "when the money was received from those who do not have the legal capacity to dispose of their property, such as minor children and monks." For this reason our great Molina makes an exception for them (vol. 1 de Just., tr. 2, ot. 94): Nisi mulier accepisset ab eo, qui alienare non potest, ut a religiose et filiofamilias; Then they need to return their money. Escobar cites this passage (tr. 1, pr. 8, No 59) and confirms the same (tr. 3, pr. 1, No 23).

"Your Reverence," I said to him, "I see that the monks have been treated better than the rest.

"Not at all," said the priest, "has not the same been done for all minors in general, to which monks belong all their lives?" It is fair to exclude them. But there is no obligation to all others to return what has been received from them for a bad deed. And Lessius proves this in detail (Book 2 De just., ch. 14, ot. 8, Ms 52). "Because," he says, "a bad deed can be valued in money, if we take into account the benefit received by him who commissions it to be done, and the labor taken for himself by him who performs it; And therefore there is no obligation to repay what has been received for such an act, of whatever kind it may be: murder, unlawful sentence, filthy deed (for these are the examples which he uses in all his research), unless the money is received from persons who have no right to use their property. You will perhaps say that he who receives money for a bad deed will decide, and that therefore he can neither take nor keep it. But I answer that after the deed is done, there is no longer any sin either to pay for it or to receive payment for it." Our great Filiucius goes even further into the details of this practice; Thus, he remarks "that, according to conscience, they are obliged to pay differently for deeds of this kind, depending on the difference in the positions of the people who perform them, and because some are worth more than others. He confirms this with solid arguments (tr. 31, ch. 9, M® 231): Ossikae fomicariae debetur pretium in comcientia, et multo majore ratione, quam publicae. Copia enim, quam occulta facit muliersui corporis, multo plus valet quam ea, quam publica facit meretrix; nee uUa est lex positiva, quae reddat earn incapacem pretii. Idem dicendum de pretio pramisso virgini, conjugatae, moniali, et cuicumque alii. Est enim omnium eadem ratio[155].

He then showed me things of the same kind, and so abominable from his authors, that I dare not mention them, and he himself would have felt abhorrent to them (for he is a good man), had it not been for the respect he had for his fathers, which makes him receive with reverence all that comes from them. I was silent all the time, not so much from the intention of encouraging him to pursue the subject, as from amazement that the books of the monks were full of ordinances so terrible, so unjust, and at the same time so strange. Consequently, he freely continued his speech, the conclusion of which was as follows.

"For this reason," he said, "our illustrious Molina (I hope you will be satisfied after this) solves the following question: 'If money has been received in the form of payment for a bad deed, are you obliged to return it? "It is necessary to distinguish," says this great man, "if the deed for which the payment has been paid has not been done, the money must be returned, but if it has been performed, it is not obligatory to return: Si non fecit hoc malumt tenetur restituere; secus, si fecit. Escobar cites this in tr. 3, pr. 2, No 138.

Here are some of our refund policies. You have learned quite a lot of them today, and I want to see now how you would use them. Answer me. "Is a judge who has received money from one of the parties in order to pronounce a sentence in his favor be obliged to return it?"

"You just told me you didn't, my father.

"I thought so," he said, "did I even say?" I told you that he is not obliged to return if he has allowed one who has no legal right to win in a lawsuit. But if there is such a right, do you really want to buy a favorable outcome of your case, when it follows the law? You are wrong. Do you not understand that the judge is obliged to give justice, and therefore cannot sell it, but he is not bound to injustice, and thus he can receive money for it. That is why all our main authors, such as Molina (pp. 94 and 99), Reginald (Book 10, NoNo 184, 185 and 187), Filiucius (Tr. 31, NoNo 220 and 228), Escobar (Tr. 3, Pr. 1, NoNo 21 and 23). Lessius (Book 2, Chapter 14, Rec. 8, No 55) teaches unanimously, "that the judge is certainly obliged to return what he has received for the justice he has done, unless it was given to him out of generosity, but that he is never obliged to return what he has received from the person in whose favor he has pronounced an unjust sentence."

I was utterly stunned by this strange decision, and while I was pondering its disastrous consequences, the priest prepared another question for me, and said:

"Answer with more caution this time. I ask you now: "Is a man who practises divination obliged to return the money earned by this trade?"

"It is as you please, your reverence," I said to him.