I. Non-being is not being. But in this case, being in relation to non-being is what it is not, being, i.e. it is non-being. Consequently, non-being is not non-being. Hence, from the fact that non-being is not being, it follows that non-being is not non-being. Let us assume, however, that non-being is not non-being. But that which is not non-being is being. Consequently, non-being is being. Thus, from the fact that non-being is not being, it follows that non-being is being. Thus, being is, exists precisely because it does not exist, that it does not exist.

II. Being is not non-being. But non-being is also a kind of being. Consequently, being is not being, i.e., being is not itself. Hence, from the fact that being is not non-being, it follows that being is not being. Let us assume, however, that being is not being. But that which is not being is non-being. Consequently, being is non-being. Thus, from the fact that being is not non-being, it follows that being is non-being. Thus, non-being exists, exists precisely because it does not exist, that it does not exist.

III. Being is being. But being as a predicate is not here being as subject, for otherwise this assertion itself would be meaningless. And that which is not being is non-being. Consequently, if the assertion that being is being has any meaning at all, it is only because being is not being.

IV. Non-being is non-being. But non-being as a predicate is not non-being as a subject, for otherwise this assertion itself would be meaningless. And that which is not non-being is being. Consequently, if the assertion that non-being is non-being has any meaning at all, it is only because non-being is not non-being.

These four arguments could, of course, be expressed in another way. But their content will always be reduced to one thing: being and non-being are and are not one and the same; and these categories are mutually conditioned and justified.

b) Let us note only one circumstance that is sometimes expressed by representatives of formal logic. It is said that "being" and "non-being" are here taken in different senses, and that therefore the whole argument is based on a misunderstanding. This, however, is absolutely not true.

Let us say that being is not non-being, and that non-being is also a being, and that therefore being is not being, let the predicate of the first proposition, 'non-being', be a quality or meaning, and when we call it, in the second proposition, being, then 'being' is not a quality, but the very fact of that quality. It will then follow that in the first statement "non-being", having been named, will not be a fact at all, i.e., the very assertion that being is not non-being will not speak of any predicate, i.e., of any non-being, i.e., it will not assert anything at all about being, and will not be an assertion at all. Consequently, it is in no case possible to distinguish between "fact" and "quality of fact".

The above-mentioned formal-logical criticism proceeds from the confusion of being as such with definite being, i.e., from the confusion of being with the content of being. When we say that white is not non-white, we really cannot say that non-white is also white, and that therefore white is not white. However, this happens only because in white and non-white it is possible to distinguish the very fact of color and the quality, or meaning, of color, i.e., the existence of color and its quality, definiteness. But when we speak of being or non-being simply, it is no longer possible to distinguish between a fact of being and a quality or meaning of being. In being as such (and also in its definition) there are as yet no qualities or contents; Being simply is and nothing else, and non-being is simply nothing else. Consequently, it is impossible to imagine that this being or non-being was used here in any different senses. There are no different meanings at all. If this is firmly assimilated, then the inadmissibility of this formal-logical objection will become quite obvious.

4. From the self-identity and self-substantiation of the categories of being and non-being, let us proceed to the fixation of the results of this identity for themselves separately. Since we are not now standing on the ground of pure and undivided becoming, but are only looking for different forms of interconnection between being and non-being, we can only resort to various combinations of the two. And there is something new here.

In fact, then it turns out that in non-being its fact is one thing, and its meaning is something else, or in being its fact is one thing, and its meaning is something else. It turns out that non-being as a fact has the meaning of being, and being has the meaning of non-being. What kind of being is it if it is non-being in its meaning, and what kind of non-being is it if it is being in its fundamental and decisive quality? When we say in this argument that "non-being is also being," it is evident that we must not think that "being" is here used in any other sense than "being" in the term "non-being." If we say that 'non-being' (predicate) is 'being' here only in its fact (just as absolutely everything that exists is this being), i.e., in an abstract sense, but not in its concrete meaning and content (just as 'white', being being in general, in particular, is not being in general at all, but only being externally determined, with a definite quality), then this separation of the general and the particular, abstract and concrete, or fact and meaning, form and content, is quite absurd in relation to being and also in relation to non-being. It turns out that non-being is general, and being is particular in relation to it; or abstractly we have non-being, and its concrete manifestation is being; or the fact of being, it turns out, contains such a meaning that it is not being at all, but quite the opposite, non-being; etc.

Let us imagine that there is such a thing, the meaning of which is a "samovar". What is this thing? Obviously, this thing is the samovar itself. Let me hold an object in my hand and answer the question: "What kind of object is this?" - "This is a ruble credit card." Obviously, under such conditions, what I hold in my hand is the most ruble credit card. How can not being remain being only as long as I hold it in my hand and do not show it to anyone, and when I was asked: "What is this?", it turned out that this is no longer being, but just the opposite, non-being?

Thus the very objection that non-being is being only in general fact, abstractly, and concretely, in content, it is non-being, proves that the objector himself identifies being and non-being, and himself understands both these categories in one and the same sense.

You can also say this. Let the term "being" be used in the statement "non-being is being" in two different senses. Let one moment of "non-being" be completely identical with being, and another be different from it. The question arises: what is the relation of these two moments in "non-existence"? They are also either identical or different. If they are identical, then all "non-being" is identical with "being". If they are different, then let us single out in them those sub-moments that coincide and which do not coincide. Accordingly, the same question arises about non-coincidences as with regard to the two main ones into which we have divided "non-existence". And again: either the general identity of being and non-being will triumph, or we will have to investigate further sub-moments. Consequently, either "being" and "non-being" are identical from the very beginning, or we divide these categories into an infinite number of discrete particles about which there can be no definite judgment.

Thus, in the mutual identification of the pure categories of being and non-being, the term "being" is used in absolutely the same sense of the word; and 'being' has the same semantic content both when it is used as such and when it enters as a composite element into 'non-being'.