The above-mentioned formal-logical criticism proceeds from the confusion of being as such with definite being, i.e., from the confusion of being with the content of being. When we say that white is not non-white, we really cannot say that non-white is also white, and that therefore white is not white. However, this happens only because in white and non-white it is possible to distinguish the very fact of color and the quality, or meaning, of color, i.e., the existence of color and its quality, definiteness. But when we speak of being or non-being simply, it is no longer possible to distinguish between a fact of being and a quality or meaning of being. In being as such (and also in its definition) there are as yet no qualities or contents; Being simply is and nothing else, and non-being is simply nothing else. Consequently, it is impossible to imagine that this being or non-being was used here in any different senses. There are no different meanings at all. If this is firmly assimilated, then the inadmissibility of this formal-logical objection will become quite obvious.

4. From the self-identity and self-substantiation of the categories of being and non-being, let us proceed to the fixation of the results of this identity for themselves separately. Since we are not now standing on the ground of pure and undivided becoming, but are only looking for different forms of interconnection between being and non-being, we can only resort to various combinations of the two. And there is something new here.

In fact, then it turns out that in non-being its fact is one thing, and its meaning is something else, or in being its fact is one thing, and its meaning is something else. It turns out that non-being as a fact has the meaning of being, and being has the meaning of non-being. What kind of being is it if it is non-being in its meaning, and what kind of non-being is it if it is being in its fundamental and decisive quality? When we say in this argument that "non-being is also being," it is evident that we must not think that "being" is here used in any other sense than "being" in the term "non-being." If we say that 'non-being' (predicate) is 'being' here only in its fact (just as absolutely everything that exists is this being), i.e., in an abstract sense, but not in its concrete meaning and content (just as 'white', being being in general, in particular, is not being in general at all, but only being externally determined, with a definite quality), then this separation of the general and the particular, abstract and concrete, or fact and meaning, form and content, is quite absurd in relation to being and also in relation to non-being. It turns out that non-being is general, and being is particular in relation to it; or abstractly we have non-being, and its concrete manifestation is being; or the fact of being, it turns out, contains such a meaning that it is not being at all, but quite the opposite, non-being; etc.

Let us imagine that there is such a thing, the meaning of which is a "samovar". What is this thing? Obviously, this thing is the samovar itself. Let me hold an object in my hand and answer the question: "What kind of object is this?" - "This is a ruble credit card." Obviously, under such conditions, what I hold in my hand is the most ruble credit card. How can not being remain being only as long as I hold it in my hand and do not show it to anyone, and when I was asked: "What is this?", it turned out that this is no longer being, but just the opposite, non-being?

Thus the very objection that non-being is being only in general fact, abstractly, and concretely, in content, it is non-being, proves that the objector himself identifies being and non-being, and himself understands both these categories in one and the same sense.

You can also say this. Let the term "being" be used in the statement "non-being is being" in two different senses. Let one moment of "non-being" be completely identical with being, and another be different from it. The question arises: what is the relation of these two moments in "non-existence"? They are also either identical or different. If they are identical, then all "non-being" is identical with "being". If they are different, then let us single out in them those sub-moments that coincide and which do not coincide. Accordingly, the same question arises about non-coincidences as with regard to the two main ones into which we have divided "non-existence". And again: either the general identity of being and non-being will triumph, or we will have to investigate further sub-moments. Consequently, either "being" and "non-being" are identical from the very beginning, or we divide these categories into an infinite number of discrete particles about which there can be no definite judgment.

Thus, in the mutual identification of the pure categories of being and non-being, the term "being" is used in absolutely the same sense of the word; and 'being' has the same semantic content both when it is used as such and when it enters as a composite element into 'non-being'.

(a) So, assuming that our becoming can be considered in more detail—and the details here are very important—let us ask what details could be given here? We have nothing but being and non-being, and their final synthesis—becoming—beyond which we have not yet progressed. As stated above, the new could be achieved here only with the involvement of the same categories of being and non-being and with a different combination of them with the resulting category of becoming. Becoming itself can be considered as being, and becoming itself can be considered as non-being. Here we will not go anywhere beyond becoming, but nevertheless something new will undoubtedly come out.

b) Let us consider becoming as being. Being for us is for the time being only pure positing, without the slightest quality. Hence, the element of becoming, i.e., of constant arising and annihilation, must appear to us as an act or acts of pure qualityless positing. Since becoming has no beginning and no end, the acts of positing received here will also have no beginning and no end, and they will always arise and be annihilated. In other words, we get a dissected becoming, in which, however, there will be absolutely no quality, but only acts of positing.

Можно сказать еще и так. Бытие полагает себя. Раз оно полагает себя, оно полагает его где–то, в какой–то среде, в каком–то «месте», — говоря вообще, в небытии. Но пусть в этом небытии для него важно только, «куда ступить», а не все прочее (напр., неважна его непрерывность, его, так сказать, расползаемость и т. д.). Это будет значить, что бытие полагает себя в своем ограничении со стороны небытия. Каждый акт его полагания будет не только самим собою, но, будучи иным себе, вместе с собственным полага–нием будет полагать и иное себе, — пусть не фактически, но во всяком случае в виде требования. Короче говоря, бытие тут полагает себя не просто как себя, но себя как совпадение бытия с небытием, себя в своем совпадении со своим инобытием. Тогда получается, что бытие, противореча самому себе, полагает свои все новые и новые акты. И все становление распадется на бесконечный ряд абсолютно бескачественных актов полагания, в которых каждый акт будет в то же время и актом полагания другого акта, если не фактического полагания, то требуемого и принципиального.

Это есть число.

c) С другой стороны, становление может быть рассмотрено и в свете небытия. Чистое небытие было у нас просто отрицанием бытия и больше ничего. Ему нельзя было приписать ровно никакого качества, поскольку всякое качество есть уже некоторое бытие. Но ведь в становлении до некоторой степени зарождается качественность. Правда, эта качественность далека от какой бы то ни было определенности; она основана только на участии здесь чистого и качественного бытия и больше ничего. Но все же здесь некое зарождение качественности. Что же получится, если мы эту бескачественную качественность будем строить по типу небытия? Когда мы рассмотрели ее с точки зрения бытия, т. е. с точки зрения актов чистого желания, мы получили, на почве становления, разные комбинации актов полагания, т, е. числа. Когда же рассматриваем бескачественную качественность становления с точки зрения небытия, мы подчеркиваем в ней именно отсутствие раздельных актов полагания и выдвигаем в ней самое небытие. Но ясно, что это небытие уже не будет здесь просто небытием. Это небытие тоже должно будет стать такой бескачественной качественностью, не прекращая быть небытием и не переходя в настоящее качество. Это уже не просто небытие, но инобытие, т. е. такое небытие, в котором подчеркивается качественность, но не полная и настоящая качественность, а только та, которая идет не дальше своего безграничного совпадения с бытием, с актами чистого полагания, т. е. не дальше становления.

d) Наконец, в становлении остается не рассмотренной нами и еще одна сторона. Мы можем говорить о совпадении бытия и небытия не только в бытии или в небытии, но η бытии и небытии сразу. Это еще не будет тем безразличным совпадением бытия и небытия, когда они сплошно переходят одно в другое и образуют тем самым становление, но таким совпадением, которое будет продолжать раздельно фиксировать то и другое. Совпадение бытия и небытия будет рассматриваться не в применении к сфере бытия и не в применении к сфере небытия, но в применении к их совокупному обстоянию, так, чтобы самые эти сферы применения не сливались бы безразлично, как в становлении. Тогда мы получаем категорию границы.

Это не есть граница в полном смысле слова, так как в своей завершенности она вообще выходит за пределы простой категории становления (и, как мы увидим ниже, конструируется только при помощи «наличного бытия»). Однако зарождается граница между бытием и небытием, несомненно, уже на стадии становления.