At the heart of Christian religiosity and culture lies the same idea of the absolute, which is expressed in a limited way by both theism and pantheism. However, the absolute is understood not as wholly incomprehensible (in contrast to theism) and not as the undifferentiated potentiality of the all-incumbent (in contrast to iantheism). For the Christian consciousness, the absolute is not unity, and the recognition of Christianity as a monotheistic religion is no less arbitrary and erroneous than the recognition of it as dualism, tritheism, and polytheism. Christian dogmatics recognizes the absolute not as three gods or essences, and not as unity, but as a trinity. The triune is the absolute, and the absolute can only be triedii. The idea of triunity elevates the absolute above the difference between potentiality and actuality, giving the principle of substantiation not only of unity, but also of multiplicity, the principle of all-unity.

The differences between Christianity and pantheism are not exhausted by this. The separation of the multitude from unity and concrete reality is an indisputable fact; And it does not allow us to identify empiricism and the absolute with pantheism. Here, Christianity, already together with theism, affirms the initial aporia of all religiosity—the opposition of the relative to the absolute. However, the aporia is overcome; and it is overcome by the fact that the relative is recognized as both existing and non-existent, and different from the absolute and one with it. This is the special, Christian understanding of the absolute, which transcends the relative human idea of absoluteness, an understanding that finds expression in the idea of creation out of nothing. The absolute is higher than our conception of it, above the distinction between itself and the other, though not in the sense that it excludes the other, but in the sense that, exceeding it, it contains it in itself. This is possible because the absolute creates (all-temporally and super-temporally – not: once created) the other out of nothing. Consequently, the other (created, relative) does not exist in itself and in itself. In the other there is no intrinsic existence (which brings Christianity somewhat closer to pantheism) and everything real is Divine (theophany). But in the other the absolute is objectified (the other accepts the absolute), and ideally and ultimately must be objectified in it (be wholly acceptable to it). Therefore, in the process of theophany (the objectification of God – the creation of God) the other acquires existence, becomes the "second subject" of the Divine, but only in the process. This brings Christianity closer to theism. The world is alien to the absolute, but it does not limit its absoluteness, for the essence of the world in itself and in itself is complete nothing, although in its acceptance of the absolute there is something different from it.

From these fundamentals follow all the other "dogmas" of Christianity. The idea of triunity requires its revelation in the doctrine of the full validity in it of both the triple and the unity, theologically speaking, it requires the teaching of the consubstantiality of the three hypostases and their equality. The idea of the other (the world, man) as an expression of absolute being necessarily leads to the doctrine of the perfect, transfigured state of the other, i.e., of the compensation of its changeability. And all this can be achieved only through the real absolutization or deification (theosis) of the world and the relativization (creation, incarnation) of the absolute. Creation is necessarily incarnation, because man is understood by Christianity as the most perfect creation, containing the whole world, like Adam Kadmon.

All of the above makes it clear why we should consider Christianity in relation to theism and pantheism as the highest form of religiosity, containing them in itself. Both theism and pantheism are the lowest forms of religiosity, its limited moments, chronologically preceding Christianity and coexisting with it. Christianity is revealed in them as well, only not completely, in a limited way; and, on the other hand, it easily degenerates in them, which is why in historical Christianity one must always reckon with the possibility of relapses of theism and pantheism. Since it is historically limited, it is inevitably colored either theistically or pantheistically. And I think it should now be quite clear to the attentive reader why the ancient religions of the Mediterranean belong to the "East" and at the same time can be regarded as the "cradle" of Christianity. Christianity did not emerge from them by way of addition, not from them, but from a potential unrevealed by them, but, as a potentiality, it was and is in them before and outside of its actualization, which contains them in itself. For the same reason and in the same sense, Christianity must outwardly "incorporate" the achievements of Eastern religious thought, or, more precisely, find these achievements in itself. I do not claim that such "finding" or self-revelation will be realized empirically. In any case, religious development is also the development of culture in general.

What are the principles of Christian culture? I speak of Christian culture, distinguishing it as a certain abstraction from its individualizations in the cultures of the West and Russia, and further individualizations in the cultures of the Middle Ages, Romance, Germanic and Slavic, French and Spanish, English and German, etc. It is clear that such individualizations are necessary and real, justified by the very idea of all-unity, and that our characterization is necessarily abstracted: the general is real only in the unity of the individual-concrete. It is also clear that there is no reason to assume that the individualizations of Christian culture have been exhausted. On the contrary, new individualizations are very likely, the carriers of which will be new, not yet existing state and ethnographic units. Perhaps the European West and Russia have already expressed themselves, their individuality (I doubt the latter); And yet, Christian culture is as much about the past and the present as it is about the future, which is not going to be abolished, but to fill in the present and the past. Without knowing the highest form of religiosity – and we really do not know such a form outside of Christianity – it is impossible to know and imagine the highest form of culture. After all, we must stand on the ground of reality, and not soar in the empyrean of our dreams and desires. If the highest form of religiosity and culture "will be", it is already potentially present in Christianity, since Christianity is universal; universal not in the sense of an abstract general concept, but in the sense of concrete all-unity. In contrast to theism, which is always concretely and limitedly historical, and in contrast to pantheism, which denies history, Christianity is all-historical or supra-historical, inconceivable and unreal outside of its historical manifestations, but not wholly connected with any of them.

The foundation of Christian culture is the recognition of everything that is real in reality as its absolutely, valuable and imperishable – this is the meaning of the dogma of the Incarnation. Christian culture affirms the absolute value of the individual, of every person – the individual, the people, humanity, and all its manifestations – morality, law, science, art. But the value of reality is recognized as absolute only to the extent of its validity, insofar as it exists, and is not a limitation and insufficiency. Such recognition, therefore, implies the comprehension of the absolute as an ideal task, and consequently the striving for the absolute, not in its incomprehensibility (or not only in its incomprehensibility), which pantheism desires, but in its actualization and realization in the concrete, in its full reality in the relative and for the relative. Thus, Christian culture is by no means a negation of reality, just as pantheistic "culture" does not contain a fundamental renunciation or withdrawal from the world. And here, more than anywhere else, it is necessary to distinguish the essence of Christianity from its historically limited discoveries, conditioned by the unidentified principle. The striving for the ideal is inevitably expressed in a certain construction of an ideal state, a "new world," a "new society," and a "kingdom of heaven." But, according to the basic idea of Christianity, this ideal state should in no way be understood as excluding what is and what was, concrete reality. It includes and contains in itself the entire reality of the present and the past, contains it entirely, without belittling. It is not otherworldly, but comprehensive; The movement towards it is not a departure from existence and a metaphysical leap into another world, not a salto mortale from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, but the transfiguration and salvation of all that exists, even that which has apparently perished empirically. The task of culture is to triumph over oblivion and time, over the past and the future, over death. But for victory it is necessary to realize all the concrete, empirical, future, the fullness of earthly reality. Such is the meaning of the Christian dogma of the resurrection, the resurrection of the whole: not only of the soul, but also of the body. And this meaning of it, usually obscured by mythology, does not in the least contradict the strictest ΜΙ of the most demanding scientific thought. On the contrary, he crowns her achievements.

This reveals the relationship of Christian culture to theistic culture. The first, like the second, affirms the earthly order, but, unlike the second, recognizes it as unnecessary and meaningless in its relativity and limitation, justifying all earthly labor by substantiating not only its relative, but also its absolute significance, its immortality, and not only as a whole, but also in each moment. Such "absolutization" does not at all imply a search for unprecedented, unnatural, or supernatural forms. All-unity becomes relative not by leaving the concreteness of the relative, but by revealing all concreteness, by means of creative development. In this sense, the different attitudes of Christianity and theism to the idea of progress are very characteristic. For the shadow, progress is the future state that will replace the present, and the present will perish forever and irretrievably, just as the past perished forever. For theism (positivism), the present is only a step and a means to a better future, and in itself has no value. The value of the present, and, therefore, its science, art, and morality are relative. For Christianity, every moment has its imperishable and necessary value in impenetrability; and therefore the best, perfect being cannot be limited only to the future, but must contain everything in itself, be all-temporal. There is no progress, as a period limited in time, for Christianity. It does not indulge in guessing whether life will be better or worse than it is now, but strives to make everything better, and above all the present. Strange as it may sound, Christian culture is the most realistic, although without theistic relativism, and at the same time symbolic, in each of its manifestations putting forward the relevance of cm to its other manifestations and the absolute.

IV.

But such is only our ideal culture, taken in its most abstract concept. We must make very significant reservations to our propositions when we turn to historical reality. To turn to it means to define the Russian idea and Russian culture and its opposition to the Western one. From the construction of the abstract we must pass to the real polyunity and its concrete (relatively, of course, concrete) discoveries or individualizations of it. In spite of our vague national self-consciousness and even national conceit, we Russians have hitherto been disinclined to self-determination, naively identifying our national ideal with Europeanization, or, no less naively, denying any value of European. Many of us, even in the revolution we are experiencing now, see either only a stage of our Europeanization, continuing the work of Peter, or a manifestation of uncultured rebelliousness, experienced by Europe long ago. This, by the way, is how a well-known professor described what is happening now, who has now emigrated to the West, where he belongs. All those who try to comprehend the revolution positively comprehend it from the point of view of Western ideals, completely unable to distinguish between the ideology of the leaders and the elements. No less one-sided is Dostoevsky's idea of the universalism of the Russian consciousness, for which the national supposedly coincides with the universal. This is true only to a certain extent and in a certain sense. Which one will become clear later.

Let us again look for guiding points of view in the religiosity of the West, and not in vague "impressions," but in objective dogmas.

The essence of Christian teaching – hardly anyone will argue with this – is connected with one or another formulation of the idea of the Trinity, i.e. the teaching of the Trinity. In the doctrine of the Trinity, however, we first of all encounter the Western "dogma" of the procession of the Holy Spirit "and from the Son" (the Filioque) approved by the local councils of the West (there could not be ecumenical "churches" after the division of the "churches"). I can imagine with pleasure and very clearly the smile on the face of even a theologically educated (and there are not many of them) reader of this essay. To this day we are convinced that it is the Filioque that is the least important disagreement between the Eastern and Western churches. It is not in it, as it is generally believed, that is the obstacle (but in the papal pretensions): it is not characteristic, not symptomatic. And is it possible, being of sound mind and firm memory, to attach such importance to theological subtleties? And then there are the Catholic theologians who assert (I want to think that optima fide) that "and from the Son" is quite equivalent to what is found in the most authoritative Eastern Fathers and teachers of the Church "through the Son." Apparently, there is nothing to argue about. Is religion in theological subtleties? It is in morality, in what is important for life, and not in speculations about "trifles". This is the general opinion. But the 'common' and the widespread are always suspicious, for unreasonable and uneducated people always constitute the majority. And I accuse the defenders of the above understanding of the matter of rather grave sins. They take absolute truth lightly, believing that it can be ineffective and incomplete, and that understanding is indifferent to life. Why, then, do they, from their own point of view, inconsistently, accept the other dogmas of Christianity? If it is a matter of morality, then does it not matter whether to believe in the trinity of God, in many gods, or not to believe in any god? At worst, then, perhaps, it still makes some sense to believe in God (for the religious sanction of morality), but there is no need to believe in the incarnation of the Godhead, which is absurd for reason, in the sacraments, cult, etc. — One must be consistent, and it is necessary, when speaking of religion, to understand that in it activity is inseparable from knowledge, that in it everything is vital to the last iota, and to every dogmatic error. however insignificant it may seem, moral sin inevitably corresponds.

Here I will not go into the details of dogmatics, referring the curious to my Noctes Petropolitanae and my forthcoming works, if they appear in print. But it is still impossible to completely bypass the issue. The Catholic teaching on the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, i.e., according to the interpretation of Catholic councils and theologians, "of that in which the Father and the Son are one," necessarily presupposes a certain special unity of the Father and the Son. This unity cannot be essential, for essence is recognized as one for all three hypostases, i.e., to the same extent as it belongs to the Spirit to the Father and the Son, according to which it is not said: "proceeding from the Father, and the Son, and Himself." The procession does not refer to the essence, but to the hypostatic being. The Spirit proceeds hypostatically, not essentially; in the procession – its hypostatic distinction. But if the unity of the Father and the Son in the manifestation of the Spirit is not essential, it is either a hypostatic unity, or a unity of some special kind, which adds to the hypostases of the Father and the Son something that is not peculiar to the hypostasis of the Spirit, and at the same time common to the Father and the Son, not covered by the hypostatic quality of each of them. However, neither one nor the other is possible. Dogma affirms the equality of hypostases, denying any subordination of one of them to others in divinity, honor, and glory; Dogma knows the differences between them only in their birth and in their origin. If the Father and the Son, in addition to what is common to all hypostases, have something else in common, "super-hypostasis," the Spirit is inferior to the Father and the Son. If "blasphemy against the Holy Spirit" is pronounced and he is recognized as a hypostasis of the second order, even at the cost of contradiction with other provisions of the confessed Creed, he cannot realize the fullness of divinity and his activity. And his activity, according to the most authoritative theological interpretations, consists (insofar as we are talking about the world and people) in the accomplishment of the work of Christ, in the complete and final deification (absolutization) of the world. Not only is the Spirit "sent" by Christ, but (even earlier) descends upon Him in baptism, i.e., it realizes the fullness of the deification of Jesus' human nature, and makes the human activity of Jesus fully divine. Consequently, the doctrine of the Filioque contains, along with the diminution of the Spirit, the diminution of Christ in his humanity. The conclusions from this are obvious.

If the Spirit and Christ in His empirical activity on earth are not fully divine, empirical being cannot be completely deified, absolute. Then the fullness of Divinity is inaccessible to empirical existence, i.e., the very goodness of God is not absolute. Never, under any circumstances, can the absolute be perceived, i.e., in particular, and known by man: not only the other essence of the Godhead remains inaccessible to man, but also the "super-hypostasis" of the Father and the Son. Human knowledge can be accomplished somewhat, but only a few: empiricism, as in theism, although, to a lesser extent, is delineated by interchangeable facets, and the absolute is transcendental to it. And, in comprehending human knowledge, we will have to come to its limits, to inexplicable, and therefore not cognizable, but only postulated forms of contemplation and categories of thought. We find such an understanding both in Catholic theology and in Western philosophy, with a peculiar understanding of epistemology as the science of the limits of human knowledge. The Lutheran Kant is as characteristic of Western thought as the creators of the Filioque and the system of Catholic theology. If impassable boundaries are set for human knowledge, it is natural to limit oneself to the field of rational cognition. When such self-limitation has not yet been theorized, being a factor rather than an understanding of a fact, it becomes an absolutization of reason, which is revived even in the theoretical comprehension of its boundaries by virtue of an irreducible tendency towards the absolute. But the absolutization of reason is the absolutization of empiricism. Therefore, the main categories of Western thought are rationalism, empiricism, relativism, the latter as a theoretical expression of the original "epistemological" idea.

Others are connected with the basic dogmatic error we have indicated, which, it is true, is not fully recognized in its nature and consequences, although it is true that it is weakened by the affirmations that deny it, the confession of the Creed. Arianism should be characteristic of Western thought and culture (in a pure and weakened form, like Adoptianism). It arose in the East on the basis of the need for the doctrine of God-manhood to preserve the fullness of humanity. But in the East it was overcome by theological thought, and only in the West did it manifest itself in the relatively long statehood of the Germans: in the Arian kingdoms and, more subtly and covertly, in the Western Empire and even in the development of the papal Church. Arianism asserts that the Son is the same person as all people, a creature "adopted" by God. This, at first glance, justifies the fullness of deification for all creation; However, only at first glance. With complete assimilation to Christ, man must nevertheless remain in separation from the transcendent Divinity, for Christ Himself, in His humanity, is separated from it. The Divinity of all created and human beings is transcendent. Obviously, we have before us only a variation on the theme of the Filioque. It is only in Arianism that it is already quite clear that the gulf between the absolute and the relative is unfillable. As in theism, the goal of mankind can only be an earthly order, and knowledge must be human-rational. In the field of theology, under these conditions, sooner or later, the denial of the dogma of the Trinity is inevitable. And it is very significant that the arena of activity of the first modalists in the ancient church was precisely Rome, and that in the West the teaching of the anti-Trinitarians was clearly manifested. The religiosity of the Filioque reveals its kinship with lower forms of theistic religiosity, making up for the insufficiency of theism by equally one-sided deviations into pantheism. From time immemorial, it has gravitated towards pre-Christian religiosity, in particular Judaism, the Old Testament and the biblical language, which can be traced back to the style of the social-democratic press. And a careful analysis makes clear the connection between the religiosity of the Filioque and Germanic paganism, with its naturalistic and pantheistic tendencies.