But such a category, if only because it is finite, has another finite category against it, has its opposite, which we recognize as such. The dialectical process proper consists in the fact that these opposites do not stand indifferently to one another; they pass into one another, so that only the third category, as their unity, in which the first two do not exist in their immediate nature, but are removed and reconciled, has truth and supreme dignity in the destinies of the absolute idea. This law of position, negation, and negation of the negation is an immutable law of the dialectical process by which the absolute lives. Spinoza taught that only the infinite follows or proceeds from the infinite in infinite forms. According to Hegel, on the contrary, the infinite posits only the finite, and for this reason alone at the same inseparable moment it removes or denies its own position. This explains too sufficiently the changeability and fluidity of the things and phenomena of this finite world; but also from this we see that the absolute is nothing but the form or law which governs and governs this fluidity and changeability. We cannot conceive of this absolute under the mystical image of the abyss from which the phenomena of the world arise and to which they return; nor can we conceive of it under the logical image of a bearer of phenomena, which would possess a certain independence or some special content that does not enter into the stream of phenomena. The life of the absolute is simpler, more transparent than it seemed to previous philosophers. The Absolute is wholly directed to the world of phenomena: it has a formal existence, as a logical concept, as a logical regularity, as a rhythmic movement of happening, changing, and disappearing phenomena. Nevertheless, in truth there exists only the idea as a dialectical process of the position and removal of all the finite determinations of thought and being. That which is substantial in things is not the calm image of things, but this eternal change of things, this need, origin, change, and disappearance. A thing in its immediacy is not something essential; it has true existence in so far as its immediacy is removed, in so far as it enters into the restless process of the idea as its moment, as one of its non-independent and fluid determinations. If, according to Leibniz, individuality is the essential form of things, then for Hegel the general is that which is the essence of things proper, the individual is something not rational in things, not conceivable, existing only for the phenomenal spirit. Here we already see how heavy this idea must fall on phenomenal reality. In itself, in its inner life, the idea is so poor that without the constant offerings and sacrifices of the phenomenal world, it would not possess an inner richness. Spinoza's substance does not protrude into the realm of the finite at all. In Hegel's philosophy, the idea always poses the finite, not in order that it wishes him life and good, but in order to make him a non-independent element of his inner dialectical process. This internal (immanent) dialectical process concentrates on itself all the interests, all the strivings of the idea, and no other life enters into its calculations. If, according to Plato, the Good gives existence to the world, in accordance with the idea, as a result of the richness and overflow of its inner content, then according to Hegel this event is given to the world not for the world, but for the idea; it does not arise from the fullness which lies in the infinite, but from the need which entails the infinite to posit finite determinations, in order to complete its own inner life by removing them.

In order to explain this weakness of the infinite idea, which cannot endow the beings of the finite world with an independent life, cannot allow them to live for themselves, to have and pursue their particular interests and goals, we must once again look at these remarkable propositions that the absolute, as the general essence of things, is a logical idea and that it is a dialectical process.

The expression logical idea denies the idea of an idea which, whether innate in the human spirit or contemplated by it in the divine mind, would have in itself a much more abundant content than can be known and obtained by the logical analysis of phenomena.

121

Although the absolute idea is not formed from the abstractions of experience, yet as a logical idea it is wholly and universally open to human consciousness, there are no points in it that are incomprehensible or inaccessible to our consciousness; and since our consciousness is turned to the world of phenomena, there is nothing in the absolute idea, which is entirely accessible to this consciousness, that does not appear. The essence does not contain such aspects that would always remain at its bottom and would not appear in the manifestation. Of course, for Plato, too, the idea is the general essence of phenomena, but at the same time it is something for itself, it contains many treasures that it does not show, does not exhibit in phenomena, therefore it relates to the phenomenon as a type, as an ideal. This last quality is not possessed by the idea in Hegel's philosophy. It is the general essence of phenomena, and nothing more. As a logical idea, it contains, in logical unity and logical generality, all that and only that which in the world of phenomena is scattered throughout space and time in the form of separate things and their determinations. Since, however, thought is the general essence of phenomena, this logical unity, this logical community of the idea, is that which is essential to things, or the determinations and qualities of things have true existence, not in their immediacy, but as logical moments of one general idea. And if it is logically impossible that the moment of the idea should exist independently and independently of the idea itself, that it should be something for itself and not for the idea, then the absolute idea cannot endow things with an independent or individual life with its particular strivings and aims. Things have a true ceiling being insofar as they enter the idea as its fluid moments.

If Hegel says that the general idea is concrete, then in truth this means that in the dialectical process of positing and removing finite determinations it is constantly replenishing itself: otherwise, as a Platonic idea, it would have possessed a developed being directly and at once, and the dialectical process would not have been necessary for it as its most essential mode of life. An absolute idea cannot be concrete immediately and initially because it is logical; it cannot bear its definitions in itself naturally and directly; As a thought, it has a content only worked out and obtained in the dialectical process. If we were allowed to think of the first, starting, or starting point of the dialectical process of an idea, we should not find in this point any concrete definition within the idea, we should perhaps find certain definitions, the most abstract, abstract, and containing nothing in themselves. In full accordance with this conclusion, we find that the first definition which an idea endows itself with when it enters into the dialectical process is pure being, i.e., that which is at the same time non-being or nothing. Pure being or nothingness is the first wealth that an idea can bring out of itself at the first moment of its inner self-development. In accordance with this quality of the idea, Hegel thoroughly teaches that the beginning of science, which is conscious of the inner life of the idea, must be the poorest and most meaningless. On the basis of these explanations, do we not have the right to say that the absolute idea is in its original form a general, logical, and abstract idea at that? The latter expression will not mean that the idea is abstracted from experience, but, on the contrary, that those mental determinations of the idea which contain the least elements taken from experience, or which are furthest removed from the rich content of phenomena, remain the essential and original wealth of ideas, which does not increase from definitions taken from experience. Hegel says that the true principle of science is given at the end, the true principle as a result, and thus gives reason to think that the later and most remote definitions of an idea are more in accord with its essence, more expressive of its real life than the initial definitions. These expressions, however, should not embarrass us. In the first place, they have their full application to the phenomenology of spirit: the beginning of science, in all fairness, is revealed only at the end of the phenomenal development of the spirit, the true principle of knowledge is given as a result of this development, or where the spirit once and for all overcomes its phenomenality and comes to the consciousness of the absolute idea, which is henceforth the inseparable principle of knowledge and being. We can no longer speak of another principle, which would be rediscovered only at the end of the dialectical process of the idea. The beginning, middle, and end of science must be the dialectical process of the idea, and nothing more, because science has no other content than knowledge of this process and its various stages. It is true that the subsequent stages in the development of an idea have a more abundant content than its initial definitions. Still, however rich all the further definitions of an idea may be, they are moments of its process, and not the process itself, and therefore do not have the significance of a beginning. Whether these definitions are poorer or richer, narrower or wider, more abstract or more concrete, they have no influence on the dialectical process of the idea, which gives birth to them and removes them with equal power. Thus, the sea, whether it gives rise to a slight swell or huge waves, remains one and the same force, before which both light swell and huge waves are equally independent.

From the foregoing, however, it is evident that this habit of the universal consciousness cannot find satisfaction in Hegel's system, for which the dialectical process of the idea is the only essentiality in all phenomena.

The Absolute is a logical, general, and abstract idea. Hegel recognises the truth of the latter definition when he teaches that the method of philosophy is the method of the thing itself, and thus the poor and abstract determinations with which logic begins its explanations are the initial and primary forces by which the absolute begins its world-creating and world-removing process. In all the phenomena of nature and spirit, however weighty they may be, we must find only the abstract categories of logic; the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit cannot give us in truth a single new category which logic does not contain as the science of the essence of Things, and which in some respect enriches the life of the absolute: nature and spirit are explainable phenomena, and not explanatory principles. Logic is the science of the absolute in itself, in its pure, non-phenomenal nature; it can be said that its content is a representation of God; as He is in His eternity, before the creation of nature and the finite spirit. But logic is at the same time the science of the idea in the abstract element of thought. Thus, when we study an idea in an abstract element of thought, or an abstract idea, we know the absolute in ourselves, we know God by His eternal essence, as He is before the creation of nature and the finite spirit. What do all these expressions say, if not that the absolute idea, in its genuine, primary, and non-derivative form, is an abstract idea? Concreteness does not belong to the idea in itself, but to those phenomenal stages of it which give dependent and derivative existence. And when we define the absolute idea by its various remote stages, we are no longer explaining the essence of the idea itself, which must be known to us, but we are explaining from the idea the essence of the phenomena which correspond to the stages under consideration. The transition from one of these points of view to another, the reconciliation of absolute truth with the truth of the general human sense, constitutes the intrinsic mystery of Hegelian dialectics, and makes its propositions, abstract in themselves, so full-bodied, profound, multi-embracing, and multi-explanatory.

The absolute idea has true life in the dialectical process of positing and denying one's own determinations. In order to explain the possibility of this process, Hegel ascribes to absolute thought. self-movement, self-development. Without any excitement to the mind, without any calculation of its future positions and states, the idea moves itself, the idea is in development. The true cause of this self-movement and self-development of the idea, however, lies, as stated above, in the fact that the idea can posit only finite determinations which do not correspond to its infinity, and which must therefore be removed in the dialectical process, because every thing in the world is set in motion if its position is inconsistent with its nature, or involves an internal contradiction. In order to be able to do so, a thing obviously needs neither free will nor calculating reason.

Logic communicates to us the knowledge of the absolute in itself, developing in propositions and negations a number of categories in which we think of finite phenomena. The infinite as such has no direct expression either in being or in cognition. We must say that this very dialectical process of positing and removing the finite is actually infinite. Thus, the Author of the world has no rest in his heart, because his creations are inconsistent with his creative nature; For the same reason, he does not give rest to his creatures, for whom the day of creation and the day of the last judgment coincide at the same moment, for whom the joy of existence is at the same time and inseparably the agony of death. Spinoza's substance directly and openly denies everything finite the gifts of life. Hegel's idea gives the finite such a life, which at the same inseparable moment is death. We do not decide which of them works better, the substance or the idea.

The creativity of the absolute idea is determined not by the expectation of beautiful creatures full of life and thought, but by necessity. At the lowest stage of development, the idea is in contradiction with its pure essence; she feels here, so to speak, pressure or discomfort. This cramped and uncomfortable position of the idea leads it to a higher stage of development. With each offensive movement, the idea creates the most beautiful and perfect images, not out of love for us, but out of indifference to its present insufficient position. She does good because she runs away from evil. The negative feeling of incompleteness, lack, and constraint is the immediate source of the creativity of the idea, and, of course, the world which is born of this negative feeling or state of the idea cannot have a positive basis for life: it is entirely something negative. For example, some atomists may argue that atoms do not strive directly and deliberately to create this organic product; Only their straitened position in the present, the incomplete correspondence of their present mode of existence with their own laws, is the direct cause of their movement and combination into higher products. In Hegel's idea, as in this atomism, progress enters into the process; The world remains in truth under the rule of a doer who has no welcoming or ideal attitude towards his work. What, however, does human consciousness gain by exchanging the mechanical process of atoms for the logical process of the idea? Here and there, self-consciousness and personal spirit are the products of a later and more remote development of the fundamental principle, which is neither self-consciousness nor personal spirit in itself. Here and there conscious thought is a phenomenon of a principle which in itself is not conscious thought. Here and there the flow of events is predetermined by natural necessity, and not by advanced thought. In Hegel, as in Spinoza, the blind mechanism is not overcome by the idea; On the contrary, the idea, whatever it may be in itself, reveals itself in the world as a mechanical agent, it does not illumine its future paths with the light of the preceding reason, it does not choose these paths out of love and free attraction to good, perfect, and rational creatures. If materialism developed historically out of Hegel's philosophy, then it is likely that in this case the historical phenomenon was at the same time logical.

In vain would we try, following Hegel, to enter at last into the spiritual world; We can only enter the world of thought. But whoever would like to find in this mitre of thought a respite from the anxieties of the sensual world, would soon come to disappointment: because this world is not a calm process, and its life is full of changes and anxieties. Philosophy seeks an unchangeable principle in order to remove the contradiction that lies in the concept of changeability inherent in the sensible world. Hegel also strives for the same goal; and he begins by pointing out the contradictions in the notion of happenability or change; And he is looking for a beginning in which these contradictions would be removed. However, this very principle is subject to eternal change in him. Thus, says one critic, instead of curing the ailment of the sensible world by means of the health of the supersensible world, which underlies it, Hegel deliberately imparts to the latter the morbid character of the former. If, at the same time, we remember that the dialectical process of the idea has neither substratum nor subject, whereas in the mechanical conception of the world the substratum and the subject serve as necessary presuppositions of the natural process, we shall hardly understand the necessity of emerging from the world of the sensible into the world of the absolute idea, and that the former will hardly appear to us in an image more favorable than the latter.

In the dialectical development of categories, Hegel gives no meaning either to the subject of judgment or to the substratum of determination. A thought, a thing, is contained only in an object that does not presuppose a ready-made and comparatively calm subject. This peculiarity must be borne in mind in order to enter into the spirit and meaning of Hegelian dialectics.

121