However, it is legitimate to begin such an investigation as ours with the question: is it possible at all, according to the teaching of St. Gregory of Nyssa, to know God? Is God accessible to our knowledge? Although St. Gregory's answer is many-sided, it can be said in general that he affirms, and with great force, precisely the unknowability of God. The eternity of God as an uncreated being and, therefore, not providing our thought with any support, makes Him inaccessible to rational cognition: "... thus he who deeply investigates that which is older than the ages, and ascends to the beginning of things, cannot stop his thought at anything, for the object sought always eludes him, and runs away, and does not indicate to the inquisitive mind any possible stop" [2]. In spite of this unknowability of the Divine, Gregory here, speaking of Him, uses the neuter gender: that which is older than the ages (το αιώνων πρεσβύτερον) - he again discerns in Him the essence, or nature, and considers it unknowable. Unknowability is a characteristic feature of the nature of the divine essence. "Such is this essence," he says, "that, although it transcends any principle, nevertheless it does not reveal to us the signs of its own nature, and it is recognizable only by its incomprehensibility" [3]. It is incomprehensible not only to men, but also to angels, although the latter statement is expressed with some caution: "Human nature has no powers at all for an accurate understanding of the essence of God, but perhaps it would not be enough to assert this in relation to the powers of man alone, and if someone were to say that the bodiless creature is also too weak to contain and comprehend the infinite nature, then he would not have been mistaken at all" [4]. So no attempt to raise one's mind or go beyond one's limits will help to know the divine nature, but it can be approached by simple and pure faith, as Abraham did. "That which he comprehended by advancing with his mind, whether it be power, beginninglessness, or infinity in relation to anything, or any such concept of those which are near the divine nature (τα περι την θειαν φύσιν), he turned into a means, he laid it as a foundation for ascent, and constantly relied on what he had already found, and extended beyond all that he knew by his own powers, for it was less than what was sought" [5] - and, "discarding in the conjectures (ύπολήψεσι) about God all conjectures (υπολοιων) about His nature, proceeding from His name, purifying his mind of such thoughts, accepting faith without admixture, purified from all opinion, he made a true sign testifying to the knowledge of God, the belief that God is better and higher than any sign that gives knowledge" [6]. Or again: "One can approach God only through faith, which unites the searching mind with incomprehensible nature" [7]. Faith is opposed by Gregory to gnosis [8], but faith in itself does not reveal to us the nature and essence of God, but only the power and greatness of what is seen around God [9]. To identify this or that concept, such as unbegottenness, with the essence of God would be idolatry [10]. The unknowability of the divine nature does not mean, however, that God is absolutely unknowable; it is only necessary to avoid extremes: not to assert His complete inaccessibility or, on the contrary, the possibility of a clear vision of Him with the mind. There is, however, knowledge through ignorance. "The Divinity," he says, "is by its nature inviolable, and incomprehensible, and surpasses all speculation, but the much-searching human understanding, conducting an investigation with those thoughts of which it is capable, lightly touches and touches the unapproachable and majestic nature; his sight is not sufficiently perceptive to see clearly the invisible, and at the same time it is not sufficiently detached from the possibility of approaching to be completely incapable of forming an idea of what is sought based on conjectures; however, by groping his conclusions, he has learned something about what he is looking for, and the impossibility of seeing it clearly gives rise to a certain clear idea that what is sought is above all knowledge" [11].

In his spiritual works, in his discourses on the Song of Songs, or in his Homilies on the Beatitudes, Gregory tells us of the experience of one who experienced the impossibility of knowing or contemplating the divine nature. This total impossibility gives rise to a "metaphysical" sorrow in us, a feeling of alienation from the Highest Good. "The more we believe that the Good by its nature is higher than our knowledge, the more we increase our sorrow, feeling that the Good from which we are separated is so great and of such high dignity that we are unable to contain the knowledge of Him" [12]. St. Gregory calls upon us to cease our investigations in view of their uselessness, although the very impossibility of attaining "nature above all blessings gives us a certain idea of the greatness of what we seek" [13]. Again, knowledge through ignorance is affirmed here. St. Gregory also contrasts contemplation and vision, denying the possibility of the latter: "How," he asks, "and by means of what thoughts can the contemplated but invisible Good reach our gaze?" [14].

Be that as it may, His nature is incomprehensible and inaccessible to our thoughts: "The divine nature," he says, "as it is in itself (αυτη καθ' αυητην), as it is in essence incomprehensible (καταληπτικης επινοίας), because it is inaccessible and unapproachable to reasonable thoughts (στοχαστικαις)... That is why the great Apostle calls God's ways inscrutable. With this word he shows that the path leading to the knowledge of the divine essence is impassable for thoughts" [15]. St. Gregory, however, adds one phrase which shows that, nevertheless, the unknowability of the divine nature does not mean to him that God is completely unknowable and inaccessible: "But, being such by His nature, the Eternal who is above all nature, is in another respect visible, this Invisible and Indescribable" [16]. Here, apparently, we are talking about the knowledge of God by a "purified" analogy with human nature [17], through ineffable intellectual enlightenment [18], about cognition in the mirror of the soul [19], through virtue [20], through divine energies, etc. - but at the same time the divine nature and essence remain what it is, i.e. unknowable, at least directly.

The assertion of the unknowability of the divine nature does not prevent St. Gregory from insisting on its simplicity. It can even be said that this statement is also one of the characteristic features of his teaching about God. He constantly speaks about this, defending the Orthodox teaching on the Holy Trinity: the consubstantiality of the Son in the polemics against Eunomius and the divinity of the Holy Spirit in the writings against the followers of Macedonius. However, it would be wrong to explain his insistence on the simplicity of the divine nature only by the necessity of polemics. For Gregory, this is a generally accepted teaching. "We believe," he says, "that even those who have a very crude and grounded mind will agree that the divine nature, blissful and surpassing all other nature, is simple. For how could anyone suppose that formless and ugly [nature], without quality and without quantity, could be multiform and complex" [21]. Thus, simplicity here is understood as the absence of type and complexity. However, this is not the reason for the disagreements between Gregory and Eunomius - the latter, according to Gregory himself, also recognized, albeit only formally, the simplicity of the Divine essence [22]. But in other places Gregory accuses Eunomius of the fact that the God he preaches is something multiple and complex, as if a kind of union of opposites [23]. However, the fundamental assertion of the simplicity of the divine nature raises many questions, since Gregory (following the theological tradition of the Church and, in particular, the teaching of his brother Basil) sees in God, or when he speaks of God, many differences. Differences, for example, between the Divine essence and the Trinitarian hypostases, between the Divine nature or essence and its energies or properties, between the Divine nature and what is seen around it, etc. What is the nature of these differences, what do they correspond to in God, how do they coexist with the simplicity of the Divine nature, and how does Gregory understand this simplicity?

It is not our intention to consider here the Trinitarian teaching of St. Gregory in its entirety. We will only say that he asserts with great clarity the truth of the hypostatic differences, and also distinguishes the hypostases from the divine essence; thus He Who is "Truly Being" (οντως οντος) is at once one and not one. Thus, we should "hold on to the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, in order to understand Him who truly is, who is one and not one." [24]. And he explains how this antinomic unity-non-unity should be understood: "In essence He is one, which is why the Lord commanded us to look at one name. But according to the attributes that serve to the knowledge of the hypostases (γνωριστικοις των ύπωοτάσεων ιδιώασιν), [one] name is divided by faith in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit, divided without separation and one without confusion" [25]. Further, Gregory emphasizes even more strongly the distinction between the Persons within the Holy Trinity and the unity of essence, and at the same time asserts that no name concerns nature and does not introduce division into it [26]. As for the Divine nature, it is above any name: "Only the uncreated nature, in which we believe in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit, is above any designation by name" [27]. "It is evident," he adds, "that the name of the Father does not express the essence, but denotes a relation to the Son. Thus, if it were possible for human nature to know the essence of God, then He Who wants all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, would not pass over in silence the knowledge of it. But He said nothing about the essence and thereby showed that it is impossible to know it" [28]. In these Trinitarian texts, the question of the simplicity of the Divine nature, although not directly touched upon, is undoubtedly presupposed, as in all the works of St. Gregory. Thus we are justified in concluding that for him the simplicity of the divine nature is compatible with the hypostatic distinctions that exist in God, though in an antinomic way, and that they do not introduce complexity into His nature.

The same problem will arise if we consider how Gregory speaks of the divine nature or essence in relation to what he designates by the word energy or other similar expressions. One may even wonder whether, for Gregory, the words nature or essence have a completely identical meaning when it comes to God. To the term nature (nature), which, as we have already noticed, is found more often in Gregory, he seems to give an ontological connotation, while essence is used by him rather in the sphere of knowledge. They are, however, interchangeable; we observe this when Gregory writes that the essence of the Father does not differ from the nature of the Only-begotten [29], or that beings for whom the concept (λόγος) of essence coincides [30] cannot possibly have different natures. For him, as for St. Basil the Great, the impossibility of intellectual cognition of the Divine nature is only a particular case of the general unknowability of the nature of things: "If you have not comprehended the nature of the ant, which is so small," he says to Eunomius, "then how can you boast that you have embraced the understanding of the Sustainer of all?" [31] There is, however, a huge and insurmountable difference between created and uncreated nature: "Huge and insurmountable is the boundary that separates, like a wall, the uncreated nature from the created essence. The latter is limited, the former is infinite; the created is contained in its own dimensions, and the measure of the uncreated is infinity. The created has extension in space and is closed everywhere by time and place, while the uncreated is free from the spatial concept, and if anyone wishes to comprehend it with the mind alone, it immediately runs away from such an effort" [32]. Unknown in His essence, therefore, because of His infinity, God becomes, thanks to His creative energy, knowable from His creatures, as St. Gregory says: "God, Whose being, as it is in essence, is inaccessible to any impulses or efforts of the mind, nevertheless for our sake is revealed in the knowledge that He exists, through the majesty and beauty of His creatures, by a certain resemblance to the things known to us, giving us through His energies only faith, but not knowledge of what He is" [33]. Consequently, the knowledge of God through His energies is understood here not as the comprehension of what He is, but as the knowledge of the existence of God from His creations, although this creative Divine energy is different from the creatures that it creates. Let us also note that in the Trinitarian context, Gregory uses the term energy in the singular, meaning the energy common to the three Divine Persons. "Who does not know," he says, "that the life-giving power proceeds in the form of energy in the same way from the Father and from the Son" [34]. Or: "All energy which extends from God to creation and is named in accordance with a multitude of significations, originates from the Father and proceeds through the Son and is accomplished in the Holy Spirit" [35]. It is also called life: "One and the same life, which is worked (ενεργειται) by the Holy Spirit and is prepared from (παρά) the Son and depends on the will of the Father" [36]. Or, as he says: "A certain single movement of good will and mutual communion from the Son to the Holy Spirit" [37]. Here we are talking about the will, but as Gregory explains in another place: "It is clear that in the divine nature there can be no difference between will and energy" [38].

At the same time, St. Gregory's teaching on names will perhaps shed additional light on his understanding of the nature of God and His energies, as well as on the problem of the knowledge of God in general. It can be argued that this teaching is opposed to the doctrine of Eunomius, who, continuing the philosophical line of Plato's Cratylus and being under the influence of the magicism of later pagan mysticism, develops a whole philosophy of names as having a divine origin and expressing the nature of things [39]. Gregory completely rejects these theories of Eunomius. Without going into the consideration of the entire teaching of Gregory here, we will dwell especially on those of his propositions that are directly related to our topic. Whereas Eunomius, in Gregory's opinion, identifies the name with the subject [40], he himself believes that names and sayings express a certain movement of our thought and are necessary for us to know God to the best of our ability, "in order that we may have to some extent knowledge of what is divinely appropriate to understand about Him (περι αυτον νοουμένων)" [41]. All things are created by God, and names are created by the powers of our reason, although this ability itself, like rational nature, is "the work of God's hands" [42]. They (names) denote the natural potentialities of things [43]. As for God, He is above every name, since "the only name that befits God is to be above every name, for the fact that He surpasses all speculation and cannot be embraced by any name is a proof to men of His inexplicable greatness" [44]. In the same way, the names of Christ (such as the Door, the Shepherd, etc.) do not denote His essence or nature, but His "energies": "None of His names," says Gregory, "is neither the nature of the Only-begotten, nor the Divinity, nor the property (ιδίωμα) of the essence; but He is really called so, and the name has its own meaning... and inasmuch as the Lord, by His Providence, provides for the lives of people in many different ways, each type of beneficence is properly recognized by each of these names. In consequence of the fact that Providence and the energy contemplated in Him acquire the force of a name, it can be said that such a name is called by us the action of invention (κατ επίνοιαν τρόπου)" [45]. Gregory forcefully insists that the names are not applied to the divine nature, but that God is named according to His energies, for otherwise He would be complex: "What," he asks, "does Eunomius decree that the utterances denote nature itself? But then he asserts that the Divine nature is something multiform and multi-component, manifesting its complexity in accordance with the differences signified by the names... Consequently, names do not denote nature, but no one would dare to say that the naming of names is devoid of authenticity and meaning. Since, then, the name is given, but not by nature, and since all that is said in the Scriptures is just (κύριον) and corresponds to what the name indicates, what reason will there be that these words should be properly applied to the Only-begotten God, except by the act of invention (του κατ επίνοιαν τρόπου)? For it is clear that the Godhead is called by names (ονοματοποιειται το Θειον) according to different energies, so that we may understand Him Who is thus named" [46]. Therefore names are the names of different energies, and in this sense they are different from the latter. However, as the names of the Divine energies, the names help us to know God, but not His nature.

It is very important to note here the following: assuming that we call God by His energies by an intelligent action, Gregory insists that these names are not simply created by our imagination, but properly correspond to something that really exists in God. In any case, each name denotes something special in God, "for if none of the names is understood in a special meaning, but they are all confused with each other through merging in meaning, then it would be an empty matter to use many names for one and the same object, while no difference essentially distinguishes some names from others" [47]. On the contrary, it is Eunomius who seeks to show that "there is no difference in meaning between different names" [48]. Names make it possible to identify certain concepts contemplated in the divine life [49], such as incorruptibility or beginninglessness; they bear witness to them, but do not create them; do not make the divine life incorruptible, but indicate that it is so [50]. Gregory here distinguishes between the object (ύποκείμενον), the concept (νόημα) and the name. "The fact that the Divine life is infinite in both senses," he says, "is inherent in the object, but to express, in one way or another, the concepts seen in the object depends only on the name by which the denoted concept is named... therefore the object remains as it is, above all name and concept; but the fact that it is not of a cause and will not ever turn into non-existence is signified by the invention of given names" [51]. By the multiplicity of names we try to embrace that which is above knowledge: "... for we designate by names only things that are knowable, but those that are above knowledge, they cannot be understood with the help of any that serve to designate names... and since it is impossible to find any suitable name for them capable of depicting the subject, we try, as far as possible, by numerous and different names, to reveal the divinatory concept (υπόνοιαν) that comes to us about God" [52]. And so here Gregory again seems to admit that names help us to discover the unknowable God. But names in themselves do not possess any reality, they are nothing more than signs [53]. Even the name God does not denote His essence, but one of His energies, as Gregory himself says about it: "And the very word God, we know, received its beginning from His edifying activity... and thus, having cognized from this a certain particular action of the Divine nature, we have not reached an understanding of the essence itself with the help of this word" [54].

As we have seen, Gregory often says, when reflecting on names and their application to God, that they are used "κατ επίνοιαν" - by invention. It is necessary to consider what exactly Gregory means by this expression. He himself puts it this way: "Invention (επίνοια) is the path (εφοδος) to the unknown of the searching mind, which, starting from the nearest, advances to the next, discovering the further with the help of the primary understanding of the proximate. Thus, having understood something relating to the object sought, and having reconciled by means of newly found concepts the subsequent with the beginning of what has been captured, we bring the desired operation to an end" [55]. The process of cognition, as we can see, takes place in many stages. St. Gregory places a very high value on that faculty of the mind, which ultimately ascends to God, for the Creator of the intellect is God. "It seems to me," he says, "that if anyone were to judge that invention is the most precious among all the good activities that our soul possesses by the gift of Divine Providence, then such a judgment would not be false" [56]. And he adds: "Where would all that is known about human life come to us, if the mind did not reason and discover each thing in a proper way? But the mind is God's creation. Consequently, everything that the mind gives is given by God" [57]. Nevertheless, Gregory insists, invention is incapable of grasping the incomprehensible and cognizing the Divine nature: "What is the essence itself, which has unborn existence, by its own nature, nothing in its name directs us to a clear vision of this. It would be unnatural if the invention of our thoughts were to have such power as to raise us above the measures of nature, to place us above the incomprehensible, and to enable us to comprehend by knowledge things which are inaccessible to our mental impulses. However, the fact that επίνοια is "the energy of our mind" [59] does not prevent us from using it piously, knowing God by His actions and giving Him κατ επίνοιαν, by invention, various names, which, however, do not express His ineffable nature [60]. Thus, for example, according to various inventions (κατα διαφόρους επινοίας), God is called Light, and Life, and the Incorruptible, and other similar names [61]. Gregory, therefore, evidently admits that our knowledge of God takes place (at least in part)

One could even say that Gregory of Nyssa considers in God, on the one hand, something incomprehensible and unapproachable (at least for any creature), and on the other hand, something comprehensible, which can be approached.

We would like to dwell on these differences in God in more detail. Gregory speaks of them with great clarity in his letter to Aulalius. There he uses (as well as in his other works) one expression which is very important for the understanding of his teaching, namely, concerning the Divine nature (τα περι την θειαν φύσιν) [62]. Thus, expounding his theological convictions concisely, in a few lines, Gregory writes: "But we, following what the Scriptures tell us, have learned that (the Divine nature) is unnameable and ineffable. And of any name, whether it be revealed through habitual use in human speech or transmitted through the Scriptures, we say that it explains what is revealed to the mind in relation to the Divine nature (των περι την θειαν φύσιν νοουμένων), but does not contain in itself the designation of nature itself" [63]. The above text reveals two points: a) there is a distinction between the divine nature and what surrounds it; b) this distinction is revealed by the action of the mind, but it is also confirmed by the Scriptures and, therefore, belongs to Tradition. And Gregory continues: "We find that by means of each name a certain external property is thought and expressed, which is appropriate to the Divine nature, but by no means signifies what nature is in essence" [64]. The impossibility of giving a name to the Divine nature follows, as Gregory believes, from its infinity: "Since we believe that the Divine nature is infinite and indescribable, we do not mentally attach any names to it, but declare that nature must necessarily be thought of in infinity. And that which is absolutely infinite cannot be limited by one thing and not limited by another, for the infinite inevitably escapes from all boundaries. Therefore that which is beyond all limitation cannot be confined to any name whatsoever. And then, in order that the concept of the infinite may remain constant in all that pertains to the divine nature, we say that the Divine is above every name, and that the "Godhead" is one of the names. Consequently, one and the same thing cannot be considered as a name and be above every name" [65]. "It has been proved," says Gregory, "that the name of the Godhead signifies energy, and not nature" [66]. The distinction that Gregory here establishes between the divine nature and energy is quite clear. The first is above every name, and the second can be named. And Gregory exclaims: "The name alone is indicative of the Divine nature: that amazement which fills our soul in the face of it" [67]. As for the expression of the Divine nature, Gregory says that everything that is contemplated near the Divinity has the same quality of immutability as the Divinity Itself: "It is to be believed, we think, that only that which is truly Divine, that which is eternal and infinite in being, and that everything that is contemplated near Him always exists in the same way, without increasing or decreasing in its reality." In the Homilies "On the Beatitudes" Gregory also speaks of what "is seen near the Divine nature" and that "exceeds the measure of human nature" [69]. This expression is undoubtedly familiar to Gregory, he uses it in his theological and spiritual works, and it certainly has a very definite meaning. He gives some explanations in the Great Catechetical Discourse. Discussing the purposes of creation, he says: "It was necessary that neither the light should remain invisible, nor the glory untestified, nor goodness without the one who enjoys it, nor everything else that is contemplated around the Divine nature, should not be inactive in the absence of one who would partake and eat" [70]. It should be noted that Gregory refers Glory and Light to that which is contemplated near the Divine nature.

How, then, is the question of the simplicity of the Divine nature raised in this teaching about God? After all, this question is one of the most important in the theological teaching of Gregory, and he constantly returns to it. This is a fundamental dogma of the Church, and, as we have seen above, it is recognized even by people with the most grounded minds. "But there is not and will not exist," he says, "in the Church of God such a teaching according to which it would be asserted that the simple and uncomplicated are not only manifold and diverse, but are also composed of opposites. The holy simplicity of the dogmas of truth asserts that God, such as He is, is elusive neither in name, nor in concept, nor in any other cognitive conceivation, that He is above not only human understanding, but also angelic and all supercosmic comprehension, remains inexplicable, and ineffable, and surpasses all meaning expressed in words, and has only one name that communicates the knowledge of His nature, - that He alone is above every name" [72]. This is one of the rare passages where Gregory seems to speak not of the simplicity of the divine nature, as he usually does, but of the simplicity of God. But since he speaks of God as He is, and ends by saying that the divine nature is above all name, the meaning seems to change little on closer examination. In general, as we shall see later, Gregory of Nyssa does not consider it necessary, while defending the simplicity of the divine nature, to deny any differences in God. On the contrary, he admits them, but strives to understand them, to interpret them, and, especially, to prove that they do not contradict the simplicity of His nature.

In order to clarify his understanding of the simplicity of the Divine nature, Gregory resorts to a comparison with the human soul, its many and varied abilities and manifestations, which, however, does not make it complex, although its actions are denoted by dissimilar names. And this is all the more true of God: "If the human mind loses nothing of its simplicity from the multitude of names we use when we speak of it, how could anyone think that God, whom we call wise, or righteous, or good, or eternal, or by any other name befitting God (unless a single meaning is implied by all these names)? from this will consist of many parts, or that from the assimilation of them He constitutes the perfection of His nature?" [73] Although, as Gregory asserts here, the divine names are given by man, they correspond to certain things that really exist in God, and different things at that. Nevertheless, it is also true that the human soul, in its weakness, cannot clearly see God's "unity in diversity," and it tends to lose sight of the simplicity of His nature: "The divine nature," writes Gregory, "whatever it may be in essence, is one; it is something simple, and uniform, and uncomplicated, and is in no way conceivable in any diverse multiplicity. But the human soul, rooted in the valley and immersed in this earthly life, since it cannot clearly examine what is sought, tries in a variety of ways, with the help of many concepts, to partially touch the inexplicable nature, without catching in any one concept the One Who is hidden" [74]. St. Gregory also insists that the "qualities" seen in God are not something acquired and to which He participates, but that He is what He possesses: "There is no lack of wisdom, power, or any other good in Him for whom the good is not acquired, but what it is, as it itself is, so is He by nature (καφό εστι τοιουτον πέφυκε), wherefore he who says that he distinguishes in the nature of the Godhead between lesser and greater essences, arranges everything in such a way, without noticing that the Godhead consists of parts unlike each other, so that we may think that the subject is something else, and that what he acquires is still different, and that He is in good by partaking of it, without being originally so." With this important text, which is directed against Eunomius' assertion that the Son is smaller than the Father, Gregory wants to show that it is precisely qualitative and, especially, quantitative differences that introduce a certain complexity into God. God is what He possesses, and we should think of Him as one. St. Gregory once again emphasizes this in the following text: "To desire good and to have what is desired, all are thought to be one and at the same time, if we are talking about a simple and omnipotent Nature." Likewise, the immutability of God is placed in relation to His simplicity: "God," says Gregory, "being one good, in His simple and uncomplicated nature is always turned to one and the same thing, and never changes by any impulses of His will, but always wills what He is, and undoubtedly is what He wills." And here again we see that simplicity is understood rather as the absence of contradictions and as the indivisibility of God. However, all these concepts are derived from the Divine essence and are contemplated in it. "What God-worthy concept does not refer to the very essence of the Son as a righteous, good, eternal being... Then who could say that one (some) good among others is acquired by the Divine essence, and not that everything that exists good originates from it and is contemplated in it" [75]. These concepts, however, differ from the Divine essence itself: "One (αλλο τι) is the concept of unbegottenness," Gregory asserts, "and the other is the meaning (λόγος) of the Divine essence" [76]. And each name means something different in God: "That which is designated belongs to each of these names" [77]. In another place of his polemic against Eunomius, Gregory speaks of "differences in qualities and properties, which are comprehended around the essence by the arguments of invention (τω λόγω της επινοίας) and which are other than the object" [78]. And he explains: "I am talking about the object itself, which is given the name of essence in the literal sense" [79]. True, here Gregory has in mind created things, "that which is seen around the body and soul" [80]. However, as we have seen, Gregory believes that the soul in its properties is an image of Divine simplicity and helps us to understand the latter; therefore, the above text does not lose its meaning even when applied to the divine essence. Be that as it may, Gregory shows that all these differences do not contradict the simplicity of the divine nature. "With these concepts we do not divide the object," he says, "but having believed that it is one, whatever it may be in essence, we have realized that the object of our thought is related to all these ideas" [81]. He understands Divine unity as the absence of contradictions: "Names do not struggle with each other, as is characteristic of the nature of opposites, when it is impossible, since one exists, to contemplate the other together with it" [82]. It is precisely difference in essence that is incompatible with simplicity: "Since the divine nature is simple and immutable, and rejects all difference in essence, it does not accept into itself, as long as it remains one, the meaning of multiplicity" (83). "For how could one suspect in the simple an admixture of the foreign? For that which is thought together with the other would cease to be simple" [84]. In another place, Gregory identifies the simple with the unchangeable: "That which is simple by nature does not consist of parts, and is uncomplicated," he says, "whatever it may be, is wholly so, not becoming different through any change from another, but abiding in eternity in what it is." And Eunomius "grafts on the essence of God each of the names (located) near the Divinity" [86]. Many times we see that Divine simplicity is understood by Gregory as the absence of contradictions in God: "If (the Eunomians) agree that (the Only-begotten) is simple, then how is it possible to contemplate in the simplicity of the object a confluence of opposites?" [87], as the Eunomians do, attributing to His divinity opposite properties, such as creation and uncreation. And Gregory remarks: "Such is the God of Eunomius, some kind of dual in nature or polysyllabic, divisible into himself, possessing a power not in accord with His power" [88]. As can be seen, complexity does not arise from the possession of power, but from the possession of contradictory forces. "For the simple by nature is not torn apart by opposite properties" [89]. And again: "Whoever is devoid of simplicity is evidently revealed to him the diverse and complex" [90]. Gregory, however, never says that divine simplicity could mean the absence of any ontological distinction or distinction in God. On the contrary, and we have already tried to show this, he admits such distinctions, not only between the divine nature and the Trinitarian hypostases, or between the hypostases themselves, but also between the divine nature and that which is around it, between nature and the energies, between the names that denote these energies and the ineffable essence. These are differences communicated to us through Scripture, or discovered in God by our imagination, visible only in part through the weakness of the human mind, but nevertheless they exist in God, or at any rate correspond to the divine reality, and in no way detract from the simplicity of the divine nature. Let's give a few more examples in order to clarify this issue.

St. Gregory often notes that what we distinguish in God - for example, that He is called Light - is not simply our construction, but corresponds to something that really exists in God. "We think," he says, "that the name light is not given to the divine nature without any meaning, but that it indicates some subject" [91] (the Father and the Son, in this case). And if this light is defined by various adjectives - of the Father we say the Unapproachable Light, of the Son the True Light - then this in no way detracts from the simplicity of the Divine essence, for these words do not express the Divine essence itself, but what is contemplated near it: "With these phrases the Scripture in no way violates simplicity, for the general and particular are not essence; Thus the combination of these words might indicate that the object is complex, but that self-essence remains what it is by nature, being what it is. And everyone who participates in the understanding will say that this refers to that which is thought or seen around the essence" [92]. In the same way, God's communication with man in the name of good does not make God a complex being: "God is not complex because He has the name of good in common with man. Consequently, it is clearly confessed that the other is the concept (λόγος) of the community, and the other is the concept of essence, but this, nevertheless, does not give rise to any complexity and multiplicity near the simple and non-quantitative nature, whether it is something contemplated and seen separately or something that has the meaning of the general" [93].