In Egypt, the union was accepted by a minority, and the masses of the people remained pure Monophysites. The Palestinian monk Sophronius, who was in Alexandria at that time, begged Cyrus to remove the expression μία ενέργεια from the union document, as not agreeing with Orthodox teaching. Cyrus, of course, did not agree to this proposal, which was tantamount to the destruction of the reunion itself, and sent Sophronius with a letter of recommendation to Sergius for an explanation on this matter. Sergius, who apparently stood completely aside, in fact had long wanted to put the union into effect, wrote letters on this and collected suitable passages from the Holy Fathers (with μία ενέργεια). Sergius asked Sophronius to remain silent beforehand, so as not to disturb the peace that had taken place; but since Sophronius continued to insist on his own, Sergius demanded that he bring from the Holy Fathers passages where the two energies would be spoken. But Sophronius could not present the patristic quotations in this form, and therefore Sergius remained unconvinced and recommended that Sophronius not upset the ecclesiastical peace because of one word: once the union had taken place, one should not speak of either one or two energies. Sergius made a promise to Sophronius to remain silent, and they parted in peace. But this situation changed thanks to the election of Sophronius to the vacant see of Jerusalem (in 633 or 634).

As soon as the news of Sophronius' election reached Constantinople, Sergius was alarmed. The fact is that every newly elected bishop of an outstanding cathedra considered the first act of his activity to be the compilation of an encyclical, by which he was to declare to the Orthodox bishops that he was of one mind with them in the faith. It probably happened at one time that the council that consecrated it also signed this epistle, testifying to its agreement with the newly-consecrated bishop, which is why this epistle {p. 463} was called επιστολή συνοδική. Sergius understood that the συνοδική of Sophronius, which would not be very pleasant to him in terms of content, would spread widely and, what was most dangerous, would reach the Orthodox West. Hitherto Sergius had conducted business only in the East, for example, in Armenia, but had not tried to win over the West; He concealed the true state of affairs. Mentioning the Unia of Alexandria, he presented it to the Westerners only as the accession to Orthodoxy of many thousands. And Sophronius, of course, informed the West about everything that was happening in the East. Sergius' task was to warn Pope Honorius, to predispose him to treat Sophronius with distrust. Therefore, Sergius considered it necessary to turn to Honorius with an epistle in which he explains what had happened in the East during the past years. He writes that he had heard about the election of Sophronius, but συνοδική had not yet received it. This is quite probable, for the συνοδική, of course, was not composed suddenly after the election, and could have reached Constantinople many months after the election of Sophronius.

Regarding the controversial issue, Sergius expressed himself as follows: "In accordance with the teaching of all the ecumenical councils, the one and the same Lord Jesus Christ performs all His actions; therefore, one should not reason about one or two energies, and be content with the recognition of "one will" (εν θέλημα) in Christ. The expression "μία ενέργεια," although found in some Fathers, makes a frightening impression on the inexperienced (τάς τινων άκοάς), since they believe that this expression denies the duality of nature in Christ. On the other hand, the expression "two actions" also seduces many (πολλους σκανδαλίζειν), since it does not occur in any father, and leads to the conclusion of two opposite wills, and through this introduces two wills, which is completely impious." Sergius asked Honorius' advice on a controversial issue.

Sergius, it should be noted, was well aware of his position in relation to Rome. People with well-known claims, but without a sufficient degree of intelligence and will, can always easily imagine an excellent and very dark case. Sergius knew how to play the papal string very well. He wrote to Honorius with the greatest outward reverence, presenting the matter as follows: he was always ready to consult with his Roman brother, but this was prevented by the distance; now even the distance does not prevent him from seeking advice, since the matter is of the greatest importance and requires consultation. Honorius, as a learned man, naturally could not evade the solution of the question proposed to him. In Rome, however, there were traditional methods of answering - to express oneself in general phrases, to talk quite a lot about an outsider, and to say absolutely nothing on the necessary question. But Honorius, who considered himself very learned, did not want to resort to these methods, expressed himself very clearly, and fell into the snare set by Sergius. He replied to Sergius with an epistle, in which he repeated the most essential expressions of Sergius, recognizing his point of view as quite just: όθεν καί έν θέλημα όμολογούμεν τού Κυρίου Ίησού Χριστού, "Wherefore we confess the will of the Lord Jesus Christ in one way," recognizing Him as πολυτρόπως ένεργούντα, "acting in many ways." A dispute about one or two energies in Christ is an empty, schoolboy dispute; Honorius treats those who argue about this with contempt; they are hucksters in newly invented words, departing from the simplicity of apostolic teachings, sophists, luring the people with the biting of new teachings. But the darkness of the apostolic teachings is strong; Rome will not succumb to error and will erase all doubtful innovations by the simplicity of her teaching.

Only after this correspondence did Sophronius' "communicative epistle" become known. The doctrine of the incarnation in this epistle is as follows. Jesus Christ is one and two, εν καί δύο, one complex hypostasis, μία ύπόστασις σύνθετος, which is called "the one nature of God the Word incarnate." The unity in Him of divinity and humanity is ενωσις υποστατική καί φυσική. He is known inseparably in the two natures, and acts naturally (φυσικώς), according to his two natures (ουσίας), and is peculiar to the essential qualities of each of these natures (ουσιώδη ποιότητα ή καί φυσικήν ιδιότητα). This would have been impossible if He had possessed one hypostasis, as a single and uncomplicated nature. One and the same Christ produces the divine and the human, but κατ' άλλο καί άλλο. This is precisely what Leo said: "Both act what is peculiar to them." From actions, and from actions alone, natures are known, and, according to the teaching of those who can know this, the difference of essences is always noticed from the difference of actions. In both natures we recognize both actions, i.e., the essential and natural, as well as the reciprocal, inseparably proceeding from the one and the other being and nature by reason of the natural quality inherent in it, and at the same time the inseparable and unmerged concomitant interaction of the two natures. This is the reason for the difference in actions in Christ, and equally gives to His natures the existence of natures. Christ, like us, is born; like us, it feeds on milk; like us, age passes; like us, he gets weary; It moves from one place to another; in His walk there is the same actual power, άνθρωπίνως 'ενεργουμένη, as in us. His humanity declares itself by unconstrained actions: He allowed His human nature to be ένεργείν when He Himself wanted and because He Himself wanted; in Him the infirmities (πάθη αδιάβλητα) of mankind had no compulsion: He was the Lord of His human sufferings.

A significant part of Sophronius' expressions turns out to be common with those union points that were proclaimed in Alexandria. Sophronius was afraid to miss anything indifferent in the dogmatic sense, but dear to the Monophysites, for otherwise the cries of the Monophysites would have been heard that he was violating the faith. Therefore he could not do without such vague expressions as εν καί δύο, or κατ' αλλο καί αλλο. But having satisfied the scrupulousness of his opponents, he clarified the question indisputably. The Monophysites did not want to recognize Christ έν δύο φύσεσι after the union, although they recognized έκ δύο φύσεων. The Orthodox also spoke of two natures, the Monophysites recognized one nature. Where, it may be asked, has the other nature disappeared? The Monophysites declared that this was the inevitable result of the very union of natures. But since the realization of the one nature was utterly impossible in view of the facts of the Gospel which testify to the human nature of Christ, the following usually happened. When the Orthodox proved to the Monophysites on the basis of the Gospel facts the reality of human nature in Christ, the Monophysites, without in the least disputing the facts themselves, tried to prove to the Orthodox that it was by no means possible to draw any conclusions from this regarding the humanity of Christ. The fact is that they admitted human nature in Christ not as a factor, but as a pure potentiality. If Christ fed, was tired, and suffered, this is a revelation of human nature. But, said the Monophysites, the theologian has no right to say that humanity and not divinity are manifested here, for otherwise the separation of natures would be affirmed. Consequently, it can be assumed that human actions are in fact manifestations of the deity. A theologian, the Monophysites asserted, can and should know two natures, but he has no right to state human nature. The whole point, therefore, boils down to the fact that in Christ there is a human φύσις, but without ενέργεια, i.e. that in Christ there is only μία ενέργεια. To say that this human φύσις ενεργεί was absolutely impossible for the Monophysites. Thus not acknowledging that φύσις is active in Christ, the Monophysites also concluded the opposite, i.e., that it is impossible to infer about the essence from actions, and that from the facts that show human nature in Christ cannot be inferred to the existence of human nature in it. The Encyclical Epistle of Sophronius rebels precisely against such a view, when it emphasizes, with particular force, the idea that essence can be known only in its manifestations and actions.

Of the three persons who acted in the era of union attempts between the Orthodox and the Monophysites, each has its own specific physiognomy.

The most outstanding wrestler at this time was Sophronius of Jerusalem. In spite of his extreme caution and the resulting verbosity, which is quite indifferent, he strikes several blows at Monothelitism so well-aimed that all the structures of the opposing party fall apart. The Synodikon of Sophronius of Jerusalem was of great importance in the history of this dogmatic movement. It came from the pen of a man who understood the state of affairs. The Patriarch of Antioch was absent at that time, the other two – Constantinople and Alexandria – were against the Orthodox exposition of Sophronius. The slightest mistake on the part of Sophronius could lead to the fact that he would be accused of non-Orthodoxy. Consequently, he had to conduct the matter in such a way that the most captious critics could not find fault. As is well known, the novella of Emperor Justinian produced the result unfavorable for theology, that those writings of Cyril of Alexandria, which were not declared exemplary by the Council of Chalcedon, entered into Christian dogmatics. For example, ενωσις [καθ' ύπόστασιν] was no longer the only expression, but was supplemented by ενωσις φυσική. Thus, in addition to the exact dogma of two natures [united in hypostasis], it was necessary to reckon with such a formula as the one indicated. From this it is clear that the omission of any of these formulas, so pleasing to the Monophysites, could lead to accusations of non-Orthodoxy. Sophronius pointed out that in every nature there is a moment of activity, and from this he deduced that each nature, by virtue of its nature, necessarily acts. Thus the question of energies was firmly posed, and all the dangerous points of the doctrine of the two wills were avoided. Sergius could not stand on the dogmatic field against such an opponent as Sophronius, especially since soon Sophronius was elected to the Jerusalem cathedra. But in any case, as a politician, Sergius conducted his business excellently. The epistle of Sophronius did not produce a proper effect in the West precisely because Sergius knew how to take advantage of circumstances and conducted his work extremely skillfully.

Sergius appears with a rather colorless physiognomy, but still definite: little productive in the theological sense, an adherent of patristic traditions, although he apparently seemed not to take part in the movement, he nevertheless understood perfectly well where he was going. Taking his own step towards union with the Monophysites, he did it so skillfully that it seemed as if it was not Sergius who was doing it, but others; In fact, it constituted the hidden center around which the whole work of the union revolved. He seems to be neutral; He cautiously keeps silent about his own steps in the dispute that has begun. According to his epistle, the question of one action arose in the conversation between the emperor and Paul quite accidentally. Sergius himself not only does not introduce μία ενέργεια, but also does not pretend to forbid it. But it is not difficult to see that in reality he holds the dogmatic scales crookedly. He assumes as indubitable that the unity of the will is the same as the unity of the actor. Thus, action, in his opinion, is connected not with the concept of nature, but with the concept of hypostasis. Of one action Sergius says that it is mentioned in some of the Fathers; two actions are not mentioned in any of them. Further, "one action" sounds scary to some, and "two actions" seduces many. The first is all the more inconvenient because it leads the inexperienced into doubts, in essence – in the opinion of Sergius – unfounded; the second leads, as an inevitable consequence, to the recognition of two wills, which from his point of view is impious. This is the dogmatic side of the matter. But next to it there is also a side – so to speak – diplomatic, the attitude towards Honorius as to the bishop of Rome, and here Sergius showed himself to be an expert in the matter. He understood that it was very important for him to win over Honorius of Rome, eo ipso, and all the Western bishops. In this case, Constantinople knew how to be blind, they thought that if a certain definition was signed by the bishop of Rome, then the entire Western Church agreed; In fact, it was not so. And Sergius won a brilliant victory on this basis.

The most pitiful figure among the leaders of this time is Honorius, the Pope of Rome. In consequence of the miserable state of education in Rome, Honorius stood head and shoulders above his contemporaries in education, for which he enjoyed the greatest respect from them. In his funeral orations he was praised with such praise that one could think that the Roman Church in his person had lost a universal luminary no less important than Athanasius. Meanwhile, Sergius managed to carry it out in such a way that he loudly announced those subtle logical strokes and hints that were in the epistle of Sergius. But all the indications and expressions that Sergius made in his epistle were appreciated not by Honorius himself, but thanks to the same Sergius. How little consciousness there was in his writing is evident from the attitude of the Roman clergy to the appearance of the έξθεσις'a, which was only excerpts from the Epistle of Sergius. The Roman clergy were heavily armed against this document, which represented only a part of the epistle which had been approved in its entirety by Pope Honorius. The matter came to such curiosities that a person was brought out who allegedly helped Honorius to compose the epistle, which could hardly have been. How little consciousness there was in the actions of Honorius and therefore the right to leadership in the affairs of the Eastern Church is also confirmed by the anathema placed on him by the Sixth Ecumenical Council. Such a blunder on the part of Honorius, of course, is not favorable to the glory of Peter's cathedra.

Honorius' reply to Sergius is a subject of study for Catholic scholars of all times and nationalities. Cardinal Hergenröther, in his ecclesiastical history, in two pages of the dense corpus Lexicon-Octavo, enumerating only the most important things on this question, counts up to 16 scholars who decide the question against it, and up to 82 who defend this epistle in works of more or less special importance. Interest was especially revived in 1870, when the question of papal infallibility was being decided, and when it was natural to undertake a revision of this epistle, for it was a thorn for the historical recognition of the popes as infallible. Outstanding writers on this question: for Honorius, the Italian Pennacchi, a Roman professor, against Honorius, the German Hefele, Bishop Gregory. Rottenburg, followed by Rackgaber.

The results of the research were as follows. 1) Up to 14 scholars solved the matter in the most radical way: they assumed that the Epistle of Honorius and the Acts of the Sixth Ecumenical Council were interpolated. The view is undoubtedly wrong. There is no doubt that the acts of the council were presented to the legates of Rome, and if they checked the translations and found them correct, then there can be no question of inventing them; and attention was also drawn to the epistle of Honorius in connection with the affair of Maximus the Confessor, so that the legates must have come to the council of 680-1 already prepared for this question, and if in 680-1 there were no objections from the legates, it follows that at that time they were quite impossible. If interpolation is assumed, then it is necessary to assume such in all monuments. Thus, it is not necessary to deny the accusatory documents, but to explain them in some way in order to apologize to the Pope. The question of inauthenticity is a corroded weapon: both the message and the acts are undoubtedly genuine. In order to save the pope's cause, scholars, while agreeing with the fact that Honorius was condemned by the Sixth Ecumenical Council, suggest that the council made an error of facti here: the pope should have been condemned if he had really said what is attributed to him, but the council misunderstood him. (2) In order to excuse the Pope completely, many others say that Honorius, in sending the epistle, as a wise shepherd, did so out of calculations of oikonomia, wishing to extinguish the dispute at the very beginning. But oikonomia, it must be said, was bad! The fact is that when the question was raised, it cannot be considered not posed. Nor does Honorius himself deny this; he gives his decision by taking the wrong side and, moreover, even ridicules the Orthodox side. But ridiculing those who are right is a poor means of appeasement. The conclusion from this is that the pope was really mistaken. (3) But, say others, if the Pope was mistaken, he did not write ex cathedra. In this case, of course, the fall of Honorius will not contradict the Vatican dogma. But the question arises: when else could the Pope write ex cathedra, if not when half the Church turns to him for a solution not of a personal, but of a dogmatic one? (4) Sensing the weakness of this explanation, still others try to soften the harshness of the expressions of Honorius' epistle. It is said that his second epistle does not contain such strong expressions as in the first. But, after all, in the second epistle he does not renounce his former opinions; and the only good thing about it is that there are quotes from the tomos of Leo. But the pope, of course, never denied the entire epistle of Leo, even when he wrote the first epistle. (5) The fifth say that Honorius took the question in a wrong formulation. It is true that Sergius posed the question slyly. But what was Honorius and the pope, if he could not distinguish between Orthodox and heretical teaching? Why did he not give him the right light and then the same solution? 6) Suppose, say the defenders of Honorius, that he allowed the expression heretical εν θέλημα; but he combined with this expression a correct thought, for he recognized two natures in Christ. Honorius did not deny the two actions in Christ, nor did he renounce the expressions of Leo V. Thus his whole fault was that he allowed the expression εν θέλημα. But once it is admitted that Honorius drew a wrong conclusion from correct premises, there can be no justification: neither Sergius nor Cyrus are any more heretics than the pope, because every heresy is precisely an incorrect conclusion from some correct foundations, and a heresy with false premises would be in history truly a miracle of miracles.

It is also pleasant to find in Catholic literature a sober view (Ruckgaber) in the solution of the question of Orthodoxy [113]. Pope Honorius did not renounce the tomos of Leo V., but he did not follow it in all its breadth; on the contrary, he wanted to correct it, as it were. He seems to deliberately avoid the use of the word "person" and substitute "conjunctio utriusque naturae", so that the reader with a Monophysite tendency could be inclined to recognize only a "single complex nature". While Leo V. acknowledges that the God-man-Christ is one, but that one side of Him shines with miracles and the other is humiliated, and thus distinguishes between one hypostasis and two natures, Honorius speaks of the unity of the divine-human life in Christ in such a way that God the Word is the bearer of all manifestations, both divine and human, not only as principium quod = ύπόστασις, but also as principium quo = φύσις, i.e., the divine hypostasis draws near, according to Honorius, to the divine nature. Only by a special interpretation of "ex cathedra," considered separately, does the Catholic scholar save his belief in papal infallibility. The Pope is infallible only when he says "ex cathedra"; And in all such cases, the entire Universal Church necessarily agrees with his words. But the ecumenical council condemned Honorius, ergo Honorius did not speak ex cathedra.

{p. 472}