For only that which is determined by any quantity has a beginning of being and ceases with its end. The measurability of time, which is subject to the generation in its quantity, divides the beginning from the end by an intermediate distance, but how to measure or divide that which has no quantity and extension? What measure is to be found for the unquantified, or what is the distance for the unextended?

How can the infinite be limited to a beginning and an end? For the beginning and the end are the names of the limits of distance, but when there is no distance, there is no boundary, but in the Divine nature there are no distances; being unextended, it has no limit, and that which has no limit is, and is called infinite. Thus it is absurd to limit the infinite to a beginning and an end, for the limited cannot be infinite.

How, then, does this Phaedrus of Plato, philosophizing there, awkwardly attach what Plato says about the soul to his propositions? For just as he speaks there of the cessation of motion, so he also wished to speak of the cessation of birth, in order to deafen the inexperienced in this with Plato's eloquence. And "it is impossible not to recognize this," he says, "on the basis of both nature itself and Divine laws."

But from what has been said, it is clear to us that nature cannot be the source of the authentic teaching of the Divine birth. And no one can offer the world itself as an example of what we are talking about, because, as we know from the description of the universe by Moses, the creation of the world is accompanied by a measure of time, so that the origin of each kind of creatures in a certain order and sequence is measured by certain days and nights, which even the very teaching of the opponents does not allow for the Hypostasis of the Only-begotten. who confess the existence of the Lord before eternal times.

It remains to consider the defense of the above proposition by the divine laws, in which both the end and the beginning of the birth of the Son are promised. "To the end of creation (God) hath set the day which certifies its beginning, for it was not the first day of birth, but the seventh, on which he rested from work, that he appointed for the remembrance of creation." Will anyone believe that what has just been said was written by him, and not inserted by us out of a desire to slander his work, so that it may seem ridiculous to readers, dragging in to prove his position something that has nothing to do with the content of the question?

For the question was: to prove, as he had promised, that a Son was born who did not exist before, that what was born had received the beginning and the end of birth, as if some disease of childbirth delayed the birth for a time. What is the answer to this? According to the law, the Jewish people keep the Sabbath on the seventh day. What agreement of the testimony with the preceding thought! Since the Jew honors the Sabbath with rest, this proves that the Lord, as he says, received the beginning of birth and then ceased to be born!

How many other testimonies to this effect have been omitted by our writer, no less forcefully than the above, confirming his opinion! Circumcision on the eighth day, the week of unleavened bread, the mystery of the fourteenth day of the moon, the sacrifices of purification, the observation of lepers, the ram, the calf, the young woman, the scapegoat, the kid. All this is far from the presupposed idea, and how it relates to the matter, let the zealots of the Jewish mysteries say.

For we, considering it unseemly and unmanly to attack what has been proposed, examine what is written in order further, to see if there is anything there that could make the struggle against it more difficult. Everything that he says further, revealing the idea that no environment between the Father and the Son should be allowed, we will omit as somewhat in agreement with our teaching, because it would be unreasonable and at the same time dishonest not to distinguish in what he says, the innocent from the criminal.

Since, in fighting with the Jews, he does not follow their doctrine, and says that there is no medium between the Son and the Father, and does not admit of any connection, and thinks that there was nothing before the Only-begotten, and guesses the existence of the Son, but defends the idea that the bearer was born first, then, stopping a little on this, since our speech has already been sufficiently prepared by what has been said, Let us turn to the subject of our discussion. 4.

It is not the same thing not to place anything higher than the Hypostasis of the Only-begotten and to say that He did not exist before His birth, but that He was born when the Father willed. For the words "then" and "when" actually and naturally have the meaning of indicating the time, both according to the common custom of those who speak sensibly, and according to their meaning in the Scriptures. "Then they will reproach the tongue" (Psalm 125:2). "When ye were ambassadors" (Luke 22:35). "Then shall the kingdom be likened" (Matt. 25:1).

And thousands of similar passages can be cited from Scripture to prove the idea that these particles of speech in Scripture usually mean time. If, then, there was no time, as our adversary agrees, then at the same time the meaning of time is completely destroyed; but when it does not exist, then the concept of eternity is necessarily assumed at the same time.

For when the word "not to be" is undoubtedly implied, the word "when" is also implied, because if he says of something, "does not exist" without the word "when," he must not admit the expression "now is." If, however, by admitting the expression "today," he rebels against eternity, then, of course, he does not mean perfect non-existence, but non-existence at any time. And since this expression has no validity whatsoever, if it is not connected with the designation of time, it is utterly foolish and absurd either to say, "Nothing was before the birth of the Son," or to assert that the Son was not always there.

For if there is no place, no time, no other created thing, in which there is no Word in the beginning, then it is utterly foreign to the teaching of godliness to say, "There was once no Lord." Thus, not to us, but to himself, Eunomius contradicts us, asserting that there was no Only-begotten, and He was, for by acknowledging that the union between the Son and the Father is not separated by anything, of course, he testifies that eternity also belongs to Him.

If, however, he says that the Son is not in the Father, then we will not object to these words ourselves, but let us oppose the Scriptures, which say that the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son, without adding to these words the expressions "when," "when," or "then," but by such an affirmative and decisive utterance testifying to His eternity. And to assert, as he did, that we call the Only-begotten God unbegotten, is the same as to say that we regard the Father as begotten, both equally absurd, or, better, blasphemous.