Among the many very heterogeneous proofs of the identity of the mind with the prime mover, the first place is undoubtedly occupied by what we have more than once called the transcendental theory in relation to Plato and Aristotle himself. The meaning of this theory is very simple: if there is something less, it means that there is something more; if something exists in particular, it means that it exists somewhere and somehow in general; if there are parts of an object, it means that the object also exists as a whole; And if an object either exists or does not exist, being either weak, or only potential, or only dependent on other objects, then this means that there is also an object that is infinite both in its indestructible integrity, and in its strength and power, and in its energy, and in its independence from any objects, and in its eternal ability to set everything that exists in motion. that is, according to its eternal energy. Strictly speaking, with slight variations, Aristotle gives only this general proof of the eternal energy of the cosmic Mind. The details of this doctrine are no longer particularly important for the history of ancient aesthetics.

The most important argument here is to be found in Aristotle, as in Plato (IAE, Vol. II, p. X 898d - 899 c), in the condemnation of the method of bad infinity, when we explain one motion by another, another by a third, a third by a fourth, etc. Since no end can be found in such an explanation for the explanation of this motion, it is simply meaningless. We will get a true explanation of motion only when we ascertain something that no longer needs anything else for its explanation, and when it moves by itself:

"If it is necessary that everything that moves should be set in motion by something, or by that which is set in motion by another, or by that which is not moved; and if that which is moved by another must necessarily be the first mover, which is not moved by another, and if it is the first, then there is no need for the other (for it is impossible that the mover and moved by another should continue to infinity, since there is no first for the infinite), if, therefore, everything that moves is set in motion by something, and the first mover is not moved by another, then it must move from itself" (Phys. VIII 5, 256a, 13-21).

"There is a fixed prime mover, since the movable, namely something moved, either stands immediately before the first immovable one, or before the moving one, but bringing itself into a state of motion and rest, in both cases it follows that the primary mover is in all cases of motion motion" (258b4-9).

"Since everything that moves must necessarily be set in motion by something, namely, if there is a movement, then by another moving, and that by another, and so on, it is necessary to recognize the existence of the first mover and not to go to infinity" (VII 1, 242a16-21).

3. Different shades of the main argument and especially the physical-teleological argument.

In connection with this main argument of Aristotle about the prime mover, he has many different shades of this argument, which we will not quote here in a systematic form and which are not directly related to aesthetics.

(a) Thus, for example, Aristotle has the doctrine of the necessary divisibility of a body which is set in motion by another body, since in the movable some elements actually move, while others may remain at rest. But if divisible bodies exist, this means that there are indivisible bodies, and then it will no longer be sufficient to explain their motion as a result of the action of some other body on them. But even self-propelled beings are far from indicating that their self-propulsion is final. It can only be potential (and then, therefore, it is necessary to recognize something existing energetically) and temporary (and then it will be necessary to recognize something eternally mobile); and these self-moving beings are also still singular (which means that in order to explain them it is necessary to recognize something universal). There are a lot of accidental things in life; And this means that there is something necessary. If fate leads to some unexpected results, then there is something that leads to rational results, that is, reason is something more first and more general than fate and all surprises. The mover also moves only one of its aspects, and consequently it is also divisible. One thing moves in him, the other rests in him. How to combine this? The moving and the movable must have something in common. But then the teacher and the student will be the same. Aristotle formulates a multitude of absurdities that arise when explaining motion without relying on the first mover. It is worth enumerating at least such chapters of the Physics as II 6, VIII 5, 6, and many others, in a word: "Anaxagoras rightly says when he asserts that reason is not affected and not mixed, after he has made it the principle of motion, for only in this way can it move while being motionless, and rule while not mixed" (Phys. VIII 5, 258b 24-27).

(b) Among all these logical shades of the doctrine of the prime mover, the transcendental argument (from what is conditioned by a cause to the cause itself) still occupies the first place in Aristotle. Proceeding from the fact that all movements in the cosmos are determined by the eternal and always regular movement of the firmament, Aristotle immediately passes on to the need to recognize what moves this sky itself, which determines its eternal regularity, unity and beauty. This is his first mover, or, as we have said, the motionless Mind, eternally acting as the Universal Soul.

"The first principle in things is not subject to motion either by its nature or in [any] accidental way, but itself causes the basic eternal and unified motion. But at the same time [it must be borne in mind that] the moving [in general] must be set in motion by something, and the first mover must be immovable in itself, and eternal motion is necessarily caused by that which is eternal, and one motion by one thing, whereas, besides the simple motion of the universe, which we attribute to the action of the fundamental and immovable essence, we see the existence of other spatial motions, the eternal motions of the planets (for that which moves in a circular way is eternal and knows no rest). body movement; in physics, proofs of this are given). If this is so, then it is necessary that each of these motions should be caused by its own immovable and eternal essence. For the nature of the luminaries is eternal, because they are an essence, and that which moves [them] must be eternal and precede that which is set in motion, and that which precedes essence must be essence. It is evident, therefore, that there must be so many essences, eternal in nature and immovable in essence, and for the reason above stated, they must have no magnitude. "That here we have essences, and that one of them occupies the first place, the other the second, in the same order as the motion of the luminaries, is evident" (Met. XII 8, 1073a 23 - b 3).

If we avoid such general transitions in Aristotle from the separate and fragmented to something necessarily unified (e.g., Met. IV 2 or IX 2), he demands a transition from the soul to the intellect (De an. III 5-6), so that he is not averse to speaking in a completely Platonic way about the universal Soul (8, 431b 21-23):

"The soul in a certain way embraces everything that exists. In fact, everything that exists is either sensuously comprehensible or intelligible. After all, in a certain sense, knowledge is identical with the cognizable, and sensation is identical with sensuously perceived qualities."

Later, Aristotle clarifies this idea of the world Soul, which necessarily arises in him. But these clarifications are already known from our previous exposition. In the last chapters of the third book of his treatise On the Soul, Aristotle seeks to pass from individual minds and aspirations, that is, from individual souls, to the universal Soul and to the universal Mind. "It is clear that aspiration and intellect, these two faculties, are the driving forces" (10, 433a9). This is supported by transcendental reasoning in other areas as well. In order for something to come into being and perish, it is necessary to come into being by itself and to be annihilated by itself (De gen. et corr, I 3). In order for something living and animate to come into being, a seed is necessary; for the seed it is necessary to have a soul that animates it; and the soul needs a mind that comprehends it (De gen. animal. II 3). The same ascent can be observed in the animal world in the anatomical sense, and Aristotle argues in detail for the teleological arrangement of organs and parts of the human body (De part, animal. II 10, IV 10). The necessity of ascending from elementary and everyday morality to divine wisdom, bliss, and speculation is Aristotle's favorite idea (Ethic. Nic. X 7 9).