In connection with this main argument of Aristotle about the prime mover, he has many different shades of this argument, which we will not quote here in a systematic form and which are not directly related to aesthetics.

(a) Thus, for example, Aristotle has the doctrine of the necessary divisibility of a body which is set in motion by another body, since in the movable some elements actually move, while others may remain at rest. But if divisible bodies exist, this means that there are indivisible bodies, and then it will no longer be sufficient to explain their motion as a result of the action of some other body on them. But even self-propelled beings are far from indicating that their self-propulsion is final. It can only be potential (and then, therefore, it is necessary to recognize something existing energetically) and temporary (and then it will be necessary to recognize something eternally mobile); and these self-moving beings are also still singular (which means that in order to explain them it is necessary to recognize something universal). There are a lot of accidental things in life; And this means that there is something necessary. If fate leads to some unexpected results, then there is something that leads to rational results, that is, reason is something more first and more general than fate and all surprises. The mover also moves only one of its aspects, and consequently it is also divisible. One thing moves in him, the other rests in him. How to combine this? The moving and the movable must have something in common. But then the teacher and the student will be the same. Aristotle formulates a multitude of absurdities that arise when explaining motion without relying on the first mover. It is worth enumerating at least such chapters of the Physics as II 6, VIII 5, 6, and many others, in a word: "Anaxagoras rightly says when he asserts that reason is not affected and not mixed, after he has made it the principle of motion, for only in this way can it move while being motionless, and rule while not mixed" (Phys. VIII 5, 258b 24-27).

(b) Among all these logical shades of the doctrine of the prime mover, the transcendental argument (from what is conditioned by a cause to the cause itself) still occupies the first place in Aristotle. Proceeding from the fact that all movements in the cosmos are determined by the eternal and always regular movement of the firmament, Aristotle immediately passes on to the need to recognize what moves this sky itself, which determines its eternal regularity, unity and beauty. This is his first mover, or, as we have said, the motionless Mind, eternally acting as the Universal Soul.

"The first principle in things is not subject to motion either by its nature or in [any] accidental way, but itself causes the basic eternal and unified motion. But at the same time [it must be borne in mind that] the moving [in general] must be set in motion by something, and the first mover must be immovable in itself, and eternal motion is necessarily caused by that which is eternal, and one motion by one thing, whereas, besides the simple motion of the universe, which we attribute to the action of the fundamental and immovable essence, we see the existence of other spatial motions, the eternal motions of the planets (for that which moves in a circular way is eternal and knows no rest). body movement; in physics, proofs of this are given). If this is so, then it is necessary that each of these motions should be caused by its own immovable and eternal essence. For the nature of the luminaries is eternal, because they are an essence, and that which moves [them] must be eternal and precede that which is set in motion, and that which precedes essence must be essence. It is evident, therefore, that there must be so many essences, eternal in nature and immovable in essence, and for the reason above stated, they must have no magnitude. "That here we have essences, and that one of them occupies the first place, the other the second, in the same order as the motion of the luminaries, is evident" (Met. XII 8, 1073a 23 - b 3).

If we avoid such general transitions in Aristotle from the separate and fragmented to something necessarily unified (e.g., Met. IV 2 or IX 2), he demands a transition from the soul to the intellect (De an. III 5-6), so that he is not averse to speaking in a completely Platonic way about the universal Soul (8, 431b 21-23):

"The soul in a certain way embraces everything that exists. In fact, everything that exists is either sensuously comprehensible or intelligible. After all, in a certain sense, knowledge is identical with the cognizable, and sensation is identical with sensuously perceived qualities."

Later, Aristotle clarifies this idea of the world Soul, which necessarily arises in him. But these clarifications are already known from our previous exposition. In the last chapters of the third book of his treatise On the Soul, Aristotle seeks to pass from individual minds and aspirations, that is, from individual souls, to the universal Soul and to the universal Mind. "It is clear that aspiration and intellect, these two faculties, are the driving forces" (10, 433a9). This is supported by transcendental reasoning in other areas as well. In order for something to come into being and perish, it is necessary to come into being by itself and to be annihilated by itself (De gen. et corr, I 3). In order for something living and animate to come into being, a seed is necessary; for the seed it is necessary to have a soul that animates it; and the soul needs a mind that comprehends it (De gen. animal. II 3). The same ascent can be observed in the animal world in the anatomical sense, and Aristotle argues in detail for the teleological arrangement of organs and parts of the human body (De part, animal. II 10, IV 10). The necessity of ascending from elementary and everyday morality to divine wisdom, bliss, and speculation is Aristotle's favorite idea (Ethic. Nic. X 7 9).

c) We repeat, there are a lot of shades of this basic transcendental proof of the existence of the cosmic Mind in Aristotle. Thus, in addition to the semantic antecedent of this Mind to every human mind and to every factual formation of things in general, this cosmic Mind is also forcefully and energetically antecedent to all finiteness, since everything finite in general can exist only if there is an infinite, and since in all intervals within the finite there is still the infinite, no matter how small these intervals may be. We have already met with this circumstance in the previous exposition and will meet more than once. In the Metaphysics (IX 8) it is pointed out that energy is prior to potency in meaning, time, and essence (cf. XII 2). In the same treatise (XII 6) it is proved that energy is not only not a potentiality, but cannot be contained in a potentiality, because otherwise it would be a partaker of matter. The gods are precisely this immortal energy, and this is eternal life (De coel. II 3, 286a 9). "God has filled the Whole [the universe] by creating [in it] a continuous becoming" (De gen. et corr. II 10, 336 b 31). We have already cited the text above that the mind and striving are the driving principles. But in the primitive mind these two faculties of motion merge into one, since there can be no antagonistic tendencies in it, which require for their recognition that a union of mind and aspiration which is no longer antagonistic (De an. III 10). All living things presuppose a soul, and the soul presupposes a mind which is no longer potential, but energy (II 2), which in general refers to everything potential, which is possible only as the realization of energy (III 7. 9. 10). Ethical virtue presupposes dianoetic virtue, that is, virtue based on reason; and reason, which belongs to transitory things, requires such a reason, which refers to eternal things, to the eternal (Ethic. Nic. VI 2, X 9). The fact that everything presupposes its opposite, and that these opposites can be understood in the most diverse senses, is discussed in detail by Aristotle in his Rhetoric (II 23). The main thing here is that opposites act on one another quite directly. Aristotle speaks of this many times in application to ordinary things (De gen. animal. I 21; De gen. et corr. I 7) and in its application to its cosmic Mind, because the latter is pure activity, energy (Met. XII 6), has no parts and has no magnitude (Phys. VIII 10). At the same time, the best does not need action, since action is twofold, namely, it is both the goal of action and the action itself; and that which is best must be together (De coel. II 12). Thus, the cosmic Mind, according to Aristotle, being the best being, does not need action at all; but this is not to be understood in the sense that his Mind is merely inactive, but in the sense that the effect, the cause of the action, the purpose of the action, the material and form of the action remain indistinguishable in him.

In this sense, a fragment of Aristotle (15 Rose) is curious, referring to a treatise by Aristotle that has not come down to us, which proves the idea that the infinite, that is, the infinite mind and infinite beauty, can experience neither increase nor decrease, just as modern mathematics proves that the addition of units to infinity or the subtraction of these units leaves infinity completely untouched. Here is this fragment, borrowed from the later commentator Aristotle Simplicius:

"Aristotle says in his writings on philosophy that there is something better in the general sense; there he also says that there is something better. For since in the existing one is better than the other, there is therefore something better which is to be regarded as divine. If, therefore, something that changes is changed by another, or by itself, and the other is either stronger or weaker, then the one that strives from itself as something stronger or more beautiful (and the divine has nothing stronger than itself, by which it would change), then the aspirant will become more divine. And it is natural that [in this case] it will not become the strongest by virtue of the strongest, and, on the other hand, it will not accept anything bad from the weakest, and nothing bad will be in it. For it does not change in itself, either as striving for something more beautiful (since it needs none of its beauties), nor for the worse, since even man does not make himself worse by his own will. And therefore it has nothing wrong as if it were changed by a transition to the worse. And this proof Aristotle took from the second book of Plato's Republic."

Thus, that which is divine only to a certain extent, in fact, by striving for the divine as such, becomes both more divine and more beautiful. But that which is divine in itself can be neither worse nor better, just as all infinity does not become greater or less by the addition or subtraction of finite units. For aesthetics, this is important because it preaches absolute and infinite beauty, which by its very essence can become neither more nor less.

Perhaps we would not have quoted this fragment of Aristotle if at the end of this fragment there had not been an indication of Aristotle's borrowing from Plato in one of the most important points of their philosophy. For us, this is a very important reinforcement of our usual thought about Aristotle's numerous borrowings from Plato, and moreover in the most important philosophical problems. Aristotle undoubtedly borrows his idea of the infinity of the deity and the impossibility of this infinity becoming more or less from Plato (R. P. II 380d-383c with explanations from false mythology). We have already met with these texts from Plato's Republic{33}

In the above fragment of Aristotle, the specific shade of Aristotle's main transcendental argument about the relationship between the cosmos and the cosmic mind is not so clear. However, there are texts from Aristotle that directly bring to the fore the physico-teleological aspect of Aristotle's main argument.

Aristotle does not simply assert that "the gods and nature do not create anything in vain" (De coel. I 4, 271a 33), but he has a teaching that directly deduces God and the divine mind precisely from the purposiveness and order that reign in nature. According to Sextus Empiricus (Adv. math. IX 20-22), Aristotle, firstly, proved the existence of God on the basis of various mental phenomena, such as inspiration, prophecy or dreams (frg. 13 R.). Secondly, Aristotle proved the existence of God on the basis of order and harmony in nature (frg. 16 R. from Sext. Emp. Adv. math. IX 26-27). Here we read: