Incidentally, does Aristotle, in his criticism of ideas, always have only Plato in mind, and does he not have in mind other Socratics, who, like the Megarians, are fully subject to Aristotle's criticism? At the same time, Aristotle borrowed his criticism of isolated ideas from Plato's Parmenides and sometimes least of all attributed it to Plato. The closest thing to the point is to think that Aristotle, if he had Plato in mind, at any rate those passages from his writings which developed only a theory of ideas in themselves. More precisely, Aristotle, in his constant criticism of ideas, has in mind simply this or that fascination with isolated ideas, wherever they may be. Plato has nothing to do with it, because he himself criticizes the theory of isolated ideas, and in all his dialogues he resolutely regards ideas either as the principle of an ordered cosmos, together with the forces and motions actually acting in it, or, at the very least, as a generative model of the cosmos.

But the piquancy of this whole relation between Plato and Aristotle lies in the fact that Aristotle is not at all a formal logician in the most essential points of his philosophy, but a pure dialectician.

(c) We have already seen above how in the Aristotelian mind its subject and its object, its thought and the object of this thought, are identical. We have already seen how the Aristotelian mind is at once absolute immobility and the absolute cause of all motion. We have already seen how the Aristotelian mind is at the same time immaterial, the "eidos of eidos," and how these eidos or forms are substantial in things and construct their eternal mobility. Now we will say that Aristotle, even where he strenuously pursues his formal-logical point of view, now and then strays into dialectics and even into the substantial representation of the ideal, which, from his point of view, it would seem, should be only material. We do not have the opportunity to cite here all the enormous material in Aristotle, which clearly testifies to this, and we will confine ourselves here to giving only a few examples.

(d) In the Metaphysics (XII-10) the question is immediately raised whether the first good is separated from everything or is not separated and is its order, or whether the good is both together (1075a11-13). Already here Aristotle suggests that it is possible to speak of the good as something independent and separate from things in a purely Platonic way. Aristotle's thought is quite inclined towards the good, understood in isolation, in the manner of Plato, although the examples he adduces have a certain banality (1075a14-23):

"For [in the case of the existence of good, both outside things and in themselves] and in order, good, and it is also the leader, and the latter is even more likely: for he does not exist by order, but order by virtue of it. And everything is harmonized in a certain way [one with another], but not in the same way, both floating creatures, and flying creatures, and plants; And it is not that one has no relation to the other, but there is such a relation. For everything here is harmonious, directed towards the same goal, but as it happens in a house, where free people are least of all supposed to do what happens, but, on the contrary, their actions - all or most - are ordered, while among slaves and animals there is little to do with the common, and for the most part their actions are accidental: this is the beginning of everyone's nature."

Here, therefore, Aristotle quite definitely goes for the transcendental good, although, being a representative of formal-logical metaphysics, he cannot formulate it as a unity of opposites.

However, Aristotle's philosophical insight still goes so far that it seems to him absurd to deduce everything from disconnected opposites. At this point, it would seem that he should speak of the good as an absolutely transcendental principle. He thinks so. But formal logic, from the point of view of which he tries to consider all being, does not allow him to turn this into an independent dialectical theory.

"[Speaking of the general], I mean, for example, that at least everyone must come to the dissolution into parts, and in the same way there are other aspects to which all things participate, in so far as they form a whole. And what impossible or absurd consequences are produced by those who hold different views, what assertions we find in those who are a little more skilful than the first, and with which the least difficulty is associated, must not be concealed from our attention. With all [thinkers] all things are deduced from opposites. However, it is also wrong that these are "all things" and that they are obtained "from opposites"; but in those cases where there are opposites, how things will be made of them is not said: for opposites cannot be affected by each other. For us, this question receives a convincing solution - thanks to the fact that there is something third" (1075a23-31).

Thus, contrary to his own formal-logical laws of contradiction and the excluded middle, Aristotle, simply as a result of the penetration of his philosophical view, comes to the conclusion that opposites cannot be treated as the beginnings of things, but that something "third" is required, that is, such an indissoluble unity of opposites as can only be considered the beginning of things. But this is nothing else than Plato's doctrine of the one or the good, which he develops, as we well know, in Book VI. "States"{34}.

In this regard, Aristotle cannot recognize matter as the opposite of anything, because it is the same each time. But, according to Aristotle, if there is a multitude of matter, it means that matter in general also exists, just as if there is a special idea or a multitude of ideas, it means that there is also an idea in general, the "idea of ideas." And if there is matter in general and idea in general, then there is also that "third" which is no longer either idea or matter, but something higher. And Aristotle is not at all opposed to calling this third thing good. He only asserts that the philosophers who set up this good as a principle developed this doctrine too little, or did not develop it at all (1075a31-1075b1). Empedocles does not like Aristotle at all because he declared love to be the beginning, but only because in this beginning he confused the cause of motion with the matter of motion (1075b 1-7). And Aristotle does not like Anaxagoras not at all because he put the good as the first principle, but because he understands his good as the intellect. The mind, on the other hand, is only the cause of motion, and not anything else, for example, the purpose of motion (1075b 8-10). Hence, according to Aristotle, the good is higher than both the causes of motion and the goals of motion. And the intellect must have its opposite, so that it cannot be regarded as the only good in Anaxagoras (1075b10-11). And the good of which Anaxagoras speaks is not the real good at all, but only the intellect. In Aristotle, the idea of the unity of opposites again arises here (1075b17-19): "And for those who establish two principles, there must be another, more important principle."

Moreover, it is precisely those who accept the doctrine of ideas who must accept the good as something third, which is higher than both ideas and the participation of things in ideas; otherwise this very participation of things in ideas will remain unexplained (1075b 18-20): "And there must also be another more important principle for those who accept ideas: for why have [particular things] taken part [in ideas] or take part [in them]?" which gives everything the opportunity to see and be seen.

Aristotle most vigorously criticizes that one-sided Platonism which presents wisdom as a principle, because wisdom has its opposite in ignorance, and the first principle excludes all opposites. It is unlikely that Aristotle had Plato in mind here specifically. But if he had it in mind, then, according to Plato, wisdom is not the first principle at all, but that one and good which is devoid of all opposites and is higher than them. Aristotle writes as follows (1075b 20-24):

"In the same way, others must come to the conclusion that there is something contrary for wisdom and the most valuable knowledge, but we are years old, because there is nothing contrary to the first principle. For all opposites have matter, and are so in potentiality; and since ignorance is contrary to [wisdom], it must have as its object the opposite [principle], but there is nothing contrary to the first principle."

This is a frank recognition of the principle of coincidentia oppositorum (coincidence of opposites), which in antiquity was most developed precisely in Plato and in Neoplatonism.