b) The same thing will happen if we begin to reason "from above", i.e. from the very beginning. The Thing itself does not exist, the category of being is not inherent in it. But it is clear that this is the most striking and most original thing in it. That it does not possess any of the properties known to us is much easier to assimilate. But the fact that it does not even exist undermines any characteristic of it at its root. And if we begin to say something about it, then, first of all, of course, we must begin with being. If the samb itself is not and does not exist, then any of its characteristics will be absolutely fruitless. And if, on the contrary, there is being, then the possibility of any other category is assured, for every other characteristic must first of all exist, and only then exist as such-and-such.

Thus, from various points of view, being is the primary and most necessary category with which philosophy must begin if it wants to reveal the symbolic content of itself in the order of strict gradualness.

2. (a) But what do we get? Being is the first positing, the first point that arises in the inscrutable bosom of the self itself. We assert that no one anywhere has ever understood and will never understand the true meaning of this first flash of thought against the dark background of the absolute self. The relation of this first positing of thought to the absolute self is equivalent either to the appearance of the first black dot in that absolute light, in which there has hitherto been absolutely no distinction, or to the appearance of the first point of light in that absolute darkness, in which there has also been no light up to now. What can be said about this? It can be said with certainty that as long as absolute light or absolute darkness exists, i.e., as long as such an infinite power of light or darkness is given, that the latter do not differ from anything else (for there is nothing else, and they have already embraced everything), nor from themselves (for they are absolutely intact in themselves, and here all distinction has already been extinguished), until, We say, there is such a light or darkness until there is no thought, no word, no characteristic of this light or this darkness. On the other hand, it can still be asserted with certainty that a thought, a word, any kind of image or description requires a distinction, a distinction of one moment from another, and the latter requires that these moments should be, exist, i.e., requires, first of all, the category of being. However, it is quite impossible to say why, for what reasons, on what basis, and how exactly this first lightning strike of meaning appears; And it is impossible to say what made the absolute self, which is already absolute self-sufficiency, still give rise to certain categories, including the category of being or differences.

(b) It may be pretended (as rationalistic philosophers do) that all is well and understandable, and that there is nothing surprising in this first appearance of thought. This is not surprising even to the great Hegel, who begins his logic with the category of being, without at all asking himself where and why this category itself appeared. Indeed, there is nothing to say on this topic, but there is something to be surprised about.

Let us remember that we proceeded from the construction of the pre-categorical itself. It was clear that there was absolutely nowhere to get away from this very thing, since any place where we would go would also be such a "self", and we would also continue to be "ourselves" ourselves. If, however, the absolute self, incomprehensible and above categorical, is invariably present in every slightest act of being, then it is clear that every slightest act of being is, first of all, this, i.e., this incomprehensibility and pre-categoriality, and only then something specific. Everywhere we see the mystery of this first conception of thought, because wherever there is a living thought, this thought is conceived and conceived, everywhere everything is born and born, everywhere it blossoms or withers, arises or is destroyed. The mystery of the first positing of thought, i.e., the mystery of its first conception, accompanies thought throughout its entire existence, for it cannot be eternally conceived, and cannot eternally arise or grow. At the emergence of any of its categories, at the slightest tremor of reason, at the slightest act of consciousness or meaning, this absolute inscrutability of the first semantic conceptions is repeated in its entirety and triumphs in its imperious victory.

What can even the most enlightened philosophy say about this? After all, it is impossible to take seriously the explanation of the origin of reason and meaning, and in particular the category of being, from various kinds of "facts", be they physical or biological, psychic or social facts, since these facts themselves exist only thanks to the category of being. This naïve and thoughtless petitio principii cannot satisfy philosophical thought. However, what remains after this, the deduction of the categories of reason (and in particular the category of being) from the pre-categorical basis, carries with it an insoluble mystery which cannot be discarded (since thought vehemently demands that the category of being be "clarified"), and it is also impossible to transform it into a clearly and separately solvable problem (for such is the very nature of the pre-categoriality postulated here).

And this mystery is a real and genuine mystery, i.e., not that temporal riddle and obscurity which is solved in the course of time and in connection with the progress of science and the methods of thought. This is a mystery that cannot but be a mystery that will not be solved by anyone and which cannot be solved, but which can only be marveled at. The most important thing is that it did not arise by chance, due to certain shortcomings of knowledge or being. It is substantiated by knowledge and being themselves as necessary. It is the absolute inexplicability of knowledge and being, for if it does not exist, it means that there is no self itself, and then everything crumbles into a nihilistic haze and madness. In order to have a mind, the mystery of its first conception is required, and this mystery is no longer the mystery of the mind alone... This is the mystery of itself and the mystery of its emanation. It is absolutely insoluble, but at the same time it is absolutely necessary. It narrows the entire life of all-embracing reason and meaning, and it manifests itself in every place of its manifestation. But it reveals itself as a mystery, and it is felt as a mystery, without any hope of resolution, but with every hope that it will fertilize any manifestations of reason and meaning in general.

(c) And not only is the first conception of thought mysterious. Her entire concrete life is also mysterious. We must seek it in such a way that the combination of the moments that characterize it will be for us a necessity, clarity and obviousness, and so that reason and reason in its construction act with complete freedom, without the slightest obstacle from any side. But then the mystery begins to speak about itself, just as it is felt in mathematics, precisely because of the convincing evidence of this or that construction.

Why is this and not the other connection necessary? After all, thought, it would seem, could have a completely different structure. Let there really be some connection of logical or mathematical premises that has nothing to do with the logic and mathematics that exists among people. And let it be true, and let the one that we have now be untrue, or even if it does not exist at all or remains unknown to anyone. This new connection of propositions would be scientific, true, obvious, illustrative; And no one would even think about the possible conventionality of such logic and mathematics, just as there is no doubt about the multiplication table now. However, this is the most remarkable thing in thought, that it has this necessary structure, and not another. Let no other structure be conceivable or even unimaginable for us. But this is the mystery that only one definite structure is conceivable to us.

3. a) Of course, it is possible not to ask such a question at all, and then we will not fix any mystery, but will only give a purely rationalistic picture of the content of thought that is really given to us. But it is impossible to suppress this question in yourself. And it is not justified blindly psychologically, but, above all, purely logically, since the structure of thought that we actually find is, abstractly speaking, only one of the possible types of the structure of thought in general. Either we must say why this particular structure of thought and not this one has a logical necessity, or we must fix the impossibility of answering this question. We cannot answer this question. But not only do we not answer this question. We also point the finger at the nebulous, abyss of the very same thing, which is the ultimate culprit and absolute reason for the fact that existence is just like this and not another. But this also means to record the fact of mystery, the mystery of the first conception of thought in general, and of all its real structure and life.

(b) The same idea, and from a purely logical standpoint, can be presented in another way. Being is being. In this form, of course, it is neither light nor darkness, nor my room, nor America, nor anything else at all. It is it, and nothing else. But if this is so, if there is really nothing with which it coincides, at least partially, then this means that it contains absolutely no differences in itself. If it were anything, it would already be a partial coincidence of it with what it is not. But it is not something. It is only itself, and nothing else. In this case, it contains absolutely no differences in itself, it is indistinguishable from anything, and it is also indistinguishable within itself. But in this case being is a secret inscrutability and namelessness, a complete unknowability and incomprehensibility, in the same way as the very itself, is also above all distinction and cognition. But earlier we spoke in general about the very thing itself, and now we speak specifically about being. It turns out that being also has its own self with all its characteristics that are already familiar to us. And with all this unexpectedness, being exists absolutely everywhere, for everywhere it is it, and everywhere it is, before it is this or that and before it possesses this or that quality, everywhere it is first itself, i.e., the super-rational, prelogical self of being.

Thus, this pre-logic nature of being is seen not only from general reasoning about the self itself, but is also fully demonstrable by purely logical arguments.

4. We have said above that not only does the category of being itself have the character of mystery, but the whole concrete life of reason and being is the same. However, we formulate the most important circumstance which, along with the category of being, is the basis of the entire categorical life of the mind.

(a) As soon as we have posited and affirmed being, we have at the same moment found ourselves in a whole system of beliefs, which at first is not even possible to take into account. As long as we had the very same before any assumptions, there was, of course, no system of assumptions, i.e., there was no method of these assumptions itself. But as soon as we put down at least being, the whole picture changed at once, and we found ourselves in the crossfire of a whole cloud of the most difficult categories, which suddenly appeared from somewhere around our "being" and imperiously demanded their recognition.