Prot. Johann Meyendorff

The development of the practice and theology of penance in the Byzantine world differed from their similar development in the West in that the East never knew the influence of legitimate interpretations of salvation, such as Anselm's teaching on "satisfaction." In addition, the East has never faced crises comparable to the Western Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and the latter, as is known, placed special emphasis on the authority of the clergy.

Patristic and Byzantine literature on repentance is mainly of an exclusively ascetic and moral nature. Very few authors of ascetic treatises on repentance mention the sacramental absolution of sins as a formal requirement. This silence does not mean that sacramental repentance did not exist; but except in cases of formal excommunication from Communion, which was to be followed by formal reconciliation with the Church, such repentance was encouraged, but it was not insisted upon as something obligatory. In his innumerable appeals to repentance, Chrysostom often mentions "confession," that is, the opening of one's own conscience in the presence of a witness or "before the Church"; But one gets the impression that he did not at all mean regular confession in church. In nine sermons that he specifically devoted to "repentance," he mentions the Church as the immediate comforter only once: "Have you sinned? Enter the Church and repent of your sin. … Are you already old, but are you still sinning? Enter [the Church], repent; after all, this is a doctor, not a judge; here they do not interrogate, here they absolve sins" (482).

The French church historian is apparently right when he writes: "The Byzantines rarely went to confession, at least the laity, while in the monasteries... confession was practiced regularly. But was it a confession or simply an instruction from a spiritual father that guided the conscience of a simple layman? Both customs existed, and in the monasteries they were indistinguishable from each other."

Ascetic and canonical literature often mentions the requirements for the penitent – the periods of time for which the sinner is excommunicated from church communion, the prostrations and charity required as retribution for sins committed and confessed; But if we are not talking about "mortal" sins – murder, apostasy, adultery – which entail formal excommunication, then nowhere is there evidence that the absolution of sins pronounced by the priest was considered necessary for the sealing of the act of repentance. On the contrary, many sources describe the permissions given by unordained monks,484 and this custom has been preserved in Eastern monasteries to this day.

The various forms of absolution or absolution of sins, found in the Byzantine "doxologies" (euchologia) and penitentials (penitential books),485 are always framed as prayer. "In the East," writes A. Almazov, "it has always been understood that permission is expressed through prayer, and even if some kind of prayer was used; declarative formula, it implied that the remission of sins belongs to God alone" (486). All declarative formulas (I, an unworthy priest, ... I forgive and absolve..."), which crept into some Eastern Greek and Slavic "euchologies", have a post-scholastic Latin origin and were assimilated within the framework of the general Latinization of the Byzantine rite.

Byzantine theologians themselves were uncertain about the exact status of penance among the mysteria (sacraments) of the Church, and often placed it in their list of sacraments along with monastic tonsure and anointing of the sick. By the fifteenth century, however, personal confession to a priest, followed by a prayer of absolution, had become a common custom among the laity, and confession to unordained monks continued to exist in monasteries as an alternative. This lack of clarity both in practice and in theological justification had a positive consequence: after all, repentance was interpreted primarily as a kind of spiritual therapy. For sin in Eastern Christian anthropology is, first of all, an ailment, a "passion." Without denying Peter's privileged right to the keys granted to the entire episcopate, or the apostolic authority to absolve sins, and the Church is the bearer of this authority, Byzantine theologians never succumbed to the temptation to reduce sin to the concept of crime, which entails the pronouncement of sentence, punishment or forgiveness. No, Byzantine theologians always remembered that a sinner is first of all a prisoner of Satan and as such is mortally ill. For this reason, confession and repentance, at least in the ideal conception of them, have retained the features of liberation and healing, and not of judgment. Hence the great variety of forms and customs, along with the impossibility of confining this diversity within the framework of some inert theological categories.

4. Marriage

The Byzantine theological, liturgical and canonical tradition unanimously emphasizes the absolute uniqueness of Christian marriage, relying on the 5th chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians. As a sacrament (mysterion), the marriage union reflects the union between Christ and the Church, between Yahweh and Israel, and therefore can only be one thing – an eternal bond that cannot be destroyed by death itself. In its sacramental nature, marriage transforms and transcends the corporeal, carnal union, and the contractual union supported by a contract concluded according to the law: human love is projected into the eternal Kingdom of God.

Only such a fundamental understanding of Christian marriage can explain the fact that until the tenth century, no remarriage, whether by widows or divorcees, was blessed in the Church. Referring to the custom of "coronation" of the married couple – which is a characteristic feature of the Byzantine rite of marriage – the canon attributed to Nicephorus the Confessor (806-815) specifies: "Those who enter into a second marriage are not married and are not admitted to the most pure sacraments for two years; those who enter into a third marriage are excommunicated for five years" (487). This text, which only repeats the earlier prescriptions of the canons of Basil 488, suggests that the second and third marriages of widowed or divorced persons can only be considered civil contracts. In fact, if the marriage received the blessing given at the Eucharist, where the newlyweds received communion, then the temporary excommunication required excluded the participation of the Church or its blessing in cases where remarriages were entered.

The absolute uniqueness as a norm of Christian marriage was also affirmed by the increased demands of Byzantine canon law on the clergy: a person who was married twice, or by his first marriage, but to a widow or divorced, was not recognized as a suitable candidate for ordination to the deacon or priesthood. But the laity, after a period of repentance and excommunication from the sacraments of the Church, were again admitted to full communion with the Church, even after the second or third marriage; Understanding and tolerance extended to them when they either could not accept solitude or decided to take a second chance to create a truly Christian marriage. It is obvious that the Byzantine tradition approached the question of remarriage – after widowhood or divorce – within the framework of penitential discipline. Marriage as a Sacrament implies the receipt of the grace of God; But for this grace to work, human participation ("synergy") is necessary. This is true of all the sacraments, but especially of Baptism, the fruits of which can be squandered by sin and regained through repentance. As for marriage, which presupposes a personal understanding and psychological adjustment of two people, the Byzantine custom recognized the possibility of initial error, at the same time agreeing that living alone, in cases of death of the partner or simply his absence, is a greater evil than the remarriage of those who are unable to "endure" loneliness.

The possibility of divorce in all eras remained an integral part of Byzantine civil law. Within the framework of the "symphony," i.e., the agreement between Church and State, the right to divorce has never been disputed, a fact that cannot be explained by reference to Caesaropapism alone. In the Byzantine Church there has never been a shortage of saints who are always ready to condemn imperial despotism, social injustice, and other evils contrary to the Gospel. John Chrysostom (398-404), Theodore the Studite (d. 820), or Patriarch Polyeuctus (956-970) found the strength to fearlessly oppose the authorities; None of them, however, opposed the divorce law. Obviously, they considered divorce to be an inevitable factor in human life in a fallen world, where man is free to accept grace and to reject it; where sin is inevitable, but repentance is always available; where the ecclesiastical will not be a compromise that betrays the norms of the Gospel, but sympathy and mercy for human weakness.

This approach of the Byzantine Church was maintained quite strictly as long as the primary functions of the Church (the Church must strive for the presence of the Kingdom of God in human life) and the functions of the state (it must govern fallen humanity, choosing the lesser evil and maintaining order by legal means) remained clearly distinguished. On the question of marriage, this essential distinction disappeared (at least in practice) when the Emperor Leo VI (d. 912) issued his Novella, which formally gave the Church the legal duty to certify the validity of all marriages. Civil marriage as a legitimate option for the life of free citizens disappeared; and soon, quite logically, Alexius I Comnenus made it the duty of slaves to formalize marriage in the Church. By these decrees, the imperial power theoretically granted the Church formal control over the marital behavior of all citizens. In reality, however, the Church was shifted direct responsibility for those inevitable compromises that had previously been resolved by the possibility of civil marriages and divorces, while at the same time the possibility of applying penitential customs disappeared. Once the Church had gained legitimate authority over the institution of marriage, it now had to cope with the legal difficulties of its new responsibility. Of course, it began to "grant divorces" (previously they were allowed only by secular courts) and to allow "remarriages" in churches; After all, without such a "remarriage", the second or third marriage, according to the new law, would remain legally null and void. True, the Church achieved the recognition of the complete invalidity of the fourth marriage (at the Council in 920), but she had to make concessions on many other issues.