Byzantine Fathers of the V-VIII centuries

III. World Order

1. Cataphatic theology, as the doctrine of Divine Providence, is at the same time cosmology. The image of the world in Dionysius is determined, first of all, by the idea of order and harmony, or "well-being" (εύταξία), the idea of the Divine world... The foundation of this world is in the ineffable peace of the Divine life, which is also revealed in the world order and order. God is the God of peace. Everything in the world is harmonious and consonant, everything is built and harmonized with each other; and nothing loses its originality, but is formed into a living harmony. This world is the Divine seal in the world. It is manifested, first of all, in the hierarchy, in the hierarchy of the world. Hierarchy, according to the definition of Dionysius, is "a sacred order, knowledge and activity, which is as similar as possible to the Divine beauty and, with the illumination communicated to it from above, is directed towards the possible imitation of God." The goal of hierarchy is "possible assimilation to God and union with Him"... "It imprints in itself the image of God and creates its partakers with divine likenesses, the clearest and purest mirrors, so that they also begin to reflect and communicate to their lower selves the Divine radiance acceptable to them." This is the Divine institution. Divine Beauty is above all, it is above all that is sacred, it is the cause of every sacred order. Everything is directed to it to the best of their ability, in order to become co-workers with God, "and as far as possible to discover in themselves the Divine activity" — by imitation of God. The order of hierarchy requires that some should enlighten and perfect, others should be enlightened and perfected. The higher must communicate their illumination and purity to the lower. The beginning of the hierarchy is the Holy Trinity, the source of life and unity. Hierarchy is a step-by-step system of the world. There are stages in the world determined by the degree of closeness to God. God is all in all. But it doesn't matter in everything... By nature, not everything is still close to God. But between these centers, as it were, retreating, there is a living and uninterrupted connection, and all exist for others, so that only the fullness of everything fulfills the purpose of the world. Everything strives towards God, but it strives through the intermediary, through the environment of closer concentrations. Except with the assistance of the higher, the lower cannot ascend to God. Dionysius adheres to this flattering principle very strictly. Thus, order turns out to be a way and an action. The goal of the hierarchy is love for God and communion with Him. 2. Everything was created by God for Himself, i.e. for good and bliss, for peace and beauty, so that everything would aspire to Him and, uniting with Him, partaking of Him, would be inwardly united with each other. Throughout the world, right up to non-existence, one can observe this reciprocity, this attraction, moved and moved by love and beauty. This is reflected both in the external world and in the inner life of the soul. Everything gravitates towards a single focus, all lines converge like reverse radiants into a single center. However, does this not result in a false harmony, does not the existence of evil be seen? Dionysius answers this question, perhaps too briefly... God cannot be the cause of evil. The good always gives rise to only the good. Therefore, evil "is not any being." It has a completely depriving meaning, it is a belittlement, a deficiency, a falling away. Evil does not exist in itself, but in another, and is something accidental for being, surplus, not included in its essential determinations... Evil only destroys, and therefore presupposes existence and good, evil does not create anything and is not the true beginning of origin... Therefore, there can be no pure, unalloyed evil, there can be no "self-evil"... Evil always presupposes good as its foundation and support. The demons themselves are not evil by nature, like the creatures of God; there is something positive in them – being, movement, life... Evil cannot be an independent principle, for then it would have to be unchanging. But immutability and self-identity are peculiar only to good. Evil is corruption and is like darkness; But light always remains light, and shines even in darkness, without turning into darkness. Nothing that exists is evil as such—it is neither evil nor matter. Evil is discord, disorder, άταξία; But pure discord is impossible, the complete absence of species and order is tantamount to non-existence. Matter is not complete chaos — it partakes of order and forms. It has the power of birth and preservation. It is not matter as such, but the attraction to the lower that is the cause of evil in the soul; — and matter in itself does not prevent souls from striving for good. The beginning and the end of evil things are in good; In other words, evil does not so much exist as it "exists", "is present", exists in the other and on the other... Evil is diminishment, its cause is impotence (άσθένεια) — in all evil deeds and phenomena we see first of all weakness. Evil is a certain protrusion from the measures of nature and being, a "deviation from true goodness", an unjust and improper action, a kind of "mixture of the unlike"... In this discourse on the essence and causes of evil, the alleged Dionysius follows almost literally the words of Proclus, whose treatise on evil has come down to us only in a Latin translation, de malorum subsistentià, made by the Dominican William Merbeke, who at the end of the thirteenth century was the Latin archbishop of Corinth. However, it should not be forgotten that the Neoplatonic view of evil was already familiar to theological thought—suffice it to recall Gregory of Nyssa. And the definitions of the imaginary Dionysius, taken from Proclus, coincide in meaning with the definitions of Gregory... In Dionysius, it remains unclear what the final fate of evil is... Will the once malignant impotence be leveled out, will the harmonious fullness of being, disturbed by evil as deprivation, be fulfilled? Or is it evil, even if it is a false face, or a semi-phantom accident, existing by the force of good and for the sake of good, paradoxically enters into the very harmony and order? Dionysius does not finish here. But it is very characteristic that he speaks of evil only in passing, as if in parentheses. 3. At the top of the created ladder stand the heavenly ranks of angels, "an innumerably blessed host of worldly minds"... Their perfection is determined by the high and predominant degree of communion with God accessible and inherent in them. In the pure spirituality of their nature, they are closest to God, and therefore they are intermediaries in His revelation to the world, messengers of His will and His mysteries. This ministry expresses the name of "angels," which is applicable to the entire heavenly world; in the strict sense, it is the name of only one of the heavenly ranks, and the lowest one at that. By their very nature, not only by perfection, angels are higher than man; it is through them that God's revelation is accomplished, and only through them. "The activity of every hierarchy is divided into the sacred acceptance by themselves and the communication to others of true purification, divine light, and perfecting knowledge." The angels were the leaders of the Old Testament righteous, the law was given to Moses through the angels, the Archangel Gabriel brought the mysterious gospel to Zechariah and Mary, the angels preached the gospel to Joseph and the shepherds of Bethlehem... The heavenly world itself has a hierarchical structure, and not all the angelic ranks are equally proficient in divine enlightenment; and here the lower receive from the higher. In the view of Dionysius, the angelic world is a single whole and at the same time a ladder. Knowledge and perfection "in their passage to the lower ones gradually weakens," he notes. All angels to a certain extent participate in the Godhead and the light communicated from him. But at the same time, the higher are the mediators and leaders of the lower, constantly participate in the providential power, and themselves have the light and powers of the lower; but the lower ranks do not have what belongs to the higher... The mysteries of the most heavenly minds are not accessible to us, except to the extent "to the extent that God has revealed to us through them as knowing themselves," i.e. to the extent of the angelic apparitions "that were to the holy theologians." We learn about angels in certain foreshadowing symbols, from which we must ascend to the signified, from sensual images to spiritual simplicity. Images do not resemble the signified—they are coarse; and this sets off the height of the signified. The images seem to hide the sacred with a kind of sacred veil from carnal minds. Our life is not bound by necessity, and the Divine rays of heavenly enlightenment are not darkened by the free will of beings governed by Providence; but the inequality of the spiritual gaze leads to the fact that the degrees of enlightenment are different, and even the communion of abundant enlightenment ceases altogether. However, "the source ray is one and simple, always the same and always abundant." Dionysius systematizes the already established church teaching about the nine ranks of angels, dividing them into three threefold groups. The first and highest triad is the Cherubim, Seraphim, and Thrones, standing "as if in the vestibule of the Godhead," at the very Trinitarian sanctuary, "around God," in the closest, closest proximity to Him. They have access to the direct and unmediated knowledge of the Divine mysteries. They live and seem to be permeated with an ineffable light, contemplating God in a bright light. These are the flaming or burning seraphim, and the cherubim abounding in knowledge and wisdom; these names are the names of their God-like properties. The fiery nature of the seraphim signifies the fiery nature of their love—they are ruled by God Himself. They transmit Divine knowledge to the lower ranks and "are the rivers of wisdom." This first hierarchy, one, one-packed, which is more God-like, which is closest to the first illumination from the Original Divine light, surpasses all visible and invisible created power. This is "God's home and in all things similar to Him." Their love for God is completely unchangeable; and they "keep the foundation of their God-like nature always unshaken and immovable." They possess "a completely simple knowledge of the highest light", "have close communion with the divine and human qualities of Jesus"... They are sanctified directly from God, "illumined by simple and immediate illuminations," and from the Good itself they learn the all-wise causes of His Divine works. And from them the lower learn. They participate in the initial knowledge and knowledge of the "most radiant mysteries," and through this they are pure, illuminated, and perfect. These are the "God-like hierarchy," the "Divine places of God's rest." They have "a more intimate and clearer illumination", simple, singular, primordial, primordial, more integral... The second hierarchy is Dominions, Powers, Powers. Only secondary illumination is available to them, indirectly through the ranks of the first hierarchy... Still lower is the third hierarchy, the Principalities, the Archangels, and the Angels. The order of angels encloses the ladder of heavenly minds. They are closest to the earth, they are like "angels of peace." Angels are assigned to each people, they lead the earthly hierarchy... Here the heavenly and earthly worlds seem to close. And it turns out to be a descending ladder of insights and revelations... It is as if God belittles His insights and makes unknown some of His mysteries, in relation to the diminishing capacity of beings... In the understanding of Dionysius, this is an immutable order. "Each order is an interpreter and messenger of the highest itself, and the highest is the interpreter of God." In essence, the angelic world seems to overshadow God for man. There is no straight path; and this reveals a kind of ambiguity in the Christological ideas of Dionysius. He speaks comparatively seldom of Christ. True, in the Incarnation of the Word he recognizes the fullness and fulfillment of the Manifestations of God, but he overemphasizes the ineffability and mystery of this phenomenon. The Divinity remains hidden after this phenomenon and even in the phenomenon itself. The image of the God-Man was not for Dionysius the focus of his spiritual experience... Dionysius continues the old Alexandrian tradition, clearly expressed in Clement and especially in Origen, sharply colored by the late Judaic and Hellenistic motif of the mediation. Perhaps there is even a certain echo of Gnostic "genealogies" here. In any case, the idea of hierarchy acquires too harsh features in Dionysius. In the name of principle, he corrects even the Holy Scriptures. Thus, he does not agree to see in the seraphim who appeared to the prophet Isaiah a real seraphim. (Isaiah 6:6). Either it was an angel called a seraphim for the sake of his fiery service, or through the intermediary of an angel a seraphim acted, to whom the angel assimilates his action, as the first performer of the Divine mysteries... Dionysius concludes his sketch of the "heavenly hierarchy" with a fairly detailed analysis of the symbolic images under which the angels are described and appear in Scripture. He emphasizes the mystery of the angelic world and its inaccessibility to human understanding. 4. The purpose of life is in communion with God, in deification... For this purpose, a hierarchy has been established. Deification is assimilation and union with God. Assimilation, but not merging, the immutable facet of Divine inaccessibility always remains unbroken. This assimilation extends to the whole world, not only to rational and verbal beings, but to each type of creature to the appropriate extent... Only the highest heavenly ranks have access to the "first and predominant deification"... The concept of deification in Dionysius is sometimes almost dissolved in the concept of peace and harmony, consonance and unity, almost merges with the concept of the natural God-likeness of everything that exists.

IV. Worship

1. The mysticism of Dionysius is liturgical or sacramental mysticism. The path to God leads through the Church and through the sacraments. Divine services are the path of deification and sanctification. For the imaginary Dionysius, the Church is, first of all, the world of the sacraments; it is in the sacraments and through the sacraments that communion with God is realized. Jesus, the divine and super-existent Mind, calls us to the perfect unity of the divine life and elevates us to the priesthood. Jesus is the beginning of every hierarchy, both heavenly, earthly, and ecclesiastical. In the church hierarchy, we are elevated to the angelic world. It can be said that the church hierarchy or priesthood is the highest level in the sensual world, directly adjacent to the heavenly world of pure spirits. In this sense, the earthly Church is an "image" of the heavenly Church – such a comparison was made by Clement of Alexandria... The essence of the earthly hierarchy is in revelation, in the "God-given words." This tradition is not exhausted by Scripture, but also includes oral, secret tradition from the Apostles — here Dionysius resembles the Alexandrians... The hierarch preserves and transmits this tradition, conveys it in sensual symbols, as if concealing the Divine mysteries from the uninitiated. Dionysius emphasizes the motif of mystery. This is required not only by the secrecy of the Divinity itself, and not only by reverence for the sacred—"pure only for the pure"—but also by the benefit of the uninitiated, the unprepared, and the novices themselves. In addition, the beginning of hierarchy requires that at different levels knowledge be revealed to different degrees. The outermost symbols (disciplina arсani) should not be accessible to the outer ones. And then knowledge and enlightenment grow in stages. In the Church, Dionysius distinguishes two triple circles. The first is the sacred ranks, "hierurgi". The second is "the ranks of those who are performed"... The dribbling is passed from top to bottom. The highest rank is episcopal. Dionysius calls it simply: "the order of hierarchs." This is the perfect and final rite, the summit of the hierarchy, the source of power and sacrament. The priests are responsible for education. Deacons or "liturgies" serve as "purification." It is they who deal with the still unenlightened, they prepare them for baptism, they guide those who are baptized, as if grafting them into a new life. They stand on the verge of the sacred rank and the worldly. The presbyters have further guidance, they explain symbols and rites to the enlightened. The bishop alone has the right to perform a sacramental service, in which he is served by presbyters... In the secular circle, Dionysius again distinguishes three ranks, corresponding to the three degrees of priesthood. The lowest order is still in need of purification: catechumens, penitents, possessed. The second order, "contemplative," is the "sacred people," ίερоς λάоς. They contemplate "sacred symbols and their hidden meaning"... The highest category is monks or "therapeuts". They are led by the bishop himself, but they are ordained by the presbyters. According to the interpretation of Dionysius, the name of a monk shows the integral and indivisible, "uniform" or monadic life that they should lead. They must direct their spirit to the "God-like monad," they must overcome all dispersion, they must gather and unite their spirit, so that the Divine monad may be imprinted in it. Dionysius calls the initiation or "performance" of monks a sacrament, and later in Byzantium monastic tonsure was usually considered a sacrament. However, Dionysius sharply emphasizes that monasticism is not a degree of priesthood, and monks are ordained for personal practice, and not for the guidance of others. They are to obey the priestly offices, particularly the elders. Therefore, monks are ordained not through the laying on of hands, and without kneeling before the altar. The priest reads a prayer ("epiclesis"), the initiate pronounces the renunciation of vices and "imagination" (from "fantasy"), — the priest signs him crosswise, with the invocation of the Trinitarian name, tonsures his hair, dresses him in new clothes, and gives him a kiss. Such was the ancient rite of initiation, in which the main place is occupied by the vow... 2. Dionysius speaks of three "sacred rites" – Baptism, Eucharist and Chrismation... Baptism opens the entrance to the Church. Dionysius calls it "enlightenment," "God's birth," or "regeneration." Baptism is performed by the bishop, but together with all the presbytery, and among the holy people, who by their consent ("Amen") seal the sacred rite. Baptismal education gives, first of all, self-knowledge. And for each person who is baptized, as one who enters into communion with God, an integral and collected life, a striving for immutability, is obligatory... Baptism is compensated by the Anointing, which is also performed by the bishop. Dionysius connects the "mystery of the world" with the idea of Divine beauty, which is signified by the fragrance of the world. Dionysius interprets in detail the symbolic actions of the sacraments, his interpretations often resemble Cyril of Jerusalem. It can be thought that it conveys a generally accepted interpretation, but at the same time strives for symmetry and parallelism, hence the sometimes violent comparisons. Attention is drawn to the constant use of expressions taken from the use of the mysteries, often instead of names and words sanctified by church custom. It is hardly accidental, but rather with intention, in order to contrast with particular clarity the true "mysteries" of the Church with the imaginary pagan "sacraments." The focus of sacramental life is the Eucharist, "the sacrament of assembly or communion," as Dionysius calls it. This is primarily the sacrament of union with the One, the completion or fulfillment of every accomplishment, the "completion of union"... An outward sign of unity is communion from one cup and one bread — those who partake of one food must be uniform... In all the symbolism of the Eucharistic service, Dionysius sees and emphasizes precisely this motif. 3. The last chapter of the book "On the Church Hierarchy" is devoted to the description and symbolic explanation of funeral rites. Dionysius speaks first of the fate of the faithful after death — "unfading life," eternal youth, full of light, radiance, bliss... This joy is a reward for podvig and loyalty, and therefore not equal blessedness is prepared for everyone. The path of death is the path of sacred rebirth, the path of "palingenesis." For the resurrection is prepared for all. And in the fulfillment of the terms, the body will also be called to a blessed life. This hope determines the joyful character of the funeral rite. It is curious that catechumens, as they are still external, are not allowed to be present at the final prayers of the burial, at the reading of the prayer of absolution, although penitents and possessed people are allowed. This is because burial is an intra-church and church-wide prayer, a brotherly prayer and action. Prayer for the departed, and especially the prayer of absolution, is a movement of mysterious love. And it is exalted by the bishop, the supreme hierarch of the community, "the messenger of Divine justifications." The last kiss is a symbol of brotherly bond and love. And, finally, the buried person is anointed with oil, as he was anointed at the beginning of his Christian path, at baptism...

Writers of the VI and VII centuries

I. Leontius of Byzantium

Part 1

1. With the name of Leontius, a number of important dogmatic and polemical works have been preserved in many manuscripts. However, it is very difficult and difficult to establish who this Leontius was. Writers of the sixth century do not mention Leontius of Byzantium at all, neither historians nor theologians; nor does St. Maximus the Confessor speak of him. In the VII century, Leontius is mentioned by Patr. Sophronius in the enumeration of men and fathers who "piously taught" about Christ. Anastasius the Sinaite cites many excerpts from his works. But this Leontius undoubtedly lived much earlier, in the time of Justinian. In his writings there is no mention of the Fifth Ecumenical Council, of the condemnation of the "three chapters," of the condemnation of the Origenists. The writer's persistence in defending the Council of Chalcedon, his vehemence in objecting to the Monophysites and Nestorians — all this would have been belated already at the end of the 5th century... The nickname "Byzantine" may indicate not only the place of birth, but also the place of his original activity, probably the latter: in the title of his work "On the Sects" Leontius is called a "Byzantine scholastic." "Scholastic," i.e., a lawyer, although this name was also used in a figurative sense, in the sense of a learned man in general. In any case, Leontius the writer had a serious philosophical training and showed great dialectical resourcefulness in religious disputes. In his youth, by his own admission, he was a Nestorian. He was led out of error by "divine men," i.e., monks; and he himself became a monk (as he is called by Pat. Sophronius and Pat. German) Apparently a monk of Jerusalem. The paucity of biographical information prompted modern historians to guess Leontius the writer in other Leontii known in the history of the VI century. All these attempts must be recognized as unsuccessful. In particular, it is unfounded to identify him with that Leontius, also of Byzantium, about whom, as a zealous Origenist, it is told in the lives of St. Sava the Sanctified and Cyriacus the Hermit. In the writings of Leontius, not only are there no Origenistic motifs, but the impious "Origenian dogmas" (subordination, pre-existence of souls, apocatastasis) are directly and decisively rejected. And besides, there is no mention of the writing activity of Leontius the Origenist in the sources. Obviously, there were some reasons why Leonty's life as a writer remained in the shadows, although his works became more famous and widespread. We cannot unravel them. 2. The works of Leontius have been preserved in many copies, of which the oldest dates back to the ninth or tenth century. If the author's face is unclear, the question of his writer's heritage will always remain doubtful and controversial. First of all, it is necessary to mention the book "Against the Nestorians and Eutychians" — this is a record of oral disputes with heretics. The spelling should be attributed to the time after 527-8 and even after 535 (Antioch is called here Theupolis, and it was renamed so under Patriarch Ephraim, after the earthquake of 527-528, and then the separation of the "Severians" and "Julianists" is considered to have taken place here, which took place after the death of the Monophysite Patriarch of Alexandria Timothy Elurus in 535), but in any case before the condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia at the Fifth Ecumenical Council. The author refutes his "impiety", but does not speak of conciliar condemnation. In this book, Leontius analyzes the basic Christological terms and tries to establish their exact meaning, and then offers a positive revelation of Orthodox teaching, in particular on the question of the suffering and death of Christ. In the last part, devoted to Nestorianism, the author dwells on the analysis of the views of Diodorus and Theodore and cites many excerpts from their works and from the works of Nestorius. In conclusion of his reasoning, Leontius cites a collection of patristic testimonies. To this book is adjoined a short work against Severus, "30 Chapters Against Severus." It is a brief compilation, a schematic list of the issues on which Severus differs from the Church. Questions of terminology occupy a large place here as well. To this also belongs the dialogue between the Orthodox and the Acephalus called "Epilysis", an analysis of the arguments of Severus, made in addition to the previous books. A special place among the works of Leontius is occupied by the book "Against the Deceptions of the Apollinarians". In the history of Monophysitism, the so-called "forgeries of the Apollinarians" played a great and fatal role. Many of Apollinarius' writings were hidden and as it were booked under the false inscription of respected and revered names. Trust in such pseudo-patristic works greatly hindered the Alexandrian theologians in their dogmatic confession (suffice it to recall St. Cyril). It is difficult to reconstruct the exact history of these "forgeries" (false inscriptions). But they were especially widespread in the Monophysite environment. Already Eutychius, in his appeal to Pope Leo at the Council of Constantinople in 448, referred to the alleged testimony of Popes Julius, Athanasius, and Gregory (the Wonderworker) — he referred in good faith, not suspecting a "forgery." Emperor Marcian in his letter to the Palestinian monks noted that the books of Apollinarius, passed off as sayings of the Holy Fathers, were being distributed among the people. Justinian also mentions forgeries and forgeries. The historian Evagrius speaks of the influence of these forgeries: the inscription of revered names (Athanasius, Gregory, Julius) on the books of Apollinaris restrained many from condemning the impious opinions contained in them. At the well-known "conference" of 531-533 with the Seberians, Hypatius of Ephesus rejected a number of patristic references by pointing to falsity, i.e. false inscription... Under such circumstances, the disclosure and proof of forgeries became an acute and immediate task of theological polemics. In the solution of this problem, the most prominent place belongs to Leontius of Byzantium. His predecessor was John of Scythopolis, of whose works Leontius speaks with great praise. The works of John of Scythopolis have been lost, which increases the interest of Leontius' works for us. In his book, he collected a lot of material. He adduces false testimonies and compares them with the true judgments of those persons to whom they are attributed. He does the same in his book Against the Monophysites. On the other hand, he compares these testimonies with the indubitable texts of Apollinaris and his disciples and shows their coincidence in meaning. In this connection, Leontius has to enter into a detailed analysis of Apollinarianism. Leontius' critical arguments are distinguished by great accuracy and persuasiveness. Other works by Leonty have come down to us in a reworked, not in their original form and composition. Such, apparently, is the extensive "Treatise Against the Nestorians" in seven books, rich in historical material. The text is constantly interrupted, the plan is confused, there are significant differences in the style of the individual parts – this makes us see here a later revision. The same must be said about the book Against the Monophysites. Here, moreover, the later insertions are clearly visible, indicating events and circumstances of another time. The book "On the Sects" or "Scholia," as its very inscription in the manuscripts shows, has been preserved in a paraphrase by a certain Theodore, written down "from his voice" (under his dictation). It is difficult to say who this Theodore was, "the most God-loving abba and the wisest philosopher." The Scholia are undoubtedly written down from a living voice — traces of living colloquial speech are clearly visible in the text known to us. Subsequently, the book was once again revised, with later insertions. In its content, the book "On Sects" presents a systematic collection of hereseologic material in a historical order, with particular detail in the Christological sections. The very damage of Leontius' works testifies to the fact that they were in frequent use. They were rewritten with abbreviations, excerpts were made from them. Such is the origin of the so-called "fragments" or "scholia" of Leontius, extracted from various collections. Perhaps, however, it is also the individual notes of Leontius himself. It has been suggested that these are excerpts from an extensive polemical work by Leontius (similar to the collection known as The Teaching of the Ancient Fathers on the Incarnation of the Word (late 7th or early 7th century) or the "Guide" of Anastasius the Sinaite, 7th century) and that all the works of Leontius that have survived in general are also a reworking of this main work. Such an assumption is not justified by a closer examination. The question of ancient summaries of patristic testimonies and notes requires, however, a new and further study.

Part 2

3. As a polemicist and theologian, Leontius is first of all a scholastic and dialectician. First of all, he strives for a firm and precise definition of the basic concepts, which was required of him by the very state of theological questions in his time; It was necessary to mint and philosophically substantiate a uniform and complete Christological terminology. But Leonty does not stop there. He seeks to base his theological confession not so much on "natural reasoning" as on the "testimony of the Scriptures," from "the Divine Scriptures and the Holy Fathers." In particular, he makes extensive use of the fathers. In them he sees "wonderful counselors of the Holy Spirit." They did not speak of themselves, but the Spirit of the Father spoke in them, and therefore not to accept the fathers, glorious and famous in the Church, means to resist the command of God. Leontius attaches decisive importance to "agreement with the fathers." For this reason, he added to his writings special collections or "flower beds" of patristic texts. Especially frequent and abundant are references to St. Cyril and to the Cappadocians. However, Leontius treats the testimonies of the fathers not without criticism: "It is proper to take care not of words, but of thoughts; and if there is any new word, since it meets its purpose and agrees with the originally professed Orthodoxy, it must be respected and honored as appropriate." On the contrary, "if any saying used in the Holy Scriptures and in the Holy Fathers, due to impious innovation, is transferred by someone away from the true meaning, then it should be rejected and turned away from them, as from clever cheaters who forge not only the image, but not the inscription" (on coins)... In his theological work, Leontius was guided primarily by the polemical needs and tasks of the time. He was not a taxonomist. If he built a system, it was only in order to eliminate the ambiguity or polysemy of the unspoken patristic testimony that is favorable for heretical reinterpretations. "A general war has been raised about the image of unity, of which many know nothing and doubt it," says Leontius: "therefore it is necessary to philosophize in order to find out what we agree with and what we do not"... Relying on the Fathers ("I take everything from the Fathers!"), Leontius subjects the old and indisputable definitions to a strict analysis, brings them into a harmonious and complete system. Most of all, he relies on St. Cyril, he wants to be an interpreter of his Christology. The Monophysites, in their struggle against the "Synodites," emphasized the divergence of the formulas of St. Cyril and the Oros of Chalcedon. And Leontius first of all tries to show that despite the apparent disagreement and non-coincidence of verbal formulas, St. Cyril and the Chalcedonian Fathers said one and the same thing. On the other hand, he tries to draw a clear line of demarcation between Orthodox teaching and Severian Christology. 4. In dogmatic polemics, first of all, precision and firmness of concepts were required. Leontius, in his Christological usage, repeats the teachers of the second century, and most of all the Cappadocians. The concept of nature, φύσις, is identified with the concept of essence, oύσία. "Nature" indicates, first of all, the community of origin, the unity of the species. And at the same time, the "natural" is something innate or innate. "Nature" is a general concept, a generalizing concept, pointing to the general in things. But only separate or individual things really exist—"nature" is real only in them, in a multitude of individuals. The concept of "essence" has the same meaning. In this Leontius is a consistent Aristotelian. Following the Cappadocians, Leontius defines hypostasis as particular, special, concrete. "Nature" (or "essence") and hypostasis are related as general and particular (or rather, singular). Leontius is aware of the previous vacillations in the definition of these concepts and explains them by inconsistency. However, what is characteristic of Leontius' concept of hypostasis is not its great concreteness. Hypostasis means, first of all, "independent existence" (τό καθ' έαυτόν είναι)—there are only hypostases ("individuals"), and there is no (i.e., non-hypostatic nature). "Nature" is real only in "hypostases", in "indivisible" (in "atoms" or individuals). Everything that exists is hypostatic, i.e. individual. But in the spiritual world, the hypostasis is a person, "a person existing in itself" (cf. in the Chalcedonian Oros). Then Leontius made a very important reservation and introduced a new concept. If there is no "hypostatic" nature, this does not mean that nature is real only in its own individualizations or hypostases. Nature can also be "realized" in another hypostasis, in a hypostasis (or "indivisible") of a different kind (of a different nature). In other words, there are not only "one-natured" individuals or hypostases, but also complex ones: in them, with the unity (or singularity) of the hypostasis, we observe the reality of two or many natures in the fullness of their natural properties. Thus, "man" is a single hypostasis of two different natures, soul and body, defined by different "natural" concepts. "Hypostasis" is not an individualizing attribute. One can say more, it is not a sign at all. "Hypostasis" is the beginning of division and differentiation, not so much "distinction" ("natures" differ from each other in their essential characteristics), but precisely "divisions"... hypostasis is a 'separate', 'separate existence', a 'limit'... In complex hypostases, one nature is realized in the hypostasis of another... It is real "in hypostasis", but not necessarily in its own ... Thus Leontius establishes the concept of "hypostasis", τό ένυπόστατоν. "Ύπόστασις and ένυπόστατоν are not the same thing, just as υσία and ένоύσιоν are not the same thing. For each hypostasis signifies someone, and ένυπόστατоν signifies essence (nature). Hypostasis means a person determined by properties, and "hypostasis" indicates something non-self-accidental, which has its existence in another, and is not contemplated in itself"... "Hypostasis" is reality in a different hypostasis. From this it is evident that the reality of a nature in a definite individual does not yet mean the recognition of the hypostasis of this nature. It is easy to foresee the Christological application of this principle... Leontius logically descends from the general to the particular. The volume is narrowed and the content is enriched with features. This order of thought is just the opposite of the order of reality, where the individual is before the general, for the general is given only in the individual. But it is important that in this logical descent we do not yet reach hypostasis. Hypostasis is described by separating properties, but they do not form hypostasis. One can say that hypostasis is a way of existence, but it is not an individualizing feature... According to Aristotle, Leontius calls the properties that describe or determine each hypostasis "accidental" (τά σχυμβεβηκότα). And at the same time he distinguishes these constitutive (or "essential") accidents as "inseparable" from ordinary "accidental" attributes, always "separable" without violating the indivisible wholeness. "Hypostasis" is one of the possible cases of the union or interaction of natures. Unity without fusion, i.e. without loss or without change of the essential properties of the united natures, such, for example, is the unity of soul and body in man, united by "mutual life," but not changing in their essence. Such a union, in the opinion of Leontius, is its own and complete unity, unity "in hypostasis" — hypostatic unity, ένωσις ύπоστατική. In Leontius, this concept acquires terminological clarity and firmness.

Part 3

5. The incarnation of the Word is a mystery and a mystery, a "mystery"; and at the same time, of all the mysteries, it is this that is revealed "in natural appearance" — in the historical image of the God-man. In Christ, the twofold is inseparably revealed and contemplated. He is God and man, "perfect" God and "perfect" man, "One of the Holy Trinity" and "one of us." Thus is revealed the kinship of natures, which is not removed by union. Conjunction, Leontius insists, presupposes the observance of duality: only two can be united, and if those who are united disappear, the union itself will cease. Again Leontius explains his idea with an example of human hypostasis. The preservation of duality, or the presence of natures in union without a change in the "natural properties," does not in the least weaken the unity. To number natures does not mean "to divide"—number does not divide, but distinguishes... Natures are different, but inseparable... Unity is supposed to be unity. In union Christ is one, one hypostasis, or person, or individual, or subject. This unity of person or subject is signified by the name of Christ. This is the name of the hypostasis, as it were, a personal name, "the name of the person" (τоύ πρоσώπоυ όνоμα). It can be said that Christ is the name of the Word in His incarnation, the name of the Incarnate Word. For the one hypostasis of the God-Man is precisely the Hypostasis of the Word. In it the union takes place, in it the human nature is received and as it were "personified" (έπρоσωπоπоίησε!) — and at the same time the Divine Hypostasis remains simple and unchanging, as before the union. After all, fullness cannot be replenished... However, according to the strength of the connection, one can speak of "complexity" (or "addition"), meaning by this the very fact of the Incarnation (i.e. the reality of the two natures)... In the incarnation, the Word does not perceive human nature in general, but individualized human nature. In other words, according to humanity, Christ differs in individual and special attributes or properties from other people (from co-men), just as human individualities differ from one another. That is why we can say: "one of us". However, human nature is individualized "in the hypostasis of the Word" — έν τώ Λόγω ύπоστήναι. The Word perceives human nature not in its "generality" but in its "wholeness" ("the whole man", όλоν άνθρωπоν)... The union begins with the emergence of the human nature of the Word, i.e. with conception. However, Leontius seems to admit (though only logically) the possibility of a certain "pre-existence" of human nature. He is confused by the too precise parallel with the human composition: the soul and the body are separated in death and exist separately for a time, i.e. each nature in its own hypostasis, and only in the resurrection are they reunited in the unity of hypostasis. And often of the "complex" hypostasis of Christ he expresses himself as if it were "composed," and not in such a way that human nature is taken into the very hypostasis of the Word. Here Leonty has ambiguity and understatement... He is too carried away by logical symmetry and does not always note with sufficient clarity the "lack of independence" of the hypostatic being of human nature in Christ. Sometimes he expresses a simple and indisputable idea in a very confused way: according to humanity, Christ differs from "co-men", as "other from others", that is, as "hypostasis" (as individuality), because within the one nature the separateness of existence is determined precisely by "hypostasis". Leontius does not want to say in any way that the humanity of Christ is "self-hypostatic", i.e. exists about itself. Then there would be no true unity of hypostasis or subject, and such a "relative union" (ένωσις σχετική) is emphatically denied by Leontius. It only wants to say that Christ is individual in His humanity, that in comparison with human hypostases He is "different" or "special" among men. But he expresses this idea too sharply and indistinctly. Especially because he compares this difference between Christ and men in humanity with His difference in Divinity from other Trinitarian hypostases, and in the latter case there is a real difference between Hypostases and hypostases. However, for Leontius, this is only an inaccuracy of language, a fascination with the parallelism of natures. He never forgets the distinction he made between "hypostasis" and "hypostasis" and speaks directly of the second birth of the Word, from the Virgin Mary, of the second birth of the Word, and not only of human nature (of course, of the "Incarnate Word" or, better, of the Incarnate Word). After all, humanity exists precisely "in the Word" – Leontius does not say: "in Christ". And the unity of the hypostasis of the Incarnate Word justifies the "transfer of names" as a way of expressing the reciprocity" of attributes. You can call the Word the Son of man. It can be said that the "Lord of Glory" was crucified. It is possible in view of the unity of hypostasis, to which what is said about each nature actually refers: "One and the same thing is said differently." And the difference of nature is fully observed. "Reciprocity" never turns into "fusion." Reciprocity is possible precisely in the "hypostatic" union, and is impossible neither in the "separative union" ("by good will") of the Nestorian doctrine, nor in the "fusion union" of the Monophysites, for in the "unity of nature" the existence of "opposite" properties is impossible, which is assumed by "reciprocity"... Leontius considers the formula of St. Cyril to be unfortunate and careless, suggesting a false understanding, even with the reservation: "one complex nature" (in Severus), which is also logically awkward... Leontius resolutely insists on the "hypostatic" character of the divine-human unity. It is precisely the hypostasis that is one, with the duality of natures. The concept of "hypostasis" best expresses the unity of individuality (όλότης ύπоστατική), the unity of the subject, the unity of Christ. And the concept of "hypostasis" clearly defines the fullness of the reality of human nature without any hint of its "independence". It was not Leontius who first used this term (cf. Pseudo-Athanasius, Against Apollinaris I, Didymus, then Eustathius the Monk), but it was the first to receive all its expressiveness and power... The historical significance and influence of Leontius is determined precisely by the fact that he made an attempt to synthetically reveal the whole of Christology from the concept of a "single hypostasis." This eliminated all the ambiguity of the former "Eastern" Dyophysitism, and thus removed the violent constructions of the Severian doctrine. Leontius adheres to the Aristotelian tradition of the Cappadocians. But this was ecclectic Aristotelianism. In anthropology, Leontius was rather a Platonist (through Nemesius of Emesa, who wrote "On the Nature of Man")... What was not said by Leontius was filled in later, especially in Damascene. 6. In a dispute with the Aphthartodocetes, Leontius reveals in detail the doctrine of the humanity of the Word. It proceeds from soteriological premises. Unlike Julian of Halicarnassus, he believes that the First-Created Adam was created in "perishable" (i.e., mortal) flesh, and immortality was available to him only through eating from the "tree of life"—i.e., it was for him a dynamic task, a possibility, and not a "natural" state. This means that in the Fall, human flesh did not become mortal for the first time, but began to die—the possibility of immortality was lost, the possibility of "corruption" was manifested. Consequently, from the fact that Christ has the nature of the First-Created Adam, it does not yet follow that His flesh is "incorruptible" from the Incarnation itself. For all its purity and purity, the possibility of death or "decay" in it remains and is removed only through actual death, in resurrection. By nature (κατά φύσιν), the flesh of Christ is accessible to suffering, not exempt from "irreproachable passions" or "suffering" states. And not only because of a special indulgence or humiliation of the Word, as Julian thought. But precisely by nature (although there are no actual grounds for death in it)... The hypostatic unity does not require changes in the natural qualities of mankind and is not damaged by the suffering of the flesh. True, by virtue of the hypostatic unity, the measure of nature is exceeded (ύπέρ φύσιν), but the laws of nature are not abolished (not παρά φύσιν). And for the Saviour, incorruptibility is above nature. Before the resurrection, the measure of nature is exceeded only sometimes. It is miracles that are the exception of the Incarnate Word in the Gospel story, and not humiliation, as Julian depicted. For him, salvation in the Incarnation was already complete, as it were, and the life of the Gospel was represented by a series of super-due deeds. For Leontius, on the contrary, the Incarnation is only the beginning, and in the entire life of the Savior he sees inner unity and growth. Leontius reminds us that "incorruption" is not some exceptional gift, for it is promised to everyone. The innate incorruptibility of the flesh would not have increased the glory of the Saviour; on the contrary, the whole life of the Saviour would then have been incomprehensible... Why did He suffer and die on the Cross, if the glorification and deification of human nature had already taken place in the Incarnation itself? And if the human nature of the Saviour possesses actual "impassibility" and "incorruption" by virtue of the hypostatic union, then is not His fullness diminished with each allowance of suffering and infirmity... The whole meaning of Leontius' remarks is to emphasize the perfect reality of the Saviour's bodily life, which is fulfilled through voluntary death in the resurrection, when for the first time the body of the Saviour is actually clothed with incorruption... Leontius sharply distinguishes between the deification of soul and body. The human in Christ is pure from sin. And therefore the soul of the Saviour from the beginning partook of all the blessings of the Word, partook of blessedness and omniscience, on which Leontius insists against Theodore of Mopsuestia with his teaching about the moral perfection of Christ and about His original ignorance. This primordial deification of the soul is connected with its sinlessness and purity. But from this it is impossible to conclude about the incorruptibility of the flesh. Purity does not preclude growth, and the Saviour was born as a babe... Death is actually conquered only through death, voluntary (for "for our sake"), but natural... And the resurrection for the first time actualizes incorruption; it is the Resurrection that becomes the source of life and incorruptibility for the entire human race, as "consubstantial" with Christ in human nature, by virtue of its mysterious "servility" ("homeopathy"). This incorruptibility and "impassibility" will be revealed in the last days. Sinners will fall into new sufferings. However, these future sufferings are essentially different from the present sufferings associated with the natural suffering of mortal flesh. Thus, in his objections to Julian, Leontius successfully brings the dispute back to its anthropological presuppositions, to the doctrine of primordial nature and original sin.