Paths of Byzantine Theology

Part 1

1. It is very difficult to distinguish the boundaries of periods in the fluid and continuous element of human life. And at the same time, the incommensurability of the successive historical cycles is revealed with immediate obviousness. New themes of life are revealed, new forces are manifested in action, new spiritual hearths are formed... Already from the first impression we can say that the end of the fourth century marks some indisputable facet in the history of the Church, in the history of Christian culture. Conventionally, this facet can be defined as the beginning of Byzantinism. The Nicene Age closes the previous epoch. And if not with Constantine, then in any case with Theodosius, a new epoch begins. Under Justinian, it reached its heyday, its άκμή. The failure of Julian the Apostate testifies to the decline of pagan Hellenism. The era of Christian Hellenism began, a time when attempts were made to build Christian culture as a system. And at the same time, this is a time of painful and intense spiritual struggle... In the controversies and anxieties of early Byzantinism, it is not difficult to recognize a single, basic, and defining theme. This is a Christological theme. And at the same time, it is a theme about a person. It can be said that in the Christological controversies the anthropological problem was actually discussed and solved. For the dispute was about the humanity of the Saviour, about the meaning of the perception of human nature by the Only-begotten Son and the Word. And thus, about the meaning and limit of human podvig and life. Perhaps that is why the Christological disputes received such exceptional acuteness, and dragged on for three centuries. In them, the entire multiplicity of irreconcilable and mutually exclusive religious ideals was revealed and exposed. These disputes ended in a great cultural and historical catastrophe, the great falling away of the East: almost the entire non-Greek East broke away, fell out of the Church, and closed itself up in heresy. 2. It must be remembered that the Trinitarian controversies of the fourth century had primarily a Christological meaning. The great fathers of this century, proceeding from soteriological hopes and presuppositions, clearly showed that faith in Christ as Savior presupposes the confession in Him of both the fullness of the Godhead and the fullness of humanity. For only in this case was the great reunion of God and man truly accomplished in Christ, and the path to "deification" was opened, in which the Fathers saw both the meaning and the goal of human existence. Such was the Christological outcome of the fourth century, however, it remained unclear how the unity of the Divine-human Face should be thought and described. In other words, how Divinity and humanity are united in Christ. This question had already been posed with all acuteness by Apollinarius. He could not answer it. Apollinarianism can be defined as a kind of anthropological minimalism, i.e., the self-abasement of man, the abhorrence of man. Human nature is incapable of "deification". In the Divine-human unity, human nature cannot remain unchanged, cannot remain itself—it will be "realized" with the Divinity of the Word. And the mind in man is excluded from this connection... For Apollinarius' opponents, the main thing was precisely his teaching about this "realization". The Apollinarians were refuted, first of all, as "sinusiastes". And overcoming Apollinarism meant rehabilitation, justification of man. This is the whole point of the Cappadocian polemic with Apollinarius. However, in this anthropological self-defense, it was possible to lose the sense of proportion and fall into a kind of anthropological maximalism. This happened to the opponents of Apollinaris from the Antiochian school, partly to Diodorus and especially to Theodore. For them, the image of Christ began to disintegrate. With particular insistence they asserted the independence of human nature in Christ. And by this they brought the God-Man too close to ordinary people, to "only people"... This was favored by the spirit of "Eastern" asceticism, primarily strong-willed, which often resolved itself into purely human heroism. It is no accident that this "Eastern" theology has ideological, if not genetic, connections with Western Pelagianism, which was also born out of the spirit of volitional ascetic self-assertion and turned into a kind of humanism. In the end, it was humanism that seduced the entire Antiochian school. This temptation broke through in Nestorianism. And in the struggle against Nestorianism, all the vagueness and inaccuracy of the Christological language of that time was revealed, i.e. the infirmity of the entire structure of Christological concepts. Words were confused and doubled and carried away the thought — words have their own magic and power. Again, a great strain of analytical thought was required to forge and hammer out concepts and terms that would not interfere with, but would help to recognize and confess the truths of faith as the truths of reason, so that it would be possible to speak of Christ the God-Man without ambiguity and contradiction. This theological work stretched over two centuries. The criticism of Nestorianism, developed by St. Cyril of Alexandria, did not convince, but confused the "Easterners." Not because they had all really fallen into the Nestorian extreme, but because they feared the opposite extreme. It must be confessed that St. Cyril did not know how to find indisputable words, did not give clear definitions. This does not mean that his theological experience was vague and ambiguous. But he did not combine with theological perspicacity that great gift of speech with which the great Cappadocians were so distinguished. St. Cyril clearly lacked words. And by a fatal historical misunderstanding, he connected his theological confession with the restless formula μία φύσις Θεоύ Λόγоυ σεσαρκωμένη. He considered it to be the words of the Great Athanasius, but in reality it was the formula of Apollinarius... In other words, in Alexandrian theology there was no means of overcoming the temptations of Antioch. And I did not have the strength to defend myself from my own temptations. This was revealed in Monophysitism, which in a certain sense really spoke the language of Cyril. Characteristically, the Chalcedonian Fathers translated "the faith of Cyril" into the Antiochian language... Since the time of Origen, Alexandrian theology has been threatened by the danger of anthropological minimalism, the temptation to dissolve, to extinguish man in the Divine. This temptation also threatened Egyptian monasticism, which was not so much volitional as contemplative, not so much tempering as cutting off the will altogether. And in this ascetic quietism the later Monophysitism found a fertile ground for itself. In short, we can say so. The Christological controversy begins with a clash of two theological schools. In reality, this was a clash of two religious-anthropological ideals. The Council of Chalcedon ended the history of Orthodox Alexandrinism and Orthodox antiochinism, and a new theological epoch began, the epoch of Byzantine theology. And in it the diverse tradition of the past is transformed into an integral synthesis. As in the era of the Arian troubles, the ecclesiastical decision precedes a theological synthesis. Just as the Council of Nicaea only opens the Trinitarian controversies, so now the Council of Chalcedon opens, and does not close, the Christological period in theology. The Chalcedonian creed is also disputed as the Nicene Creed: these are only theological topics, and the rule of faith must be revealed into a creative and speculative theological synthesis. 3. The Christological controversies of the fifth century began on an accidental occasion and with a particular question, about the name: Theotokos, Θεоτόκоς. But broad theological perspectives were immediately revealed. And the general question of the meaning of "Eastern," Antiochian theology was raised. It was natural to move from the denunciation of Nestorius in the criticism and analysis of the Christological views of his predecessors and teachers, Theodore and Diodorus, as St. Cyril did immediately after the Council of Ephesus. And the condemnation of Theodore, Ives, and Blessed Theodoret at the Fifth Ecumenical Council was a completely logical, albeit tragic, theological epilogue to the condemnation of Nestorius in Ephesus... Nestorius was neither a great nor an independent thinker. And he was not even a theologian in fact. Only external historical circumstances placed him at the center of the theological movement, most of all the fact that he was the Archbishop of Constantinople, and therefore his words were especially heard with authority and were heard everywhere. The whole significance of his theological pronouncements was that he was a typical and one-sided Antiochian. And in the Nestorian controversies, it was not so much about Nestorius himself as about Antiochian theology in general. Thus did the "Easterners" understand Saint Cyril. Hence the whole "tragedy" of the Council of Ephesus. In fact, the question immediately received a paradoxical formulation: it was necessary to decide whether St. Cyril was right in his criticism of "Eastern theology." And experience showed that he was right, no matter how controversial his own theological theses, which he defended with passion and irritation. St. Cyril correctly divined the immanent dangers of Antiochian theology and pointed out its limits, beyond which begins not only doubtful Orthodoxy, but also outright error and heresy. With the foundation, St. Cyril saw the forerunner of Nestorius already in Diodorus of Tarsus, — "this Diodorus was a disciple of Nestorius"... During his lifetime, Diodorus was not touched by suspicion, in the struggle against Arianism (with the Omii and Anomoeans) he was a zealous defender of the faith; he was close to the Cappadocians, especially to Basil the Great, and after the Second Ecumenical Council he was chosen as a "witness of the faith" for the Eastern diocese. It was only in the midst of the Nestorian controversies that the question of Diodorus' Orthodoxy arose; However, he was never condemned at Orthodox councils – he was anathematized only by the Monophysites... The theology of Diodorus has to be judged by fragments. Of his enormous literary heritage, only scanty remains have come down to us (in particular, from his books "Against the Sinusias"). And yet, it can be said with certainty that Diodorus went too far in his struggle with the "sinusiates". Not only did he emphasize the "perfection" (i.e., the fullness) of mankind in Christ, but he sharply distinguished and separated in Christ the Son of God and the Son of David, in whom the Son of God dwelt as in a temple. Therefore, he considered it impossible to speak of the "two births" of the Word. "God the Word did not suffer two births, one before the ages, and the other at last, but of the Father He was born by nature, and He who was born of Mary He prepared for Himself a temple"... God the Word was not born of Mary—only a man like us was born of Mary. And the man born of Mary became the Son by grace... "The Son, who was perfect before the ages, received the perfect from David, the Son of God the Son of David"... "For the flesh which is of us, adoption and glory and immortality by grace are sufficient, because it has become the temple of God the Word"... Diodorus denies that he introduces "Sons" – the Son of God is one, and the flesh "or man" that He has taken on is His temple and abode... It is not so much individual words and sayings that are important here, but the very style and inner tendency of thought. And in the depiction of Diodorus, the face of Jesus Christ undoubtedly doubled – he recognized, if not "two sons", then in any case two subjects... From the premises of Diodorus, it was natural to draw further conclusions. They were made by Theodore of Mopsuestia with his characteristic rational straightforwardness. Theodore sees in Christ first of all the "perfect man" born of Mary; and of Him we know that He is united to God. How can this conjunction be conceived? Theodore usually defines it as the indwelling of the Word (ένоίκησις), as a connection (συνάφεια) or as a relationship (σχέσις). It seems to him that it is impossible to take literally: "The Word was made flesh" — this would be "alienation from His nature and His descent to lower beings." "Became," according to Theodore, can only mean: "appeared" (κατά τό δχεϊν), "because it seemed or appeared, the Word was made flesh." The Word dwelt in Jesus as in the Son, ώς έν ύιώ. And at the same time, it is impossible to admit that it dwelt "essentially" — this would mean to contain the Infinite within narrow material limits, which is absurd and contradicts the Divine omnipresence. And for the same reason, it is impossible to indwell and dwell according to the active power or "energy" of the Godhead, for the power of God cannot be contained in a closed space. It is possible, in Theodore's opinion, to allow only a certain partial inhabitation. Scripture often testifies to such an indwelling, saying that God "lives" or "walks" in His elect — this is the honor that God bestows on those who seek Him "according to His good pleasure towards them," κατ' έυδоκίαν. Only such "union by good will" can be spoken of in relation to Christ. And Theodore does not conceal the fact that in this way Christ is moved into the ranks of the righteous, prophets, apostles, holy men, — moreover, to the first and highest, to a special and incomparable place. For in Christ the fullness of God's favor was revealed... And so the unity of human nature with the Word was complete, perfect, and indivisible. "Dwelling in Jesus, the Word united with Himself all that He received in its entirety," said Theodore. Theodore calls this unity the unity of the person, ή τоΰ πρоσώπоυ ένωσις... However, in doing so, he has in mind only the undivided unity of will, action, dominion, dominion, dignity, power... And there is no stronger bond than this," Theodore notes... But this is unity by goodwill, by unity of will (ταυτо βоυλία). And unity in the power and in view of the merits of Jesus. True, this unity begins with the very conception of Jesus, but according to the foreknowledge of future merits... Further, this unity is developing, growing... Christ, as a "perfect man," like all people, grew, both in body and soul. He grew both in knowledge and in righteousness. And to the extent of growth, he received new gifts of the Spirit. He struggled, overcoming passions and even lusts... And in this the Spirit assisted him "with his moral influences," illuminating him and strengthening his will, in order to "mortify sin in the flesh, to tame its lusts with light and noble power." This was inevitable, it seemed to Theodore, since Christ was a real man... In baptism he is anointed by good pleasure, but only in death does he attain "perfect chastity" and "immutability of thought." It should be noted that Theodore assumed that the Godhead was separated from Christ at the time of death, "since it could not experience death"... It is quite clear that Theodore sharply distinguishes between "two subjects." It is curious that he compares the duality of natures in the Divine-human unity with the marital union of husband and wife "in one flesh"... For Theodore, the Jesus of the Gospel is only a man, in moral obedience and harmony united to the Word and united to himself by the Word. In other words, he is a man adopted by God, ό λαμβανόμενоς. From this it is understandable why Theodore indignantly denied that Mary could be called the Mother of God. "It is folly to say that God was born of a virgin," he said; — born of a Virgin is one who has the nature of a Virgin, and not God the Word... He was born of Mary who was of the seed of David. Not God the Word was born of a woman, but he who was formed in her by the power of the Holy Spirit"... In a non-proper, metaphorical sense, one can call Mary the Mother of God, just as one can call Her the Mother of God, άνθρωπоτόκоς. By nature, she gave birth to a man. But God was in the man she had born, and He was in a way that He had never been in anyone else... It is quite clear that by "unity of person" Theodore understood only the fullness of deified, grace-filled humanity. Perfect nature cannot be thought of as impersonal, άπρόσωπоν, he believed. Therefore, since humanity is full in Christ, he also had a human face. At the same time, the nature of the Word is not impersonal. But in the Incarnation there is established a "unity of concord" and a "communion of honor" — in this sense, a kind of new "unity of person"... It is not difficult to unravel the anthropological plan of Theodore. He believed that man was created to strive for impassibility and immutability. In Christ, he saw the first example of a fulfilled human calling and purpose. Man in podvig attained sonship with God, with the help of God, by grace and grace. God united Him to Himself, gave Him every primacy, gave Him a name above every name. He's lifted up, and sits at the right hand of the Father, and is above all things... And God is pleased to do all things through Him, both the judgment and the testing of the whole world, and His own coming... In Theodore, all the emphasis is focused on human podvig — God only anoints and crowns human freedom. It is very characteristic that during Theodore's lifetime in the East, apparently, no one accused him of heresy – he died in peace, he was remembered with reverence. "His name was very glorious in the East, and they were greatly amazed at his writings," remarks St. Cyril. And his attack on Theodore was greeted in the East with stormy indignation. This testified to the extent to which the type of Theodore's theology corresponded to the religious ideals of the "Eastern." And of course, it is not Theodore's separate, "inaccurate" expressions that are of decisive importance—they were not at all slips of the tongue. Theodore had a carefully thought-out system — he worked on his main book "On the Incarnation" for many years. It should not be thought that Theodore was seduced by the inaccuracy of his theological language. He proceeded from a firm soteriological hope, from a certain religious ideal. It was a reductio a b surdum of anthropological maximalism, the self-exposure of ascetic humanism. The condescension of the "Easterners" testified to their predilections, to the vagueness of the "Eastern" soteriological consciousness.

Part 2

4. Until his condemnation in Ephesus, Nestorius did not systematize his theological views. He was a preacher, he spoke often and a lot. He had an undoubted gift of speech. But as a preacher, he was more of a demagogue than a teacher—he abused rhetorical effects. We have the opportunity to judge his early preaching experiences. Nestorius reveals in them the established theological worldview that developed in the Antiochian atmosphere — he continues the theological work of Theodore. But only later, in the years of exile, in the years of bitter but unrepentant, but rather insulted reflection on his "tragic" fate, did he make an attempt to express himself, if not systematically, then in principle. This is his famous Book of Heraclides by the Thegourta Neraclidis, which has been discovered relatively recently in Syriac translation, which is more of an apologetic pamphlet than a theological confession. This late confession shows that Nestorius did not change even under his excommunication. He is all in polemics with Cyril and the Ephesian fathers. And from this book it is easiest to understand Nestorius, and to understand not only the dogmatic, but also the historical correctness of Cyril. The essence of the matter, of course, is not in the dispute about the name: the Mother of God, but in the basic Christological premises of Nestorius. He continues Theodore, and one might say that he completes his thoughts. The basic concept of Nestorius is the concept of a person, πρόσωπоν. First, the "natural person," the principle of individuality, πρόσωπоν φυσικόν, a term that seems to belong to Nestorius himself. Always "perfect nature" is self-sufficient, has in itself a sufficient basis for existence and stability, is an individual—in this Nestorius was a consistent Aristotelian: only the concrete, the individual is real in his eyes, the general and generic (Aristotle's "second essence") is for him only an abstract concept. From this Nestorius concludes that in Christ both the Godhead and humanity existed each in its own properties, in its hypostasis and in its essence; and humanity in Christ is so complete that it could live and develop for itself... Thus, "two natures" for Nestorius meant practically "two persons". And whom, the "face of the union," πρόσωπоν τής ένώσεως, is the one Person of Christ, una persona Unigeniti. The whole meaning of Nestorius' teaching is in how he defines the relationship between these concepts and the facts and realities they designate. Nestorius divides in Christ the "two natures," uniting them in "worship" — χωρίζω τάς φύσεις, αλλ' ένώ τήν πρоσκύνησιν. "Unites worship" because the "natures" are united in Christ, and Nestorius emphasizes the fullness and inseparability of this union... According to Nestorius, in Christ God never acted apart from humanity. However, first of all, it is a voluntary union, a union in love, and not only in the sense that the Word descends and is incarnated by will, by mercy and love, but in the sense that the whole meaning of the incarnation is exhausted by the unity of will and action, κατά τήν θέλησιν κα τήν ένεργείαν. For Nestorius, this unity is the "unity of the house-building person" — here he restores the archaic meaning of the concept of "person," as it were, when it meant first of all a "legal person," a "role," and even a mask, a mask. Nestorius himself defines the unification of "natural persons" into a house-building unity as a kind of exchange and mutual communication, as "mutual use of images" — here we can recall our phrase: in the name, in the name of... Nestorius is characterized by a moment of reciprocity, "acceptance" and "gift". The word accepts the "face" of man and communicates its "face" to man. God became incarnate in man, says Nestorius, and "made his face his own Face," took upon Himself the "face" of the guilty nature. In this lies the immensity of Divine condescension, "that the face of man becomes his own (for God), and He gives man His Face." God uses the face of man, for He received him, and moreover in the form of a servant and servant... The Godhead uses the face of humanity, and humanity uses the face of the Godhead, and in this sense we speak of a "unity of face for both" (a kind of symmetry of natures). Use here means assimilation. In this sense, one can speak of the indwelling of the Divinity, of the perception of humanity, one can speak of human nature in Christ as an instrument of the Divinity, as God-bearing, for in Christ we contemplate and confess God... For Nestorius, this house-building unity is a unity that is developing: perfect union is preceded by a time of podvig and struggle, when the Anointed One does not yet have the right to inheritance and dominion, when the passions have not yet been conquered, their confrontation has not yet been resolved, and Christ does not yet work miracles, does not have the power to teach, but only obeys and fulfills the commandments. Only after the temptation in the wilderness and the baptism of John, having risen in soul to God in harmony with His will, did Christ receive authority and power — "because He overcame, I triumphed in all things, He received as a reward for His victory the power to preach and proclaim the gospel of the Kingdom of Heaven"... In other words, "when He had completed the feat of His own perfection in the midst of all temptations. He acts for us and works to deliver us from the domination of the tyrant," for his own victory was not enough for Him... There is undoubted truth in this attention of Nestorius to human efficacy in Christ. But it is distorted by a one-sided maximalist emphasis — Nestorius sees almost nothing but human podvig in Christ, which attracts God's favor. Nestorius designates the house-building unity of the person by the name of Christ, the Son, the Lord—these are names indicating the union, the "two natures," in contrast to the names of separate natures. Characteristically, Nestorius clearly contrasts the names: God the Word and Christ. They must not be confused, for that would be to confuse nature itself. It is quite clear that Nestorius is most anxious to put aside the idea of the Divinity of the Word as the beginning or focus of unity. Hence the decisive rejection of the "intercommunion of attributes": "If you read the entire New Testament, you will not find that death is ascribed to God the Word, but to Christ, Lord or the Son"... Nestorius asserts here something more than merely the non-confluence of natures, between which definitions, actions, and properties are respectively distributed: he emphasizes the difference between subjects before and after the incarnation, and avoids calling Christ the Incarnate Word, but confines himself to the name of Immanuel, "God is with us"... The denial of the name Theotokos necessarily followed from the premises of Nestorius. And to this name he contrasts the name Christos, Χριστоτόκоς, as indicating the "person of union," and the name Mother of Man, as indicating the nature by which Mary is the mother of Jesus. And again, Θεоδόχоς, God-Accepting, since Mary gave birth to Him in whom God is "God with us" – "the temple of the Godhead"... In this sense, she can also be called the Mother of God, the Mother of God "in manifestation", since God appeared in the son of Mary – "descended from heaven" and "became incarnate", but was not born of Mary... It would be wrong to trace all these inaccuracies and errors of Nestorius to the vagueness of his theological and exegetical language, to the indistinctness of his theological concepts, i.e. to the confusion of general and specific names. Nestorius' error stemmed, first of all, from his anthropological premises, from an erroneous vision and perception of the Face of Christ. In this he repeats Theodore. There is a consistency in his reasoning. The Gospel tells of Him Who was born, dwelt among people, and suffered from them, but all this can only be said about man... Nestorius, as it were, was seduced by evangelical realism. He refused to see in the historical Christ God the Word, even if with the proviso: the Incarnate Word, for for for him this meant attributing to God human birth, changeability, suffering, mortality, and death itself. That is, to admit a certain transmutation and application of the Godhead. God cannot be the subject of history, and it is impossible to consider God the one who was a child, was crucified, died... And Nestorius attributed the Gospel story to Christ, but with the proviso that the Word is not the subject for the predicate according to humanity. Thus it turned out that such a subject in reality could only be a human "person," namely, a "person" or "personality," and not "nature," for "impersonal" nature for Nestorius was something illusory, seeming, only mental, but not actual, not existing. This means that the actor of the Gospel for Nestorius is Immanuel, "God is with us," or Christ, the God-accepting human person, "the Son through union with the Son." In other words, the Saviour for Nestorius was a man, or the Saviour was a man, although united with God... The unity of the Gospel story splits into two parallel or symmetrical series, although inseparably connected, each series is closed in itself, as if self-sufficient... Hence soteriological conclusions. Nestorius' fear was limited to the moral, volitional, and not the ontological union of mankind with God, a kind of moral agreement between man and God. And about "deification" as a religious ideal, Nestorius could not and did not dare to speak. It is no accident that in his soteriology "legal" motives (vicarious sacrifice) are so emphasized. Thus, anthropological maximalism was resolved by soteriological minimalism ("enantiodocetism", reverse docetism). 5. The Church responded to the heresy of Nestorius through the mouth of St. Cyril of Alexandria, and responded, first of all, with a bright and ardent soteriological confession, in which humility was combined with boldness of hope. The Ecumenical Council in Ephesus did not establish any unambiguous definition of faith. He limited himself to referring to tradition and the Nicene Creed. True, the council accepted and approved the polemical epistles and chapters of Cyril. However, it is unlikely in the dogmatic or faith-determining sense, rather in the prohibitive, "ogonistic" sense. And this is connected, first of all, with the very formation of Cyril's "chapters". These were anathemas, the definition of faith from the opposite... And besides, these "heads" of Kirill immediately turned out to be the cause of division, the subject of dispute. The fathers gathered in Ephesus split. True, an Ecumenical Council in the strict sense of the word was only the Council of Cyril and Memnon, and the Council or Council of the "Easterners" was only an "apostate Council." However, the dogmatic acts of the Council of Ephesus ended only with the reunification of the "Easterners," and the famous "formula of unity" of 433 is, strictly speaking, the dogmatic conclusion and epilogue of the council. This formula was composed in the Antiochian theological language, as was the Chalcedonian definition of the creed. The more clearly the line between Orthodoxy and Nestorianism is seen here. Here is the text of this confession: "We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Only-begotten Son of God, is perfect God and perfect man, of the soul of reason and body, Θεόν τέλειоν καί άνθρωπоν τέλειоν, — that he was born before the world of the Father according to the Divinity, and in the last days for our sake and for our salvation from the Virgin Mary according to humanity, that He is of one essence with the Father in Divinity and of one essence with us in humanity, for the union of the two natures has been accomplished δύо γάρ φύσεων ένωσις γέγоνε... Therefore we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord... In view of such an unmerged union, we confess the holy Virgin to be the Mother of God, for God the Word became incarnate and incarnate, and in His very conception united with Himself the temple, which He received from Her, τόν έξ αυτής ληφθέντα ναόν. We know that some of the Gospel and Apostolic sayings are considered by theologians to be general (κоινоπоιоϋντες) as referring to one Person, ώς έφ' ένоς πρоσώπоυ, while others distinguish (διαιρоΰντες) as referring to two natures, ώς έπί δύо φύσεαν, the God-worthy refer to the Divinity of Christ, those who despise His humanity"... This formula was proposed by the "Easterners," by the way, as early as 431 at their "Soborik," and now it is accepted by St. Cyril. It was it that was later processed into the Chalcedonian oros. Formally, it resembles the definitions of Nestorius; However, this is only a verbal similarity. In the very structure of this exposition of faith one senses a different idea than that of Theodore and Nestorius. And first of all: the recognition of the one subject, the one Divine-human Face — the Lord is born of the Father, and He (τόν αύτόν) of the Virgin at the end of these days — this is precisely what Nestorius did not want to acknowledge or say. He deviated from tradition and from the rule of faith not when he spoke of "two natures," but when he separated two subjects, distinguished two ontological centers of relations in Christ. And then, in the "formula of unity," the Divinity the Word is directly confessed as the beginning of unity. True, this only reproduces the logical scheme of the Nicene Creed, which did not exclude different interpretations. It should be added that the "formula of unity" in itself does not exhaust the question; it presupposes the definition of terms and requires theological commentary. In a certain sense, the same must be said about the Chalcedonian Oros. In general, the ultimate persuasiveness of faith-determined formulas is obtained only in a living and coherent theological interpretation, as the Nicene Creed was revealed in the theology of Athanasius, and even more so in Cappadocian theology. That is why theological systems receive great dogmatic authority, hence the constant references of councils to patristic testimonies, to the "faith of the fathers." And so, St. Cyril remained forever the "Christological teacher"; and what Blessed Theodoret wrote against him and against his "heads" was condemned and rejected at the Fifth Ecumenical Council. Characteristically, when reuniting with the "Easterners," St. Cyril did not renounce his "heads," as was primarily demanded in the East, and the "Eastern" did not insist on this any further. And therefore, it can be said from the very beginning that Cyril's "chapters" turned out to be a theological explanation of the conciliatory confession.

Part 3

6. In the East, the "agreement" of 433 was not immediately accepted and not by everyone. Many were reconciled only under the violence of the secular authorities. The disobedient were deposed. However, the embarrassment did not stop. The Easterners saw in the agreement of 433 the abdication of Cyril. But Kirill understood it differently. And not only did he not renounce his "chapters", but, on the contrary, extended his sharp criticism to the entire theology of the East... The temptation for Cyril was even stronger in the East than direct sympathy for Nestorius. And it was not so much Nestorius who was defended from Cyril as Theodore and Diodorus... For a time, Edessa became the refuge of the irreconcilable Antiochians, where in 435 Rabbula was replaced on the episcopal cathedra by the famous Iva (who was later condemned at the Fifth Ecumenical Council for a letter to Mary the Persian)... Edessa was more connected with Persia than with the Hellenic world. From Persia the Monk Ephraim the Syrian (about 365) moved here and here he founded his famous school, which was called the "school of the Persians"... Only after the Monk Ephraim in Edessa did the Greek influence increase, the influence of Antioch above all. They translate the Greek Fathers, hagiographers, and ascetics. And at the beginning of the 5th century in Edessa they already theologize according to Theodore and Diodorus. This is probably why the Edessa school was temporarily closed under Ravbul. Under Yves, it was rediscovered... However, very soon a split began in the school "brotherhood". And in 457, the irreconcilables, together with the head of the school Narzai, had to move beyond the Persian border. And in 489 the Edessa school was completely closed, at the request of Imp. Zeno... Narzai moved to Nisibin and founded a school there, on the model of Edessa. In these years, the Persian Church finally broke away from Byzantium and closed itself in local traditions. From that time on, Antiochian theology became the national, or rather, the state confession of the Persian Christians. And the Nisibin school became the spiritual center of this "Nestorian" church. However, it would be more correct to speak not of "Nestorianism", but of "the faith of Theodore and Diodorus". The "Nestorian" church is in reality the church of Theodore of Mopsustia. It was Theodore who was the Father and Teacher par excellence in the Syro-Persian Church. All "Nestorian" theology is only a humble commentary on his works, "as the holy friend of God, Blessed Martheodore, bishop and interpreter of the holy books, explained the faith"... In Greek theology, the Antiochian tradition is interrupted early. In Syriac, it acquires a new meaning, warms up, becomes more Semitic. The Syrian theologians shunned philosophy as a Hellenic delusion. Theodore's "historical" theology was the only kind of Hellenism acceptable to Semitic taste, precisely because for Theodore, too, theology was philology rather than philosophy. And there is a certain inner affinity between the "historical-grammatical" method of the Antiochians and the rabbinic exegesis of the East... Syriac theology is very characteristic of a peculiar exegetical scholasticism, in part reminiscent of the Talmud. Syriac theology was a "school" theology in the strict sense of the word. Connected with this is the leading influence of the theological school... The Nisibin school very quickly reached its heyday. Already Cassiodorus (about 535) pointed to it as an exemplary Christian school, along with the Alexandrian Didaskalia. The charter of the school from 496 has come down to us. But it is not difficult to recognize in it the features of a more ancient and traditional system. The Nisibin school was a typical Semitic school, most of all it resembles the Jewish rabbinical schools ("beth-hammidrash"). First of all, it is not only a school, but also a dormitory. Everyone lives together, in cells, in the school house. Everyone forms a single "brotherhood" - both old and young. Those who completed the course (they were called "researchers") remained in the dormitory. But this is not a monastery – whoever seeks a strict life, says the rule, "let him go to a monastery or to the wilderness"... The only subject of instruction was the Scriptures. The course was three-year. They started with the Old Testament and studied it for all three years. Only in the last year did we study the New Year. The text was read, copied, and then the interpretation followed. One of the teachers, the "pronunciation teacher," taught Syriac Masorah (i.e., vocalization of text and diacritics). Another, the "teacher of readings", taught liturgical reading and singing ("choirs together with reading"). The chief teacher (or "rabban") was called the "Interpreter." In his teaching, he was bound by the "school tradition". Such a tradition in Edessa was at first considered to be the works of the Monk Ephraim. But very soon Theodore was recognized as the "Interpreter" par excellence. In Nisibin he was considered the only authority. The Nisibine Ustav in particular warned against "speculation" and "allegories"... At the end of the sixth century, Genana of Adiabene, who had become head of the Nissibine school in 572, made an attempt to replace Theodore with Chrysostom. This caused a violent protest. In addition, Genana used allegory. Strict Nestorians considered him an impious Origenist. Others suspected him of Manichaeism. His doctrine of hereditary original sin seemed fatalistic. With the support of the Persian authorities, Genana managed to retain the management of the school (he drew up a new charter for it, 590), but half of the students fled. Other schools remained faithful to the tradition (in Seleucia or Ctesiphon, in Arbela, in many monasteries). The Council of 585 severely condemned and prohibited the "interpretations" of Genana, and at the same time confirmed that the judgment of Blessed Martheodore should be considered the sole and final measure of truth in all matters... Thus Syrian theology consciously stopped at the beginning of the fifth century. It was confined in archaic school formulas, which had shrunk and stiffened over time. Creative energy found an outlet only in hymns... There was no inner movement in "Nestorian" theology, and there could not be. The Nestorians rejected the inquisitiveness of thought... In Syria, Aristotle was studied a lot, he was translated and explained. It was through the Syrian medium that the Arabs adopted Aristotle and subsequently transferred him to the medieval West. But Nestorian theology did not even come into contact with this Syrian Aristotelianism. In the Nisibin Ustav there is a very characteristic prohibition for disciples to live together with "doctors" — "so that the books of worldly wisdom and the books of holiness should not be studied in the same place"... It was the "doctors" or naturalists who studied Aristotle in Syria... Nestorian theologians avoided speculation. But this did not save them from rationalism. They fell into rationality, into legalism... In a sense, it was a return to archaic Judeo-Christianity... Such is the historical end and impasse of Antiochian theology... 7. And in Egypt not everyone considered the "agreement" with the Easterners to be final or even only binding. After the death of Saint Cyril, the desire to abolish the act of 433 was immediately felt. Thus began the Monophysite movement. This was not a revival of Apollinarianism. The Monophysite formula comes from Apollinarius. But it was not at all the recognition of "one" or "one" nature that was essential and fundamental in the teaching of Apollinarius. Apollinarianism is the doctrine of human incompleteness in Christ—not everything human is received by God the Word... The Monophysites did not speak of this incompleteness, but of such a "change" of all that is human in hypostatic unity with God the Word, in which the co-measurement ("consubstantial") of the human in Christ with the universal human nature is lost. The question was now raised not about the human composition, but precisely about the form of the union... However, there is a certain psychological affinity between Apollinarism and Monophysitism. It is in the anthropological minimalism that is common to them... These basic features of the Monophysite movement are already clearly manifested in the case of Eutyches. Eutyches was not a theologian at all, and did not have his own teaching. He spoke of "one nature" because Athanasius and Cyril taught so. Therefore, he considered it impossible to speak of "two natures" — after the union, i.e. in the very Divine-human unity... But this is not the point of his thought... And for the Fathers of the year 448, the decisive factor was the refusal of Eutyches to confess Christ to be of the same essence with us in humanity. Eutyches wondered "how the body of our Lord and God can be of one essence with us"... He distinguished: "human body" and "human body". And he agreed that the body of Christ was "something human," and He was incarnated from a Virgin. But His body is not "the body of man"... Eutyches is afraid to equate Christ with the "common people" by acknowledging human "consubstantiality," to bring Christ too close to "ordinary people" — after all, He is God... But in his stubbornness one senses something more, one senses a hidden thought about the incommensurability of Christ with people and according to humanity... Eutyches' contemporaries called it "Docetism"... And, indeed, Eutyches spoke in essence as it were: one can speak of the "human" in Christ only in a special and not direct sense... However, it was more a vagueness of vision than a vagueness of thought... Eutyches saw everything in Christ as too "transfigured", changed, different... In this vision is the source of true Monophysitism... The condemnation of Eutyches at the "permanent council" of 448 made a strong impression throughout the world. Eutyches appealed to Rome and Ravenna, and probably to Alexandria as well. In any case, Dioscorus received him into communion and canceled the decision of the Council of Constantinople. The emperor was on the side of Eutyches and at his insistence convened a great council. The council opened on August 1, 449 in Ephesus. It was presided over by Dioscorus. The cathedral turned out to be a "robber"... Dioscorus behaved like an oriental despot, like a "pharaoh". Oriental fanatic monks raged. The council did not deal with dogmatic questions. He was all in personal accounts. Eutychius was restored. And all those who adhered to the "agreement" of 433 and spoke of the "two natures" were condemned and many deposed, Flavian of Constantinople and Theodoret, first of all. It was a mass "murder", a party reprisal... However, this was not the solution to the dispute. The robber council did not make dogmatic definitions. He had no moral authority. He could influence only by external violence. And when external circumstances changed, the need for a new council became obvious. He was summoned to Nicaea, already under the new emperor Marcian. But it was discovered in Chalcedon, on October 8, 451. This was the new (fourth) Ecumenical Council, which enshrined in its famous definition of faith ("oros") the dogmatic results of the anti-Nestorian dispute. At the same time, this definition was a safeguard against Monophysite ambiguities. For it turned out that the root and danger of Monophysitism lies in the sobriety of thought and the vagueness of theological vision. This was a heresy of the imagination rather than a delusion of thought. Therefore, it could be overcome only in theological sobriety, in the clarity of religious definitions. 8. For the Council of 449, Pope Leo sent his famous epistle ("tomos") addressed to Flavian of Constantinople. At the robber council it was silent. In Chalcedon it was received with consolation and delight. And it is accepted as a confession of the Cyril faith, Λέων είπε τά Κυρίλλоυ... This was not a dogmatic definition. It was a solemn confession. This is its strength, and this is its limitation. Pope Leo spoke in liturgical, not theological language. Hence the artistic plasticity of his presentation. He always spoke and wrote in a kind of measured speech. He paints a vivid image of the God-man. And at the same time, he is almost silent about the controversial issue, not only does he not define theological terms, but simply avoids them and does not use them. He did not like to "philosophize" about faith, he was not a theologian at all. The Pope wrote in the language of the Western theological tradition and did not even raise the question of how his confession should be translated into Greek, how Orthodox truth should be expressed in the categories of the Greek tradition. This weakness of the papal "scroll" was immediately revealed. Nestorius saw in him a confession of his faith. The Chalcedonian fathers saw in him "the faith of Cyril." However, some of them (and curiously, the bishops of Illyricum) hesitated to accept the "scroll" until they were reassured by direct references to St. Cyril. Everything depended on how to read the Roman epistle, how to "translate" it, and in what theological categories... The Pope proceeds from soteriological motives. Only the perception and assimilation of our nature by Him Whom neither sin could grasp nor death could captivate, opens up the possibility of victory over sin and over death — nisi naturam nostram Ille susciperet et suam faceret... "And it is equally dangerous to confess the Lord Jesus Christ only as God without humanity, and only as a man without Divinity"; et aequаlis erаt periculi, Dominum Jesum Christum aut Deum tantummodo sine homine, aut sine Deo solum hominem credidisse... The denial of human consubstantiality between us and Christ overthrows the entire "mystery of faith"... It does not turn out that a true connection with Christ is not established, "if we do not recognize in Him the flesh of our race" — if He had only "the image of a man (formam hominis), but did not receive from the Mother the "truth of the body" (et non materini corporis veritatem)... The miracle of virgin birth does not violate the consubstantiality of the Son and the Mother—the Holy Spirit gave the power of birth, but "the reality of the body from the body," veritas corporis sumpta de corpore est... Through the new, because immaculate, birth, the Son of God enters this world below. But this birth in time does not weaken His eternal birth from the Father. The Only-begotten of the eternal Father is born of the Holy Spirit, of the Virgin Mary. And in the Incarnation He is truly one, and "in this unity there is no deception" — Who is the true God, He is also the true man; qui enim verus est Deus, verus est homo... The two natures are united into a unity of person (in unam coeunte personam), and the "properties" of the natures remain "unchangeable" (salva proprietate). Greatness perceives insignificance, power perceives weakness, eternity unites with mortality, the "impassive nature" unites with the suffering. God is born in the perfect nature of the true man, uniting in this the fullness and wholeness of both natures — in integra ergo veri hominis perfectаque natura verus natus est Deus, totus in suis, totus in nostris... He acquired the human without losing the Divine, humana augens, divina non minuens... And this manifestation of the Invisible One was a movement of goodness, not a diminution of power. The perception of human nature by the Word was its exaltation, not the humiliation of the Godhead... Pope Leo achieves great expressiveness in this game with contrasts and antitheses... He defines the fullness of unity and union as the unity of the Person. However, he never defines directly and precisely what he means by the name of a person. This was not an accidental omission, and it would be especially inappropriate to keep silent about it in a dogmatic "scroll"... But dad didn't know how to define a "face"... In his early sermons, Leo spoke of the Divine-human unity either as "confusion" or as "co-existence." Again, I couldn't find the words... In the "scroll" he achieves great clarity, but not in separate definitions, but in a descriptive synthesis... An ineffable union has been accomplished, but in the unity of the person each nature ("each image", form) preserves its properties ("peculiarities", proprietas) – each image preserves the particularity of its action, and the duality of actions does not break the unity of the person... The duality of actions and revelations in the perfect unity of the indivisible Person — such is the Gospel image of Christ. One person; but one side shines with miracles, and the other in humiliation, the one is a common source of humiliation for both, the other is the source of common glory... But by virtue of the unity of the person in the two natures (in duаbus naturis), both humiliation and glory are mutual. Therefore, it can be said that the Son of man came down from heaven, although in reality the Son of God took on a body from a Virgin. And vice versa, it can be said that the Son of God was crucified and buried, although the Only-begotten endured this not in His co-eternal and consubstantial Divinity with the Father, but in the weakness of human nature... In the sequence of Gospel events, one senses a certain growth of mysterious evidence: the human becomes clearer and clearer, the Divinity becomes more radiant... Children's swaddling clothes and the voices of angels, baptism by John and testimony from the Father in the Jordan are outward signs. Hungry and thirsty, wandering homeless, and the great Wonderworker... Weeping for a dead friend, and then Resurrecting him with a single word of command... Something more opens up here... Tears and confession: "My Father is greater than Me" testify to the fullness and authenticity of human self-consciousness. And the statement: "I and the Father are one" reveals the Godhead... Not two, but One; but not one, but two (natures)... And after the Resurrection, the Lord deals with His disciples, eats with them, but passes through the closed doors, – He allows them to feel Himself, but by His breath He communicates the Spirit to them – and this at once and together, so that they may come to know in Him the inseparable union of the two natures, and without merging the Word and the flesh, they will understand that the Word and the flesh form one Son... In the depiction of Pope Leo, one Christ is really visible, he clearly and confidently draws the Gospel icon of the God-Man in his "scroll". It was evidence of a strong and clear faith, bold and calm in its clairvoyance... And, of course, Lev expounded precisely "Cyril's faith", although not at all in the language of Cyril. They are united not by formulas, but by a community of knowledge, one and the same, almost naïve, method of perceiving or perceiving the Divine-human unity... However, even less than Cyril, could Pope Leo suggest or anticipate an unambiguous dogmatic definition. His words are very vivid, but as if shrouded in a radiant fog... It was not easy and difficult to fix them ("fix") in terms of dogmatic theology... Whether the person of Pope Leo coincided with the ύπόστασις (or φύσις) of St. Cyril, or with the πρόσωπоν τής ένώσεως of Nestorius, remained unclear. Does the Latin natura coincide with the Hellenic φύσις; And how exactly is this unity of the person "in two natures" to be understood, this "descent" of the two natures "into one person"? and, finally, the most obscure thing about Pope Leo is the concept of "image", which he took from the old, still Tertullian tradition... In any case, Leo's "tomos" was not clear enough to replace the controversial "agreement" of 433. The authentic sounded not from the West, but in the East, from the lips of the Eastern Fathers, in the year 451, in Chalcedon.

Part 4

9. The Chalcedonian oros was revised from the exposition of the faith of the year 433. The fathers of 451 did not immediately agree to draw up a new definition of faith. It seemed possible once again to confine ourselves to a general reference to tradition and prohibitions against heresies. Others were ready to be satisfied with a volume of Leo. Apparently, many were deterred by the fear of alienating the blind adherents of St. Cyril by a premature dogmatic definition, who with inert stubbornness clung not so much to his teaching as to his words. This fear was justified. The Chalcedonian oros turned out to be a stumbling block and temptation for the "Egyptians", first of all, already in terms of language and terminology. However, under the circumstances, it was no less dangerous to remain with unreliable, ambiguous and controversial formulas... We cannot trace the history of the composition of the Chalcedonian oros in all the details. From the conciliar "acts" we can only guess about the former disputes, More disputes were held outside general meetings, at private conferences, during breaks... The accepted text reads as follows: "Following the Holy Fathers, we all teach in agreement to confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, perfect in the Godhead and perfect in humanity; one and the same true God and truly man, of the rational soul and the body, of one essence with the Father in divinity and of one essence with us in humanity, in all things like us the food of sin, born before the ages of the Father according to divinity, and in the last days for our sake and for our salvation from Mary the Virgin Theotokos according to humanity; One and the same Christ, the Son, the Lord, the Only-begotten, in two natures, unmerged, unchanging, inseparable, inseparably cognizable, so that by union the difference of natures is not in the least violated, but rather the particularity of each nature is preserved and they are united into one person and one hypostasis; — not divided or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, God the Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, as the prophets taught us before, and the Lord Jesus Christ Himself taught us, and how He handed down to us the symbol of the fathers"... The closeness to the "agreement" of 433 is immediately apparent. But very characteristic additions have been made to it. First, instead of: "for the union of the two natures was accomplished" (δύо γάρ φύσεων ένωσις γέγоνε), it is now said: "known in two natures" (έν δύо φύσεων)... There was a dispute about this expression at the council. In the original and not extant sentence there was: "of two natures" (εκ δύо φύσεων); And, apparently, most of them "liked" it. The objection was made from the "Eastern" side – the formula seemed evasive... This was not "Nestorian" suspicion. Indeed, "out of two" sounded weaker than just "two". For Eutyches also agreed to speak of the "two natures" before the union (which is exactly what the "of the two" corresponds to), but not in the union itself; and Dioscorus at the council openly declared that "of the two" he accepts, and "two" he does not accept... Leo had: "in two natures", in duаbus naturis... After a new drafting meeting, its wording was adopted: "in two"... It was sharper and more definite than before: "the union of the two"... And most importantly, at the same time, attention was transferred from the moment of union to the one Person himself... There are two ways to think about the Incarnation. Or in the contemplation of the successive dispensation of God He comes to the event of the Incarnation, "and the union was accomplished"... Or to proceed from the contemplation of the Divine-human face, in which the duality is recognized, which is revealed in this duality... St. Cyril usually thought in the first order. However, all the pathos of his statements is connected with the second: the Incarnate Word should not be spoken of as before the Incarnation, for the union has been accomplished... And in this respect the Chalcedonian formula is very close to his spirit... Secondly, in the Chalcedonian definition, the expressions "one person" and "one hypostasis" are directly and decisively equated, έν πρόσωπоν and μία ύπόστασις, the former being consolidated and strengthened together through the latter... This identification, perhaps, is the very tip of the oros... In part, the words are taken from Leo: in unam coeunte personаm, — in oros: είς έν πρόσоπоν καί μίαν ύπόστασιν συντρεχόυσης... But significant: "and into one hypostasis"... It is here that the acute and burning question of Christological terminology is touched upon. The descriptive: the "person" (of course, the "face" rather than the "personality") is transferred to the ontological plane: the "hypostasis"... At the same time, in the Chalcedonian oros, two metaphysical concepts are clearly distinguished: "nature" and "hypostasis". This is not a simple opposition of the "general" and the "particular" (as was established by Basil the Great). "Nature" in the Chalcedonian Oros is not an abstract or general concept, it is not "general as distinct from particular," minus the "isolating" properties. The unity of the hypostasis means the unity of the subject. And the duality of natures signifies the fullness of concrete determinations (properties) according to two natures, in two real planes—"perfection," i.e., precisely the concrete fullness of properties, both "in the Godhead" and in humanity. In the Chalcedonian oros there is a paradoxical understatement. From the connection of the speech it is immediately evident that the hypostatic center of the Divine-human unity is recognized as the Divinity of the Word, "one and the same Christ, the Son, the Lord, the Only-begotten, in two natures knowable..., one and the same Son and Only-begotten"... But this is not stated directly, the unity of the hypostasis is not directly defined, as the hypostasis of the Word. Hence precisely the further ambiguity about human "nature." What does it mean to recognize "nature" but not "hypostasis"? Can there really be a "hypostatic nature"? Such was historically the main objection to the Chalcedonian oros. It clearly confesses the absence of human hypostasis, in a certain sense precisely the "hypostasis" of human nature in Christ. And it is not explained how this is possible. Here is precisely the intimate affinity of oros with the theology of St. Cyril. The recognition of human "hypostasis" is the recognition of the asymmetry of the Divine-human unity. In this, oros moves away from the "Eastern" way of thinking. And at the same time there are two parallel series of "properties" and determinations, "in the two natures," "in the Godhead," and "in humanity." So it is in the "scroll" of Leo. But they come together not only in the unity of the face, but also in the unity of hypostasis... Understatement goes back to ineffability. The paradox of the Chalcedonian oros is that the "perfection" of Christ is immediately confessed "in humanity" — "of one essence with us in humanity, in all things similar to us except sin," which means that everything can and should be said about Christ, as about every man, as a man, except for sin — and it is denied that Christ was (simple) man — He is God incarnate... He did not "receive man," but "became man." Everything human is predicated about Him, He can be taken for a man, but He is not a "man", but God... This is the paradox of the truth about Christ, which is refracted in the paradox of the Chalcedonian exposition... The Chalcedonian Fathers had a twofold task. Eliminate the possibility of a "Nestorian" dissection, on the one hand; that is why the identity ("One and the Same") is so sharply expressed in the oros, and the unity of the face is defined as the unity of hypostasis. To affirm the perfect co-measurement ("consubstantial") or "likeness" (i.e. the coincidence of all qualitative determinations) of Christ in humanity with the entire human race, of which He appeared as Saviour precisely because He became its Head and was born of a Virgin in humanity, on the other hand; this is precisely what is emphasized by the confession of the two natures, i.e., in fact, by the definition of the "human" in Christ as "nature," and moreover "perfect," complete, and consubstantial. It turns out to be a formal discrepancy: "the fullness of humanity", but not "man"... In this imaginary "mismatch" all the expressiveness of the Chalcedonian oros... But there is also a real understatement and a certain incompleteness in it. Oros makes certain ("Dyophysite") terminology obligatory, and thereby forbids any other terminology. This prohibition referred, first of all, to the terminology of St. Cyril, to his verbal "Monophysitism." This was necessary, firstly, because the recognition of the "one nature" made it easy to cover up real Apollinarism or Eutychianism, i.e. the denial of the human "consubstantiality" of Christ. But this was necessary, secondly, also for the accuracy of concepts. St. Cyril spoke of the "one nature" and spoke only of the Divinity in Christ in the strict sense as of "nature," precisely in order to emphasize the "hypostasis" of humanity in Christ, in order to express the incommensurability of Christ with (simple) people in the "way of existence" of humanity in Him—of course, not in terms of the properties or qualities of this human composition. For him, the concept of "nature" or "nature" meant precisely the concreteness of being (being itself, not only the "image" of being), i.e., as it were, the "first essence" of Aristotle. And therefore, for a more precise definition of both the composition and the way of being of human definitions in Christ, he inevitably lacked words. Ambiguity was created, which confused the "Easterners"... It was necessary to clearly distinguish between these two moments: composition and "way of being". This was achieved through a kind of subtraction of "hypostasis" from the concept of "nature," without, however, that this concept should be transformed from the concrete ("particular") into the "general" or "abstract." Strictly speaking, a new concept of "nature" was constructed. However, neither in the oros itself, nor in the "acts" of the council, was this clearly stated or explained. And at the same time, the "one hypostasis" was not directly defined as the Hypostasis of the Word. Therefore, the impression could be created that the "fullness of humanity" in Christ is affirmed too sharply, and the "image" of his existence remains unclear... This was not a flaw in the definition of faith. But it required a theological commentary. The council itself did not give it. This commentary was given with great delay, almost a hundred years after the Council of Chalcedon, in the time of Justinian, in the works of Leontius of Byzantium... The Chalcedonian oros, as it were, warned events, even more than the Nicene Creed did in its time. And, perhaps, not everyone at the council understood its hidden meaning to the very end, just as in Nicaea not everyone understood the full significance and decisiveness of the confession of the Word as consubstantial with the Father. It should be recalled that in the Nicene Creed there was a certain formal awkwardness and inconsistency (and almost the same: the indistinction between the concepts of "essence" and "hypostasis", the combination of "consubstantial" and "from the essence of the Father")... This created the need for further discussion and dispute. Only the polemical or "ogonistic" meaning of the new definition was immediately clear, and the dividing and enclosing line was confidently drawn. And the positive confession had yet to be revealed in the theological synthesis. A new topic was given for him... It should also be noted that the "union of natures" (or "unity of hypostasis") is defined in the Chalcedonian oros as unmerged, unchanging, indivisible, inseparable (άσυγχύτως, άτρέπτως, άδιαιρέτως, άχωρίστως). All negative definitions. "Inseparability" and "inseparability" determine unity, the image of unity. "Non-fusion" and "immutability" refer to "natures"—their properties ("peculiarities") are not removed or changed by conjunction, but remain precisely "immutable," even as it were, fixed by conjunction. The spearhead of these negations is directed against all "Apollinarianism," against any thought of union as a transforming synthesis. Oros explicitly excludes the idea of "fusion" (σύγχυσις) or "confusion" (κράσις). In the fourth century, it was against Apollinaris that the Divine-human unity was usually defined as "confusion (κράσις and μίξις). Now it seemed dangerous. And again there was no exact word to express the image of the ineffable union in any likeness or analogy.

Part 5

10. The Chalcedonian oros caused a tragic schism in the Church. Historical Monophysitism is precisely the rejection and rejection of the Council of Chalcedon, the schism and rupture with the "synodites." The Monophysite movement as a whole can be compared with the anti-Nicene movement. And the composition of the Monophysite schism was as variegated and heterogeneous as that of the so-called "anti-Nicene coalition" in the middle of the fourth century. There were always few real "Eutychians" and Apollinarians among the Monophysites, from the very beginning. For the Monophysite majority, Eutyches was as much a heretic as he was for the Orthodox. Dioscorus restored him and received him into communion more from outside motives than from agreement with him by faith, most likely in defiance of Flavian... In any case, in Chalcedon, Dioscorus openly rejected all "confusion," and "transformation," and "dissection." And Anatolius of Constantinople, during the discussion of oros at the council, reminded that "Dioscorus was not deposed for the faith." The words of Anatolius, of course, do not yet prove that Dioscorus was not mistaken in anything. However, it is very characteristic that Dioscorus was tried and condemned at the council not for heresy, but for the Ephesian robbery and "murder"... Neither Dioscorus nor Timothy Elurus denied the "double consubstantiality" of the God-man, to the Father according to Divinity, and to the human race according to humanity. And the same must be said of the majority of Monophysites. They claimed to be faithful and the sole guardians of the Cyril faith. At any rate, they were speaking his language, his words. And the Chalcedonian oros seemed to them to be covered by Nestorianism... The theology of this Monophysite majority was, first of all, a systematization of the teaching of St. Cyril. In this respect, the theological views of Philoxenus of Hierapolis and Severus of Antioch, the two most important leaders of Syrian Monophysitism at the end of the fifth and the beginning of the sixth century, are particularly characteristic. It was Severus's system that became the official dogmatic doctrine of the Monophysite Church when it finally closed in on itself, both the Syrian Jacobites and the Copts in Egypt, and the Armenian Church. It was, first of all, formal and verbal Monophysitism. These Monophysites spoke of the Divine-human unity as the "unity of nature," but μία φύσις meant little more to them than the μία ύπόστασις of the Chalcedonian oros. By the name of "nature" they meant precisely "hypostasis" (Severus directly notes this); In this respect, they were rather strict arresters, and only "individuals" or "hypostases" were recognized as real or existing. In any case, in the "unity of nature" the duality of "natural qualities" (the term of St. Cyril) did not disappear or remove for them. That is why Philoxenus already called the "single nature" complex. This concept of "complex nature" is the main God of Severus' system — μία φύσις σύνθετоς Severus defines the divine-human unity precisely as "synthesis," "compilation," σύνθεσις. And at the same time he strictly distinguishes "composing" from any fusion or confusion: in "composing" there is no change or transformation of the "components", but they are only "combined" inseparably, they do not exist "separately". Therefore, for Severus, the "double consubstantiality" of the Incarnate Word is an indisputable and immutable dogma, a criterion of true faith... Severus is more likely to be called "diplophysitis" than monophysite in the proper sense of the word. He even agreed to "distinguish" in Christ "two natures" (or, better, "two essences"), and not only "before the union", but even in the union itself ("after the union"), with the proviso, of course, that it can only be a question of mental or analytical distinction ("in contemplation", έν θεωρία; "by invention", κατ' έπίνоιαν), and again it is almost a repetition of the words of St. Cyril... For Severus and for the Sevirians, the "unity of nature" meant the unity of the subject, the unity of the face, the unity of life. They were much closer to St. Cyril, something that usually seemed to the ancient polemicists. Comparatively recently, the works of Monophysite theologians have again become available to us (in ancient Syriac translations), and it has become possible to judge their views without the mediation of biased witnesses. It is no longer necessary to speak of Monophysitism as a revived Apollinarianism, and it is necessary to make a strict distinction between "Eutychians" and "Monophysites" in the broad sense of the word. It is very characteristic that this line was quite firmly drawn by John of Damascus. In his book "On Heresies in Brief" Damascene speaks directly of the "Monophysites" as schismatics and schismatics, but not heretics. "The Egyptians, they are also schismatics and Monophysites. Under the pretext of the Chalcedonian definition, they separated from the Orthodox Church. They are called Egyptians because the Egyptians were the first to begin this type of division ("heresy") under the kings Marcian and Valentian. In all other respects they are Orthodox" (heresy 83)... However, this is what makes the schism mysterious and incomprehensible. Of course, divisions in the Church are quite possible without dogmatic disagreement. Both political passion and darker passions can disrupt and tear apart the unity of the Church. In the Monophysite movement, from the very beginning, national or regional motives were attached to religious motives. For the "Egyptians" the Council of Chalcedon was unacceptable and hateful not only because in its definition of faith it taught about "two natures," but also because in the well-known 28th canon it exalted Constantinople over Alexandria, which the Orthodox Alexandrians themselves did not reconcile themselves to. It is no accident that "Monophysitism" very soon becomes a non-Greek faith, the faith of the Syrians, Copts, Ethiopians, and Armenians. National separatism is always felt very acutely in the history of Monophysite disputes. The dogmatics of Monophysitism is very much connected with the Greek tradition, it is only from Greek terminology that it is understandable, from the Greek system of thought, from the categories of Greek metaphysics; It was the Greek theologians who worked out the dogmatics of the Monophysite Church. However, Monophysitism as a whole is very characteristic of a sharp hatred of Hellenism, the "Greek" in their mouths is a synonym for pagan ("Greek books and pagan sciences")... Greek Monophysitism was comparatively short-lived. And in Syria, very soon, the direct eradication of everything Greek begins. In this respect, the fate of one of the most remarkable Monophysite theologians of the seventh century, James of Edessa, is very characteristic, especially famous for his biblical works (he is called the Syriac Jerome). He had to leave the famous monastery of Evsebola, where he had tried for eleven years to revive Greek science, "persecuted by the brethren who hated the Greeks"... All these extraneous motives, of course, were very confusing and inflamed the theological dispute. However, their importance should not be exaggerated in any way. The decisive factor was still the religious difference of feeling, namely the difference of feeling, not so much the difference of opinion. This explains the stubborn attachment of the Monophysites to the theological language of St. Cyril and their insurmountable suspicion of the Chalcedonian oros, where they invariably imagined "Nestorianism." This cannot be explained by a mere difference in mental make-up or habits of thought. This is not explained by the admiration for the alleged antiquity of the Monophysite formula ("forgeries of the Apollinarians"). It can hardly be thought that Severus in particular did not know how to understand the Chalcedonian terminology, that he would not have been able to understand that the "Synodites" use words differently from him, but in the content of the faith they do not stray so far from him. But the fact is that Monophysitism was not a theological heresy, it was not a "heresy" of theologians, and it is not in theological constructions or formulas that its soul, its mystery, is revealed. It is true that Severus's system can be almost completely transposed into Chalcedonian terminology. But only "almost". There is always a certain residue... What distinguishes the Monophysites from St. Cyril is primarily the spirit of the system. It was very difficult to reconstruct the inspired teaching of Cyril into a logical system. And terminology made this task difficult. The most difficult thing was to clearly define the image and character of human "properties" in the Divine-human synthesis. The Severians could not speak of the humanity of Christ as of "nature." It decomposed into a system of properties. For the doctrine of the "perception" of mankind by the Word had not yet developed in Monophysitism to the idea of "hypostasis." The Monophysites usually spoke of the humanity of the Word as a "dispensation" (oίκoνoμία). And it was not in vain that the "synodites" caught here a subtle taste of a kind of docetism. Of course, this is not at all the docetism of the ancient Gnostics, nor is it Apollinarianism. For the Sevirians, however, the "human" in Christ was not fully human. For it was not active, it was not "self-moving" — here is the subtlest affinity with Apollinarius, who was confused precisely by the union of "two perfect and self-moving"... In the contemplation of the Monophysites, humanity in Christ was, as it were, a passive object of Divine influence. "Deification" (theosis) was presented as a one-sided act of the Godhead, without sufficient consideration of the synergy of human freedom (the assumption of which does not presuppose a "second subject"). In their religious experience, the moment of freedom was not sufficiently expressed at all, and this can be called anthropological minimalism. In a sense, there is an affinity between Monophysitism and Augustinism: the human is overshadowed and, as it were, suppressed by the Divine. And what Augustine said about the irresistible action of grace in the Monophysite doctrine refers to the divine-human "synthesis." In this sense, one can speak of the "potential assimilation" of humanity by the Deity of the Word, even in the system of Severus... In Severus, this is reflected in his intricate and strained teaching about the "one God-manly action" (the expression is taken from the Areopagiticus). The actor is always One, the Word. And therefore it is one in action ("energy"). But at the same time it is complex, complex in its manifestations (τά άπоτελέσματα), in accordance with the complexity ("syntheticism") of the acting nature or subject. A single action manifests itself in two ways. And the same applies to the will (or volition). In other words, the Divine action is refracted and, as it were, concealed in the "natural qualities" of humanity perceived by the Word... It must be remembered that Severus was dealing here with a difficulty that had not been solved in the Orthodox theology of his time. And among Orthodox theologians the concept of "deification" sometimes took on a tinge of the irresistible influence of the Divine. However, for Severus, the difficulty turned out to be insurmountable, in view of the clumsiness and inflexibility of the "Monophysite" language. And also because in his meditation he always proceeds from the Divinity of the Word, and not from the Divine-human face. Formally, this was the path of Cyril, but in essence it led to the idea of human passivity (one might even say lack of freedom) of the God-Man. And in these deviations of thought the vagueness of the Christological vision was expressed. The human in Christ appeared to these conservative Monophysites to be too transfigured, not qualitatively, not physically, of course, but potentially or virtually; in any case, in such a way that it does not act freely, the Divine is not manifested in the freedom of man... In part, there is a simple understatement here, and in Severus's time, Orthodox theologians also did not always reveal the teaching about the human freedom of Christ (or rather, about the freedom of the "human" in Christ) with sufficient clarity and completeness. However, Severus did not raise the question of freedom at all and, of course, not by chance. Under his presuppositions, the question itself must have seemed "Nestorian," a hidden assumption of the "second subject." The Orthodox answer (as it is given by St. Maximus) presupposes a distinction between "nature" and "hypostasis": not only "man" ("hypostasis") is free, but also "human" as such ("nature" itself), in all its "natural qualities," in everyone and in everyone. And such recognition no longer fits into the framework of the Monophysite (although "Dyophysite") doctrine... Severus's system was the theology of the "Monophysite" majority. It can be called conservative Monophysitism. But the history of Monophysitism is a history of constant strife and division. It is not so important that from time to time we meet under the name of Monophysites separate groups of either Apollinarians, or followers of Eutyches, or new Docetists or "fantasists," who taught about the "transformation" or "fusion" of natures, who denied the consubstantiality of humanity in Christ, or spoke directly about the "heavenly" origin and nature of the body of Christ. These isolated heretical outbursts testify only to the general ferment and restlessness of minds. Much more important are the divisions and disputes that arise in the mainstream of the Monophysite movement. They reveal to us his inner logic, his driving motives. And first of all, the dispute between Severus and Julian of Halicarnassus. Julian seemed to be a Docet to Severus as well. True, Severus was not impartial in his polemics. Later Orthodox polemicists argued not so much with Julian as with his enthusiastic followers. In any case, in the authentic writings of Julian there is none of that crude docetism of which his opponents often speak, accusing him of transforming the mystery of the Redemption into a kind of "fantasy and dream vision" (hence the name "phantasists") by his teaching about the innate "incorruption" (άφθαρσία) of the Saviour's body. Julian's system of the "incorruption" of the body of Christ is connected not with his understanding of the Divine-human unity, but with his understanding of original sin, with its general anthropological presuppositions. Here Julian is very close to Augustine (of course, this is a similarity, not a dependence). Of the Monophysite theologians, he is the closest to Philoxenus. Julian considers the primordial nature of man to be "incorruptible", "non-suffering" and non-mortal, free from the so-called "irreproachable passions" (i.e. infirmities or "suffering" states in general, πάθη άδιάβλητα). The Fall essentially and hereditarily damages human nature—it becomes weak, mortal, and perishable. In the Incarnation, God the Word perceives the nature of the first-created Adam, "impassible" and "incorruptible," and therefore becomes the New Adam. That is why Christ suffered and died not "according to the necessity of nature" (not έξ άνάγκης φυσικής), but willingly, "for the sake of the economy" (λόγω oίκoνoμίας), "by the will of the "Godhead", "in the order of a miracle". However, Christ's suffering and death were genuine and real, not an "opinion" or a "ghost." But they were completely free, since it was not the death of "perishable" and "passionate" ("suffering") humanity, since there was no fatal doom of the Fall in them... There is still no heresy in this teaching... But it merges with the other. Julian imagined the divine-human unity to be closer than Severus. He refused to "number" or distinguish the "natural qualities" in the divine-human synthesis, he refused even "in invention" to distinguish between "two essences" after union—the concept of "essence" had for him the same concrete ("individual") meaning as the concept of "nature" or "hypostasis." In the incarnation of the Word, the "incorruption" of the perceived body is strengthened by such a close union with the Divinity that in suffering and death it was removed by a certain house-building allowance of God. In Julian's understanding, this did not violate the human "consubstantiality" of the Saviour. But in any case, he clearly exaggerated the "potential assimilation" of the human by the Divine by virtue of the Incarnation itself. And again this is connected with a lack of feeling, with a passive understanding of "deification". Julian understood the "incorruptibility" of primordial human nature as its objective state rather than as a free possibility. And in Christ he understood "impassibility" and "incorruption" too passively. It is precisely this quietism that disturbs the equilibrium in Julian's system. He did not proceed from the analysis of metaphysical concepts. In his system, the decisive significance of the soteriological ideal is clearly felt... Julian's followers went even further. They were called Aphthartodocetes ("imperishables") and "fantasies," which are a good expression of the quietism (rather than "Docetism") that was conspicuous in their way of thinking. The human is passively transformed. To some of Julian's followers it seemed that this humanity, transfigured and deified in the Divine-human unity, could no longer be called "created" — thus arose the sect of the Actistites ("netvarniki")... A similar conclusion has been reached by some of Severus's supporters in the controversy about the human knowledge of Christ. In the Divine-human unity, the limitation of human knowledge must be removed immediately and passively, otherwise there will be a split between human "ignorance" and Divine omniscience, and the "unity of nature" will be broken. Thus reasoned in Alexandria the supporters of a certain Stephen Niov. This argument is partly reminiscent of Apollinarius' arguments (not conclusions) about the impossibility of a genuine union of the "two perfects" precisely because of the limitations and vicissitudes of the human mind. But the "Niovites" found another way out of this difficulty; they denied any difference in Christ after the union, in which the human mind was immediately elevated to Divine omniscience. Here, again, the quietistic understanding of human thought was at play. Most of the Severians were "cryptics" in this matter—the omniscience of Christ was only not manifested in humanity. It seemed impious to admit that the human "ignorance" of Christ (in particular about the day of judgment) could be real, and was not only an applied omission... It should be noted again that there was an unresolved question for Orthodox theology here. But for the Monophysites it was also insoluble. In other words, within the limits of the Monophysite premises, it was solvable only through the recognition of the passive assimilation of the human by the Divine... In all these disputes, the vagueness and vagueness of the religious vision, damaged by anthropological quietism, is revealed. In the Monophysite movement there is an inner duality, a dichotomy of feeling and thought. It can be said that the theology of the Monophysites was more Orthodox than their ideals; In other words, the theologians in Monophysitism were more Orthodox than the multitude of believers, but even their unsuccessful, "Monophysite" language prevented theologians from reaching the final clarity. Therefore, in a strange and unexpected way, Monophysitism becomes "more Orthodox" precisely when the religious wave subsides and theology cools down into scholasticism. It is then that the closeness of the Monophysites to St. Cyril seems so obvious. For this is closeness in words, and not in spirit... The source of Monophysitism is in dogmatic formulas, but in religious passion. The whole pathos of Monophysitism lies in the self-abasement of man, in the acute need to overcome the human as such. And hence the instinctive desire to distinguish the God-Man from men as sharply as possible, even in His humanity. This longing can manifest itself in different forms and with different strengths, depending on how enlightened and curbed is this sultry thirst for human self-abasement, which breaks through from the subconscious and dark depths. It is no accident that Monophysitism was so closely connected with ascetic fanaticism, with the ascesis of self-torture and anguish. And it is no accident that in Monophysite circles Origen's motifs about universal apocatastasis came to life again. In this respect, the lonely image of the Syrian mystic Bar-Sudaili is especially expressive, with his teaching about the universal restoration and the ultimate "consubstantiality" of all creation with God. Neoplatonic mysticism paradoxically crosses with Eastern fatalism. The apotheosis of self-abasement is the paradox of Monophysitism. And it is only from these psychological predispositions that the tragic history of Monophysitism can be understood... The belated epilogue of the Monophysite movement was the Monothelite controversy. It was a dispute about formulas, and about the formulas of church diplomacy rather than theology. However, it is not only a seductive tactical ambiguity that is evident in these formulas, but also a dangerous vagueness of theological vision or perception. That is why this dispute about words flared up with unprecedented bitterness and was sprinkled with the blood of Orthodox confessors... The Monothelites were supported and even inspired by the state power, concerned with the restoration of the religious unity of the disintegrating empire. An agreement with the Monophysites was an old dream of the emperors (cf. Basilisk's Encyclokon 472, Zeno's Henoticon 482, and Justinian's unional attempts). Now it was becoming an obsession. But the hierarchy also sought an agreement with the Monophysites, and not only out of insincere evasiveness. To many "synodites" the disagreement with the moderate Sevirians seemed insignificant and unimportant, it seemed almost a historical misunderstanding. Therefore, it seemed that it could and should be dispelled by wise compliance. Such a hope testified to the confusion of Christological ideas, to the vagueness of theological experience. In any case, the hope turned out to be deceptive... In this confusion lay the Monothelite danger... In the history of the Monothelite dispute, two periods can be distinguished. The first is the agreement of Cyrus of Alexandria with the local Sevirians ("Theodosians") in 632 (633). It was also accepted in Constantinople, Pat. Sergius, the main inspirer of the entire union enterprise, and was fixed by imperial decree. He was also approved by Pope Honorius. Unional anathemas were composed very evasively, but in Monophysite terminology. It was an obvious compromise. The Orthodox saw the main untruth of this agreement in the recognition that Christ performed both the Divine and the human "by a single Divine-human action" (μία θεανδρική ένεργεία). the defenders of the agreement insisted that they did not diverge from the "scroll" of Leo, that they were repeating his faith. And indeed, they did not mean "unity of action" in any way in the sense of "fusion." They clearly distinguished between the divine and the human, they referred unity not to "nature" but to "hypostasis", and never called the "one action" "natural", but always precisely "hypostatic"; the very definition of the "single action" as "Divine-human" already emphasized its "complexity." And yet, "one action" means much more than just "one person." The Monothelites did not notice this. The error of "monoenergism," of course, does not lie in the fact that the human in Christ is confessed to be "God-moving"—such a conclusion necessarily follows from the teaching of the unity of the Divine-human person or subject. And none of the Orthodox has ever challenged it. The error was that the Monothelites, following the Sevirians, understood this "movement of God" as the passivity of the human. They compared the action of the Divinity in the humanity of Christ with the action of the soul in the human body. This habitual analogy in this case became dangerous. For it did not emphasize the most important thing, the freedom of man in his very movement of God, while the body is precisely not free in its subordination to the soul. It was this difference that the Monothelites did not feel. They imagined the human too naturalistically. In any case, they refused to speak of "two natural actions," fearing to double their hypostasis by such recognition. The uniqueness of the human was not emphasized with sufficient force, precisely because it was not felt. And it must be added that "energy" means more than just action, but rather vitality and vitality. The Monothelites feared to invoke the "natural" vitality of the human in Christ, confusing it with "independence"; and therefore the human turned out to be inevitably passive for them... The second period in the history of the Monothelite controversy begins with the publication of the "Ekfesis" by Imp. Heraclius ("Exposition of the True Faith", 638). Here, instead of "one action," the "unity of will" or "willing" (έν θέλημα) is affirmed; At the same time, it is forbidden to talk about both "one" and "two actions". The new term was suggested by Pope Honorius. There was obvious ambiguity in the very formulation of the question. "Unity of will" can be understood in two ways. Or as a complete and perfect coincidence or agreement between human will and the Divine; or as the singularity of the Divine will, to the "beckoning" of which the "human" submits without its own or "natural" will. In other words, the unity of the will can mean either only the unity of the subject, or also the "weak-willedness" of the human. It remained unclear what exactly Patr wanted to say. Sergius, composing his "exposition". As if it were the former, since he motivates the recognition of the "one will" by the impossibility of admitting any bifurcation or "contradiction" in the will of the God-man. And at the same time he forbids speaking of two natural volitions, and by this he subtracts, as it were, the will from the "human" in Christ... In the Monothelite movement, two depths must be distinguished. Of course, Monothelitism arose as a diplomatic movement, as a search for a conciliatory compromise. And it can be said that this was a "political heresy", a heresy for political reasons. But the Monothelite movement is not exhausted by this. It deeply disturbed the Church. Monothelitism was a symptom of theological confusion. And for all the theological colorlessness of the Monothelite formulas, a new dogmatic question was sharply posed in them, albeit from the opposite. It was a question of human will. The whole Monothelite controversy was not possible only because there was no decisive answer to this question; And moreover, the question itself has not yet matured, has not yet burned into his consciousness. The temptation of quietism had not yet been overcome. The entire polemics of St. Maximus with the Monothelites boils down, strictly speaking, to the explanation that the will is a necessary element of human nature, that without will and freedom, human nature will be inauthentic and incomplete. From these anthropological premises, the Christological conclusion followed by itself. In the Monothelite movement the last secret of Monophysitism was exposed. It was a doubt about the human will. Something other than that of Apollinaris is not a temptation about human thought... In a sense, Monophysitism was a "dogmatic precursor to Islam" (as Spengler remarked)... The Monothelite movement ended in a silent retreat, a vain attempt to hide in silence (Typos of 648, with a ban on discussing the question of two or one will at all). But now there was no silence. The need for a decisive response became more and more acute. The answer was given at the Sixth Ecumenical Council in 680 (the Council ended in 681)... The Council repeated and supplemented the Chalcedonian Oros, and continued it in the following definition. "We also preach, according to the teaching of the Holy Fathers, that in Him there are two natural wills, that is, wills (δύо φυσικάς θελήσεις ήτоι θελήματα), and two natural actions (δύо φυσικας ένεργείας), — inseparable, unchanging, inseparable, inseparable. And the two natural wills are not opposite (to each other), as the impious heretics said, — let it not be! but His human will does not contradict or oppose, but should or rather is subject to His Divinity and omnipotent will" (έπόμενоν... καΐ μή άντιπίπτоν ή άντιπαλαΐоν, μάλλоν μέν оύν καΐ ύπоτασσόμενоν). This definition is taken almost literally from the epistle of Pope Agathon, sent to the council. And the pope repeated the definition of the Lateran Council of 649, which followed the teaching of the Monk Maximus. Therefore, the oros of the Sixth Council no longer required a new theological commentary. This commentary has already been given in advance, in the theological system of Maximus the Confessor.

Part 6

11. In the dogmatic disputes of the fifth and sixth centuries, the question of the significance of theological traditions was raised very sharply. The teaching of the Church is unchangeable; Therefore, an argument from antiquity, a reference to the past, has a special evidentiary value. And patristic testimonies are cited at this time and are taken into account in theological disputes with special attention. It was at this time that collections and collections of patristic texts were compiled. However, at the same time, the need for a critical attitude to the past is revealed. Not all historical legends can be accepted. For the first time this question arose in the fourth century, in connection with the teaching of Origen. But the overcoming of Origenism in Trinitarian theology was accomplished almost silently, and the name of Origen was mentioned very rarely. The question of the Antiochian tradition turned out differently. In the Nestorian controversies, suspicion fell on the entire theological past of the East. And in answer the opposite question was asked, about the Alexandrian traditions. With the passage of time, the need for a critical synthesis and revision of traditions became more and more obvious. And in the time of Justinian, the first attempt was made to sum up the historical results. This is precisely the meaning of the Fifth Ecumenical Council (553). It was convened for the judgment of the "three chapters," i.e., in essence, for the judgment of Antiochian theology. But it was no accident that a more general question was raised at the council, On the "chosen fathers" (έγκριτоι πατέρες). The list of the Fathers was suggested by the emperor in his letter, read at the opening of the council, and it was repeated at the third meeting of the council. This list explains the general and vague reference: "according to the teaching of the Fathers", "following the teaching of the Holy Fathers"... The names were named: Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, both Gregories, Ambrose, Augustine, Chrysostom, Theophilus and Cyril, Proclus, Pope Leo. There is a certain intention in the choice of names. Of course, the Westerners were named for the sake of the Westerners, for they had never had a sensible influence in the East, and little was known about them there. But it is characteristic that of the "Eastern" only Chrysostom was named (in the paradoxical neighborhood of Theophilus!). This was already the trial of Vostok. The names of the great fathers of the fourth century do not require explanation. But there was a new poignancy in the enumeration of the Alexandrians: Theophilus, Cyril – the name of Proclus is also attached to this (of course, his "scroll to the Armenians"). This list reflects not only Justinian's personal tastes or sympathies. It is typical for the entire era. And Justinian himself only expressed the prevailing mood. He was not an innovator. He summed up the results. He strove to build and complete an integral system of Christian culture and life. This plan has its own greatness, and there is its own great untruth. In any case, Justinian always thought more about the Christian Kingdom than about the Church. His pathos was that the whole world should become Christian, the whole "inhabited earth," γή oίκоυμένη. In this he saw his calling, the sacred and theocratic calling of the universal Christian king. In his eyes, this calling was a special gift of God, a second gift independent of the priesthood. It is the tsar who is called upon to implement the system of Christian culture. In many ways, Justinian forcibly preempted events. He was in a hurry to complete the construction. This explains his unionist policy, his desire to restore the universal unity of the faith, which was broken after the Council of Chalcedon. Related to this is his interference in theological disputes in general. Justinian did not tolerate disagreements. And in disputes for the sake of unity, he more than once turned from a "most Christian sovereign" almost into Diocletian (a comparison of Pope Agapit in 536). Too often, the synthesis has degenerated into a violent and fruitless compromise. There are many tragic pages in the history of the Fifth Council, especially in its prehistory. It is partly true that the question of the "three chapters" arose almost by accident, that the controversy about the Antiochian traditions was initiated or revived artificially. Justinian had his own tactical motives for issuing the famous edict of 544. Contemporaries asserted that this edict was prompted and even composed by the Palestinian Origenists (Theodore Askida), in the hope of diverting attention from themselves. Such an explanation is too simple... The edict had "three chapters" — about Theodore of Mopeuestia and his books; on the objections of Theodoret against St. Cyril; about the "impious" letter to Marius Persus, known under the name of Ives of Edessa. The emperor proposed to anathematize them. The edict caused great excitement everywhere. It seemed to have been published in favor of the Monophysites. It was seen as a hidden condemnation of the Council of Chalcedon, although the emperor directly anathematized those who would interpret its "chapters" in this sense... The indignation was especially violent in Africa, in the West in general... The opponents of the edict did not so much defend the Antiochians as they considered the edict itself untimely and dangerous in practice. Is it convenient to revise and correct the decisions of previous councils? And a general question arose: is it possible at all to posthumously condemn brothers who have reposed in the world; have they not already been taken away from all human judgment, having been brought before the judgment of God? The supporters of the edict seemed to be "persecutors of the dead" ("necroioctes"). This is what was argued about the most. It was the Western ones who persisted. Pope Vigilius hesitated in confusion between the will of the emperor and the opinion of his Church. The dispute dragged on for many years. The emperor insisted on his own, and at times, indeed, he was transformed almost into Diocletian. In 551 he published a new "Confession" against the "three chapters", with 13 anathemas. Finally, in the year 553, the Ecumenical Council convened. It was not easy to induce the Western bishops, who had already gathered in Constantinople, to appear at the council... And the decrees of the council in the West were adopted only after a long and stubborn struggle... The Council recognized the possibility of posthumous condemnation, agreed with the arguments of the emperor and issued 14 anathemas, in which most of the anathemas of 551 were repeated. The decision was preceded by a detailed analysis of the suspected theological monuments and a comparison of them with indisputable examples of the Orthodox faith. The dangerous inaccuracy of the Antiochian books was clearly revealed. In a sense, this was a revision of the question of the Council of Ephesus, not of Chalcedon. One could argue about the timeliness of such a revision. It seemed to many that there was no need for this, that psychologically it could be beneficial only to the Monophysites. There seemed to be no need to fight the Nestorian danger when the danger was threatening from the opposite side. All these arguments were of a practical nature and the objectors did not go beyond formal rejections. But, whatever the motives that inclined Justinian to raise the question of the "three chapters", in essence he was right. That is why the Council accepted his anathemas. They refute and condemn in detail Nestorianism, but at the same time the false teachings of Apollinaris and Eutyches... It was a solemn confirmation of the Council of Ephesus and a new sentence on the "Easterners." It is very characteristic that Origenism was also condemned at the Council. The initiative of condemnation again belonged to the emperor. As early as 543, he issued 10 anathemas against Origen and all those who defend his impure opinions. This edict was adopted in Constantinople, in Palestine, and in Rome. Before the council, Justinian addressed the bishops with a new epistle about Origen. Apparently, the condemnation of Origen was proclaimed by the assembled fathers before the official opening of the council; That is why it is not mentioned in the Council's Acts. However, it is included in the anathemas of the council (anath. 11; cf. Trull. 1); and during the council itself it is mentioned by Theodore Askida. Soon after the council, Cyril of Scythopolis reports on the condemnation of Origen and the Origenists in his Life of Sava the Sanctified, and directly assimilates it to the Ecumenical Council. In addition to Origen, Didymus and Evagrius were condemned. Certain "impious opinions" expressed by Origen himself or his followers were condemned. The condemnation referred primarily to the Palestinian Origenists, who disturbed the peace in the monasteries there. As early as 542 they had already been condemned by Pat. Ephraim at the local council in Antioch. Even earlier, Antipater, bishop of Bostra (in Arabia), wrote against the Origenists. Palestinian Origenism was connected with Syriac (cf. Bar-Sudaili)... In his edicts, Justinian only repeated the accusations made from the localities. Shortly before the council, a special embassy arrived in Constantinople from the Lavra of the Monk Sava, with the hegumen Konon at its head; the monks presented a special report to the emperor with an exposition of "all impiety"... It is difficult to say how accurately Origen was quoted by his accusers. In any case, the opinions condemned do follow from its premises. The edict of 543 condemns the doctrine of pre-existence and the transmigration of souls, the doctrine of the eternal soul of Jesus, which had already been united with the Divine Logos before His incarnation, the doctrine that He was not only man for the sake of men, but also a seraphim for the seraphim, that He would one day be crucified for demons, the doctrine of apocatastasis, etc. More details in the epistle of the year 552. Here is an outline of the whole system. Its basic idea is that everything from eternity was created in perfect spirituality, and through falling away the present heterogeneous and corporeal world arose; The world process will end with the universal restoration and complete disembodiment of all that exists. This is Origen's own scheme. We can say for sure what attracted the Origenists of the sixth century in Origen's system. Cyril of Scythopolis tells about the division of the Palestinian Origenists into Isochrists and Protoctists. The names are very transparent. The Isochrists asserted that in the universal restoration all would be "equal to Christ" (ίσоι τώ Χριστώ), and this conclusion does follow directly from Origen's anthropological and Christological premises. The protoctists seem to have spoken not so much of apocatastasis as of pre-existence, and, above all, of the pre-existence of the soul of Jesus as the "first creation" (πρώτоν κτίσμα)... It is not difficult to understand why these ideas could spread in the monastic milieu; from them naturally follow conclusions of a practical nature about the paths of ascetic achievement... Again, it was possible to argue whether the question of Origen should be raised at an Ecumenical Council; but Origen's untruth was beyond doubt... The condemnation of the Origenisms at the Fifth Council was a condemnation of the inner temptations of the old Alexandrian theology, which had not yet lost its influence in certain and fairly wide circles. The prohibitions of the Fifth Council meant a judgment on the mistakes of the past. They testify to a turning point in theological consciousness. The Antiochian and Alexandrian traditions are interrupted. The Byzantine era began. 12. In the VI and VII centuries, church culture crystallizes. The enduring symbol of this epoch is the great temple of Wisdom, the Everlasting Word, in Constantinople. Creative tension is felt in some depths. It is clearer in asceticism than in theology. But out of the new ascetic experience is born a new theological synthesis, a new system. It is revealed to us in the works of St. Maximus. It is he, and not Damascene, who sums up the creative results of early Byzantine theology. This explains its powerful influence in the following centuries... Once again, the contradiction between the Empire and the Desert escalates. With catastrophic force it is exposed in the iconoclastic turmoil. A theocratic synthesis in the style of Justinian proved ambiguous and premature. And it falls apart. In this sense, the iconoclastic movement closes the era of early Byzantinism. But in persecution and in martyrdom, the dawn of a new life is already dawning...

St. Cyril of Alexandria