Byzantine Fathers of the V-VIII centuries

Part 3

3. In his soteriological reasoning, St. Cyril most often relies on the two main texts of the Apostle Paul: Heb. 2:14, "As children are partakers of flesh and blood, so he also took them up, that by death he might take away the power of him who has the power of death, that is, the devil," and Rom. 8:3, "As the law, weakened by the flesh, was powerless, God sent His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh as a sacrifice for sin, and condemned sin in the flesh." In addition, St. Cyril often cites 2 Cor. 5:15: "But Christ died for all, that those who live should no longer live for themselves, but for him who died for them and rose again." In other words, for St. Cyril the Saviour is first of all the High Priest... Cyril's soteriology is most of all the soteriology of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Here again the influence of St. Athanasius is felt. Like Athanasius, St. Cyril admits that the Incarnation and life among men would be sufficient if the Savior were to be only a Teacher to set an example. But death had to be destroyed — and therefore the sacrifice of the Cross and death were needed — death for us and for us, and death for all. The angels themselves are sanctified by the merits of the Incarnate Word. For Christ is the source of all holiness and life, the great Intercessor and Mediator, and the New Adam, the beginning and root of regenerated humanity, returning to its original state. Redemption is sealed by the resurrection, which testifies to the divinity of Christ and affirms the hope of our resurrection. The Incarnation begins the historical Economy, in fulfillment of the prophecies and destinies of God. But it is fulfilled in death. And St. Cyril emphasizes that the death of Christ is redemption precisely because it is the death of the God-man, or, as he puts it, "the death of God according to the flesh." Only the Incarnate Word could be a real "saint and messenger of our confession" (cf. Heb. 3:1). "The Son of God, having deigned to descend to exhaustion, receives from the Father a calling to the priesthood, which befits not properly the Divine nature, but the human nature, according to which He, having become like us, experiences all that is proper to it, not undergoing anything according to the Divinity, but assimilating all that has been perfected by mankind according to the economy." The Word performs the sacrament "according to the human nature received" — and it is not the Word itself that is "ordained to the sacrament and to the measures of man before the incarnation" — but it is the Word that performs the sacrament... "If anyone says that our saint and messenger was not God the Word Himself, when He became incarnate and became a man like us, but as a man different from him from a woman, or who says that He offered Himself as an offering for Himself, and not for us alone, for knowing no sin, He had no need of an offering, — anathema." This X of Cyril's anathemas forms one of the focuses of his anti-Nestorian polemics. The twelfth anathema is connected with it: "Whoever does not confess that God the Word suffered in the flesh, was crucified in the flesh, tasted death in the flesh, and became the firstborn from the dead, since He is Life and Life-giving, like God, is anathema." The spearhead of these denials is directed against the idea of human sacrament and sacrifice. The death of man cannot be sufficient, and human sacrifice has no redemptive power, this is what St. Cyril seeks to say. Salvation is not from men, not from the works of men, but only from God. This is the basis of kenosis, condescension and humiliation of the Word. And at the same time, the purification of human nature had to be accomplished through sacrifice... "Suffering was supposed to bring salvation to the world," says St. Cyril, "but the Word, begotten of the Father, could not suffer in His own nature — and so He performs the work of salvation with great skill, assimilates a body capable of suffering, which is why He is called the Sufferer of the flesh, subject to suffering, remaining in Divinity outside of suffering"... After all, the Scriptures call the Savior the same One Who created all things — through Him all things are reconciled to the Father and "pacified by the blood of His Cross"... "Into whose death were we baptized? In whose resurrection are we justified by faith?" asks St. Cyril. "Have we been baptized into the death of an ordinary man? And through faith in him do we receive justification?" ... And he answers: of course not, "but we proclaim the death of God incarnate"... This means that in the salvific passion, death, and sacrifice, God's condescension is revealed to us, and not the heroism or self-exaltation of man. This condescension or "kenosis" does not consist, of course, in the fact that the Divinity is diminished and falls under suffering – St. Cyril resolutely rejects such a kenotism, and the "Easterners" in vain suspected and reproached him for transferring suffering to the Divinity. On the contrary, he always emphasizes that suffering belongs to the flesh, only the flesh is suffering and pleasant; and, therefore, only suffering "according to the flesh" can be "real." But at the same time, St. Cyril affirms the inseparability (of course, not the indistinguishability) of the "flesh" from the Divinity. Sufferings were committed in humanity and in human nature, but they were not the sufferings of "man," an independent human personality. In all his anathemas, St. Cyril speaks of precisely this. With particular sharpness in the fourth anathema: "Whoever distributes the Gospel and Apostolic utterances, spoken about Christ by Himself or by the saints, between two persons or hypostases, and some of them refers to man, thought separately from the Word of God the Father, and others, as divine, to the one Word of God the Father, is anathema." First of all, such a division denies the reality of humiliation or exhaustion, "for where has the Word humbled himself, if he is ashamed of the measures of men?" Again, this does not mean the transfer of the predicate about humanity to the Divinity, it does not mean the confusion of natures, but "both words refer to Jesus Christ alone"... For, as St. Cyril observes, "we know that the Word of God the Father is not incorporeal after the ineffable union"... And the Incarnate Word should not be spoken of as of the Word before the Incarnation, although the Divinity of the Word is not changed by the Incarnation. At the Incarnation, says Carill, "everything belongs to Him, both divine and human"... And at the same time, the "greatness of glory" is not diminished by the "measure of exhaustion"... In other words, the difference of natures does not mean the separation of "persons" or "hypostases"—the inseparably twofold is said of the One, but precisely of the Same. "We do not eliminate the differences in sayings," says St. Cyril, "but we do not distribute them between two persons"... The One Christ is the Incarnate Word, and not "a God-bearing man" (anathema. V); "One with His flesh," i.e. both God and man (anathema. II); — and this is the "essential" or natural unity, ένωσις φυσική, and not only a bond of honor, authority, and strength (anathema. "We say," explained St. Cyril, "that we should not call Christ a God-bearing man, so as not to represent Him as one of the saints, but as the true God, the incarnate and incarnate Word of God... The word was flesh... And since He became flesh, i.e. man, He is not a God-bearing man, but God, Who willingly gives Himself over to depletion and takes possession of the flesh received from the woman"... That is why the Word Himself is called Christ, i.e. the Anointed One, in measure and by virtue of His union with anointed mankind, and no one else... In glorifying His humanity, the Word glorifies Himself, not another. St. Cyril sharply expresses this thought in two anathemas: "Whoever says that the Word of God the Father is God or the Lord of Christ, and does not confess the same God both as man, since the Word was flesh according to the Scriptures, is anathema"... (VI). "Whoever says that Jesus, as a man, was an instrument of God the Word, and is surrounded by the glory of the Only-begotten, as different from Him, is anathema" (VII). And this idea is further strengthened in the ninth anathema: "Whoever says that the one Lord Jesus Christ is glorified by the Spirit, as if using a power alien to Him, and from Him received the power to conquer unclean spirits and perform Divine signs in people, and does not consider the Spirit, by Whom He performed miracles, to be His own, is anathema"... The emphasis here is on the opposite: "alien" and "own". For people, the Spirit is a "stranger" who comes to us from God. This cannot be said of Christ, "for the Holy Spirit is His own (i.e., God the Word), as well as God the Father," because of the identity of the essence. And the Word works through the Spirit, as does the Father... He Himself performs Divine signs by the Spirit, as a possessor, and not in such a way that the power of the Holy Spirit acts in Him as His superior... This is the decisive difference between Christ and holy people... From this St. Cyril draws conclusions. First of all, it is necessary to confess the Most Holy Virgin as the Mother of God (anathema. I), because She gave birth to the incarnate Word in the flesh, gave birth "not to the beginning of existence, but that He, having become like us, might deliver us from death and corruption." And from the Virgin is born the Word, and not anyone else — "not through a change in essence, but through union with the visible flesh"... Secondly, it is not proper to speak of co-worship of mankind in Christ, but to speak of "one worship" of the Incarnate Word (anathemat. VIII). And thirdly, the flesh of Christ was life-giving flesh (anathema. XI). This also applies to the Holy Eucharist, where we glorify the flesh and blood not of an ordinary person like us, but our own body and blood of the Word, the Life-giver of all things... This does not weaken the consubstantiality of the flesh of Christ and ours, but, since the Word is Life by nature, He also makes His own flesh life-giving... Through union and assimilation with the Word, the body becomes the "body of life"... And in this sense, it is extraordinary... At the same time, of course, "flesh is animate and rational". This is the whole meaning of Eucharistic communion, in which we are united with God the Word, who became for us and acted as the Son of man. Through all the anathematisms of St. Cyril runs a single and living dogmatic thread: he confesses the one Christ, the unity of the Face, the unity of life.

Part 4

4. The terminology of St. Cyril was not distinguished by clarity and monotony. Often he was ready to speak a foreign language. For him, words are always only means. And from his listeners and readers he demands and expects that through words and through words they will ascend to contemplation. This does not mean that he confuses concepts, that his thought is double or wavering. On the contrary, in his confession of St. Cyril is always firm, straightforward, and even almost stubborn. This is connected with his well-known verbosity, excess in terminology. He accumulates synonyms, gives too many images and similitudes. Under no circumstances should his theological language be too systematized and stylized. In Christological usage, St. Cyril usually does not distinguish between the terms: φύσις, ύπόστασις, πρόσωπоν, and uses them one next to the other or one together with the other, as obvious synonyms. All these terms in St. Cyril denote one thing: concrete individuality, living and concrete unity, "personality". This does not prevent him from using them in a different sense in some cases, from speaking of the "nature of man" in Christ, from distinguishing "hypostasis" from "person," and from using the term "hypostasis" in a direct and broad non-terminological sense. In this broad sense, he uses it in the well-known and disputed expression of anathemas: ένωσις καθ' ύπόστασιν. And at the same time, to denote the same fact, which he defines as "natural unity", and to which he refers the pseudo-Athanasian Apollinarian formula: μία φύσις τоύ θεоϋ Λόγоυ σεσαρκωμένη. St. Cyril often does not notice that his words sound stronger, say more than he wants to say. And in this respect he did give rise to an inaccurate and incorrect interpretation, to a "Monophysite" interpretation. "Natural" or "hypostatic" unity for him means only "complete unity" and "true unity," as opposed only to the moral or conceivable "relative contact" (συνάφεια σχετική) of Nestorius and other "Eastern" ones. In this sense, Cyril himself, in response to Theodoret, explained the expression: καθ' ύπόστασιν, which means "none other than that the nature or hypostasis of the Word (which means the Word itself) in truth (indeed, κατ' άληθείαν) was united to human nature without any transformation or change, ... and is thought of and is one Christ, God and man" — "The Only-begotten Son Himself, through the perception of the flesh... has become a true man, so that he also remains true God"... "Natural union" is a "true" unity, i.e., one that does not confuse or merge natures in such a way that they need to "exist otherwise than outside of union." The main task for St. Cyril is always to exclude any isolation of humanity in Christ into some kind of independent existence. He strives to affirm the truth of unity, in his mouth μία φύσις means the unity of the Divine-human being or Divine-human life. In its fullness, this unity and the image of union are unknown and ineffable. It can only be partially defined. The first thing that needs to be emphasized here is that union begins with the very conception by the Most Holy Virgin. Man was not first conceived, and the Word descended upon Him. But the flesh of the descended Word was conceived, with which He is united, and which did not exist by itself for the slightest moment (ίδικώς). This union is not a combination of two pre-existent things, it was a "perception" of the ownership and union with the Word of a newly arising human "quality" (πоιότης φυσική) – only logically one can imagine the humanity of Christ before the union. And at the same time, the unity of Christ is not, in the understanding of St. Cyril, a consequence of the Incarnation or union. Embodiment is perception. And St. Cyril seeks to clarify that the perception of humanity does not violate the unity of the hypostasis of the Incarnate Word. The hypostasis or person of the Word in the incarnation (Λόγς ένσαρκоς), as well as outside the incarnation (Λόγоς άσαρκоς), remains unchanged and one. In this sense, union is "hypostatic," for humanity is received into the eternal hypostasis of the Word. The union is "natural," for humanity is ineffably connected with the very nature and face of the Word. Speaking of the one "nature" of the Incarnate Word, St. Cyril in no way diminishes the fullness of humanity. It denies only the "autonomy" or independence of humanity. Human nature in Christ is not something "about Himself" (καθ' έαυτήν). But the humanity received by the Word is full humanity, and in Christ there are two "natural qualities" or "two perfect qualities" (i.e., full of being), each "in its natural attribute" (ό τоϋ πώς είναι λόγоς). Christ possesses in His unity a twofold consubstantiality, He is of one essence with both the mother and the Father... It is true that St. Cyril generally avoids speaking of humanity in Christ as of nature, or of two natures, and prefers to speak of "properties of nature." But only because he understands φύσις in this case as ύπόστασις (i.e., as a self-sufficient individuality), and not because it in any way diminishes or limits human nature itself. Therefore, he could not hesitate to sign the formula of union, which spoke of "two natures", since the connection of the text excluded an inadmissible understanding of this expression. Therefore, in other cases he could speak of the union of "two natures"... The distinction between "natures" (ίδιότης ή κατά φύσιν) for St. Cyril always remained very sharp, and for this reason he emphasized that the union was miraculous and incomprehensible. And as the unknown mystery of the Divine descent to people, it is revealed in the historical person of Christ, sealed in the Gospel. St. Cyril clearly distinguishes between the concepts of "distinction" and "division." It is not necessary to distinguish between the twofold things in Christ, but only to distinguish, that is, to distinguish mentally or logically (εν θεωρία, εν ψίλαις καί μόναίς έννоιαις). For the unity of the "heterogeneous" in Christ is indissoluble and indissoluble, ένωσις άναγκαιοτάτη... "Therefore," explained Saint Cyril, "if after the ineffable union you call Immanuel God, we will understand the Word of God the Father, incarnate and incarnate. If you also call Him a man, nevertheless we understand Him, Who is contained in the measure of humanity. We say that the Inviolable One became tangible, the Invisible One became visible, for the body united with Him was not alien to Him, which we call tangible and visible"... St. Cyril in every possible way emphasizes the unity of Christ as an active person in the Gospel: to one person (i.e. subject) should be attributed both that which is said according to the Divinity, and that which is said according to humanity, to the one hypostasis of the Incarnate Word. Even the suffering of St. Cyril is attributed to the Word, of course, with the explanation that this attribution is determined by conjunction: it is not the Word itself that suffers, but the flesh; however, the Word's own flesh — there was no "theopaschitism" in Saint Cyril. The theological thought of St. Cyril is always perfectly clear. But he could not find a complete expression for it. This is the main reason for the long disputes and misunderstandings with the East. The formula of unity is composed in "Antiochian" expressions, it does not include the favorite expressions of St. Cyril. Instead of "one nature" it speaks of a "single person" of two and in two natures... And at the same time, the further development of Orthodox Christology took place in the spirit and style of St. Cyril, despite the fact that it was now necessary not so much to defend the truth of unity as to explain its non-confluence, revealing, as it were, its measures and limits. However, the Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon already asserted with emphasis that they contained "the faith of Cyril." And the same thing happened later. This was not hindered, but rather facilitated by the fact that the genuine Monophysites persistently disputed the right of the Orthodox to Cyril's heritage and succession. Cyril's formulas were abandoned, but his strength lay not in formulas, but in his living contemplation, which was revealed in him into an integral Christological system. St. Cyril was a creative theologian of great style, the last of the great Alexandrians.

On the History of the Council of Ephesus

D'Ales relies on the new edition, and this is the first merit of his interesting, though too brief, book. This is a transcript of his special course delivered this spring at the Institut ctholique in Paris. The historian must also reveal and show the meaning of what happened or happened. And this is becoming more and more difficult in the history of the Council of Ephesus. The history of the council is the history of schism. The fathers who had gathered in Ephesus to discuss Nestorius were divided. Two councils met in Ephesus, mutually excommunicating each other. True, only one of them was true and "ecumenical", the council of Cyril of Alexandria and Mnemon of Ephesus, to which the Roman legates also joined; and the second council or conciliabulum, the council of the "Easterners," was and turned out to be an "apostate council." But at the same time, even at this "council" the overwhelming majority was indisputably Orthodox. The historian must, first of all, show and explain how and why this schism or division of the Orthodox episcopate was possible and, in a certain sense, even inevitable. The preliminary answer is quite simple and easy: it was a division and clash of two theological schools or trends, Alexandrian and Antiochian. And this is connected with the recently fashionable attempt at the historical and even dogmatic rehabilitation of Nestorius. The question arises whether he was justly condemned, and whether his enemies did not really impute to him such false teachings, which he did not actually preach and did not share... The acuteness of the question lies in the fact that Nestorius was historically supported by almost the entire Orthodox "East", i.e. the Church of Antioch or Asia Minor, and here Nestorius was renounced in essence more canonically than dogmatically... In the final analysis, the question of Nestorius is the question of Diodorus and Theodore of Mopsusetia), the question of Bliss. Theodorite. Thus this question was posed at the Fifth Ecumenical Council, when Theodore was condemned, and of the works of Bl. Others were anathematized. And here again the doubt arises whether these posthumous anathemas were not biased and hasty. If only a few stand up for Nestorius in modern theology, then it is unlikely that the majority does not defend the Antiochians... And so, it is a great and indisputable merit of Fr. d'Alès that he is quite free from these fashionable hobbies. This testifies not only to his sober theological conservatism, but also to his great theological observation. In the last chapter of his book, he poses a general question: Nestorius and Cyril of Alexandria; and makes an attempt to restore the teaching of Nestorius, first of all, on the basis of those indisputable passages from the sermons of Nestorius, sent by him himself to Rome, which served as a pretext for his condemnation both in Rome and in Alexandria, even before the Council of Ephesus... With all caution and frugality, with all the reservations and amendments, we have to recognize here in Nestorius a dangerous and deceptive theological tendency, a tendency towards the excessive isolation of human nature in Christ... And this tendency, indeed, was common to all Antiochian theology. It cannot be said that this was "Adoptian" theology, but the temptation of "Adoptianism" was not overcome and decontaminated here... On the contrary, St. Cyril, in all his slips of the tongue, was an unshakable confessor of the Incarnate Word... Fr. d'Ales will not deign to complete his analysis. But a more careful and detailed analysis can only confirm his characteristic... At the Council of Ephesus, indeed, a "misunderstanding" was revealed. But this misunderstanding did not lie in the fact that, roughly speaking, "they did not know their own," and the Orthodox in their temper anathematized each other as heretics, but in the fact that some of the Orthodox turned out to be theologically short-sighted... The Antiochians, the "Easterners," were guilty of this short-sightedness. For them, the ghost of Apollinaris obscured the real image of Nestorius, just as in their time, after the Council of Nicaea, the ghost of Sabellius overshadowed the image of Arius. At that time they argued with the imaginary Sabellianism of St. Athanasius and the Cappadiceans, now with the imaginary Aollinarism of St. Cyril. The truth of Athanasius is not detracted from by the later birth of the Monophysites from the spirit of "Egyptian" piety, no matter how much the Monophysites lay claim to the heritage of St. Cyril... And the shortsightedness of the Antiochians was not determined solely by their philosophical skills or intellectual presuppositions. It is organically connected with their religious ideal, it must be said, with their anthropological ideal, with their teaching about the vocation and destiny of man. Anthropology is the main weakness of Antiochian theology. The clash of Alexandrian and Antiochian theology already at the Council of Ephesus was a clash of two anthropological intuitions, two anthropological ideals. The history of the Christian disputes of the fifth and eighth centuries in general can be fully understood only from anthropological premises. After all, the whole dispute was about an anthropological fact: after the victory over Arianism, they no longer argued about the Divinity of Christ, the Incarnate Word; they argued only about His human nature. And they argued from a soteriological point of view. The theology of the Antiochians can be defined, first of all, as a kind of anthropological maximalism, as an exaggerated self-assessment of human dignity. This maximalism was theoretically sharpened, probably in the disputes with Apollinarius, in the confrontation against Apollinarian minimalism in anthropology, with its disgust and disdain for man, which led Apollinaris to circumcision, to the truncation of human nature in Christ. In Apollinarianism, premature and excessive self-distrust of man, premature self-denial and excessive hopelessness were manifested. The human seemed too weak and base to be worthy of "deification." But the Antiochian reaction against this unrighteous anthropological self-abasement was nourished by an untransformed humanistic optimism, probably of Stoic origin. It is not without reason that Nestorianism was already in antiquity compared with Pelagianism (cf. Maria Mercatora). There is an undeniable psychological affinity, if not a genetic link. It was easy to draw soteriological conclusions from such a feeling. On the one hand, "salvation" was reduced to the simple liberation of human nature, to its restoration in natural, immanent measures and powers, in puris naturalibus—the Antiochians seldom spoke of "deification"... On the other hand, salvation seemed to be realizable by the "natural" powers of man, hence the doctrine of human podvig and the growth of Christ develops so vividly in Antiochian theology. And Christ was revealed to the "Easterners" as an ascetic, and in this sense, as a "simple man." These anthropological prerequisites prevented the "Easterners" from accurately discerning and describing the unity of the Divine-human face. In any case, they were inclined, so to speak, to the symmetrical representation of the "two natures" in Christ, and with hasty suspicion they regarded any asymmetry as a heretical "fusion." Meanwhile, it is precisely asymmetrical diophysitism that is Orthodox truth. The temptation of the "East" is not in the "division" of nature, but precisely in their symmetrical equalization, which leads to the doubling of the Divine face, to the "dual Sons"... The paradoxical asymmetry of the Divine-human face lies in the fact that human nature in the Divine-human unity does not have its own "face," its own "hypostasis," that it is perceived in the hypostasis of God the Word—why it is necessary to say: the Incarnate Word, and it is impossible to say: God-bearing man. This the Antiochians could not understand... Orthodox asymmetrical diophysitism is closely connected with the soteriological idea of "deification" as the transfiguration or "revival" of man, which is quite clear in St. Cyril. This does not in the least truncate human fullness, but, without any belittling of human dignity, it means that man is presented with a superhuman goal and limit, that he must surpass the human measure or "the measure of nature" — in transfiguration, in union with God... The fullness of human nature, which does not transform into the other, but unlocks in "deification"—this could not be understood and recognized by the minimalists in anthropology, the Apollinarians and Monophysites. They did not know how to think of this "unlocking" of human self-sufficiency as anything other than a "transformation," as a fall out of the measures of nature, a kind (Greek). They exaggerated the incommensurability of the human in Christ with the human in us, in the "common people"... For other reasons, the anthropological maximalists could not understand and accept the "hypostatic" unity — like "deification," it meant too much for them, more than their religious-soteriological ideal demanded and allowed... In Ephesus, no injustice or mistake was committed. Nestorius was condemned and deposed with reason, and his condemnation was a tragic warning of the inherent dangers of "Eastern" theology. The history of "Eastern" theology actually ends with Bl. Theodorite. The historical thread breaks. The path turned out to be a dead end... And if, after the Council of Ephesus, the divided bishops were reunited on the basis of a dogmatic formula set forth in terms of "Eastern" theology (as the Chalcedonian Oros later did), this meant neither victory nor "rehabilitation" of the Antiochian school. For the meaning of a formula is determined by its interpretation. And this interpretation given by the Church completely excludes "Eastern" maximalism. "Fr. d'Alès's book only introduces the history of these painful and disturbing disputes. But in modern literature it is perhaps one of the best books on the history of Christological movements in the ancient Church.

Blessed Theodoret

D'Ales relies on the new edition, and this is the first merit of his interesting, though too brief, book. This is a transcript of his special course delivered this spring at the Institut ctholique in Paris. The historian must also reveal and show the meaning of what happened or happened. And this is becoming more and more difficult in the history of the Council of Ephesus. The history of the council is the history of schism. The fathers who had gathered in Ephesus to discuss Nestorius were divided. Two councils met in Ephesus, mutually excommunicating each other. True, only one of them was true and "ecumenical", the council of Cyril of Alexandria and Mnemon of Ephesus, to which the Roman legates also joined; and the second council or conciliabulum, the council of the "Easterners," was and turned out to be an "apostate council." But at the same time, even at this "council" the overwhelming majority was indisputably Orthodox. The historian must, first of all, show and explain how and why this schism or division of the Orthodox episcopate was possible and, in a certain sense, even inevitable. The preliminary answer is quite simple and easy: it was a division and clash of two theological schools or trends, Alexandrian and Antiochian. And this is connected with the recently fashionable attempt at the historical and even dogmatic rehabilitation of Nestorius. The question arises whether he was justly condemned, and whether his enemies did not really impute to him such false teachings, which he did not actually preach and did not share... The acuteness of the question lies in the fact that Nestorius was historically supported by almost the entire Orthodox "East", i.e. the Church of Antioch or Asia Minor, and here Nestorius was renounced in essence more canonically than dogmatically... In the final analysis, the question of Nestorius is the question of Diodorus and Theodore of Mopsusetia), the question of Bliss. Theodorite. Thus this question was posed at the Fifth Ecumenical Council, when Theodore was condemned, and of the works of Bl. Others were anathematized. And here again the doubt arises whether these posthumous anathemas were not biased and hasty. If only a few stand up for Nestorius in modern theology, then it is unlikely that the majority does not defend the Antiochians... And so, it is a great and indisputable merit of Fr. d'Alès that he is quite free from these fashionable hobbies. This testifies not only to his sober theological conservatism, but also to his great theological observation. In the last chapter of his book, he poses a general question: Nestorius and Cyril of Alexandria; and makes an attempt to restore the teaching of Nestorius, first of all, on the basis of those indisputable passages from the sermons of Nestorius, sent by him himself to Rome, which served as a pretext for his condemnation both in Rome and in Alexandria, even before the Council of Ephesus... With all caution and frugality, with all the reservations and amendments, we have to recognize here in Nestorius a dangerous and deceptive theological tendency, a tendency towards the excessive isolation of human nature in Christ... And this tendency, indeed, was common to all Antiochian theology. It cannot be said that this was "Adoptian" theology, but the temptation of "Adoptianism" was not overcome and decontaminated here... On the contrary, St. Cyril, in all his slips of the tongue, was an unshakable confessor of the Incarnate Word... Fr. d'Ales will not deign to complete his analysis. But a more careful and detailed analysis can only confirm his characteristic... At the Council of Ephesus, indeed, a "misunderstanding" was revealed. But this misunderstanding did not lie in the fact that, roughly speaking, "they did not know their own," and the Orthodox in their temper anathematized each other as heretics, but in the fact that some of the Orthodox turned out to be theologically short-sighted... The Antiochians, the "Easterners," were guilty of this short-sightedness. For them, the ghost of Apollinaris obscured the real image of Nestorius, just as in their time, after the Council of Nicaea, the ghost of Sabellius overshadowed the image of Arius. At that time they argued with the imaginary Sabellianism of St. Athanasius and the Cappadiceans, now with the imaginary Aollinarism of St. Cyril. The truth of Athanasius is not detracted from by the later birth of the Monophysites from the spirit of "Egyptian" piety, no matter how much the Monophysites lay claim to the heritage of St. Cyril... And the shortsightedness of the Antiochians was not determined solely by their philosophical skills or intellectual presuppositions. It is organically connected with their religious ideal, it must be said, with their anthropological ideal, with their teaching about the vocation and destiny of man. Anthropology is the main weakness of Antiochian theology. The clash of Alexandrian and Antiochian theology already at the Council of Ephesus was a clash of two anthropological intuitions, two anthropological ideals. The history of the Christian disputes of the fifth and eighth centuries in general can be fully understood only from anthropological premises. After all, the whole dispute was about an anthropological fact: after the victory over Arianism, they no longer argued about the Divinity of Christ, the Incarnate Word; they argued only about His human nature. And they argued from a soteriological point of view. The theology of the Antiochians can be defined, first of all, as a kind of anthropological maximalism, as an exaggerated self-assessment of human dignity. This maximalism was theoretically sharpened, probably in the disputes with Apollinarius, in the confrontation against Apollinarian minimalism in anthropology, with its disgust and disdain for man, which led Apollinaris to circumcision, to the truncation of human nature in Christ. In Apollinarianism, premature and excessive self-distrust of man, premature self-denial and excessive hopelessness were manifested. The human seemed too weak and base to be worthy of "deification." But the Antiochian reaction against this unrighteous anthropological self-abasement was nourished by an untransformed humanistic optimism, probably of Stoic origin. It is not without reason that Nestorianism was already in antiquity compared with Pelagianism (cf. Maria Mercatora). There is an undeniable psychological affinity, if not a genetic link. It was easy to draw soteriological conclusions from such a feeling. On the one hand, "salvation" was reduced to the simple liberation of human nature, to its restoration in natural, immanent measures and powers, in puris naturalibus—the Antiochians seldom spoke of "deification"... On the other hand, salvation seemed to be realizable by the "natural" powers of man, hence the doctrine of human podvig and the growth of Christ develops so vividly in Antiochian theology. And Christ was revealed to the "Easterners" as an ascetic, and in this sense, as a "simple man." These anthropological prerequisites prevented the "Easterners" from accurately discerning and describing the unity of the Divine-human face. In any case, they were inclined, so to speak, to the symmetrical representation of the "two natures" in Christ, and with hasty suspicion they regarded any asymmetry as a heretical "fusion." Meanwhile, it is precisely asymmetrical diophysitism that is Orthodox truth. The temptation of the "East" is not in the "division" of nature, but precisely in their symmetrical equalization, which leads to the doubling of the Divine face, to the "dual Sons"... The paradoxical asymmetry of the Divine-human face lies in the fact that human nature in the Divine-human unity does not have its own "face," its own "hypostasis," that it is perceived in the hypostasis of God the Word—why it is necessary to say: the Incarnate Word, and it is impossible to say: God-bearing man. This the Antiochians could not understand... Orthodox asymmetrical diophysitism is closely connected with the soteriological idea of "deification" as the transfiguration or "revival" of man, which is quite clear in St. Cyril. This does not in the least truncate human fullness, but, without any belittling of human dignity, it means that man is presented with a superhuman goal and limit, that he must surpass the human measure or "the measure of nature" — in transfiguration, in union with God... The fullness of human nature, which does not transform into the other, but unlocks in "deification"—this could not be understood and recognized by the minimalists in anthropology, the Apollinarians and Monophysites. They did not know how to think of this "unlocking" of human self-sufficiency as anything other than a "transformation," as a fall out of the measures of nature, a kind (Greek). They exaggerated the incommensurability of the human in Christ with the human in us, in the "common people"... For other reasons, the anthropological maximalists could not understand and accept the "hypostatic" unity — like "deification," it meant too much for them, more than their religious-soteriological ideal demanded and allowed... In Ephesus, no injustice or mistake was committed. Nestorius was condemned and deposed with reason, and his condemnation was a tragic warning of the inherent dangers of "Eastern" theology. The history of "Eastern" theology actually ends with Bl. Theodorite. The historical thread breaks. The path turned out to be a dead end... And if, after the Council of Ephesus, the divided bishops were reunited on the basis of a dogmatic formula set forth in terms of "Eastern" theology (as the Chalcedonian Oros later did), this meant neither victory nor "rehabilitation" of the Antiochian school. For the meaning of a formula is determined by its interpretation. And this interpretation given by the Church completely excludes "Eastern" maximalism. "Fr. d'Alès's book only introduces the history of these painful and disturbing disputes. But in modern literature it is perhaps one of the best books on the history of Christological movements in the ancient Church.

I. Life

D'Ales relies on the new edition, and this is the first merit of his interesting, though too brief, book. This is a transcript of his special course delivered this spring at the Institut ctholique in Paris. The historian must also reveal and show the meaning of what happened or happened. And this is becoming more and more difficult in the history of the Council of Ephesus. The history of the council is the history of schism. The fathers who had gathered in Ephesus to discuss Nestorius were divided. Two councils met in Ephesus, mutually excommunicating each other. True, only one of them was true and "ecumenical", the council of Cyril of Alexandria and Mnemon of Ephesus, to which the Roman legates also joined; and the second council or conciliabulum, the council of the "Easterners," was and turned out to be an "apostate council." But at the same time, even at this "council" the overwhelming majority was indisputably Orthodox. The historian must, first of all, show and explain how and why this schism or division of the Orthodox episcopate was possible and, in a certain sense, even inevitable. The preliminary answer is quite simple and easy: it was a division and clash of two theological schools or trends, Alexandrian and Antiochian. And this is connected with the recently fashionable attempt at the historical and even dogmatic rehabilitation of Nestorius. The question arises whether he was justly condemned, and whether his enemies did not really impute to him such false teachings, which he did not actually preach and did not share... The acuteness of the question lies in the fact that Nestorius was historically supported by almost the entire Orthodox "East", i.e. the Church of Antioch or Asia Minor, and here Nestorius was renounced in essence more canonically than dogmatically... In the final analysis, the question of Nestorius is the question of Diodorus and Theodore of Mopsusetia), the question of Bliss. Theodorite. Thus this question was posed at the Fifth Ecumenical Council, when Theodore was condemned, and of the works of Bl. Others were anathematized. And here again the doubt arises whether these posthumous anathemas were not biased and hasty. If only a few stand up for Nestorius in modern theology, then it is unlikely that the majority does not defend the Antiochians... And so, it is a great and indisputable merit of Fr. d'Alès that he is quite free from these fashionable hobbies. This testifies not only to his sober theological conservatism, but also to his great theological observation. In the last chapter of his book, he poses a general question: Nestorius and Cyril of Alexandria; and makes an attempt to restore the teaching of Nestorius, first of all, on the basis of those indisputable passages from the sermons of Nestorius, sent by him himself to Rome, which served as a pretext for his condemnation both in Rome and in Alexandria, even before the Council of Ephesus... With all caution and frugality, with all the reservations and amendments, we have to recognize here in Nestorius a dangerous and deceptive theological tendency, a tendency towards the excessive isolation of human nature in Christ... And this tendency, indeed, was common to all Antiochian theology. It cannot be said that this was "Adoptian" theology, but the temptation of "Adoptianism" was not overcome and decontaminated here... On the contrary, St. Cyril, in all his slips of the tongue, was an unshakable confessor of the Incarnate Word... Fr. d'Ales will not deign to complete his analysis. But a more careful and detailed analysis can only confirm his characteristic... At the Council of Ephesus, indeed, a "misunderstanding" was revealed. But this misunderstanding did not lie in the fact that, roughly speaking, "they did not know their own," and the Orthodox in their temper anathematized each other as heretics, but in the fact that some of the Orthodox turned out to be theologically short-sighted... The Antiochians, the "Easterners," were guilty of this short-sightedness. For them, the ghost of Apollinaris obscured the real image of Nestorius, just as in their time, after the Council of Nicaea, the ghost of Sabellius overshadowed the image of Arius. At that time they argued with the imaginary Sabellianism of St. Athanasius and the Cappadiceans, now with the imaginary Aollinarism of St. Cyril. The truth of Athanasius is not detracted from by the later birth of the Monophysites from the spirit of "Egyptian" piety, no matter how much the Monophysites lay claim to the heritage of St. Cyril... And the shortsightedness of the Antiochians was not determined solely by their philosophical skills or intellectual presuppositions. It is organically connected with their religious ideal, it must be said, with their anthropological ideal, with their teaching about the vocation and destiny of man. Anthropology is the main weakness of Antiochian theology. The clash of Alexandrian and Antiochian theology already at the Council of Ephesus was a clash of two anthropological intuitions, two anthropological ideals. The history of the Christian disputes of the fifth and eighth centuries in general can be fully understood only from anthropological premises. After all, the whole dispute was about an anthropological fact: after the victory over Arianism, they no longer argued about the Divinity of Christ, the Incarnate Word; they argued only about His human nature. And they argued from a soteriological point of view. The theology of the Antiochians can be defined, first of all, as a kind of anthropological maximalism, as an exaggerated self-assessment of human dignity. This maximalism was theoretically sharpened, probably in the disputes with Apollinarius, in the confrontation against Apollinarian minimalism in anthropology, with its disgust and disdain for man, which led Apollinaris to circumcision, to the truncation of human nature in Christ. In Apollinarianism, premature and excessive self-distrust of man, premature self-denial and excessive hopelessness were manifested. The human seemed too weak and base to be worthy of "deification." But the Antiochian reaction against this unrighteous anthropological self-abasement was nourished by an untransformed humanistic optimism, probably of Stoic origin. It is not without reason that Nestorianism was already in antiquity compared with Pelagianism (cf. Maria Mercatora). There is an undeniable psychological affinity, if not a genetic link. It was easy to draw soteriological conclusions from such a feeling. On the one hand, "salvation" was reduced to the simple liberation of human nature, to its restoration in natural, immanent measures and powers, in puris naturalibus—the Antiochians seldom spoke of "deification"... On the other hand, salvation seemed to be realizable by the "natural" powers of man, hence the doctrine of human podvig and the growth of Christ develops so vividly in Antiochian theology. And Christ was revealed to the "Easterners" as an ascetic, and in this sense, as a "simple man." These anthropological prerequisites prevented the "Easterners" from accurately discerning and describing the unity of the Divine-human face. In any case, they were inclined, so to speak, to the symmetrical representation of the "two natures" in Christ, and with hasty suspicion they regarded any asymmetry as a heretical "fusion." Meanwhile, it is precisely asymmetrical diophysitism that is Orthodox truth. The temptation of the "East" is not in the "division" of nature, but precisely in their symmetrical equalization, which leads to the doubling of the Divine face, to the "dual Sons"... The paradoxical asymmetry of the Divine-human face lies in the fact that human nature in the Divine-human unity does not have its own "face," its own "hypostasis," that it is perceived in the hypostasis of God the Word—why it is necessary to say: the Incarnate Word, and it is impossible to say: God-bearing man. This the Antiochians could not understand... Orthodox asymmetrical diophysitism is closely connected with the soteriological idea of "deification" as the transfiguration or "revival" of man, which is quite clear in St. Cyril. This does not in the least truncate human fullness, but, without any belittling of human dignity, it means that man is presented with a superhuman goal and limit, that he must surpass the human measure or "the measure of nature" — in transfiguration, in union with God... The fullness of human nature, which does not transform into the other, but unlocks in "deification"—this could not be understood and recognized by the minimalists in anthropology, the Apollinarians and Monophysites. They did not know how to think of this "unlocking" of human self-sufficiency as anything other than a "transformation," as a fall out of the measures of nature, a kind (Greek). They exaggerated the incommensurability of the human in Christ with the human in us, in the "common people"... For other reasons, the anthropological maximalists could not understand and accept the "hypostatic" unity — like "deification," it meant too much for them, more than their religious-soteriological ideal demanded and allowed... In Ephesus, no injustice or mistake was committed. Nestorius was condemned and deposed with reason, and his condemnation was a tragic warning of the inherent dangers of "Eastern" theology. The history of "Eastern" theology actually ends with Bl. Theodorite. The historical thread breaks. The path turned out to be a dead end... And if, after the Council of Ephesus, the divided bishops were reunited on the basis of a dogmatic formula set forth in terms of "Eastern" theology (as the Chalcedonian Oros later did), this meant neither victory nor "rehabilitation" of the Antiochian school. For the meaning of a formula is determined by its interpretation. And this interpretation given by the Church completely excludes "Eastern" maximalism. "Fr. d'Alès's book only introduces the history of these painful and disturbing disputes. But in modern literature it is perhaps one of the best books on the history of Christological movements in the ancient Church.

Part 1

1. Theodoret was born, probably, in 393 in Antioch, in a Christian family. He received a good and comprehensive education, Christian and Hellenic; but it is difficult to say with certainty from whom he studied. He was probably not a student of Chrysostom. It is unlikely that he was a student of Theodore of Mopsuestia. From childhood, Theodorite came into close contact with the monastic environment, but it is unlikely that he himself lived in any monastery. The life of Theodoret before his election to the Cyrus cathedra is not known to us. We know that he was a reader in Antioch, that after the death of his mother he distributed all his inheritance and, apparently, retired to one of the Nicert monasteries, "a school of wisdom," as he put it. You have to think that he somehow showed himself and attracted attention. This alone can explain his election as bishop of the city of Cyrus in 423. Cyrus was a small and almost deserted town not far from Antioch, but Theodoret loved it and called it "the best of any other glorious city." He cared for his flock not only spiritually, but also in everyday life; By his own admission, he was "busy with innumerable concerns, urban and rural, military and civil, ecclesiastical and social." At the same time, he did not break his ties with hermits and ascetics, and he himself led a temperate and non-acquisitive life. "I have acquired nothing but the rags in which I am dressed," he said of himself in his old age. Both in his own region and in other cities of the East, he had to encounter pagans, Jews, and various heretics, and the struggle with them was not always safe: "often my blood was shed, and I was prematurely thrown into the very doors of hell"... Apparently, he had to travel a lot in the East, and everywhere he delivered a catechetical and instructive sermon. He gained honorable fame far beyond the boundaries of his remote region. From his letters of that time, it is possible to restore his rather bright and attractive image. 2. With the beginning of the Nestorian controversies, Theodoret moved to the forefront of church figures, and for a long time. It can be thought that he had already taken part in the compilation of the Antiochian Epistle to Nestorius, with an exhortation not to oppose the designation of the Most Holy Virgin as the Mother of God. He responded to the anathematisms of St. Cyril sharply and severely, more sharply than Andrew of Samosata. He doubted that they belonged to Saint Cyril and saw in them "the empty and at the same time impious teaching of Apollinarius". Other "Easterners" received them in no other way, and before leaving for Ephesus, John of Antioch spoke of the "heads" of Cyril as "the teaching of Apollinarius." The ghost of Apollinaris confused the "Easterners" in any case more than the personality of Nestorius. And in Ephesus they wanted, first of all, to demand an answer from Cyril. Their suspicion was intensified by the haste and harshness of St. Cyril's action at the council. In the schism that took place in Ephesus, Theodoret was one of the main figures from the "Eastern" side. "Egypt is mad again against God, and is at war against Moses and Aaron and with His servants," he wrote from Ephesus to Andrew of Samosata. At Chalcedon, at a conference convened by the emperor of representatives of both councils, Theodoret spoke harshly of his opponents, equating them with pagans, and bitterly remarked that even the pagans considered the sun and sky, which they deified, to be impassible, and the stars immortal, while the Egyptians revered Christ as passionate. To them he appends the Old Testament texts about the lawless and apostates. Theodoret did not understand Saint Cyril, he was frightened by the imaginary danger, and in his infatuation he inevitably inclined too close to Nestorius, calling him "a sweet-voiced pipe", interceding for him, defending him from "the injustice inflicted on him by the impious". In Theodoret's sympathy with Nestorius, the decisive influence was played by the fact of "murder," i.e., the deposition, as the "Easterners" believed, "without trial and illegally." Theodoret did not enter into the discussion of the views of Nestorius, and most of all he argued with Cyril... With a heavy feeling he returned to Syria after the council — it seemed to him that "the darkest darkness of the Egyptian plague" had thickened, that the right faith had been put to shame and "evil dogmas" had triumphed. He longed for peace, but the "wicked chapters" continued to frighten and disturb him. And at the same time, he firmly and distinctly sums up the dogmatic results of the dispute, more with Cyril than with Nestorius. In Cyril, in his anti-Nestorian writings, Theodoret saw the main obstacle and threat to the world. Reconciliation with Egypt seemed to him possible only on the condition that Cyril renounce all that he had written against Nestorius. And this made it necessary to reconsider the whole case of Nestorius. "To anathematize indefinitely, without any restrictions, the teaching of the said bishop, means to anathematize piety itself," thought Theodoret. And he decided: "Not to agree to the unjust and unlawful condemnation of the most holy and God-loving Nestorius, either with his hand, or with his tongue, or with his mind." This determines the position of Theodoret in the history of the reunification of the East with Egypt. He soon became convinced of Cyril's dogmatic Orthodoxy, but in the new and indisputable confessions of the Archbishop of Alexandria he saw a rejection of the "false verbosity" of the impious heads, he saw repentance and conversion "from the false to the right," from "impious reasoning" to the truth. And therefore for him the insistence of Cyril on the question of condemning Nestorius remained incomprehensible and suspicious. The danger of Nestorianism remained unclear to Theodoret. The ghost of Apollinaris still stands before him... The most he was ready to agree to was to keep silent about the question of Nestorius. In the end, he agreed to the cautious formulation of the condemnation, "everything that he said or thought otherwise than that which somehow contains the apostolic teaching." He did not want to mention the name of Nestorius at all in the terms of conciliation... And St. Cyril was almost right when, in defending his disputed "heads" against Theodoret, he said of him that he "exquisitely contemplates the mystery, — barely in the waking state, as if through sleep and in intoxication." In any case, the fear of Cyril's alleged Apollinarianism hindered the triumph of Orthodoxy as much as in his time, during the anti-Nicene struggle, the fear of the alleged Sabellianism of the strict Nicaeans. Just as in his time the ghost of Sabellius had obscured the real image of Arius, so now the ominous shadow of Apollinaris closed the entire dogmatic horizon to the "Easterners," including Theodoret. And they preferred to retreat into the realm of dogmatic innuendo and uncertainty. It was not until the end of the thirties that peace finally came to the East, and the concord with Egypt was restored, which had almost been broken again by the question raised in Edessa and Alexandria about the faith of Theodore and Diodorus. The restraint of St. Cyril and Proclus of Constantinople prevented a new rupture. In the history of these troubles, Theodoret occupies a prominent place, he was, if not the head, then the soul of the Orthodox, albeit suspicious, East. 3. Under the cover of an external agreement, the old struggle continued. After the death of Saint Cyril, it flared up with renewed force under his tough and arrogant successor Dioscorus. The dispute about faith was complicated by personal and regional enmity and rivalry. There were many dissatisfied with the established dogmatic situation not only in Egypt, but also in the East itself. The ghost of Apollinarianism began to come true. A real Monophysitism appeared and, relying on the court, immediately went on the offensive. Relying on the slanders of the offended fugitives from Antioch, Dioscorus, under the pretext of defending the memory and faith of Cyril from the "shameful" objections of the "Easterners", in 448 in an epistle to Domnus of Antioch raises the direct question of the Orthodoxy of the whole East and of Theodoret above all. Still earlier, in the same year, an imperial decree had appeared prohibiting the writing, reading, and preservation of books written against the opinions of St. Cyril under threat of the death penalty, with a clear indication of "some ambiguous teachings." At the same time, the emperor ordered the removal and deposition of the Metropolitan of Tyre, Irenaeus, who had recently been installed on the advice and with the participation of Theodoret. Irenaeus had a very dubious past: at the Council of Ephesus he was a zealous defender of Nestorius and after the Council wrote in his defense (a lost book called "Tragedy"); together with Nestorius he was exiled to Petra of Arabia; even after his consecration he spoke carelessly and seductively, so that Theodoret had to exhort him not to argue about the name: Mother of God: and, finally, he was married for the second time. The pretext for the attack was therefore very well chosen. But in the East they did not fulfill the imperial decree and asked for its repeal. This time Theodoret correctly guessed in Dioscorus the enemy of truth, guessed that a storm was approaching, and began to prepare for it and prepare others. He responded to the suspicions of Dioscorus with a clear and precise confession in the spirit and meaning of the "agreement" of 433. But in Alexandria the excitement increased. Discontented monks from the East wandered everywhere in the Egyptian monasteries and everywhere talked about the danger to the "Cyril faith". A special embassy was sent to Constantinople from Alexandria, and the envoys first of all brought the accusation of heresy, and "everyone's ears buzzed that instead of one Son, Theodoret preached two." However, it was not this accusation that attracted the emperor to the side of the "pharaoh", as Theodoret called Dioscorus, but rather hints at the restless spirit of the Bishop of Cyrus, at his danger to public order and authority. The struggle was waged primarily against Theodoret. The Alexandrians managed to obtain an imperial decree on the removal of Theodoret to Cyrus without the right to leave there, in view of the fact that he "often convenes councils and thereby outrages the Orthodox." In his honorable exile, Theodoret did not break his ties with his Eastern brethren, as well as with friends in Constantinople and at court. It was at this time, in November 448, that Eusebius, bishop of Doryleia, of the Metropolis of Synaad, filed an accusatory complaint against Eutyches against Flavian of Constantinople, and Eutyches was condemned and "excommunicated." For Theodoret, it was, according to him, a ray of light in the middle of the night. Soon after the Council of Constantinople, an "Eastern" embassy went to the capital to defend the Orthodoxy of the suspected East. This embassy was not a lasting success. But in the desire of a conciliar court, Theodoret agreed with his accusers, and under their suggestion, on March 30, 449, an imperial decree was announced to convene an ecumenical council for August 1 in Ephesus, and Dioscorus was given primacy at it, and Theodoret, as suspected, was excluded from participation in the council, unless this would be pleasing to the council. In response to a request to lift this ban, the emperor repeated his decision, "because he dared to expound the opposite of what Cyril of blessed memory wrote about the faith"... It was possible to foresee in advance what the forthcoming council would be like. Theodoret clearly saw "the beginning of a complete apostasy," and did not expect anything good from the forthcoming council. The council met in order to judge some of the Eastern bishops, "infected with the impiety of Nestorius," as the emperor expressed it in letters addressed to Dioscorus, and was prepared in advance "to expel them from the holy Churches and to uproot all the devil's root." The council turned out to be in reality a "robber council", and with this name it went down in history. Theodoret was condemned here in absentia, as a notorious Nestorian, "deprived of all service, all honor, and every degree of priesthood." The sentence was based on the complaint of the Antiochian presbyter Pelagius, on the selections from the book of Theodoret presented by him in defense of Diodorus and Theodore, on the letter of Theodoret to the monks against Cyril – the very fact that Theodoret "dared to think and write contrary to the writings of our blessed father Cyril" proved for the council his impiety. And besides, he spoke out in defense of the Nestorian teachers... The verdict did not meet with objections from the "Easterners" present; they recognized the deposition of Theodoret, including Domnus of Antioch, although he himself was deposed together with Theodoret. In addition, Flavian of Constantinople, Eusebius of Doryleia, the first accuser of the now restored Eutyches, and Ives of Edessa were deposed. The sentence was enshrined in an imperial decree. Any communication with the condemned was forbidden, "both in the city and in the field," under the threat of constant exile. The works of Theodoret, along with the works of Nestorius and the books of Porphyry against Christians, were ordered to be publicly burned, and it was forbidden to keep and read them. All bishops had to express in writing their agreement with the conciliar decision. To supervise the collection of signatures, a special imperial official was appointed from among the henchmen of Dioscorus. The Roman legates did not sign the conciliar decrees and were forced to flee from Ephesus. Before leaving, they received from Flavian and Eusebius an appeal to the Roman see. Theodoret also turned to Rome. He expected a formal review of the whole case from the pope. He addressed him as the primate of a local church that had not yet spoken, and moreover, it was especially independent of the pressure of Constantinople. There was nowhere to turn but Rome. The East was powerless and weakened. Alexandria and Constantinople were in the power of enemies. Theodoret expected the pope to intervene as an arbitrator. The expectation of Rome's help was justified. The Pope did not recognize the acts of the Dioscorus Council. Theodoret, the Roman Council, apparently, received him into communion and restored him to the episcopal dignity. Theodoret himself at this time lived in his remote monastery of Apamia, apparently in great need. In his letters, he continued to complain about his unjust "murder," and emphasized the dogmatic meaning of the persecution raised against him. In particular, he was embarrassed and disturbed by the cowardice of the majority, intimidated and depressed by the harsh behavior of Dioscorus. "Which polyps change their colour according to the rocks, or chameleons their colour according to the leaves, as these change their minds according to the time," asked Theodoret mournfully. And he called on everyone to take care of "akrivia". He wrote a lot at this time, and in his letters he explained Christological truths, at the same time refuting the false interpretations and slander spread by his enemies. As an example of an accurate dogmatic interpretation, he points to the tomos of Pope Leo to Flavian, which was not adopted at the robber council, but later approved at the Council of Chalcedon. "As soon as I read it," wrote Theodorite, "I praised the humane Lord, that He did not completely abandon the Churches, but preserved the spark of Orthodoxy, and not even a spark, but the greatest fire that can ignite and illumine the universe"... With the accession of Marcian, the situation in the empire changed. The exiles were allowed to return, returned to Cyrus and Theodoret. On May 17, 451, an imperial sacra was issued convening a council for September 1 at Nicaea. This corresponded to the desires of Theodoret, who directly asked "to convene a council not of rebellious people and vagabonds, but of those to whom the works of God are entrusted"... At the council, Theodoret was greeted violently. The Egyptians refused to recognize him as a bishop and to sit with him. But the "senate" and the imperial dignitaries, supported by the "Easterners," came to the defense of Theodoret, as the plaintiff and accuser against the council of 449. From the very beginning, he took part in the Council's votes and deliberations as a full member. At the eighth session, Theodoret was restored to his Cyrus cathedra, and "all doubts about the most God-loving Theodoret were resolved." They demanded from him only a direct anathema against Nestorius. From the Council's Acts it is evident that Theodoret seemed to have tried to evade this, proposing to read his own statement of faith in order to establish how he believed and taught. "I was slandered," he said, "and I came to prove that I was Orthodox. I curse Nestorius and Eutyches, but I will not speak of it until I have stated how I believe." Obviously, he feared that a simple condemnation of Nestorius would be ambiguous, since the Orthodox and the Monophysites, who were not at all of the same mind, could agree on it. The excommunication of Nestorius does not yet resolve the question of the Orthodoxy of the excommunicater. Therefore, when the council did not want to listen to his detailed confession, Theodoret added to the anathema against Nestorius a reference to the decisions (oros) of the council that had already taken place and to the tomos of Pope Leo. In any case, Theodoret was restored and returned to the cathedra. Almost nothing is known about the life of Theodoret after the Council of Chalcedon. In the last years of his life, he seems to have shunned church events, although as early as 453 he had been called to do so by Pope Leo in a special letter. He probably died in 457.

Part 2

4. The controversy about Theodoret did not end with his death. Already after the Council of Chalcedon, Marius Mercator, known for his struggle with the Pelagians, came out against him in the West. He accused Theodoret of Nestorianism and proved his accusation by comparing excerpts from Theodoret with the writings of Theodore (of Mopsuestia) and Nestorius, on the one hand, and Cyril, Pope Celestine, and the decisions of the Council of Ephesus, on the other. Such a selection and comparison turned out to be very unfavorable for Theodoret. Marius Mercator did not enter into the analysis of Theodoret's views on the merits. This polemical speech had no practical consequences. The situation escalated later. It goes without saying that in Monophysite circles there was an irreconcilable hostility to Theodoret. For the Monophysites, the condemnation of Theodoret was naturally connected with the rejection of the Council of Chalcedon, at which he was received into communion and his Orthodoxy was recognized. At the end of the fifth century, the emperor Anastasius directly raised the question of anathematizing Theodoret. At the same time, Philoxenus of Hierapolis opposed him, selecting seductive passages from his creations. In the course of time, the excitement grew, and in the year 520 the emperor Justin testified that "Theodoret is everywhere accused of error in faith." In contrast to these rumors, solemn meetings were held in Cyrus in honor and memory of the blessed bishop... Under Justinian, the offensive of the Monophysites became especially violent. At the Constantinople interview between the Severians and the Orthodox in 531, the question of Theodoret was again directly raised. The Monophysites questioned the sincerity of his renunciation of Nestorius at Chalcedon. Again the question arose about the meaning of the disagreement between Theodoret and Cyril... Thus gradually the question of the "three chapters," of Theodoret, Yves, and Theodora, was brewing. This question was sharply posed by Justinian in his edict, probably in 544 (known only in paraphrases and references). Apparently, little was said here about Theodoret. He was accused of objecting to St. Cyril and censuring the Council of Ephesus. Justinian tried to separate the question of Theodoret and the Council of Chalcedon, and asserted that neither Theodoret nor Iva took part in the dogmatic acts of the council, that they were summoned to the council after the condemnation of Eutyches and Dioscorus and after the compilation of the exposition of the faith... Under the threat of exile, Justinian managed to obtain the consent to the condemnation of the "three chapters" from Patriarch Menas of Constantinople and from other patriarchs. Pope Vigilius had given his consent even earlier. But the West expressed a strong protest, especially the African clerics. Vigilius then changed his attitude and, having been summoned by the emperor to Constantinople, stood in opposition there, and pronounced excommunication on Patriarch Menas. However, he soon yielded to the emperor again. However, he is again under pressure. The Hermian bishop Facundus presents an extensive work "In Defense of the Three Chapters". Facundus did not say much about Theodoret, but he tried to explain the meaning of his disagreements with Cyril in essence and to justify the behavior of the "Easterners" in Ephesus in general. At the same time, Facundus reveals the conclusions that can be drawn from the condemnation of the "chapters" in undermining the significance of the Council of Chalcedon. He refutes Justinian that Iva and Theodoret did not participate in the acts of the council. And he concludes: "The writings of Theodoret against Blessed Cyril cannot be condemned without the Council of Chalcedon appearing reprehensible, because Theodoret took part in his reasoning and definitions, defended the letter of Pope Leo, refuting the madness of Eutyches, and proved his correctness to those who do not understand." It is not without the influence of Facund's defense that Pope Vigilius, in his new judgment (April 11, 548), speaks of the "chapters" very mildly, stipulates the inviolability and dignity of the former councils, and limits his condemnation of Theodoret only to his objections to the "heads" of Cyril. But this judgment of the pope also provoked protests throughout the West, and in 549 Vigilius again retracted it. In 551, Justinian renewed the question of the "three chapters" in his "Confession of Faith". Here the question of Theodoret is reduced to his struggle against the Council of Ephesus and against St. Cyril, and to his individual expressions. At the same time, Justinian emphasizes the recognition of the Council of Chalcedon. During these vacillating decisions and judgments, the question was gradually freed from the Monophysite elucidation. He received the final decision at the Fifth Ecumenical Council. In its details, the course of affairs at the council is not quite clear to us. But the general meaning of the Council's decision is quite definite. The personality of Theodoret as a man and teacher, and the correctness of his faith are recognized above suspicion. But among his works are found those which, for various reasons, through carelessness and thoughtlessness of presentation and language, must be recognized as seductive. The council decided to reject "that which Theodoret had impiously written against the true faith and against the twelve chapters of St. Cyril, and against the first Council of Ephesus, and which he had written in defense of Theodore and Nestorius." This was not the excommunication of Theodoret, but meant the denial of dogmatic authority behind his unsuccessful polemics with St. Cyril, which, however, does not give the right to doubt his right-thinking in general. Such an interpretation of the decrees of the Fifth Council was given at the same time by the Pope. This is precisely how the Church's consciousness perceived them. Theodoret is venerated in the Church as a blessed man among the fathers of the Council of Chalcedon and teachers of piety. But his theological judgments are accepted with reservations, taking into account the inaccuracy and carelessness in the presentation and language.