"What is there to clarify?" He lived, grew. Why clarify anything else? In ancient literature, there is simply no such genre as biography. Plutarch in his "Comparative Lives" does not describe anyone's childhood. The time of this kind of epic narrative is the time of the chess clock: when it's my turn to make a move, then my clock goes, when I do nothing, my clock stands. There is no isomorphic time that flows independently of events. Therefore, for evangelists, the time when Christ did something is significant. And this is not clever, this is stupid, this is violence against historical reality, when they begin to invent that, you know, at that time He went to India, or to Egypt, or somewhere else. These things are very easy to verify – Christ did not preach in Greek, he preached in Aramaic (this is the spoken language of Palestine). Today's linguistics is able to understand and prove where the translation is, where the original is. In translation, a certain phrase may be just interesting, but in the original language it will be stunningly bright – it is a play of meanings and shades. Now, when they began to translate the words of Christ from Greek into Aramaic, it turned out that many of His sayings have become strikingly poetic and aphoristic. So, there is nothing in Christ's speech or in His thought that would be a calque from Sanskrit or from Buddhist philosophy [141].

– And what can modern theologians add to what was said about Christ in the era of the Ecumenical Councils from the fourth to the eighth centuries?

– A most interesting feature from the history of Christianity: the theological disputes of the first centuries of Christianity were disputes about the person of Christ. Not about the teaching of Christ, not about the interpretation of one or another of His parables, but about who Christ Himself is. The main discussions were around clarifying the extent of His participation in God and the world of people.

And yet the Fathers of the Ecumenical Councils consciously avoided the solution of certain problems. For example, the Chalcedonian dogma of the Fourth Council (451) says that in Christ the Divine and human natures were united inseparably, unchangeably, inseparably, inseparably. After all, this is not so much an answer as an evasion of the answer – four "don'ts". How the Divinity and humanity were actually united in Christ, we do not know. Four too hasty attempts to respond were rejected. The space of truth is fenced off, but not consecrated, not formulated.

After all, God became Man, not us. That is why here you need to clearly set a limit to your constructive curiosity. A person can only truly know what he has done himself. What was not made by us, not made by us, not with us, remains a mystery to us. Since it was not we who made God Man, but He Himself willed to become Man, there can be no positive answer to the question of how the absolute, the eternal, and the incorruptible were united with the limited, temporary, and perishable, at least until we ourselves have attained the goal of which Athanasius of Alexandria said: "God became Man so that man could become God."

What remains to the lot of modern theologians? The problem also lies in the fact that a number of definitions of the Ecumenical Councils were formulated in the language of ancient philosophy. More precisely, in the language of the late antique school. But, firstly, this language is still initially non-Christian, pagan. Secondly, today it is preserved only in church schools and is incomprehensible outside the walls of seminaries. Incidentally, even in seminaries, it is not so much the language itself and the terms themselves that become understandable, but the rules for the use of these terms in professional theological texts. For example, we say that Christ has one hypostasis. In the Trinity there are three Hypostases. What does the word "hypostasis" mean? Even the Holy Fathers in different centuries had quite different meanings behind this word.

In the pre-revolutionary St. Petersburg Theological Academy, Professor B. Melioransky raised this question. By that time, all theologians had already agreed that the word "hypostasis" most accurately corresponds to such a term of modern philosophy as "person". But this content was first put into this word by St. Philaret of Moscow at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Melioransky asked: Can we, while remaining faithful to the terms and formulas of the ancient Councils, load these terms with a different content, a content that we take from modern philosophy? After all, the Fathers of the Ecumenical Councils took it from contemporary late antique philosophy, but can we, while remaining faithful to their dogmatic formulas, fill these formulas with the content of modern philosophical culture? The Fathers affirmed the closest connection between anthropology and theology: "Therefore, if you have understood the meaning of the difference between essence and hypostasis in relation to man, apply it to the Divine dogmas – and you will not be mistaken" (142). But today anthropology and philosophical ideas about man have changed decisively. Can these changes not affect theology? The question is still open. In reality, this is happening, albeit to the disgruntled lamentations of theologians [XX].

– For a person who is far from theological discussions, disputes about the nature of Jesus Christ, about the relationship between the Divine and the human in Him, often seem to be internal "showdowns" between confessions, between currents in Christianity. Is all this dogma really so important for a person who just wants to love Him?

– Yes, these are indeed our internal "showdowns", but I do not see anything bad or unnatural in them. Can't theologians seriously speak their own language? Why, for example, do physicists have the opportunity to discuss their problems in a circle of scientists, and as soon as theologians try to seriously talk about topics of interest to them in a language understandable to the relevant specialists, they are immediately accused of scholasticism?

Жителям Бирюлево может быть абсолютно все равно, что происходит с электронами и какому закону они подчиняются, но каждому из них важно, будет ли в его доме гореть лампочка или работать телевизор. А ведь появление и работа этих приборов – прямое следствие дискуссий среди ученых-физиков. То же самое можно сказать и о богословии, потому что последствия споров ученых-богословов очень важны не только для тех, кто в них участвует, но и для всей человеческой цивилизации.

Наша культура очень целостна. Когда стоит красивое здание, то мы видим только то, что находится снаружи: стены, облицовку, рамы и так далее. Но держат все это мощные внутренние опоры, каркас, не видимый нами. Здание нашей цивилизации тоже зиждется на определенных столпах и опорах, создававшихся, в том числе, и в богословских дискуссиях, и если хоть одна опора выходит из строя, то все здание начинает коситься, а сломай их две или три – и здание вообще рухнет.

Я приведу пример подобного, некогда почти состоявшегося, «просчета архитектора». Один из первых споров в богословии был спор о том, считать ли Христа подобным Богу или единым с Ним. Люди, получившие название ариан, утверждали, что Христос Богом не является, что Он не единосущен Богу Отцу. В греческом языке спор шел из-за одной-единственной буквы: единый – «омо», а подобный – «оми». Причем этот последний звук передавался двумя буквами – oi. Так вот, если бы только Церковь вставила в догмат эту самую маленькую, незаметную букву греческого алфавита – йоту (i), то эта новизна опустошила бы все музеи будущей Европы.

Логика была бы следующей: если Христос не Бог, то, значит, Бог к людям не приходил. Он остался по-ветхозаветному непостижим, трансцендентен и невидим. В этом случае мир христианства стал бы миром безликого Бога, и, как в исламе или иудаизме, запрет на Его изображение обрел бы полную силу. Не было бы ни Андрея Рублева, ни Микеланджело, ни Рембрандта; не было бы живописи ни сакральной (иконы), ни светской, как нет ее, например, в Саудовской Аравии или Ираке. Так что все «ненужные» богословские споры, как оказалось, напрямую влияют на жизнь каждого из нас.

Вообще, что такое догмат? Это честная констатация евангельских фактов. Догмат стоит на страже Евангелия, чтобы ничего оттуда не пропало. Одни люди, читая Евангелие, видят во Христе только Бога и не замечают Его человечества, другие люди, читая то же Евангелие, видят во Христе только Сына Человеческого и не замечают в Нем Бога. А догмат говорит: «Нет. Давайте брать Евангелие целиком: Иисус Христос – и Бог, и Человек одновременно. Каким образом? Мы не знаем, а просто констатируем факт, ведь не мы же писали Евангелие».