Even a strict determinist like Marx, who sometimes described the social behavior of the bourgeoisie as if it were physics, suddenly expressed a deep contempt that only a belief in moral responsibility can justify.

R. Niebuhr. Interpretation of Christian ethics. 1. 1. 3.

Those who think logical thinking is the driest of our manifestations will be grieved that I give it such a privileged place. But I had to base my arguments on it, because of all the possible claims of our inner life, only the idea of the special value of reason is the one that the naturalist is unable to dispute without cutting his own throat. You can, if you wish, regard all ideals as illusions and love as waste of biology without contradicting yourself or falling into absurdity. (True, a picture of the world arises, in which, perhaps, no one believes, but this is another matter.) And it is impossible to prove that there is no evidence.

We don't just think about things; We make moral judgments: "This is good," "This is bad," "I must," "This cannot be done." There are two views on such judgments. Some believe that we are using some special force here; others believe that it is still the same mind. I hold the second point of view, that is, I believe that the basic moral principles, on which all others depend, are comprehended by reason. We "merely see" that there is no reason to sacrifice the happiness of our neighbor to our happiness, just as we see that two magnitudes equal to a third are equal to each other. We cannot prove either axiom, not because they are unreasonable, but because they are self-evident and all proofs depend on them. Their inner intelligence shines with its own light. It is precisely because morality stands on such self-evident foundations that we, calling a person to virtue, say to him: "Come to your senses."

But all this is so, by the way; We will talk about something else. Now it does not matter to us which of the two views is correct. It is important that moral judgments put the naturalist in the same impasse as all others. In arguing about morality, we, as in any dispute, consider arguments to be devalued if they are due to non-moral or unreasonable reasons. We often hear: "He believes in the sanctity of property because he is a millionaire," "He is a pacifist because he is a coward," "He is in favor of corporal punishment because he is a sadist." Often these suspicions are wrong, but all that matters to us is that one side puts them forward and the other vehemently refutes them; Both believe that they would nullify the dispute. In our actual life, no one will attach the slightest value to a moral judgment if it can be proved that it is due to an extra-moral factor. It is on this basis that both Freudians and Marxists attack conventional morality with such success.

That which devalues a particular judgment must also devalue any moral judgment in general. If the ideas of right and wrong are explained by unreasonable and immoral causes, these ideas are an illusion. A naturalist will be happy to explain how it came to be. Some chemical processes gave rise to life. Life under the pressure of natural selection gave rise to consciousness. Conscious organisms that behave in a certain way live longer than others. Heredity, and sometimes upbringing, pass on to descendants their skills. Each type creates its own model of behavior. In humans, conscious learning plays a big role; In addition, the tribe strengthens itself by killing the disobedient. Finally, it invents gods who punish disobedience. Over time, a strong impulse will take hold, which tells you to subordinate your behavior to someone else's interests. But he clashes with other impulses, and a moral conflict arises: "I want to do A, but I have to do B."

All of this may or may not explain why people make moral judgments; But this does not explain how people can be right. If the naturalists' point of view is correct, "I must" is the same as "I hiccup" or "I feel sick." In life, when they say "I must", we say "you are right" or "you are wrong". In the world of naturalists (if they really take their philosophy beyond the limits of books), the answer must be: "Is that so?"

There is no internal contradiction in this. A naturalist can, if he wants, stand his ground. "Yes," he will say, "there is no right and no wrong. No moral judgment is right or wrong, and thus all moral systems are of equal value. All ideas about good and evil are pure hallucinations, shadows of organic impulses over which we still have no control." Many naturalists say this with considerable pleasure.

But then they must stand to the end. Fortunately, this almost never happens. Recognizing both good and evil as illusions, they immediately call upon us to sacrifice ourselves for the future, to teach, to rebel, to transform, to live and perish in the name of the human race. This is exactly what the naturalist Wells did throughout his long life. Isn't it strange? Just as all books about spiral nebulae, atoms, and cavemen give the impression that naturalists know something important, so their teachings suggest that they believe in some idea of good—say, their own—and think of it better than others. Otherwise, why should we be indignant and denounce evil? After all, for them, it would seem, all this is like the taste of beer: I like weak, and many prefer porter. If the opinions of Wells and, say, Franco are only impulses imposed on them by nature, there can be no argument and anger. Do natural believers, when they call us to a better life, remember that even the word "best" means nothing if there is no measure of goodness?

In fact, to their great credit, not everyone remembers. Their philosophy is inhuman, but they themselves are people. When they see a lie, they discard their theories and speak, I repeat, like people, and noble people. They are better than they think. And when everything is calm, they try to somehow make ends meet.

They reason something like this: "Morality (or 'bourgeois morality', or 'conventional morality', or 'ordinary') is, of course, an illusion. But we have discovered what behaviors help the human race survive. Don't take us for moralists! It's different here!" and so on, as if it made any difference. It would help if we could establish for certain, first, that life is better than death, and second, that the lives of our descendants are no less important to us than ours. However, both are moral judgments, and natural trust will not explain them. Of course, we feel that this is true; but natural confidence tells us to believe that such feelings have nothing to do with truth. Perhaps my altruism is like my addiction to cheese. If he has not lost his natural trust, I submit to him; If I'm weak, I'd rather spend money on cheese. There is no particular reason to indulge him. The naturalists who destroyed my respect for conscience on Monday have no right to demand that I should revere it on Tuesday.

So, there is no way out. If we do not renounce moral judgments, we will have to believe that conscience is extra-natural. It has meaning and value only if it at least reflects some absolute moral wisdom that exists in itself, and is not generated by an irrational and immoral nature. In the previous chapter we recognized the source of reason as supernatural, and in this chapter we recognize the source of the ideas of good and evil as the same. If you think that moral judgment is a very different thing from reasoning, you will say, "We now know another attribute of God." If, as I do, you regard them as phenomena of the same order, you will say, "We now know more about the divine mind."

We are almost ready for the main arguments. However, first, let's look at a few more misunderstandings that could arise.