Khomiakov's philosophical articles, despite their fragmentary and unsystematic nature, are of outstanding interest, and nothing can justify ignoring Khomyakov in the history of our philosophical thought. Khomyakov's philosophical worldview was formed in the spiritual atmosphere of German classical idealism, and his thought worked tirelessly on the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel. The majestic system of Hegelian panlogism was the ultimate point in the development of German idealism. It was impossible to go further, the collapse of Hegel's system was a serious crisis for philosophy in general, and so Khomiakov reflected on those fundamental shortcomings and contradictions that led European philosophical thought to a complete collapse. And Khomiakov gave a brilliant and profound criticism of Hegelianism, a criticism of rationalism, this primordial sin of almost all European philosophy, and clearly realized the need for a transition from abstract idealism, which turned being into nothing, to concrete spiritualism. These rudiments of concrete spiritualism make Khomyakov the founder of independent Russian philosophy, so brilliantly presented later by Vl. Solovyov. Solovyov should have justly called Khomyakov his immediate predecessor.

First of all, let us see how Khomiakov criticized Hegel. "Existence," he says, "must be completely detached. The concept itself, in its utter abstraction, had to revive everything from its own depths. Rationalism or logical rationality had to find for itself the final crown and Divine sanctification in the new creation of the whole world. Such was the enormous task which the German mind set itself in Hegel, and one cannot but be amazed at the boldness with which it set about its solution. "Hegel's logic should be called the inspiration of abstract being. Such would be its fullest, it seems, never before expressed definition. Never had a man set himself such a terrible task, such a daring enterprise. An eternal, self-regenerating creation from the depths of an abstract concept that has no essence in itself" [73]. Khomiakov formulates the point at which the philosophical movement in Germany stopped: "the recreation of the integral mind (i.e., spirit) from the concepts of reason. As soon as the task defined itself in this way (and in fact this is the meaning of Hegel's activity), the path had to stop: every step was impossible." And further: "The general error of the whole school, which is not yet clearly prominent in its founder, Kant, and which sharply characterizes its culminator, Hegel, is that it constantly takes the movement of the concept in the personal sense as identical with the movement of reality itself." "It was impossible to begin development with that substratum, or rather, with the absence of a substratum, from which Hegel started; from this a whole series of mistakes, the confusion of personal laws with the laws of the world; hence also the constant confusion of the movements of the critical concept with the movement of the world of phenomena, in spite of their opposite; From this lies the destruction of all Titanic work. The root of Hegel's general error lay in the error of the whole school, which mistook reason for the integrity of the spirit. The whole school did not notice that, by taking the concept as the sole basis of all thought, it destroys the world: for the concept transforms every underlying reality into a pure, abstract possibility. Khomiakov deeply understood the impossibility of further development of philosophy along a rationalistic, rational, abstract path, since this path leads to absolute nothingness, turns the world into a shadow of a shadow. It is necessary to get out of this hopeless circle of concepts to being, to look for the substratum, for being. Hegel made a grandiose attempt to breathe a living spirit into abstract ideas, but it turned out to be impossible to create the world of existence by rationalistic deduction of concepts.

Khomiakov excellently explains the fatal inevitability of the transition from Hegelianism to materialism, which actually occurred in German philosophy and was an indicator of its painful crisis. "Criticism realized one thing: the complete inadequacy of Hegelianism, which sought to create a world without a substratum. His pupils did not understand that this was the whole task of the teacher, and very innocently imagined that it was only necessary to introduce this missing substratum into the system, and the matter would be harmonized. But where to get the substrate? The spirit was obviously not suitable, firstly, because Hegel's very task directly expressed itself as a search for a process that creates the spirit; and secondly, because the very character of Hegel's rationalism, which is highly idealistic, was not at all spiritualistic. And so the most abstract of human abstractions, Hegelianism, grasped at matter and passed over into the purest and crudest materialism. Matter will be the substratum, and then Hegel's system will be preserved, i.e., the terminology, most of the definitions, mental transitions, logical devices, etc., will be preserved, in a word, what may be called the factory process of the Hegelian mind. The great thinker did not live to see such a disgrace; but, perhaps, his disciples would not have dared to commit such a disgrace to their teacher, if the coffin had not hidden his formidable face"[77]. This is a very interesting page in the history of human thought. Thus was formed the "dialectical materialism" which still possesses many minds, or rather hearts, a strange and logically untenable combination of ideas mutually exclusive from one another. Dialectics presupposes panlogism, the dialectical logic of things is inconceivable if one accepts a material, material substratum, this would be a monstrous logization of matter, which makes materialists just as rationalists as idealists, and points to the impossibility, the inner inconsistency of materialism. Khomiakov understood all this better than many people of our time who claim to be philosophers. "The whole school, of which Feuerbach serves as a brilliant focus, considers itself Hegelian, and yet look at its relation to Hegel's fundamental propositions. Kant said that he could not know the things in herself. Hegel said that the thing in itself does not exist at all, but exists only in the concept. For him this thesis is not accidental, not introductory, but fundamental and directly connected with the very foundation of his philosophy; for his whole system is nothing but the possibility of a concept which develops to the whole variety of reality and culminates in the reality of the spirit. And so with his disciples the thing in general appears as a common substratum, and precisely the thing in itself, not as a self-limiting concept and not even as the object of the concept, but precisely in itself. You see that I was right in saying that the New German school, ostensibly Hegelian, took from the teacher only, so to speak, the factory process of thought and terminological graphs, while at the same time being completely alien to his spirit and meaning. A concept without a substratum, or the possibility of being a concept passing into reality apart from something understood and understood, such was Hegel's task, and it was of it that Schelling said in general that it is a thought in which nothing is thought. For the realization of the whole system, although, of course, with a complete distortion of it, a new principle was introduced—the thing as matter in general. Has at least the accusation that fell on the original, real Hegelism been removed, i.e., has a thought been received in which something is thought?" [79] "When the school, in its last, Hegelian development, came to the final negation of any substratum, it is understandable that its last pupils, in order to save the perishing doctrine with which they had grown together by all the habits of the mind, decided to introduce into it a substratum most tangible, the most opposite to the abstraction from which the teacher's system perished, and did not bother to ask themselves, whether the concepts that they forcibly brought together are reconcileable" [80]. Materialism does not stand up to the slightest scientific criticism; but it has this apparent superiority over pure rationalism in that it represents a (albeit imaginary) substratum, and thus satisfies the inner requirement of reality which lies in the soul of man; and both, pure rationalism and materialism, are nothing but two sides of one and the same system, which I can call nothing else than the system of non-Cessarianism, otherwise of weak-willedness.

I have made many callouts from Khomiakov in view of the great interest that his thoughts represent for our time. In this respect, Khomiakov is not in the least obsolete: we are confronted with the same philosophical problems, we are also keenly aware of the inadequacy of rationalism in all its forms and forms, even under the guise of criticism or empiricism, and we are also looking for a substratum, that which truly exists. The only difference is that we are now criticizing not so much Kant as the neo-Kantians; not so much Hegel as the neo-Hegelians, and experienced even more disappointments. Khomiakov anticipated Solovyov's theory of "mystical perception" and his "criticism of abstract principles," as well as all the latest searches for epistemological points of view that overcome rationalism, empiricism, and criticism. "All German criticism," he says, "all the philosophy of the Kantian school, still remained at the stage to which Kant placed it. It has not advanced beyond understanding, i.e., that analytic faculty of reason which is conscious of and examines the data it receives from the whole reason, and, dealing only with concepts, can never find within itself a criterion for determining the inner and the outer, for it deals only with that which has already been perceived, and consequently has become internal. You will remember that, in trying to expound in part the great step taken by our thinker, I. V. Kireevsky, who died too early, namely, the rational recognition of the wholeness of reason, which perceives the actual (real) data transmitted by it to the analysis and consciousness of the intellect. It is only in this sphere that data still bear in themselves the fullness of their character and the signs of their beginning. In this sphere, which precedes logical consciousness and is filled with vital consciousness, which does not need proof or argument, man realizes what belongs to his mental world and what belongs to the external world. Rationalism and empiricism abstractly dissect living consciousness and close from us that experience in which real being, being, is directly given. I do not consider the terms "mystical perception" or "faith" to be philosophically appropriate. This experience, in which our integral being comes into contact with being, and not rationalistically dissected, is obligatory for all, rises above the conditional opposition of the rational and the empirical, is the source of metaphysical knowledge and is processed by metaphysical reason.

Russian philosophical thought now stands at a crossroads, and it should remember that there are paths that have already been traversed and lead to the desert. Such are the paths of rationalism, the path of Kantianism, which leads with fatal inevitability to Hegelianism, which rests on nothing or phantom matter. For us there is only one path that leads to the consciousness of existence, and that is the path of spiritualism, cleansed of all the sins of rationalism and abstraction. Our philosophical thought is embarking on this path, and at the moment of its ascent it does not hurt to recall the first Russian thinker who showed the right path to our independent philosophy, A. S. Khomyakov.

N. K. MIKHAILOVSKY and B. N. CHICHERIN[84]

(On personality, rationalism, democracy, etc.)

This year took away two major people who occupied a prominent place in the history of our thought and our society, N. K. Mikhailovsky and B. N. Chicherin. The fate of these people is very different, strangely opposite: one was the "ruler of thoughts" of several generations of the Russian intelligentsia, and his whole life passed in noisy magazine battles; Other Never | He was not popular, little read, and the work of his strong thought took place somewhere far away, did not coincide with any of the prevailing intellectual and social currents of our mind. And yet it is possible to find something in common in these opposite people, who have never agreed on anything. Both of them were as if they were hewn out of a single piece of granite, with a firmness that inspired the greatest respect, they carried their faith through their lives, they were firmly rooted in their soil, and they sincerely despised everything that wavered and restless, everything that did not agree with their once and for all established convictions. This is a striking psychological similarity between people who are so socially opposed, but the comparison can be continued. Both Mikhailovsky and Chicherin were typical rationalists, although the former proceeded from Comte and asserted rationalist positivism, the latter from Hegel and created a whole system of rationalist idealism. Both of them, Mikhailovsky, the spokesman for the thoughts and aspirations of our democratic intelligentsia, and Chiche- | Arisco, who despised all democracy and | In the case of the supremacy of the individual, he found his pathos, which inspired every line of them, in one and the same thing: in the idea of the supremacy of the individual, in his self-value and self-purpose. Each of them in their own way

He loved freedom, but for all the opposition of philosophical foundations and social conclusions, both deceased thinkers professed a purely rationalistic individualism and were profoundly alien to the irrational individualistic aspirations and struggles of the rebellious spirit of our day.

Chicherin's strength lay in the philosophical foundation of individualism, in the remarkable philosophy of law, in the consciousness of the metaphysical nature of liberalism, taken in its ideal, suprahistorical purity. From this followed all the significance of Chicherin's legal journalism, which is why the requirements of law that came from his lips are so impressed, because he gave absolute metaphysical meaning to law. Mikhailovsky's strength lies in democratic deductions from individualism. In his brilliant journalism, he connected the needs of an intelligent person with the movement of the masses, and a whole epoch of our society has grown closely with his name. Why was Mikhailovsky so popular and Chicherin so unpopular? The answer to this question will characterize some features of Russian life.

First, about Mikhailovskoye, which is closer and dearer to us. We belong to the generation of the 1990s, which was brought forward by a powerful new social wave and entered into an irreconcilable struggle with all the old trends. The struggle was waged with the sharpness and ruthlessness of green youth, with the consciousness of growing strength, and we wholeheartedly believed that the future belonged only to us. We argued especially sharply and heatedly with a veteran of the old trend, its last major representative, N. K. Mikhailovsky. In the heat of controversy we were often unfair and even rude to this remarkable man. And we did not understand that "we were opponents, but very strange. We had the same love, but not the same. And we, like Janus, or like a double-headed eagle, looked in different directions, while the heart beat alone." We had the same love for freedom, the same heart of the Russian intelligentsia was beating, and even more closely than the common love we were bound together by one common hatred... Now our homeland is at such a historical turn that this one, common, is somehow especially felt and especially we want to lay a wreath on the grave of our enemy, friend and father, N. K. Mikhailovsky.

With the death of Mikhailovsky, a whole epoch in the history of our intelligentsia disappeared from the stage, a particle of our being, our intellectual nature, dear to us according to memories, was torn away from us. And every Russian intellectual should feel this death vividly and should reflect on N. K.'s grave on his historical past and on his duties to the future. Once, in the days of early youth, we all read Mikhailovsky, he awakened our young thoughts, posed questions, gave direction to our awakened thirst for social truth. Then we left our original teacher, outgrew him, but we are still struggling with the problems posed by him, which brought philosophy and life so closely. This is very characteristic: Mikhailovsky was never a philosopher in the way he solved various problems and because of his lack of philosophical erudition, but it was philosophical questions that troubled him all his life, and at the threshold of his consciousness there was already a rebellion against the limitations of positivism. In this he was a typical Russian intellectual, full of philosophical sentiments, but devoid of a philosophical school and bound by the prejudices of positivism. We loved and still love Mikhailovsky for that spiritual thirst which so sharply distinguishes the Russian intelligentsia from the philistinism of the European intelligentsia. Mikhailovsky and I were once divided by a different understanding of the social development of Russia and different social programs. Here the strongest passions flared up. Now much has softened, and we can more calmly assess the social merits of Mikhailovsky, a sincere and profound democrat and fighter for the individual, although we still have a negative attitude towards Narodism and accept the legacy of Marxism, but critically verified. One thing is certain: both Narodism and Marxism pale in their opposition before the great historical task of establishing law in our life. Now we would most of all reproach Mikhailovsky for not being able to give a legal formulation to the social demands of his journalism. Narodism has always sinned with a weak political sense of justice, and in the 1970s it even led to political indifference. But it should be noted with sadness that Marxists, who historically came out with completely different political sentiments, do not always underestimate the enormous independent significance of legal requirements [86].

I shall dwell on one central point of Mikhailovsky's literary activity, on what I have called his pathos, on the idea of personality, on his individualism. Here we will see at once both our kinship with Mikhailovsky and our profound difference with him, perhaps greater than that which is created by public programs, since we are talking here about the most holy of holies. Mikhailovsky's philosophical position was truly tragic and hopeless. He waged an idealist struggle for personality, opposed human individuality not only to nature, but also to society. We are ready to welcome this with all our hearts. But what is personality, from where does it draw strength to oppose its individuality to the environment?

Alas! For the positivist, personality is only a biological concept, for the rationalist personality has no individuality. Mikhailovsky's "personality" is a biological abstraction, it is a kind of impersonal biological normality (the maximum of the physiological division of labor within the individual). Mikhailovsky instinctively protested against the claims of Darwinism, he guessed the fundamental sin of naturalistic evolutionism—the ignorance of what adapts and develops, the inability to introduce this inner creative activity into the process of development. But this is self-deception. Personality with its inherent creative energy, if we take the standpoint of positivism and naturalism, is completely decomposed into a social and natural environment, individuality turns out to be an accidental play of biological and social forces. There is nothing to defend, nothing to oppose to the outside world. The most terrible test of any positivism (not only in its extreme naturalistic form, but with all its psychological corrections and with all the refinement of modern criticism) is the utter impossibility from this point of view not only to substantiate the idea of personality, but even to state it. It is impossible to find the stable center that forms the unity of the personality, it is impossible to find the bearer of all mental states and creative acts. Philosophically conscious individualism is completely incompatible with positivism, and individualistic moods and impulses must be recognized as a psychological refutation of positivism, a challenge to it. The philosophical theory of personality presupposes the existence of a timeless and extra-spatial concrete spirit, which cannot be deduced from "nature" and society and cannot be deducible into the simplest moments. Only a real individual spirit, free and possessing creative energy, and not a temporary socio-biological formation, not a fragment of the process of nature and not an accidental play of sensations, can rebel against the external world and oppose its absolute rights to it. Mikhailovsky had an undeniable inclination towards metaphysical individualism, but the spiritual atmosphere in which he grew up did not allow him to break with the traditions and prejudices of positivism. But he was also an undoubted rationalist, and here an abyss forms between us.