In speaking of the needs for moral action and for the knowledge of truth, I regard them as one need, since they are identical in their essential character. As in the natural being of the animal, the subjective side, which consists in animal desires, and the objective side, which consists in the sensory perception of external objects that serve to satisfy the desires, constitute only animal life, the essential character of which is in the complete subordination of a given natural reality, both internal and external; In the same way, in man's spiritual being, the subjective or moral side, which consists in the striving for general and universal ends, and the objective or intellectual side, which consists in the knowledge of the universal truths which determine these higher ends, constitute a single spiritual life, the essential character of which consists in the transcendence of the nature given to us in external reality, in external objects as well as in the subject himself. Neither the universal ends of moral action, nor the universal truths of knowledge are given in manifesting nature or independently of things; In this way, the moral need and the intellectual need are combined into a single one: to rise above external reality, to assert oneself as a supreme being in the immediately given nature. This spiritual need has already been designated as a metaphysical need. I use this name as sufficiently expressing the nature of the object. Since this metaphysical need, together with the mental and moral activity which it engenders (produit), will create the distinctive character or special essence of man, he may well be defined as a metaphysical being, a definition which, as we shall see later, is absolutely true in another sense as well.

The direct product of man as a metaphysical being is all systems of religion and philosophy, which wish to give to human reason the universal truths it seeks, and to human activity its highest principles and norms. Thanks to these systems, man asserts himself in the field of metaphysics and <investigates?> it. But the metaphysical property of the human being also manifests itself through other phenomenes of human nature, through phenomena which at first sight have no connection with metaphysics, which are regarded in everyday life as natural and commonplace, but which have always attracted the attention of the greatest philosophers; For it is well known that the fundamental difference between superficial minds and deep minds is that the former leave unconsidered things which for the latter are objects of admiration and a task to be solved.

The most general of these phenomena, which, when studied in depth, reveals the metaphysical character of man, is the phenomenon of laughter. It is known that only man possesses this faculty; animals, although they cry sometimes, never laugh; even the slightest smile is impossible for them. And if I were asked to define a person in terms of a trait that is as characteristic as it is obvious, I would call him a creature that laughs. We shall soon see how this relates to the previous definition of man as a metaphysical being. An animal that is completely absorbed in a given reality cannot take a critical and negative position towards it, which is why it is incapable of laughing; After all, laughter presupposes a state of freedom: a slave does not laugh. The world of phenomena, the states of sensory consciousness, represent for the animal its whole world, it cannot free itself from it, it is absorbed by it, and that is why it is so serious. A person can be frivolous, can laugh, and this proves his freedom. But it is evident that man can be free from the external necessity of the world of phenomena only in so far as he does not belong to this world as a whole, in so far as he is not an exclusively natural being. He can be free from one world only if he also belongs to the other. Thus, human laughter, proving the natural freedom of man, thereby proves the quality of his metaphysical being. In natural laughter, in the laughter of a child or a young girl, the metaphysical freedom of a person manifests itself unconsciously for himself. It is realized by the consciousness of oneself in meaningful laughter, in a thinking person who has a clear consciousness of another, ideal world, which he opposes to external reality, which appears as the whole reality to the beast or the bestial man. A person sees the contrast, he mocks the false reality, he laughs. How could he laugh if he believed in this insignificant reality; But he laughs, because he knows well that the true reality belongs to another world, the ideal world, and this world is only a distorted shadow of it. He feels free in this world only because he is a citizen of another world, and only as a metaphysical being can he laugh at his natural being. The same laughter, truly human, is evoked in us by the great satirical and comic poets, as well as by the great humorists. Let me not be told that satire, in mocking the contemporary reality of an epoch or society, has as its ideal not transcendental actuality, but the same phenomenal reality, only of a different epoch or a different society. This is true only in relation to superficial satire, which attacks an imaginary evil without reaching its roots. True satire does not represent the individual shortcomings of this or that particular phenomenon, but the state of humanity itself, it mocks our entire external reality and man, since he is subordinate to this reality. And if this insignificant state were our final state, if this despised reality were the only one, then we should commit suicide; But we challenge her and laugh. Our fatherland is not in it: what can it do to us?

Another phenomenon of human life that reveals its metaphysical character is art and poetry. What is the true object of art? In ancient times, when people possessed a thing, but did not possess its idea, art was defined as an imitation of nature. It is obvious that this was all it was, it could not have any independent value, and it could be said with a writer that an apple that could be eaten should be valued much higher than a painted apple. But it is certain that works of art make a very special impression on us, which is just as strong and even much stronger than the impression produced by the corresponding reality, which would be impossible if the work of art were only a reproduction of this reality. Art does not copy individual phenomena — it is not photography; All works of art must have a general and universal character, but on the other hand, they cannot be pure universals: nothing is so opposite to art as abstractions. Objects of art and poetry are concrete realities, individualities, but individualities are universal or typical. And this close union of the individual and the universal in works of art has been recognized as a distinctive feature of art, whereas in our visible world individuals are not universals, and universals are not indie species. Thus, although materially the world of art is identical with our real world, formally it is different, and if there is a relation of imitation between them, then it must be said that our external reality is a bad copy, a parody of the ideal world, the disparate pictures of which appear to us in the works animated by the artist and the poet. And if one person can create these pictures and others can understand them directly, then this proves that this ideal reality, this metaphysical reality, is the domain of man, it proves that man is a meta-physical being.

In speaking of the metaphysical being of man, as it manifests itself in laughter and in the fine arts, I cannot be very sure that I shall be understood by the majority of my readers. In our mad and serious age, the divine genius has disappeared, and sincere joy with it. The works of art that are produced today are only copies of copies, and if people still laugh, it is more out of habit. The only thing that still somehow testifies to the ideal side of man, which contains a minimal reflection of the ideal, is positive science, the sworn enemy of all metaphysics. But the vehemence with which the majority of scientists declare themselves innocents to all metaphysics, or even attack it directly, is very suspicious, and leads us to an inquiry into the true relation of positive science and metaphysics. (From the introduction<el> l<section>).

We have pointed out that in works of art metaphysical reality is presented to us in disparate pictures. Science demands that it be given to us in logical cognition, as a universal unity. This is what is most categorically rejected today. But this hatred of everything metaphysical is obviously the best proof of the reality of the metaphysical need, and the more this hatred is desperate, the more the power of the hostile force manifests itself. The enemies of metaphysics, being unable to deny even the very fact of a metaphysical need, are forced to assert that either this need is abnormal, exclusive, a kind of disease, or that, being normal, that is, inherent in human nature, it cannot nevertheless be satisfied. As for the first assumption, it is completely unfounded. What is the criterion for the normality of needs? Any need is normal if it exists. But even if there were abnormal needs, how could one place among them a universal human need, which manifests itself in the most diverse people, in different epochs and in all countries? Since there is no doubt that the need for metaphysical knowledge in one form or another, be it religion or philosophy, is inherent in the vast majority of people, those who do not have this need at all can therefore be regarded as abnormal beings, monsters. As to the assertion that the metaphysical need, though inherent in human nature, can never be satisfied, it remains to be added that man is condemned to eternal suffering, and thus to make of mankind an eternal spiritual Tantalus. Such a supposition is too serious for us to take it, if we take the word of these gentlemen, and have not carefully examined the proofs by which it can be substantiated.

Chapter Two. On the Possibility of Metaphysical Knowledge

Before examining the philosophical arguments by which they wish to prove the impossibility of metaphysics, it is necessary to say a few words about the widespread, I would even say hackneyed, argument which is most frequently used for the same purpose. It consists in the assertion that the human mind is too limited to know the true substance of things, metaphysical reality. "No created spirit is allowed to penetrate into the innermost depths of nature. Be pleased that she reveals her appearance to you." How do we know that the human mind is limited and incapable of knowing the essence of things? Thanks to experience, of course. But every experiment is satisfied with a series of phenomena given at a certain time. Thus, on the basis of experience, we could assert that the human mind, in its past development and up to the present moment, has not been able to know metaphysical reality. But as we do not know in what relation the time which mankind has already passed to the time which it has yet to pass, it would be as unreasonable to conclude that the inability of the preceding development is absolute, as it would be to assert, when we see a child a few months old, that it is forever speechless, because it has not yet spoken. Perhaps mankind is as incapable of metaphysical knowledge as a suckling infant is incapable of speaking. But more than that, once we assume that humanity is in a state of development, we cannot say that even at the moment, now, humanity is incapable of anything. All development is subject to the law of continuity, as a result of which we can never indicate an absolute boundary between the different phases or stages of this development: they are always closely intertwined, and a new phase begins when the previous one has not yet reached its goal; That is, as soon as we assume, and we cannot help admitting, that in the future phase of human development, in the indefinite future, it will be possible to know metaphysical reality, can we be sure that this future has not already come for at least some individuals? Experience, therefore, can give us nothing certain as regards the capacity or inability of the human mind to metaphysical knowledge.

Someone will say that the limits of the human mind, which make it incapable of knowing metaphysical reality, are substantially and absolutely necessary, that is, inherent in the human mind, not in its temporary manifestation as a phenomenon, but in its inner essence, in its substantial and absolute nature. But such a statement already presupposes that we know the inner essence of the human mind, that we know it as a substance, since otherwise we could not know what is proper to it in its essence; This presupposes, therefore, knowledge on a level other than phenomenal – essential knowledge or substantial knowledge, it presupposes, in a word, metaphysical knowledge. In the same way that we base our negation of all metaphysical knowledge on metaphysical knowledge, we shall destroy this negation and affirm the possibility of such knowledge.

Turning now to the philosophical argument which proves the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge, it is easy to see that it manifests itself in three forms, according to which the object of knowledge, i.e., the metaphysical being, or the knowing subject, or, finally, the very nature of real knowledge, is taken as the starting point.

The first type, reduced to the form of a syllogism, is as follows:

Maj: The object of metaphysical knowledge is that which is in itself, and not that which is relative.

Min: We can only cognize phenomena, that is, what relates to us, therefore we cannot cognize what is in ourselves.

C: Ergo, we cannot have metaphysical knowledge.