To this I answer: nеgo majorem, nego minorem, nego consequentiam

1) Nеgo majorem: The object of metaphysical knowledge is discussed without the possession of this knowledge, that is, without knowledge of what this metaphysical object can be. However, it is necessary to have some idea about it, otherwise there would be nothing to talk about. If it is impossible to have such a positive or absolute idea prior to its cognition, it is necessary at least to define it, negative or relative, in relation to what we already know, what is given to us in our experience, that is, in relation to phenomenal or natural being. Through this relation we must give a twofold definition to the metaphysical being. First of all, we define it as that which is not phenomenal being. This is obvious. But in distinguishing the metaphysical being from the phenomenal, we must admit the necessary connection between the two, and then say that the metaphysical being contains the absolute basis of the phenomenal being. For the very concept of the latter presupposes that phenomenal being does not possess as such its true substance or its absolute principle, and that consequently this true substance or absolute principle of phenomena is contained in another being, which is no longer phenomenal being, but is metaphysical being. But if the metaphysical being is the absolute basis of phenomena, then it is no longer regarded as being exclusively in itself, an absolutely simple and indifferent being: there is already a relation, a connection with the other. It cannot be the basis of the world of phenomena in general, in abstracto. If metaphysical being and phenomenal being are not understood as pure abstractions, then we must understand the metaphysical being as the real basis of real phenomena in their real multiplicity and variety, or, in other words, the metaphysical being must contain in itself the principle of all the particular forms and all the individual properties of our real world, it must possess in a superlative degree the fullness and reality of this world. By definition, a metaphysical being cannot be an exclusively simple and indifferent substance, but, as the basis or real principle of all phenomena, must also contain in a certain way all the relative forms and all the realities of our real world (and an indefinite number of other forms and realities, for the world of phenomena is not something complete, new phenomena are constantly appearing, The basis or origin of which must be contained in the metaphysical world): it is not an abstract or speculative being, but a being infinitely real and concrete. If, therefore, there is a definite interconnection between the world of phenomena and the metaphysical world, then the general possibility of knowing the latter is thereby established.

(2) Nego minorem: When it is asserted that we can only know phenomena and not what is in itself, it is assumed that these two modes of being (modes de l'etre) are absolutely separate and opposed to each other, that they have nothing in common. It is this assumption that is not only unsubstantiated, but decidedly false. A phenomenon is an appearance or manifestation, an appearance or the discovery of something. What can there be if not being in itself (since everything that is is is either in itself or in a phenomenon for another)? It is obvious that we can know only that which makes itself known to another in general, that which is revealed or appears, that is, we can only know phenomena. To be a phenomenon and to be knowable for another means one and the same thing. But since phenomena can only be a manifestation of what is in itself, by knowing them we also receive some knowledge of the latter. It is quite obvious that we cannot know the immediately existent as it is in itself, that is, our knowledge cannot contain it in its essence or materially, just as the image in the mirror cannot materially contain the reflected object. But just as this image gives us a true idea of the object, in so far as it can be reflected, so the metaphysical being, which is absolutely unknowable in its inner essence as it is for itself, can be known with certainty as objective being, in the phenomena which are its manifestations, expressing more or less directly its inner nature. The concept of phenomenon as a manifestation or appearance presupposes two terms: first, the being that is, and, second, that for which it is; And it is obvious that, depending on their interrelation, the phenomenon may be more or less immediate, but it is always a relation, a being for the other.

After these remarks, we are in a position to give a precise definition of what is called the phenomenon and the being in itself. By phenomenon we mean the immediate existence of one being for another, or that which can be directly known by another; We mean by being in itself that which cannot exist directly for another, or cannot be known directly by another. We must remember this definition well, as we will see its importance later. As to the present, it is enough for us to note that the immediate consequence of this definition is the close connection between the phenomenon and the being in itself, since the former is only an existence for the other, a relative existence or a manifestation of the latter, so that knowing the phenomena we know its ipso being in itself. From this it follows that the difference between our ordinary knowledge and metaphysical knowledge is relative or power. If the knowledge of phenomena were the knowledge of them as such, apart from what is in itself, and if metaphysical knowledge were the direct knowledge of what is in itself as such, beyond all phenomenon and discovery, then there would be nothing in common between these two modes of knowledge. But we have seen that the direct knowledge of what is in itself is an absurdity, and that, on the other hand, in every phenomenal knowledge we know more or less what is in itself, in so far as it is revealed. Thus all knowledge is the knowledge of what is in itself in its phenomena, and the difference may lie in the fact that one or another of them is more or less perfect manifestations of what is in itself, and if we wish to point out a certain difference between phenomenal knowledge in the proper sense of the word and meta-physical knowledge, we shall say that the latter is knowledge of what is in itself. in its direct and adequate (or integral) detection [1].

We do not yet inquire whether we have such knowledge, we only want to clarify the general possibility of such knowledge, and this possibility is given to us by the preceding definition, since if a metaphysical object is manifested, it is knowable by nature.

3) Nego conseguentiam: There is more to the conclusion than the packages. If, however, the metaphysical object had no connection with phenomenal existence (which was asserted in Major and was found to be false), and yet there was nothing but phenomena in the knowledge given to us (which was asserted in the Minor and was also found to be false), it would not follow that we know nothing about the metaphysical object in the knowledge given to us. Sometimes it is forgotten that our rational or rational cognition is a spontaneous act that is not limited to what is known, but transforms and expands it. I do not wish to speak here of what are commonly called innate ideas, because their impossibility is always assumed (falsely or truely) as established by the opponents of metaphysics. In order not to complicate the matter, I will not talk about them here. I shall examine only the spontaneous act of rational cognition, for even if the human mind is a tabula rasa before sense experience, no one has yet been able to deny that in relation to this experience the human mind makes use of its proper faculty, the faculty of abstraction, which consists in the transformation of empirical data into general ideas. If a metaphysical being were absolutely devoid of all phenomenal quality, as is supposed, if it were an absolutely simple and indifferent being, then our mind, by increasing abstraction, might soon arrive (it is well known that it does) to the idea of a being absolutely free from all quality and phenomenal form, and thereby obtain adequate knowledge of the metaphysical being. But we shall not dwell on this possibility (which is well realized in various philosophical and religious systems) after we have seen that the metaphysical being by definition cannot be limited by this state of indifference and absolute emptiness, and that it manifests itself in the totality of phenomena. Thus, by the nature of its object, metaphysical knowledge is perfectly possible, which had to be proved.

The second kind of argument against metaphysics, reduced to the form of a syllogism, is as follows:

Maj: The human mind, as a knowing subject, is determined by certain forms and categories that are inherent in it and outside of which no knowledge is possible.

Min: A metaphysical being is not determined by these categories

C: Ergo, we cannot know a metaphysical being.

To which I answer: n m, n m, n c.

1) N ma and min in the order in which they are placed in the syllogism.

That all knowledge given to us, all our experience, that is, the whole world of phenomena, is determined by the forms and categories of our knowing subject, is a great truth, which was first clearly proved by Kant. That our space and our time, to say nothing of the categories of our understanding, belong in reality only to our cognizing object, and not to things in themselves, is a truth whose great significance we shall have occasion to appreciate. But that these forms are by their nature, ipso gener, subjective, that is, that our space and our time, as well as the categories of our understanding, can have nothing corresponding to them in a metaphysical being, not only has not been proved, but neither Kant nor any of his followers have even attempted to prove it, since it is obvious that that such a proof is impossible, while the contrary to it is more than probable. That a metaphysical being is determined neither by our actual space nor by our actual time is obvious, but that in its form it is not at all the subject of its forms, that it can have nothing that corresponds to them, is another matter, and we have already seen that the very definition of a metaphysical object requires the assumption that it possesses in a certain way all the relative forms of the phenomenal world. 3) N c for the same reason is close to the conclusion of the preceding syllogism.

If the forms of knowledge given to us were subjective in nature (which they are not), and if the metaphysical being could not be defined in any way through these forms (which also does not exist), then it would only follow that all knowledge given to us is subjective, and that the metaphysical being cannot be its object. But Kant himself admits that our real knowledge is composed of two elements: (1) the material element, produced in some way by the things or by the beings themselves acting on our perception, and (2) the formal element, the forms and categories in which the material element, so to speak, is clothed. All our cognition of things consists of these two elements. Now, by analysing this complex product and abstracting from all formal elements which do not belong to things as such, we can obtain as a result a being pure of materiality. Ding an sich, which in its external manifestations would be pure X for us, but in our inner consciousness our own being in itself is given to us directly, and through this we have the key to metaphysical knowledge. This is the thought of the famous Schopenhauer. We do not need to subject it to in-depth criticism here. It is enough for us to point out the possibility of metaphysical cognition outside the forms assumed by the subjective, of phenomenal cognition. In any case, as long as it cannot be proved that the forms of our knowledge are subjective absolutely or by their nature, the possibility of metaphysical knowledge on the part of the knowing subject is admitted.