Maj: The human mind, as a knowing subject, is determined by certain forms and categories that are inherent in it and outside of which no knowledge is possible.

Min: A metaphysical being is not determined by these categories

C: Ergo, we cannot know a metaphysical being.

To which I answer: n m, n m, n c.

1) N ma and min in the order in which they are placed in the syllogism.

That all knowledge given to us, all our experience, that is, the whole world of phenomena, is determined by the forms and categories of our knowing subject, is a great truth, which was first clearly proved by Kant. That our space and our time, to say nothing of the categories of our understanding, belong in reality only to our cognizing object, and not to things in themselves, is a truth whose great significance we shall have occasion to appreciate. But that these forms are by their nature, ipso gener, subjective, that is, that our space and our time, as well as the categories of our understanding, can have nothing corresponding to them in a metaphysical being, not only has not been proved, but neither Kant nor any of his followers have even attempted to prove it, since it is obvious that that such a proof is impossible, while the contrary to it is more than probable. That a metaphysical being is determined neither by our actual space nor by our actual time is obvious, but that in its form it is not at all the subject of its forms, that it can have nothing that corresponds to them, is another matter, and we have already seen that the very definition of a metaphysical object requires the assumption that it possesses in a certain way all the relative forms of the phenomenal world. 3) N c for the same reason is close to the conclusion of the preceding syllogism.

If the forms of knowledge given to us were subjective in nature (which they are not), and if the metaphysical being could not be defined in any way through these forms (which also does not exist), then it would only follow that all knowledge given to us is subjective, and that the metaphysical being cannot be its object. But Kant himself admits that our real knowledge is composed of two elements: (1) the material element, produced in some way by the things or by the beings themselves acting on our perception, and (2) the formal element, the forms and categories in which the material element, so to speak, is clothed. All our cognition of things consists of these two elements. Now, by analysing this complex product and abstracting from all formal elements which do not belong to things as such, we can obtain as a result a being pure of materiality. Ding an sich, which in its external manifestations would be pure X for us, but in our inner consciousness our own being in itself is given to us directly, and through this we have the key to metaphysical knowledge. This is the thought of the famous Schopenhauer. We do not need to subject it to in-depth criticism here. It is enough for us to point out the possibility of metaphysical cognition outside the forms assumed by the subjective, of phenomenal cognition. In any case, as long as it cannot be proved that the forms of our knowledge are subjective absolutely or by their nature, the possibility of metaphysical knowledge on the part of the knowing subject is admitted.

3rd type:

Maj: All our actual cognition consists in the representations of our mind or in the states of our consciousness, and anything that is not a state of our consciousness cannot be known by us.

Min: A metaphysical entity cannot be a state of our consciousness.

C: Ergo, we cannot know a metaphysical being.

The answer is the same: nego m, n min, and nego cons.

1) N maj: (From the article by R<ussky> V<estnik>)

2) N min: Since every phenomenon is a representation or state of consciousness of the corresponding subject, what is asserted in the Minor again says that a metaphysical being cannot be a phenomenon; which has already been recognized as false, as contradicting the very definition of a metaphysical being.