Strictly speaking, every representation, by its very nature, is always and necessarily complex, because every representation is a representation of a thing, i.e., the representation of a constant group of certain impressions which occupy a special position in the content of the representation of the properties or attributes of the thing. Consequently, there are no and cannot be simple ideas that would have as their content individual impressions, and all reasoning about such ideas is reduced only to pure misunderstandings. Of course, any impression can be thought in abstracto, but it is impossible to imagine none, because representation is the spatial determination of impressions, and therefore only objects or images can be represented under those conditions in which certain impressions are constantly connected with each other, including the impression that forms the present state of consciousness. For example, I can think of acid, but I cannot conceive of it, whereas I can freely imagine a lemon and connect with this idea a certain impression of acid. In the same way, I can, of course, think of whiteness, but I can never conceive it except outside myself and in a certain spatial form. Consequently, each representation of a single impression is possible only by the strength of the connection of this impression with a multitude of others and only in the complex of these other impressions, i.e. each representation always and necessarily forms a concrete. Therefore, the question of the composition of representations obviously does not concern the development of the content presented, but only the development of connections between individual representations; For in the first respect all representations are complex, and the development of their content can only make them more complete, but no less isolated; in the second respect, each representation, although it exists by nature separately and independently of other representations, nevertheless, by the creative process of thought, can always be placed in a certain connection with a multitude of others.

In order for several different representations to be connected in the unity of a complex representation, the presence of the same condition is necessary that makes the formation of individual representations possible, i.e., the unity of the spatial connection of representations is necessary. By virtue of this unity, the various representations are objectified in a definite order of local position, and the consciousness of this spatial correlation of them is what is called a complex representation.

If, at the same time, different representations are embraced not only by spatial connection, but also by temporal unity in the process of their formation, then their connection is affirmed by consciousness in the unity of the object represented; if temporal unity does not exist, they are recognized as a group of different objects in the represented unity of place. The representation of this tree, for example, in addition to the representation of the trunk, consists of a whole multitude of separate representations of branches and branches, of an enormous number of individual representations of leaves, and all this infinite number of representations is connected into a complex representation of one object, because in the formation of these representations there is no interruption in the moments of connection between the basic elements of sensuous-visual intuition, i.e., between the data of touch and muscular sense. On the contrary, the complex representation of the whole garden can exist only in the form of a group of different objects, because each of these objects, embraced in itself by the unity of the spatio-temporal connection of its parts, by the strength of the interruption in the relation of space and time in the primary data of touch and muscular feeling, forms a different complex, even if only of the same impressions. and therefore it is connected with other objects not by the unity of spatial connection, but only by the unity of spatial correlation, i.e. by the unity of space itself as a form of view, as an empty container of objective extensions. It is clear that the real content of a complex representation here is the representation of a place with which an indefinite number of representations of individual objects can be associated. Consequently, the formation and expansion of the number of connections between individual representations in this case is achieved in a purely external way – by means of a simple expansion of the contemplated volume and in this expansion the establishment of new spatial relations. The representation of different things, for example, can be connected with the representation of the room in which these things are placed, the representation of several rooms with the representation of a house, the representation of a house with the representation of a street, a city, etc.

The fundamental element in the content of all complex representations is the representation of place, and all objective representations that can only be connected with this basic representation are united in it, and this very unification of representations is expressed in consciousness by the representation of the spatial correlation of things. Consequently, the content of a complex representation expresses in itself only the external connection of individual representations and does not in the least concern their content, so that in this respect individual representations are not only not united in the complex, but cannot be united in it. Any complex representation is properly a multi-component representation, because it contains a series of completely independent representations, connected only together by the representation of a definite space. Consequently, in every complex representation there is not a unity of representation proper, but only a represented unity of the spatial connection of different representations.

In their content, individual representations can be completely similar to each other, and if they do exist as completely separate representations, it is only because each of them has its own spatio-temporal definition of the connection between the same dates of consciousness. My conception of this chair, for instance, is exactly identical with my conceptions of every other chair placed in this room, and yet my conception of this chair is not a conception of every other chair, because each conception is received separately and objectified separately, and I cannot conceive of this chair being placed in different places at the same time. occupied by all the other chairs. Without this local definition, the separateness of ideas would immediately disappear, and all of them would immediately merge in the complete unity of their content. Then, precisely, one image of a chair will appear in consciousness, and by virtue of the power of identity in the content of living ideas, it will replace all these ideas for thought. But since the spatial expression of representations is preserved in it, it is evident that it will itself be a representation, only not bound by the conditions of a definite place, and for this very reason uniting in itself several living representations. And since the whole process of unification of the presented content here is expressed by a simple fusion of identical representations, the image replacing them will be a merged representation.

In order to form a coherent representation, complete identity is necessary between individual representations in the basic elements that determine the possibility of any representation in general, i.e., complete identity of form (given of touch), size (given of muscular sense), and, according to the conditions of experimental development in the formation of representation, identity of color (given of vision). Only when this necessary condition exists is it possible to replace several separate representations by a single representation, and the basis is laid for the further formation of new mental products, because the process of forming a merged representation is a natural transition to a special process of generalization, and the very fact of a merged representation is the real germ of the concept. It is on this basis that in logic and psychology representations are very often confused with concepts by transforming merged representations into so-called general representations. But the merged representation is obviously not at all the same as the general representation, because the merged representation does not concern all homogeneous objects in general, but only identical objects. I may, for example, imagine one of the windows in my room, and if I do not connect my idea with a certain place in the room, then this representation of a window of mine can, of course, replace for me the representation of any other window, but not the window in general, but only from the number of windows in my own room. Of course, no one is able to imagine a window in general, as well as any other object in general, because in general it is only possible to think of things in concepts, but in no case to represent them in images. Consequently, there can be no general representations, but only merged representations, i.e., representations in which a group of identical representations can be replaced by a single representation of some object of the group, with this object detached from its real connection with a definite place.

Under conditions of limited experience, when there are only groups of a few representations, homogeneous in their content and identical in spatial determination, the unification of the represented content is fully achieved by the creation of merged representations. But with the expansion of experience, when representations arise, although homogeneous, but with different spatial definitions, the unifying role of merged representations inevitably ends, because different spatial forms cannot, of course, be defined in one spatial expression, i.e., cannot be united in one image. Consequently, in this case, only the identical content of representations can be subject to unification, apart from their different spatial expressions, and consequently this united content of representations will no longer be the content of any representation; for with the destruction of the spatial definition of impressions, the essence of the representation is also destroyed, and therefore its very possibility is eliminated. Then a certain content is not represented, but only thought of as a definite connection of impressions, or, translated into the objective phenomena of being, the thing is not represented, but only thought of as a definite connection of certain qualities. The formation of this thinking in consciousness forms an entirely new product of mental creativity – the concept.

A concept consists in the unification of several, or at least two, given representations, not in some new representation, but in one general position of thought for them, i.e., in a position which is equally valid in relation to each of the ideas united. Consequently, the content of concepts cannot include such elements from the united representations that characterize these representations in their particulars and therefore cannot be transferred from one of them to another. And from this circumstance it is self-evident that every concept is formed in a complex process of generalization, the first moment of which is always the unification of identical elements, the second moment is the subtraction of various elements, and the result is the establishment of a general formula of individual representations, or a general formula of the being of the things represented, equally determined in the sum of certain attributes, namely, in this definition connected by thought in the unity of the concept.

This identity of the elements of two different phenomena makes it possible to link them into a conceivable group under one common definition of thought. The group grows in proportion as we add new phenomena to it, and with it the content of the concept in which it is defined necessarily changes. The fact is that some attributes that characterize a few particular phenomena may not be found in other similar phenomena, and therefore cannot be included in the content of a definition common to the entire group of known phenomena. Consequently, such attributes must necessarily be excluded, and therefore the process of concept formation takes place by reducing the elements in the content of representations, and this decrease proceeds until the content of the concept becomes so stable that the series of new phenomena no longer require its reduction. With the attainment of such stability, each new phenomenon increases only the composition of the group, and does not produce any changes in the existing content of its mental expression, so that each member of the group is always and equally determined by this content. With the achievement of such results, the process of merging the views ends.

2.

Concept formation as a process of inductive inference.

In the organization of the world of impressions, the activity of thought is determined by the law of similarity, while in the organization of the world of representations it is carried out according to the law of identity. This circumstance is psychologically completely understandable. In the initial period of mental development, there are not things for a person – complex concepts of thought, but only phenomena as elementary states of consciousness. The latter, precisely because they are phenomena, are no longer the same today as they were yesterday, and the processes they initiate are no longer the same today as they were yesterday, but both are only repetitions, a new phenomenon of the previous, although experienced in the same way as the previous one, but in no way connected with it either by unity in being or by unity in the act of consciousness. This proposition changes essentially only with the emergence of the world of ideas, because with this emergence the things of knowledge are realized, and in these things the idea of permanence is revealed, i.e., the consciousness of the continuous possibility of given impressions, and it is precisely this consciousness that determines the unity in the position of impressions of different times, or their identity.

Discard only this possibility, assume, for example, that your acquaintance has died, and then even his absolute double, if possible, you will consider not for himself, but only for his double, although the former image will invariably arise in your consciousness at each meeting with his double. Consequently, the process of identifying a present image with a previously existing one, or the process of recognition, does not take place directly, but only through the medium of a special mental process, when it is thought that goes from the image evoked in consciousness, as previously received, to its object, and from the object again to the same image as present. Consequently, the process of identification of ideas is possible only in thought and through the operations of thought; so that separately and in themselves no representations can be recognized as identical, because the double position of one and the same representation can only be an empty phrase, and not at all an expression of thought. For when I say, for example, that A is A, I do not express any more than I have a consciousness of A, and I do not express any judgment about it; For the above expression is only a judgment in its form, and in its essence it is only a very strange attempt to express by the form of thought the decisive absence of thought. If, on the other hand, it is impossible to posit the same idea twice, because such a proposition would be utter nonsense, then, for the same reason, it is certainly impossible to be directly conscious of the identity of the idea with itself. Consequently, the consciousness of identity develops in some other direction, and it actually unfolds in an entirely different direction, and in its development necessarily passes through three successive moments. First of all, it is expressed as the identity of the representation and the thing represented, and then as the identity of the present idea with the past idea of the same thing, and finally as the identity of the thing with itself with the difference of ideas about it at different times. In this last moment, it becomes the basic law of thought in the process of unification of ideas and concepts.