It is precisely this possibility of independent acquisition of impressions that determines the possibility of transforming the process of thought into a special process of cognition, i.e., into the process of studying the composition and conditions of existence of all experimental reality. In its formal structure, this new process is the same process of the formation and development of ideas and concepts, only it is necessarily connected with the subject's positive striving to expand the world of consciousness through the independent acquisition of various materials of thought. It is precisely by virtue of this connection between thought and will that it is defined in consciousness as a special special process of mental activity, because by virtue of this connection it can in no case be transferred to the simple mechanics of impressions and representations, and in no case can it be represented as a special higher form of the process of consciousness.

In order to clarify this characteristic feature of the cognitive process, it is necessary to clarify the basic conditions of its origin and development. In this respect we have already said that in the very first steps of psychic development every impression is associated with a definite feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and by the strength of this connection it is accompanied by an indispensable tendency to retain some impressions and to eliminate others. The repetition of impressions in one and the same association with acts of feeling and will enables thought to include the content of these acts in the simple content of impressions, and thus to fix their association in a single mental expression; so that impressions are for us not only impressions of sweet or bitter, but also impressions pleasant or unpleasant, desirable or undesirable, i.e., impressions are determined by us not only by their own content, but also by the content of the acts of feeling and will connected with them. A child, for example, lives and can live only by impressions, and therefore if he knows anything, it is clear that all his knowledge can only consist in the fact that he begins to remember which impressions give him pleasure and which cause him displeasure, which therefore are desirable for him and which are undesirable for him. Consequently, at the very first stage of mental development, even in its most rudimentary form, the phenomenon of knowledge already appears with a very definite character. In addition to the mere consciousness of a fact, it necessarily contains a certain interest in that fact, and a direct will or unwill that it should exist. This circumstance is very important for the accurate determination of the genesis of the cognitive process and for the correct explanation of its development.

In connection with the various elements of feeling, thought and will, the process of consciousness as a process of formation of mental phenomena becomes a process of life, i.e.

For the activity of consciousness it is quite indifferent what facts are formed by it, but for the process of life different facts have different meanings, and since all the primary facts of consciousness in general are determined by certain influences on man of the objective world, it is obviously far from indifferent to the subject to what influences he is subjected. The process of life necessarily compels him to look upon the world of objective reality as a ready source of pain and pleasure, and the direct interest of life necessarily compels him to strive for a clear distinction in the world of objective reality between things pleasant and unpleasant and indifferent, so that on the basis of this distinction he may be able to arrange for him a corresponding practice of his life. If, for instance, a child enjoys the soft light of a lamp, he will naturally desire that the lamp should be lit before him; that is, he will strive not only to retain the pleasant impressions which he receives, but also to make such impressions as give him pleasure. And on the other hand, if a child touches the glass of a burning lamp and suffers the pain of a burn, he will naturally wish not to touch the burning lamp any more, i.e., he will strive not only to eliminate the unpleasant impressions present, but also to avoid the possibility of causing them. Consequently, the knowledge of reality obtained from experience not only expresses the relation of the world to man, but also determines the relation of man to the world, because it serves as a direct basis for man's purposeful activity in arranging for himself the well-being of life under the given conditions of the world's existence. Consequently, the process of knowledge does not arise properly from the needs of thought, but from the needs of life, and since life for man is the first and for a long time the only value, knowledge for life or practical knowledge is quite naturally and necessarily the first and for a long time the only form of human knowledge. The world's own content, regardless of its significance and value for the development of human life, does not at first arouse any interest in itself, because the thought determined by life constantly poses only practical questions for itself and does not seek or accept any other solution to these questions than the practical one. By virtue of this predominance of the practical motives of cognition, the whole process of the initial study of objective reality is quite naturally and necessarily directed only to the elucidation and determination of the mutual relations between the world and man, i.e., in the initial cognition only what the external world can give to man and what man can receive from it is actually clarified.

Such content and direction of elementary knowledge clearly shows that the determining principle of the cognitive process is the feeling of pleasure, as the general expression of the favorable course of life, and knowledge develops only in the interests of satisfying this feeling. If it were possible to eliminate this feeling from the cognitive process, then the process of cognition itself would naturally cease, because in this case the will to know could not arise in man, and consequently in this case man would inevitably turn out to be only a sentient and imagining machine. If, in reality, however, he not only feels and imagines, but also introduces an independent element of his own relation to the facts of sensation, then this circumstance is entirely caused by the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, the content of which determines the entire interest of knowledge, and by the strength of this interest the desire for knowledge and the striving for it are created.

Thus, knowledge by its very nature is always and necessarily a complex product of the cooperation of all psychic forces, i.e., feeling, thought, and will. This constant and necessary correlation in the cognitive process of the various expressions of mental activity is of great importance for the correct explanation of the formation of knowledge and for the precise determination of its objective value, because this correlation determines the creative character of mental activity not only in the process of attaining knowledge, but also in the very construction of its content. Not every construction of thought is necessarily a cognitive construction, but only such a construction as serves as a response to a definite cognitive striving, so that the simple mechanics of impressions and representations can create only a simple organization of the chaotic phenomena of consciousness, and does not create any knowledge.

Consequently, the content of all knowledge, although created by the work of thought, is nevertheless affirmed in the rank of real knowledge only by an act of the will on the basis of a satisfied feeling of curiosity. If this feeling is fully satisfied with a certain knowledge of the object, then knowledge has the meaning of real knowledge and cannot be thought of by a person except a fully qualified person.

When, for example, in relation to some phenomenon of a certain object, a thought can only be expressed negatively, that it is neither this nor the other, nor the third, and that what exactly it is is unknown, then in this case the thought is inevitably agitated by a feeling of uncertainty; and when a positive judgment formed in thought about a given phenomenon of an object does not fit next to all other judgments about all other phenomena of the same object, but stands in undoubted contradiction with them, then in this case the thought is inevitably agitated by a feeling of strangeness. By the determining force of these disturbances, however, it necessarily strives to create a situation in which the given causes of disturbances are annihilated and the disturbed harmony of mental life is restored, and as soon as it reaches such a position, it stops there, and this position is established as real knowledge.

Consequently, the formation of each cognition is not directly based on any objective foundations, but only on the subjectively harmonious position of this cognition in the present content of the mind. Both the naïve commoner and the specialist scientist alike affirm as knowledge only those constructions of thought in which the harmony of their mental content is realized, and they equally adhere to this knowledge only as long as this harmony exists. and therefore all knowledge by its very nature is always and necessarily subjective.

It is precisely in this assertion that the whole essence of the epistemological problem lies, the solution of which quite naturally boils down to the solution of the question of how faith is possible as real cognition.

2.

The identity of faith and knowledge in their psychological nature and logical structure.

Such a formulation of the problem of knowledge, according to the historical and contemporary situation of the question of faith, necessarily requires for itself some additional explanations and justifications. For faith and knowledge are generally regarded as entirely different products of thought. Therefore, on the basis of philosophical thought, the entire teaching about faith has usually been reduced and is reduced to the question of the mutual relationship between faith and knowledge, and faith is defined either as the lowest stage of knowledge, or as a direct negation of it. In view of the understandable hostility of this definition to the content of religious faith on the basis of theological thought, all discussions about faith have usually been reduced and are reduced to the possible justification of faith in the face of knowledge, and faith is treated either as a special form of knowledge, or as a necessary supplement to it. Consequently, theological and philosophical interpretations of faith can reach very sharp differences between each other, and if in judging these interpretations one relies on individual facts, then there is no doubt that they can speak with equal force in favor of the most opposite understandings of faith. The champions of knowledge, relying on numerous facts of naïve faith, can quite naturally come to understand faith as a direct negation of knowledge, but not all faith is only blind superstition. And on the other hand, the defenders of faith, relying on the same numerous facts of rational faith, can quite naturally come to understand faith as a necessary supplement to knowledge, but not all faith is necessarily rational faith. Why are some facts taken into account and not taken into account in different interpretations of faith? This depends on the fact that faith is not considered in its own nature, but only in its relation to knowledge, and not to the actual knowledge which man actually possesses, but to the ideal of knowledge, to truth, and faith is evaluated only on the basis of this relation: so that the true purpose of all reasoning about faith is not really to solve the problem of faith. but only in a simple evaluation of the given content of faith from the point of view of the ideal of knowledge.