f[129]) The philosophical systems we have cited still agree on a great deal, but the few points of similarity just mentioned are enough to imagine the general course and direction of possible coincidences. Let us note here a number of the simplest circumstances.

The above systems of philosophy are based on the positing of a thing as a thing. This simple premise compels us, again before any conception of the world, to qualify a long series of philosophical teachings as purely abstract, as having some significance only in the order of abstraction, but not in the order of adequate reflection in thought of living reality. In fact, the very thing removes in itself absolutely all the antitheses that are inherent in a given thing. It is their absolute synthesis; and it is only by way of mental abstraction that one can single out certain partial moments in it. But, as we know, the very thing can also appear; and in its appearance, when the latter is adequate, it nevertheless continues to contain all its antitheses in an indistinguishable form. In this form we ourselves call the manifested itself a symbol, or a concrete, living thing.

(f) In fact, let us take, for example, the antithesis of the ideal and the real. A considerable part of the whole history of philosophy is concerned with the task of uniting the ideal and the real, or of giving priority in this antithesis to one of the two members. In fact, these epochs in the history of philosophy are simply hypnotized by abstract methods and do not know how to see simple and living things. Indeed, is it possible to conceive of a thing which has no idea, i.e., no meaning and no significance? After all, to have your own idea means to be yourself. If these boards that I see through my window did not contain their own specific idea of being the roof of the neighboring house, then they would remain a pile of boards, and nothing more. But these boards embody the idea of the roof of the house, and only if this idea is there is really a roof. Further, could one imagine that the roof of the neighboring house, which I see through the window, does not consist of boards, as boards are of sawn wood? Is it possible to imagine a wooden thing without wood, without its material, without its wooden matter? Of course not. Therefore both the idea of the roof and the matter of the roof are equally necessary to the roof itself. But at the same time, the roof itself is not at all a mere idea of a roof, nor merely the matter of the roof. It is the roof itself, whether it is to be understood as something of itself (in which case it will be given in a folded form), or whether it is understood as a symbol (in which case it will be in a dissected and unfolded form). But no matter how we divide and decorate the roof, the ideal and the real are always merged into one indistinguishable being; everything in it may be different, but as long as the roof is a roof, the ideal and the real in it are indistinguishable.

It is clear that if idealism is understood as the doctrine of bare ideas, and materialism as the doctrine of the existence of matter alone, then the antithesis of idealism and materialism is the result of abstract philosophical methods, nourished by a passion for the exaltation of the dead sides of reality for the sake of one or another abstract metaphysics. Both abstract methods take only one side of things and do not take the other, and the things themselves do not and cannot take at all.

(g) Related to this is the antithesis of essence and phenomenon. Of course, for the purposes of analysis, the establishment of these categories is very important, just as the study of the individual organs of the body is necessary in order to master anatomy. However, this value is by no means infinite and not the last. Is it really possible to conceive of a living thing without any essence, but only as a phenomenon or without any phenomenon, but only as an essence? If we want to define a thing as a thing, i.e., to take it as a given itself (unfolded) or as a symbol (unfolded), then there can be no talk of a choice between essence and phenomenon. Of course, there is an essence in things. Without it, things would be nothing, i.e., there would be no things at all. What is the essence of this object standing near the wall? The essence of this item is to serve as a place to store books. Only when you know what this essence is, you can judge!" about this thing. Otherwise, you can't even call a wardrobe a wardrobe. Further, is there a wardrobe without the wood from which it is made? It's ridiculous to ask. Only a very abstract philosophy, then, can fail to admit that essence and phenomenon coincide in one indistinguishable identity, that the thing itself is neither the phenomenon nor the essence of the thing, but simply the thing itself. And it is this self that we postulate, proceeding from the fact that it is precisely the essence of the thing and the appearance of the thing that are indistinguishable in it.

(h) Another prejudice helps us to overcome the previous review of apophatic teachings. Is a thing finite or infinite? Needless to say, absolutely everyone thinks that between the one and the other there is an impassable abyss, so impassable that the finite can never be infinite, under any circumstances, and the infinite can never and in no way be finite. At the very least, we can find examples in the history of philosophy when attempts are made to show that the infinite passes into the finite, or that the finite becomes infinite. In fact, from the point of view of the symbol itself, the finite and the infinite are again only maximal abstractions, admittedly often convenient for one purpose or another, but not for the purpose of reflecting living reality.

First of all, these categories are not independent if only because they are correlative. Since you think the finite, then you are obliged to think the infinite; and vice versa. We are not talking about factual thinking, but about principled thinking. Having two rubles of money in your pocket, you can, of course, not think of an infinite number of rubles; And when you think of the infinite universal space, you do not in fact yet think of it as finite. However, this separation of the finite and the infinite is achieved here only by introducing an accidental material content alien to these categories themselves. Of course, to have two rubles does not mean to have an infinite number of rubles. But let us discard these rubles; and let us discard even the very quantities to which the categories of the finite and the infinite are applied here; And let's take these categories themselves. Then it will immediately become clear that one is absolutely inconceivable without the other, that one is the boundary for the other, and that the limiting and the limited coincide absolutely in the boundary.

Take the infinite. It is different from the finite one. But once the infinite has been taken, it means that everything has already been taken, that there is nothing left left. In this case, the difference between the infinite and the finite is the difference between the infinite and itself, i.e., the finite is nothing but the infinite formed in a certain way. Let's take the finite. The finite is different from the infinite. But to be different from something means to have a common border with it. But it is possible to have a common boundary only when the limiting actually coincides with the bounded along this boundary. Consequently, the infinite coincides with the finite in its duration, and the infinite is only the finite formed in a certain way.

Abstract thought led here to monstrous conclusions, such as the sophism with Achilles and the tortoise. But philosophers still have not yet learned to operate with a category in which the finite and the infinite would coincide forever, to the point of complete indistinguishability. It would be necessary to listen, if not to the mystical philosophers quoted above, then at least to Hegel with his doctrine of true and evil infinity, and if not to Hegel, then at least to Cantor with his doctrine of actual infinity. I propose to take not mystics, not Hegel and not Kantor, but again my old worn-out galosh.

I ask you: is it worn-out or not? Unfortunately - yes, worn-out. Does it mean that it was once new? Yes — alas! "It was once new. So, then something happened here? Of course! I demolished it! But not immediately, did they? Well, of course, not immediately. So, it took time? Oh, yes! Small. And movement? Of course, and movement! It was necessary to walk in these galoshes on the streets for at least some time. But allow me! Did I try on my galoshes in the store? I tried it on in the store. And did you wear them there? One step. Have they been demolished at all during this time? Of course, they did not demolish at all. So when I take only one step in these galoshes, they don't wear out yet? They are not worn out yet. Well, here is a critique of the abstract separation of the finite and the infinite.

If galoshes do not wear out while moving a step, then they do not wear out when moving a million paces; That is, it means that they do not wear out at all. This is ridiculous. If they begin to wear out already when moving only one step, then the question arises: how big must this step be for galoshes to wear out somehow. Let's say this step is equal to half a meter. If so, then a quarter of a meter step does not yet wear out the galosh. Well, then I will move in steps of a quarter of a meter, and my pair of galoshes will be enough not only for my life, but for the whole life of all people who have ever existed or will exist; the products of the Soviet "Triangle" will be enough for the entire infinity of time. Absurdly. This means that the measure should be taken less, not a quarter of a meter. But which one? It is clear that such a measure does not exist at all, it goes to infinity all the time, it is infinitesimal and smaller than any given quantity, no matter how small the latter may be.

But what does it turn out to be? It turns out that these three months, during which I took my galoshes and they went from new to worn-out, I went through a whole infinity of the smallest shifts. It turns out that three months is the entire infinity of time, that within three months it is possible to have an infinite number of separate spatial and temporal displacements. Otherwise, I could not have worn my galoshes.

Thus, the simple fact of worn-out galoshes, if we take it not from some abstract point of view, but take it as such, i.e., worn-out galoshes as worn-out galoshes, this simple fact of everyday life alone screams that in living things the infinite and the finite are indistinguishable, that this very difference is already a sign of a departure from the living life of things.

After that, do not tell me that the coincidence of the infinite and the finite in a single symbol was invented by the Church Father Dionysius the Areopagite or the idealist Hegel. Quite independently of either mysticism or idealism, regardless of any world outlook, the finite and the infinite coincide in one indivisible and living thing, which can therefore be considered both a symbol of the finite and a symbol of the infinite. It is clear to everyone that it is not a matter of worldview, but only of the desire or unwillingness to reason.