And in mathematics this incomprehensibility of the last foundations is especially noticeable. Let in logic and in philosophy in general people make a lot of fog; And there, if people reasoned more scientifically — let us even assume this vulgar judgment — then everything would be clear to everyone and nothing mysterious would remain. But mathematics is already a real science, and no one doubts its reliability. And yet many of its statements give a decidedly miraculous impression, especially some intricate solutions of higher mathematics. That any new theorem follows from a given axiom or theorem, or from a series of them, is understandable, i.e., the content of this conclusion is clear here. But why thought requires this particular conclusion and not another, no one can explain. Delving into the content of mathematical analysis, we quickly begin to notice that mathematicians are not doing their own human business at all, that they are describing their visions of some world that they do not understand; And their whole task is to eliminate everything human, subjective, accidental, in order to obey this mysterious command to reason in this way and not otherwise, in order to copy as much and as accurately as possible from the incomprehensible picture revealed to them.

The same must be said about all human knowledge, and in particular about logic. No matter how obvious, convincing and clear it is, behind it there is a certain abyss of incomprehensible, illogical, mysterious things, what it feeds on and where it gets its structure from, but about which it can neither be talked about nor thought. Just as no biologist can ever explain the bizarre forms of plants and animals that go far beyond the biologically investigated factors, and just as no explanation can destroy our wonder at the various bizarre forms of plants and animals, so logic will never explain to us its logical forms and make us stop wondering at them, however clear and obvious they may be in themselves.

We will be able to state this from the very first steps of logical thought in general.

I. THE MYSTERY OF THE FIRST CONCEPTION OF THOUGHT

1. The most unknowable and prelogical itself. But let us want to record the very first, most primitive movement of thought after this very one. First of all, what kind of movement will it be?

a) Let's start "from below", with things. What is the most primitive, the most abstract, the most necessary in a thing? Here is a branch of lilac. It can be of different colors, which means that color is not something basic. It can be of different sizes. This means that size is also not something original. And so on and so forth. Coming to the very first thing that characterizes this branch of lilac, we are confronted with one category, which in any case must be in it, no matter how and by what the lilac itself is defined. This is precisely her being. Lilac must first of all be there in order for us to assert something about it. Lilac is — this is the first, even the palest and most abstract — without which lilac is not something and which is, as it were, the basis and pivot for all its real properties and qualities and for its entire concrete life. Being, i.e., the first positing, is what the whole life of a given thing will then be based on, and this is the final foundation for every thing during the entire period of its existence. Lilac is something. But to be that something, it must first just be. This lilac bloomed a few days ago and will bloom for another two weeks. But in order to blossom and fade, it must first just be. This lilac bush is a simple one, and over there is a Persian lilac. But to be plain or Persian, lilac must first just be. Here I have a lilac flower with three or four petals, but after a long search I found a lilac flower with five petals. However, in order to have three, four, or five petals, lilacs must first just be. And so on and so forth.

Being, or, what is the same thing, positing, affirmation, is obviously the very first, the most fundamental thing that a thought affirms, without which nothing else exists.

(b) The same thing will happen if we begin to reason "from above," that is, from the very beginning. The very itself does not exist, the category of being is not inherent in it. But it is clear that this is the most striking and most original thing in it. That it does not possess any of the properties known to us is much easier to assimilate. But the fact that it does not even exist undermines any characteristic of it at its root. And if we begin to say something about it, then, first of all, of course, we must begin with being. If it is not itself, does not exist, then any of its characteristics will be absolutely fruitless. And if, on the contrary, there is being, then the possibility of any other category is assured, for every other characteristic must first of all exist, and only then exist as such-and-such.

Thus, from various points of view, being is the primary and most necessary category with which philosophy must begin if it wants to reveal the symbolic content of itself in the order of strict gradualness.

2. (a) But what do we get? Being is the first position, the first point that arises in the inscrutable bosom of itself. We assert that no one anywhere has ever understood and will never understand the true meaning of this first flash of thought against the dark background of the absolute self. The relation of this first positing of thought to the absolute self is equivalent either to the appearance of the first black dot in that absolute light, in which there has hitherto been absolutely no distinction, or to the appearance of the first point of light in that absolute darkness, in which there has also been no light up to now. What can be said about this? It may be said with certainty that as long as there is absolute light or absolute darkness, that is, as long as there is such an infinite power of light or darkness, that the latter do not differ from anything else (for there is nothing else, and they have already embraced everything), nor from themselves (for they are absolutely intact in themselves, and here all difference has already been extinguished), until, We say, there is such a light or darkness, until then there is no thought, no word, no characteristic of this light or this darkness. On the other hand, it can still be asserted with certainty that a thought, a word, any kind of image or description requires a distinction, a distinction of one moment from another, and the latter requires that these moments should be, exist, i.e., requires, first of all, the category of being. However, it is quite impossible to say why, for what reasons, on what basis, and how exactly this first lightning strike of meaning appears; And it is impossible to say what made the absolute self, which is already absolute self-sufficiency, still give rise to certain categories, including the category of being or differences.

(b) It may be pretended (as rationalistic philosophers do) that all is well and understandable, and that there is nothing surprising in this first appearance of thought. This is not surprising even to the great Hegel, who begins his logic with the category of being, without at all asking himself where and why this category itself appeared. Indeed, there is nothing to say on this topic, but there is something to be surprised about.

Let us remember that we proceeded from the construction of the pre-categorical itself. It was clear that there was absolutely nowhere to get away from this very thing, since any place where we would go would also be such a "self", and we would also continue to be "ourselves" ourselves. If, however, the absolute self, incomprehensible and above categorical, is invariably present in every slightest act of being, then it is clear that every slightest act of being is, first of all, that very itself, i.e., this incomprehensibility and pre-categoriality, and only then something specific. Everywhere we see the mystery of this first conception of thought, because wherever there is a living thought, this thought is conceived and conceived, everywhere everything is born and born, everywhere it blossoms or withers, arises or is destroyed. The mystery of the first positing of thought, i.e., the mystery of its first conception, accompanies thought throughout its entire existence, for it cannot be eternally conceived, and cannot eternally arise or grow. At the emergence of any of its categories, at the slightest flutter of reason, at the slightest act of consciousness or meaning, this absolute inscrutability of the first semantic conceptions is repeated in its entirety and triumphs in its imperious victory.

What can even the most enlightened philosophy say about this? After all, it is impossible to take seriously the explanation of the origin of reason and meaning, and in particular the category of being, from various kinds of "facts", be they physical or biological, psychic or social facts, since these facts themselves exist only thanks to the category of being. This naïve and thoughtless petitio principii cannot satisfy philosophical thought. However, what remains after this, the deduction of the categories of reason (and in particular the category of being) from the pre-categorical basis, carries with it an insoluble mystery which cannot be discarded (since thought frantically demands that the origin of the category of being be be clarified), and it is also impossible to transform it into a clearly and separately solvable problem (for such is the very nature of the pre-categoriality postulated here).

And this mystery is a real and genuine mystery, i.e., not that temporal riddle and obscurity which is solved in the course of time and in connection with the progress of science and the methods of thought. This is a mystery that cannot but be a mystery that will not be solved by anyone and which cannot be solved, but which can only be marveled at. The most important thing is that it did not arise by chance, due to certain shortcomings of knowledge or being. It is substantiated by knowledge and being themselves as necessary. It is the absolute inexplicability of knowledge and being, for if it does not exist, it means that there is no self, and then everything crumbles into a nihilistic haze and madness. In order to have a mind, the mystery of its first conception is required, and this mystery is no longer the mystery of the mind alone... This is the mystery of himself and the mystery of his emanation. It is absolutely insoluble, but at the same time it is absolutely necessary. It narrows the entire life of all-embracing reason and meaning, and it manifests itself in every place of its manifestation. But it reveals itself as a mystery, and it is felt as a mystery, without any hope of resolution, but with every hope that it will fertilize any manifestations of reason and meaning in general.