Looking at this new and unprecedented picture, we begin to notice that our prelogical itself has suddenly disappeared as such, i.e., it has suddenly ceased to be an unknowable and inaccessible abyss. As soon as the category of being appeared, i.e., as soon as the first individual point of meaning was established, the self-existent itself was immediately transformed into an infinite and bubbling chaos of innumerable semantic possibilities surrounding this point. Of the very thing as such, we could not even say this, and if we did, it was only in the order of allegorical descriptions. Now, in the most literal sense, the very itself, without yet becoming any logical category, turns into a living and inexhaustible womb of innumerable semantic possibilities, into that infinitely fertile and fat soil into which our first seed of reason, the category of being, falls. From the relationship with this abyss of possibilities, the category of being will give rise to all other categories of reason.

(b) This majestic and stunning picture of the life of the mind, which suddenly appears out of nowhere at the first appearance of being, is also surprising, to say the least. As long as there was no existence, there was nothing. But then the first miracle happened: the non-existent, the prelogical, the super-semantic itself gave birth to being in unknown ways. And at the same moment, a whole inexhaustible abyss of still unfathomable possibilities appeared, and our being found itself surrounded by this impenetrable night and the life-giving chaos of endless semantic designs.

It turns out that being, in order to be, must be surrounded by this non-being. If there is being, then there is non-being, this is the new and unexpected truth that suddenly appeared to us with the first lightning of the dissecting mind. Being, in order to be, must be different from that which is not being, different from non-being. And this means that non-being must also exist. But being is a positing, an affirmation, i.e., a clear division, opposition, coordination. Consequently, non-being is the absence of division and distinction; it is an indistinguishable chaos. On the other hand, however, once the category of being has appeared, everything that is or can be is necessarily considered from the point of view of being. This does not mean that everything is necessarily being itself; But this means that everything is necessarily considered from the point of view of being. To consider this or that area from the point of view of being means to consider it from the point of view of existential possibilities. Thus we look on a dark night at a sky covered with clouds and containing no distinction or form. It is not merely the absence of being (in which case there would be nothing to talk about), but it is the presence of being only in its pure possibility. If there is at least some being somewhere, it means that there is a category of being; and if there is a category of being, then from now on everything that exists and does not exist necessarily bears the stamp of being (for this is the case with every category in general; it cannot but be present everywhere, directly or indirectly); and the seal of being for that which does not yet exist, i.e., for that which is not yet non-being, is the possibility of being. Hence the indistinguishable chaos that we have received above is precisely the indistinguishable and infinite chaos of semantic and existential possibilities.

c) Here too it is possible to pretend that nothing special has happened, that there is nothing more natural than this antithesis of being and non-being. For Plato and Hegel this is very clear and simple: if there is being, then there must also be non-being, since if being does not differ from anything, then it is not being either. And indeed, if we take this elementary dialectical statement in itself, there is absolutely nothing mysterious or strange in it, it is the most elementary requirement of any reasoning thought. And yet it never ceases to amaze and amaze us. Kant, in the introduction to the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, argues approximately as follows. When we deduce the general from the particular, and then, on this basis, continue to subsume the particular under this general, there is nothing surprising in this. But when we have found a priori some generality, and then it turns out that everything factual particular, in spite of its absolute accidentality, exists exactly as we have conceived our general, this circumstance cannot but arouse surprise in us. Something of the same kind happens in the construction of these first positings of being and non-being. Why is this so? Why being should be opposed to non-being, and why this happens absolutely everywhere where there are the germs of thought, one never ceases to wonder, no matter how simple and comprehensible the elementary scheme may be. In essence, this mutual difference and mutual identification of being and non-being is no less understandable than the ancient Stoic teaching that the world breathes into itself the emptiness surrounding it and thereby creates life and all form within itself. This is basically the same as the opposition of being and non-being, which is accompanied by the absorption into being of the semantic possibilities contained in non-being.

5. Thus, the first conception of thought takes place in a mysterious and magical — without exaggeration, one might say, mythical — environment. From somewhere the first luminous point of being suddenly shone, and from somewhere suddenly a tense abyss and chaos of existential possibilities suddenly swarmed, agitated, seething around them, not manifested, but insistently demanding their inclusion in being, their participation in being.

Perhaps the periodic world fires of which Heraclitus dreamed are also dictated by these cold intuitions of being, which differs from non-existence only to merge with it again and reunite with it.

In what follows we shall learn to understand how absolute inseparability and absolute dissociation are one and the same thing, and as that which lies in the middle between these last extremes, and is a living and real picture of reason and being. Being is eternally bifurcated, differentiated, and it is eternally transformed into unity, integrated. In this struggle of distinctions and identifications consists the whole real life of reason and being.

II. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE FIRST SYMBOL

1. BEING, NON-BEING, BECOMING

So, we have recorded our first statement in general. This is affirmation itself, or being. We do not yet know what this being will be like and what it will be filled with, but it is already clear to us that we cannot do without being anywhere. Now the question arises: what do we have next?

1. (a) The old philosophers often allowed the luxury of a systematic deductive exposition, beginning with the most abstract foundations of reason and ending with its concrete and empirically given formations. This luxury, unfortunately, we cannot admit now, although it would be required by the plan of our entire reasoning as a whole. We shall again prosaically proceed from ordinary sensible things, agreeing with the philistines, of course, even if conditionally, that sensible things are really the most comprehensible to us. Since every sensible thing is a symbol of the absolute self, it is evident that it somehow repeats and reproduces this self. And so in our construction of the first symbol we have some right to proceed from general observations of the most ordinary sensible things. Therefore, let's delve into this philistine prose.

b) What is there in a thing besides its being, and what is a thing as a whole?

Everyone will say that a thing not only is, exists, but that it also moves, changes, becomes, arises and is destroyed. As a result of these changes, it acquires a wide variety of qualities, which, combined into one whole, create the individuality of the thing. In addition, every thing is in a certain environment which reconstructs its whole individuality anew, and in which it manifests itself in one way or another, and the latter has, of course, in this respect certain very definite limits to its possibilities. This is what philistine and everyday thought finds in every thing that is characteristic and essential.

Strictly speaking, no philosopher has said anything more in enumerating the basic categories from which a thing is constructed. The properties of a thing indicated by everyday thought can be used sometimes more successfully, sometimes less, sometimes more harmoniously and harmoniously, sometimes less, sometimes more learned and dialectical, sometimes less. But there is no way to go beyond these simplest attitudes; and even any such exit, when it is possible, takes place only on their basis and during their lifetime. Consequently, the thing as a symbol of the absolute self cannot go beyond these limits in the main. One only needs to be able to understand why the symbol of the absolute self is spoken of here.