(c) Dialectical philosophers, in revealing the complex logical structure of things, although they were based on these simplest observations, were very often carried away by these inexpansive thickets of thought to such an extent that there could be no question of any simple propositions either for themselves or for their readers. There is no objection to the complexity and subtlety of dialectical thought; This complexity and this subtlety are really great. And here you cannot simply turn away and use the abusive expression "scholasticism". However, we have every right to demand that every complexity and subtlety should correspond dialectically to the simplest experience of life, and that, for all its complications and refinements, thought should have a direct and obvious connection with philistine and everyday observations.

2. On the basis of the above-mentioned elementary properties of any sensible thing, let us first try to introduce the philosophical categories necessary here, and then try to formulate their necessary interconnection, or dialectics.

a) A thing is, exists. This is the first thing, and we have already recorded it at the very beginning. Further, the thing, we said, moves, changes, becomes, arises, and is destroyed. A long series of similar expressions could be used here, but all of them will have a particular character (for example, a living being can be said to eat, drink, have aspirations, inclinations, feelings, become younger, grow old, etc.; a stone can be said to split, weather, coarse or polished, painted, discolored, dissolved, etc.). The question arises: Of all these most indubitable properties of every thing, which expression is the most general, the most suitable to all kinds of being and existence? Such an indicator is, undoubtedly, becoming. Change, movement, birth and dying—in short, any process that happens in one way or another to things, animate and inanimate, is nothing but a kind of becoming. Is it possible to abandon this category when describing the elementary structure of a thing? Of course not. Without becoming in one form or another, a thing is even unimaginable at all.

(b) But what is becoming in comparison with the existence we recorded at the beginning? Is not mere being enough for a thing, and what does becoming give us? That being alone is not enough is easily understood by everyone, because with one category of being a thing would not move in any respect. Everything would rest in place, and everything would be frozen, numb. This means that it is obvious that becoming gives something new. But what exactly is it?

What does it mean that a thing becomes? This means that it ceases to be one and becomes another. Thus, if becoming is understood as movement, then the thing ceases to be at point A and ends up at point B. If we are talking about a qualitative change, then becoming means that some quality of the thing has ceased to exist and another has been formed. Consequently, being, too, since it is involved in the stage of becoming, must from one become another. But what does it mean for existence to become different? After all, we do not yet have any other category than being. Being, in order to be in becoming, must become different: this means that the "other" can only be the negation of being itself and nothing else, for otherwise it would be necessary to put forward a really different, i.e., new, category, and we have nothing but being as yet. But the negation of being is non-being. This is the only category that we could still put forward, in the absence of any other. But it is quite enough. Being must pass into non-being. If we have this, then the category of becoming is provided for us.

(c) In fact, let us take the movement. Point A passed point A and came to point B. Point A passed and was replaced by point B. Point A no longer exists for point B, and point B does not yet exist for point A. In motion, therefore, every point does not exist for every other point, although at the same time it cannot not exist at all. If no point of the path traversed by a body existed at all, then it is clear that motion itself would not exist. This means that these points exist on their own. But at the same time they do not exist, they are constantly being removed, destroyed. At the very moment the dot appeared, it immediately disappeared, went into the past; and not at any other moment, but at this very moment, at this very moment. Let the body come in its motion to a point in the path that would only arise and come, but would not immediately disappear, would not go into the past. It is clear that the arrival of this point would mean a halt in the movement. Let some point of the path only go into the past, and, moreover, it does not come, does not arise. This would be absurd, since only that which has come and arisen can go into the past and disappear. Motion, then, clearly shows that generation and annihilation exist in it absolutely simultaneously and in relation to the same moment.

(d) Let us now abstract from the specific properties of motion and speak only of becoming. If there we spoke of the emergence of individual moments of motion, and of the fact that this occurrence coincides with their annihilation, we must now speak of the origin of being and the annihilation of being. Becoming, according to this, will take place as follows: 1) being arises; (2) at the very moment when it arises, it is annihilated, i.e., it passes into non-existence; 3) non-being, in this way, also arises; (4) But this otherness suffers the same fate, for at the very moment of its emergence it passes into another, i.e., it is annihilated. Becoming, therefore, is a one-sided coincidence of being and non-being: being passes into non-being, and non-being passes into being. Or, to put it bluntly, becoming is the coincidence of being and non-being.

f) This cannot be objected to by pointing out the separateness of really existing qualities, which remain even when one of them passes into another. Let black turn into white or vice versa (e.g., let it dawn or dusk). This does not mean, they say, that white is black and black is white. Here is a confusion of concepts. First, white and black are not simply being and non-being, but a certain quality of being and non-being. We do not at all say that one quality is another quality, but that being is non-being, and non-being is being. Secondly, white and black are not the becoming of being or non-being, but the result of becoming. And we have not yet said a word about the result of formation. The results of becoming, perhaps, do not coincide. We have spoken only of being and non-being. And being, if it is to emerge at all from its immovable and petrified state, must necessarily become precisely as being, without passing into any other category. But under such conditions, it necessarily passes into the other itself, into the negation of itself, and becomes only non-being, just as non-being, when it necessarily passes into the other itself, necessarily becomes being.

f) This is where a difficult dialectic begins. But it is quite clear to everyone that underneath it lies the simplest fact of comparison, without which nothing living, and, perhaps, nothing dead, is inconceivable. In order to realize such a simple fact as becoming, one must be able to understand how this being is non-being and non-being is being. In essence, this identity is also the simplest thing, although it requires a certain culture of mind for its recognition. The philistine, of course, is very surprised by it. But why not be surprised at how in motion each new moment comes at the very time when it passes into the past? For it is clear to everyone that it is one and the same moment, absolutely the same moment, when the body arrives at a given point in its path and when it leaves it. However, it must also be clear from this that the emergence and disappearance take place in one and the same instant, that the existence of a given moment of time and its non-existence coincide in one and the same instant. If the man in the street does not object to this in the sensual movement, it is only because he is accustomed to these sensual observations. If he were accustomed to the use of pure thought as he is accustomed to the use of sense perceptions, he would not object to the fact that the categories of being and non-being are not only distinct and separate, but that there are categories in which being and non-being coincide in absolute indistinguishability.

3. In the doctrine of becoming we have the first example of that all-consuming action of being and of the same action of non-being, of which we spoke above. This is the first example of the differentiation and integration that make up the real life of mind and being. These two categories, being and non-being, first appeared before us in all their opposition and interseparability, in all their incompatibility. Then it turned out that they must mutually annihilate, perish one in the other, coincide in one undifferentiated unity. True, it is still far from the fire of Heraclitus, but its harbinger is already fully felt here, in the very first stages of dialectical thought.

Before proceeding further, however, let us consider a number of extremely important details that will help to present the formation itself in a much richer and, most importantly, understandable form.

In the doctrine of becoming, we formulated how the categories of being and non-being appeared before us in their complete, purest coincidence. And yet this very coincidence presupposes some details of their interconnection, which we have not yet touched upon. It turns out that there is a relationship between them that precedes a complete coincidence in indifference.

The first such relationship stems from their mutual substitution and mutual justification. The second and third are from recording the results of the relationship within one and the other category. The fourth is from fixing the relationship after the second and third operations.

(a) First of all, then, let us ask ourselves: since everything begins with being, and all the destinies of the latter, as well as of its non-existence, are determined by a single source, how could this source be expressed? This source in the absolute sense is itself in which being and non-being are merged into one undifferentiated superunity. But we have now left the environment of itself and speak of being and non-being in their separateness. Consequently, their absolute identity must be somehow expressed at the stage of dismemberment. It is expressed by the fact that these two categories indifferently substantiate each other, so that it is indifferent which of them is placed at the head and which is deduced from which. This is what we will record in the next discussion.