f) This cannot be objected to by pointing out the separateness of really existing qualities, which remain even when one of them passes into another. Let black turn into white or vice versa (e.g., let it dawn or dusk). This does not mean, they say, that white is black and black is white. Here is a confusion of concepts. First, white and black are not simply being and non-being, but a certain quality of being and non-being. We do not at all say that one quality is another quality, but that being is non-being, and non-being is being. Secondly, white and black are not the becoming of being or non-being, but the result of becoming. And we have not yet said a word about the result of formation. The results of becoming, perhaps, do not coincide. We have spoken only of being and non-being. And being, if it is to emerge at all from its immovable and petrified state, must necessarily become precisely as being, without passing into any other category. But under such conditions, it necessarily passes into the other itself, into the negation of itself, and becomes only non-being, just as non-being, when it necessarily passes into the other itself, necessarily becomes being.

f) This is where a difficult dialectic begins. But it is quite clear to everyone that underneath it lies the simplest fact of comparison, without which nothing living, and, perhaps, nothing dead, is inconceivable. In order to realize such a simple fact as becoming, one must be able to understand how this being is non-being and non-being is being. In essence, this identity is also the simplest thing, although it requires a certain culture of mind for its recognition. The philistine, of course, is very surprised by it. But why not be surprised at how in motion each new moment comes at the very time when it passes into the past? For it is clear to everyone that it is one and the same moment, absolutely the same moment, when the body arrives at a given point in its path and when it leaves it. However, it must also be clear from this that the emergence and disappearance take place in one and the same instant, that the existence of a given moment of time and its non-existence coincide in one and the same instant. If the man in the street does not object to this in the sensual movement, it is only because he is accustomed to these sensual observations. If he were accustomed to the use of pure thought as he is accustomed to the use of sense perceptions, he would not object to the fact that the categories of being and non-being are not only distinct and separate, but that there are categories in which being and non-being coincide in absolute indistinguishability.

3. In the doctrine of becoming we have the first example of that all-consuming action of being and of the same action of non-being, of which we spoke above. This is the first example of the differentiation and integration that make up the real life of mind and being. These two categories, being and non-being, first appeared before us in all their opposition and interseparability, in all their incompatibility. Then it turned out that they must mutually annihilate, perish one in the other, coincide in one undifferentiated unity. True, it is still far from the fire of Heraclitus, but its harbinger is already fully felt here, in the very first stages of dialectical thought.

Before proceeding further, however, let us consider a number of extremely important details that will help to present the formation itself in a much richer and, most importantly, understandable form.

In the doctrine of becoming, we formulated how the categories of being and non-being appeared before us in their complete, purest coincidence. And yet this very coincidence presupposes some details of their interconnection, which we have not yet touched upon. It turns out that there is a relationship between them that precedes a complete coincidence in indifference.

The first such relationship stems from their mutual substitution and mutual justification. The second and third are from recording the results of the relationship within one and the other category. The fourth is from fixing the relationship after the second and third operations.

(a) First of all, then, let us ask ourselves: since everything begins with being, and all the destinies of the latter, as well as of its non-existence, are determined by a single source, how could this source be expressed? This source in the absolute sense is itself in which being and non-being are merged into one undifferentiated superunity. But we have now left the environment of itself and speak of being and non-being in their separateness. Consequently, their absolute identity must be somehow expressed at the stage of dismemberment. It is expressed by the fact that these two categories indifferently substantiate each other, so that it is indifferent which of them is placed at the head and which is deduced from which. This is what we will record in the next discussion.

I. Non-being is not being. But in this case, being in relation to non-being is what it is not, being, i.e. it is non-being. Consequently, non-being is not non-being. Hence, from the fact that non-being is not being, it follows that non-being is not non-being. Let us assume, however, that non-being is not non-being. But that which is not non-being is being. Consequently, non-being is being. Thus, from the fact that non-being is not being, it follows that non-being is being. Thus, being is, exists precisely because it does not exist, that it does not exist.

II. Being is not non-being. But non-being is also a kind of being. Consequently, being is not being, i.e., being is not itself. Hence, from the fact that being is not non-being, it follows that being is not being. Let us assume, however, that being is not being. But that which is not being is non-being. Consequently, being is non-being. Thus, from the fact that being is not non-being, it follows that being is non-being. Thus, non-being exists, exists precisely because it does not exist, that it does not exist.

III. Being is being. But being as a predicate is not here being as subject, for otherwise this assertion itself would be meaningless. And that which is not being is non-being. Consequently, if the assertion that being is being has any meaning at all, it is only because being is not being.

IV. Non-being is non-being. But non-being as a predicate is not non-being as a subject, for otherwise this assertion itself would be meaningless. And that which is not non-being is being. Consequently, if the assertion that non-being is non-being has any meaning at all, it is only because non-being is not non-being.

These four arguments could, of course, be expressed in another way. But their content will always be reduced to one thing: being and non-being are and are not one and the same; and these categories are mutually conditioned and justified.

b) Let us note only one circumstance that is sometimes expressed by representatives of formal logic. It is said that "being" and "non-being" are here taken in different senses, and that therefore the whole argument is based on a misunderstanding. This, however, is absolutely not true.

Let us say that being is not non-being, and that non-being is also a being, and that therefore being is not being, let the predicate of the first proposition, 'non-being', be a quality or meaning, and when we call it, in the second proposition, being, then 'being' is not a quality, but the very fact of that quality. It will then follow that in the first statement "non-being", having been named, will not be a fact at all, i.e., the very assertion that being is not non-being will not speak of any predicate, i.e., of any non-being, i.e., it will not assert anything at all about being, and will not be an assertion at all. Consequently, it is in no case possible to distinguish between "fact" and "quality of fact".