The development – and few would dispute the basis of this category for history and social science – of whatever in this case, which concerns us, the development of culture, people, a certain society and statehood, must necessarily be understood as the revelation of a certain all-spatial and all-temporal ("all" – of course, within the limits of its time and its space) subject. The subject of development, not existing separately and separately from the process of development, not being some kind of "substance" in the sense of that soul, about the separate existence or non-existence, mortality or immortality of which the metaphysicians of the old kind are still arguing, manifests itself in all moments of its evolution. He is their all-temporal and all-spatial unity, all of them and each of them. And if development is not an invention of the Arab Als Ob protégé of the commentator of Kant, if it is not the fruit of a construction of our reason that is absolutely alien to reality and therefore has no cognitive value, but a certain reality from which we are obliged to proceed is real, really exists, and manifests itself in it and without it. The subject of human history is humanity, which I am not afraid to call by the sonorous name of Adam Kadmon. However, humanity, or Adam Kadmon, is reality not in its abstraction, but only in the all-unity (at any rate, not without all-unity) of its individualizations in subjects of lower orders: in cultures, peoples, classes, groups, etc., up to the only empirically concrete individuality, up to the individual or the single man. It goes without saying that each of the "subjects" I have just mentioned (not excluding even the individual) must be understood in the same way as humanity, i.e., not in the sense of an abstract essence, but in the sense of a real polyunity. The necessity of the subject of development was vaguely grasped even by the "father" (or rather, one of the fathers, for positivism is polyandric in its principles) of positivism, Augustus Comte, although he did not think his thought through to the end and obscured it partly by spiritualistic metaphysics, partly by shallow empiricism. And without going into useless polemics with people who, to use an adequate and authentic verbal expression of their idea, lack the physical power of thought, I would ask the reflective reader to find at least one example of a historian who can do without such terms and concepts as "society," "people," "state," "class," "class consciousness," etc. Let this historian recognize his terms as "metaphors." "Ask him, dear reader, to do without metaphors and find out what he means by them. You will immediately see in what a helpless position he will find himself.

I repeat, the subject of development is not at all an abstract concept and not an abstract reality in the spirit of the evilly ridiculed and victoriously destroyed "man in general," "the table in general," etc. With such an understanding of "ideas" it is easy to despair at the necessity of placing in the "intelligent world" not only the bug of Sophia, but also the vessel that stands under the bed at night. And Wilhelm of Ockham profoundly remarked: "Entia non sunt multiplicanda ultra necessitatem." It is inseparable from the process of development, it does not exist separately from it, which is why it is called not just one, but universal or multiple. It is an actual polyunity, a concrete unity of many, although an artificially isolated and detached moment of it catches it in an abstract concept, thinks of it as a system and a factor. The subject of development is all the moments of its development and together each of them, everything and everything; And moreover, it is always in each of its moments potentially entirely, entirely. That is why it is both all-temporal and all-spatial, which by no means destroys the reality of time and space, as people believe, who poorly understood the concept of all-unity developed by ancient philosophy, but, on the contrary, defines the degree of their reality as a certain inferiority of the true and complete.

We are most interested in the subject of Russian culture, in particular, Russian statehood. I call it the Russian people, without attaching any definite ethnological meaning to this term. The Russian people is a plurality of nationalities (or, if you like, a multi-unity subject) partly existing, partly disappearing, partly defining before our eyes or awaiting self-determination in the future, co-subordinated, for the time being, to Great Russia. We will be able to fully understand it only in all its manifestations: when, having completed the path of its development, it is fully actualized in being, and, therefore, in our cognition. In each separate "moment" it is not all relevant: in one it is actualized more, in the other less, although in each it is qualitatively different and unique, unique. In each of its moments, however, it is entirely, entirely, potentially, because the "moment" is nothing but the individualization of the subject. Moreover, without being fully actualized, the moment lends itself to the greatest actualization precisely as the cognizable, which explains the peculiar position of the researcher. — The student of a given moment of development is presented with something unique, unique, although actualized. On the other hand, at the same moment of development, the researcher is potentially given, and for his cognition is given, a special aspect (individualization) of the entire development or of the entire developing subject. Therefore, in every cognizable moment there is its own internal dialectic, necessary, organic, quite real, and not brought into it from outside by our thought. By revealing this dialectic, or (which is the same thing) by reflecting, actualizing in cognition the true being in its actuality and possibility, we reveal the multiplicity itself (for empiricism the given, in the other plane of being, the given) and all its other moments, although in the individualization of the given. Just as the paleontologist – let us allow himself a certain elevation of speech: by one jaw he restores the entire skeleton of an animal unknown to him, the historian can reconstruct the entire structure of this "spirit" by one act of the subject of development, by one manifestation of the "people's spirit", guess its other manifestations and possibilities (forever remaining only possibilities) of other manifestations, in which he agrees with the artist. Such cognition is usually called "intuition," "divination," and so on, and it is imputed to the historian as a special merit, although without it it is impossible to be a true historian. It is undoubtedly akin to an artistic "construction", but it does not represent anything unusual and "mystical". In the end, we also cognize the personality and character of a person, sometimes holistically perceived by some one, apparently insignificant, feature.

Dialectics is "a necessary and basic method of cognition in the study of development, and more broadly, in the study of reality taken as a whole. But, of course, the dialectical method should not be schematized, clumsily placed in the Procrustean bed of schemes. It does not at all boil down to the establishment of a thesis, an antithesis, a synthesis, much less to the establishment of this Hegelian law, which is to a certain extent just, by atomizing reality, i.e., by decomposing it into separate entities and establishing an imaginary causal connection between them. I agree that the experiments of electrification can be used to judge the state of the national economy, even the ideology and religious worldview. In many cases, the approach to the historical process from its material side is perhaps more convenient, and for elementary minds undoubtedly easier. But I reserve the right to judge the state of the national economy, the relationship between labor and capital, etc., by ideology, while at the same time categorically rejecting the right to primacy or primogeniture for any of the aspects of people's life that we conventionally single out (including ideology). Let us leave to the "metaphysicians" the argument about which comes first: the egg or the chicken. You can approach the process only from one side; But conditionally and for reasons of convenience, the party chosen is by no means the cause of the others, and the preferable is not methodologically at all first ontologically.

At first glance, any dialectic frightens away with the apparent or seeming groundlessness of its conclusions, and sometimes repels with an arrogant dissection of reality. Often it can and does lead to completely unconvincing phantasms and errors, or plunge into despair, such as that with which we began and which has led to all the above considerations. Fortunately, we have fairly reliable ways of verifying what is obtained by dialectics, so that we do not even have to resort to the cruel lessons of reality. What we are revealing at this moment, as the potential of the universal subject, can be revealed in most, if not all, of the other moments. And this already gives some validity to our first dialectical conclusion, allows us to clarify it and, if necessary, correct and supplement it. And there is no doubt that when we study other moments, we will see in them actualized much of what we have seen in the first as potential. Our dialectics will then acquire still greater conviction and validity. And if it is still possible to argue about some details, the main features of development are established with sufficient certainty. After all, as the main ones, they could not remain purely potential, but had to be expressed clearly and vividly, actualized in outstanding people, in movements that were strong and embracing wide circles. In expressing these thoughts, I defend not only a definite theory of history, which I recognize as the only correct one in its essence, but also all my previous historical work (I think that the work of historians in general). Therefore, without any pride, but also without false modesty, I refer the reader for illustrations to my historical works, especially to the "Culture of the Middle Ages" and the published "Giordano Bruno". If my suggestion seems unacceptable to anyone, let him turn to Taine, to Fustel de Coulanges (especially The Civil Community of the Ancient World), and, finally, to the latest and most sensational book, O. S r e n g 1 e g, Untergang des Abendlandes. I do not at all consider this book to be philosophically significant and valuable in terms of its conclusions. But Spengler, a poor philosopher (and not without megalomania), is one of the most talented historians. His brilliant and paradoxical juxtapositions perfectly clarify the essence of history and lead to an understanding of its nature. Spengler's book should become a reference book for the novice historian, although, of course, it will do more harm than good to many. It is not for nothing that even now its main theme is the answer to the question: is the West perishing or not?

Reasoning a priori, there is no need to know the whole history (and this is impossible), the whole life of the people under study, and it is no longer such a misfortune that we do not know it in its entirety and are not able to know it. If such a need existed, it would not be worth while to study history, especially the history of modern times, with its innumerable archives and newspapers in all languages, even non-existent. Then in the pantheon of historical science in the most honorable places should be placed the Caliph Omar, who, according to legend, destroyed (they say, however that he was slandered) the Alexandrian library, the inventors of wood paper (for many things I am very grateful to them) and the rats that devour old documents. However, I do not want to deny the importance of extensive knowledge and continue to respect bourgeois science. The more we know the history of the people under study, the more we rise above divination, the better we appreciate the relative significance of the possibilities of a given moment, the more completely, deeply, and concretely we know them. In this way we overcome the surrogates of knowledge: the cautious but impotent assumptions of a narrow specialist who imagines himself to be a historian, and irresponsible prophecies about the future, which are more befitting of a true clairvoyant. Prophecies about the future (including and even mainly "scientific") should be regarded as a surrogate for knowledge, which is obtained from the arbitrary, and foreign and unscrupulous projection into the future of the potentialities revealed in the present. For the cognition and characterization of the national spirit, the national idea, etc., it is better and more cautious not to construct utopias, which are now to be understood in this way. It is hardly scientific to guess about a future that can be desired and sought, but which is still unknown. It is preferable not to imitate half-educated people, modestly limit oneself to the present and the past. Here our soil is safer. In addition, by limiting ourselves to the past and the present, we will learn to understand and clarify them, and not to snort disparagingly at them in the name of the harmful, devaluing and completely untenable idea of progress. Let us not forget that each moment of development has a natural, unique value: only in it is this quality of multiplicity actualized.

Let's be very specific. "Whether or not a great future awaits us, Russians (contrary to the competent opinion of the Russian writer A. M. Peshkov, I believe that it is necessary to create it), the Russian people are great not because of what they will still do and about which we can know nothing, but because of what they have done, because of what they have already actualized and are actualizing in themselves: its age-old statehood, its spiritual culture, its church, its science, its art, for the recognition of which, indeed, there is no need to go to Paris. Most of those who wrote about the Russian national character and the Russian idea, from my point of view, made a very significant mistake. Having seen certain features of the Russian people, they dialectically revealed them, mentally perfected them and then transferred, as an ideal, to the desired future. Under such conditions, prophecy became inevitable. But if it is understandable and justified by an artist, for example, by Dostoevsky, it cannot be justified by a publicist and philosopher. The latter, in any case, should already be aware that he uses a mythological method of presentation. True, Plato did not neglect myth either, but Plato was able to distinguish scientific conclusion from myth-making, even if it was inevitable. One example. "Dostoevsky very vividly and fascinatingly depicts to us the future of mankind (at least European) under the Orthodox leadership of Russia, which has become the head of the Slavs. He clarifies the religious and moral principles that will guide the Russian people, in contrast to the Latin and Germanic peoples. Perhaps it was impossible to show with sufficient clarity and completeness the unconditional significance of Orthodox-Russian humility, Russian reincarnation and sacrifice otherwise than by building a certain ideal state. But there is no doubt that Dostoevsky (rightly or wrongly, it makes no difference to us now) saw these qualities in our past and present. He was able to rise above their potentiality, to unfold it dialectically, and to comprehend their goal, a certain religious-social ideal. But it does not follow from this that the ideal will be realized, that it will pass from potentiality to actuality. It is possible that its ultimate actualization is Dostoevsky's ideology. It is possible that some other Russian qualities will prevent it from becoming actualized, for example, inertia, laziness, loss of religious faith, or, as Vl. Solovyov, the yellow peril, i.e., other potentialities of world history.

I foresee two objections. In the first place, I will be told that science (isn't it sociology?) can predict future stages of development, as a solar eclipse predicts. It is useless to fight against such a belief in science, characteristic of poorly educated people, and I consider it inappropriate for the twentieth century to refute fetishism. "Secondly, the stones of the intelligentsia will cry out against the depreciation of all activity. Since Abraham's children can be made of stones, I will answer them in a few words. I should not be concerned here with the question of what are the ideals and aims of social activity, although one can write about the "social ideal" with more brevity and intelligibility than Prof. Novgorodtsev. If the intellectual social ideal turns out to be a naïve faith, so much the worse for this ideal. But the main thing is that I do not at all deny the possibility of realizing a better future and the moral necessity of realizing it. I only assert that it is realizable only through the present and in the present, it is realizable only by the utmost exertion of effort in the solution of the immediate tasks that lie ahead. It can exist if we want it not only verbally, but also effectively.

Thus, the understanding of the "Russian idea" can be approached from any moment of Russian reality, dialectically revealing it and verifying the conclusions by studying other moments, but mainly by studying moments of undoubted significance. And only in the latter case is it possible to make your conclusions reliable and convincing. Of course, it is not difficult to find many of these moments in our history, concentrating, for example, on such phenomena as the growth of statehood, literature, and art. I think that to this day Russian religiosity, which includes Russian militant atheism, cannot be considered a secondary moment, and consequently not indicative, not rich in potential. In any case, it is as legitimate to proceed from religiosity as from anything else. And this makes my position methodologically justified, and my legitimate conclusions acceptable even to readers of the most atheistic way of thinking, which, incidentally, are the least interesting to me. But there are other reasons that force us to take religiosity as a starting point.

Our task is to at least somewhat understand the Russian idea in its relation to the West and the East. Obviously, we need to take as a starting point what we know best in Russia, in the West, and in the East. But if we turn to the history of the East, we can easily see that it is almost unknown to us, with the exception of its two aspects, religion and art. We have no history of the East. The East still employs mainly philologists who have their own special interests and tasks, very important and fascinating, but who simply do not know and do not understand what history is. Until recently, the East was approached statically, ethnographically; Oriental peoples were not included in the number of historical peoples. And, of course, one cannot consider the confused enumeration of the kingdoms of your kingdoms and the dynasties of sovereigns in China as the history of China. Undoubtedly, the Orientalists have at their disposal a very rich amount of material, but they partly do not know how to approach it historically, and partly do not want to. If a historian undertakes the history of the East, he, lacking the necessary knowledge, is unable to penetrate into the nature of things, and most often approaches his task with the schemes of Western history, begins to discuss Japanese feudalism, Kantianism in Indian philosophy, etc., with a zeal worthy of better use. about the history of a particular state or people) is revealed only in art and religion. A vast amount of material is available to everyone here, and in fact the most has been done here. Why religion and not art? — First of all, Oriental art is largely religious. And, secondly, religion is the most significant area of life. In one way or another, religion gives the relation of man to the absolute, which is expressed in the close connection of all life with it. Religiosity, both practically and in essence, is the richest and most convenient starting point.

II.

The Mediterranean basin, Western Europe and Russia represent the core of the Christian cultural world. Of course, on the one hand, Christianity, mainly through Asia Minor and Asiatic Russia, leads us to the East, on the other hand, the eastern part of the Mediterranean basin was in previous epochs in Hellenism, the Asia Minor states and Egypt one of the most striking expressions of non-Christian and Eastern culture, as it became, already in the Christian era, the place of flowering of Muslim culture. And Christianity itself revealed itself on the very border of the West and the East. Precise geographical boundaries are impossible and unnecessary here. But, in general, everything that lies outside the Russian-European world today belongs to the periphery of Christianity. And it should not be forgotten that Christianity is nothing but a kind of "synthesis" of Hellenism, Judaism and Eastern religions with the religiosity of the West (here I give the term "synthesis" a somewhat specific meaning, indicating not the origin, but only the content). In its imperishable value, the paganism of Greece, Rome, Asia, and the barbarian West outlives itself and completes itself in Christianity, which makes the world embraced by its idea an organic whole. Thus we have two cultures, the Christian and the non-Christian ("Eastern"), whose boundaries roughly coincide with the vague boundaries that divide the West and the East in our vague conception. But our division has a very important advantage of distinctness, which, unfortunately, is not distinguished by the ordinary. In our terminology, the East is the land of Islam, Buddhist culture, Hinduism, Taoism, ancient naturalistic cults, Hellenic, Roman and barbarian religions. It goes without saying that both cultures mutually condition each other, sprout each other. But all these are easily taken into account details that do not change the overall picture and allow us to give a synthetic understanding of each culture. Of course, in order to fully appreciate the cultural development of mankind, it is necessary to take into account other parts, but it is unlikely that our immediate topic will suffer especially from neglecting them, neglecting them in the present state of knowledge, especially since America can be regarded as the most important for us as an offshoot of Christian-Western culture, which, incidentally, is very instructive precisely in its religious-philosophical discoveries. It would be very tempting to dwell on some analogies in the development of American and Russian philosophical thought. However, humbly confessing my ignorance, I deliberately evade the analysis of American relations and leave them to people who are more knowledgeable about "Americanism" to talk about them.

Let us now try, on the basis of the criterion already established above, to define the Christian cultural world (the West and Russia) in relation to the non-Christian (the East). In order to protect ourselves as much as possible from erroneous and one-sided conclusions, let us concentrate on the most vivid and typical manifestations of religiosity.

A threefold understanding of absolute being or of God in relation to His relation to the world is possible: theistic (including monotheism, dualism and polytheism), pantheistic and Christian, which is not quite successful, apparently out of a tendency to external scientific likeness, is called panentheistic.