The Eastern Fathers of the Fourth Century

1. The main features of the theological life of the fourth century.

With the beginning of the fourth century, a new era opened in the life of the church. The empire in the person of Equal-to-the-Apostles Caesar received baptism. The Church emerges from her enforced seclusion and receives under her sacred vaults the searching ancient world. But the world brings with it its anxieties, doubts, and temptations, and brings with it both great anguish and great pride. The Church had to satiate this anguish and humble this pride. In turmoil and in struggles, the ancient world is reborn and churched. Spiritual excitement embraces the whole of society, church and church, from the top to the bottom. And alien passions are attached to the religious search, and the calculations of rulers and politicians, and personal desires, and tribal strife... The time of great and victorious triumph was also a time of great temptations and sorrows for the Church. And often the confessors of Orthodoxy had to make their way in chains and fetters, amidst persecution and suspicion, and end it with a martyr's crown. Suffice it to recall the life of the great Athanasius or Chrysostom... It was too early to talk about the final victory. The world was still "external" to the Church. Immediately behind the church fence, the old, pagan life continued. Pagan temples were also opened. Pagan teachers also taught, and polemicized with Christianity. The whole culture was still pagan, it was saturated with pagan vestiges and memories. This was felt in everything, starting from domestic life. It is not surprising that the monastic movement, the craving and flight to the desert were so strong in the 5th century. It shows not only the desire for solitude or solitude. In the world, indeed, it was difficult to live according to Christianity... The pagan restoration under Julian was not at all an accidental episode, and it showed that the old world was not yet dead. In the 4th and even in the 5th century, pagan culture experienced a new rise. Suffice it to recall Iamblichus, the Athenian school of the Neoplatonists. And it was the same in the West – let us recall the dispute about the Altar of Victory already under Gratian. In the fourth century, two worlds collided with each other: Hellenism and Christianity. And this is what is characteristic: the Church does not reject or deny ancient culture, but Hellenism does not accept Christianity. This was the case before, in the age of Gnosticism, in the time of Plotinus and Porphyry, when Porphyry openly opposed Christianity (we know his objections from the answers of Macarius of Magnesia). Now the resistance is becoming even more stubborn... The external struggle is not so important. Even more difficult and tragic was the internal struggle: every Hellenic had to endure and overcome internal division. Others reconciled and calmed down too early. In this respect, the image of Synesius of Ptolemais is very characteristic, and in the rank of bishop he remained a Neoplatonist, with a belief in dreams and fortune-telling... In the 4th century, a difficult process of spiritual regeneration of ancient society began. The majority still lives in a kind of cultural dual faith. And very slowly the spiritual structure of ancient man is transformed. This process ends much later, and is resolved by the birth of a new, Byzantine culture. The fourth century was a transitional era. This is its historical originality. It was more the end of the story already experienced than the beginning of a new period.

The entire fourth century passed in heated theological disputes. And above all, in the struggle against Arianism... The Apian movement was not homogeneous. And it is necessary to distinguish between the question of the origin of the teaching of Arius himself and the question of the reasons for the theological sympathy that he met with from various sides. There are many reasons to connect Arius himself with Antioch, with the local presbyter Lucian, even with Paul of Samosata. This was already pointed out from the very beginning by St. Alexander of Alexandria. "It received its leaven from the impiety of Lucian," he wrote about the Arian movement. This does not mean that Arius simply borrowed his teachings from Lucian. There is no reason to deny the certain independence of Apius... Not much is known about Lucian. And his image is mysteriously doubled. Apparently, he was connected with Paul of Samosata, and for many years he lived under suspension, "under three bishops." But he died as a martyr, and his name was included in the church diptychs. In any case, he was an outstanding biblical scholar and continued the work begun by Origen on the correction of the Greek biblical text. In doing so, he also used the Hebrew text, perhaps the Syriac Peshitto, who had studied in Edessa, under a certain Macarius. It was Lucian's review of the text of the LXX that received general recognition in the churches of Asia Minor and in the district of Constantinople. As an exegete, Lucian was a resolute opponent of Origen, striving to oppose the Alexandrian allegorical method to the method of direct and literal "historical-grammatical" interpretation. Disagreement on questions of exegetical method, first of all, divided the Antiochian and Alexandrian theologians. They adhered to various philological schools, for even the ancient interpreters of ancient texts differed on questions of method... And at the same time, in his theological views, Lucian was hardly very far from Origen. It is very significant that many of his disciples were at the same time Origenists. The same can be said about Aria himself. It is no accident that the Arians so often refer to Origen and Dionysius of Alexandria. Opponents of Origen in exegesis, they remained Origenists in theology. In any case, the problems of Arian theology are clear only from Origen's premises. Arian theologians feel the same fear of the temptations of modalism as Origen. The Arian movement was possible only on Origenistic grounds. And therefore the struggle against Arianism was in reality the overcoming of Origenism. The name of the teacher was rarely mentioned in disputes. For the opponents of Arianism were also Origenists, first of all, St. Alexander. Origen himself was not an "Arian." But the Arian conclusions were easy to draw from his premises, not only from his words or slips of the tongue. And the overcoming of Arianism historically turned out to be at once the overcoming of Origenism, in Trinitarian theology. Origen's system as a whole was not yet subject to discussion at that time, and only at the very end of the century was the general question of his right-thinking raised. The renunciation of Origen's Trinitarian theology took place as if tacitly. It is very characteristic that such a consistent Origenist as Didymus is already completely free from Origen's motifs in the doctrine of the Trinity. He is farther from Origen than even St. Athanasius. It was not only a renunciation, but also a overcoming of Origenism. And this is the positive theological outcome of the Arian disputes.

Arius proceeded in his reasoning from the concept of God as a perfect unity, as a self-enclosed monad. And this divine monad is for him God the Father. Everything else that really exists is alien to God in essence, has a different, its own essence. The completeness of God's existence excludes any possibility that God communicated or gave his essence to anyone else. Therefore, the Word or the Son of God, as a hypostasis, as truly existing, is unconditionally and wholly alien and unlike the Father. He receives his being from the Father and, by the will of the Father, like other creatures, comes into being as an intermediary in creation, for the sake of creating the world. Therefore, there is, as it were, a certain "gap" between the Father and the Son, and in any case the Son is not co-equal to the Father... Otherwise, there would be two "beginningless," i.e., "two principles"—the truth of monotheism would be rejected... In other words, "it was when there was not," when there was no Son. It was not, and it became, it came into being, came into being. This means that the Son is "of non-beings", εξ ουκ οντων. He is a "creature," that is, something that has happened. And therefore it has a "changeable" nature, like everything that has happened. Divine glory is communicated to him somehow from without, "by grace." However, according to the foreknowledge of the future, immediately and in advance... — Such was the general outline of the teaching of Arius, as far as we can judge from the surviving fragments of his writings and from the testimony of his contemporaries. It was in essence a denial of the Trinity of God. For Arius, the trinity is something derived and has happened. It arises, is separated by "time intervals" (διαστημα), its hypostases are not similar to each other, alien to each other and non-eternal, "infinitely dissimilar to each other." It is a kind of diminishing Trinity, a kind of union or "society" of three dissimilar beings (a remark of Gregory the Theologian), a union of "three hypostases" united in essence. In other words: three Suvoli, but "separated in essence". In other words: three beings... Arius was a strict monotheist, a kind of Judaist in theology. For him, the Trinity is not one God. There is one and only God, this is the Father. The Son and the Spirit are the highest and firstborn creatures, the mediators in the creation of the world. In this, indeed, Arius repeats Paul of Samosata, in general, repeats the monarchian dynamists. But he is much closer to Philo. And it is not difficult to understand why the reasoning of Arius could arouse sympathy among the Alexandrians, among the Origenists. One immediately feels how connected the entire theology of Arius is with the problem of time and with the question of creation, of the origin of the world. This was the main question for him. Creation is precisely origination. That created thing that has come into being, which exists not from itself and not through itself, but from another, which did not exist before it came into being. And therefore "birth" for Arius is indistinguishable from "creation" — both are origination. The emergence of the Aryans cannot think otherwise than in time. Related to this is the ambiguity in the concept of "beginnings". What has happened has a beginning, has a cause for its existence outside and before itself. But "beginning" can mean twofold: the foundation or source of being, first; Secondly, the moment in time. For Arius, both meanings coincide. "Beginninglessness" or timelessness for him also means ontological primacy. Therefore he refuses to admit the "beginninglessness" or eternity of the Son's existence. For it would mean the denial of "birth" or "origin," and the Word would be a kind of second and independent God. If the Word is from the Father, then He came to be. Otherwise, He is not of the Father. From tradition Apius knows that the Word is the God of revelation, the proximate cause of creation. But the creature is changeable, it is in time. This gives him a new reason to connect the existence of the Word with time. Arius seems to be at odds with Origen all the time. After all, Origen openly taught about the eternal birth of the Word, and at the same time he relied on the immutability of the Divine being. However, he concluded too much from this: it seemed to him that all generation contradicted the Divine immutability; and therefore he also taught about the eternal creation of the world — the creation by God of a world beginning in time seemed to him impossible. For Origen, too, the birth of the Son and the creation of the world were equally united in the concept of origin. In the name of divine immutability, Origen essentially denies all origination. He does not dare to say about anything that exists: it was, when it was not... He comes to the conclusion about the eternity of all existence, about the co-eternity of everything with God. In this it is Origen who is close to Aristotle, with his doctrine of the eternity of the world. The world ceased to be a creature for Origen. This conclusion turned out to be unacceptable to his followers. But in rejecting the conclusion, they did not abandon Origen's premises. Arius reasoned in the same way. He denies the eternity of the world, the whole pathos of his system is in the assertion of the temporal nature of everything that has happened, of everything that has a "beginning" of its existence in another. But from this it follows that the Son is also born in time... Arius differs from Origen in conclusions, but coincides in the premises... And within the limits of Origen's system there remained a hopeless alternative: either to recognize the eternity of the world, or to reject the eternal birth of the Son... It was possible to get out of this circle only through the denial of Origen's premises... That is why the system of Arius attracted the stubborn followers of Origen, who rejected the doctrine of the eternity of the world. In this respect, the theology of Eusebius of Caesarea is most vivid. Far from everything he coincides with Arius – he directly rejects the main idea of Arius about the "origin" of the Son "from non-beings"... And at the same time he denies the "co-beginninglessness" of the Son with the Father: as the cause or beginning of the Son, the Father "pre-exists," although not in time. The existence of the Son for Eusebius is in any case connected with time. Before His actual birth, the Son exists "in the Father," but exists unbegotten, "in potentiality." And only then is it born, as an existent and independent hypostasis, even as a "second essence" (or "second being") along with the Father, and is born by the will and from the will of the Father. In His being, the Son is turned to the world, and in this sense He is "the firstborn of all creation." He is the creator, the demiurge, the creator of all visible and invisible beings, including, first of all, the Spirit of the Comforter. As the direct creation of the Father, the Son is co-existent with Him. But as proceeding from the Father, He is less than Him, there is a certain "intermediate" force between the Father and the world – there is a "second God", but not the first. And He is "honored by the Divine," but he is honored... He is a creature, though "not like other creatures." Like Arius, Eusebius discusses an essentially cosmological, not theological problem. He talks all the time about "origin." The Being of the Son... "in his own hypostasis" for him is closely connected with the existence of the world. And therefore, in order not to erase the boundary between God and the world, he sharply separates the Son from the Father: "the existence of the Son is not necessary for the fullness of being and for the fullness of the Father's divinity." For Eusebius, the existence of the Son is connected with time because the existence of the world is connected with time. He distinguishes between the origin of the Son and the creation of the world, γενεσις and δημιουργια... But it still cannot get out of the aporias of "origin". The aporia of "origin" was the main topic of the Arian disputes. And in a certain sense, Origenism, like Origenism, can be called a heresy about time. This was precisely the main error of Arian thought.

The Apostles set a philosophical task before the theological consciousness. And in philosophical concepts and words, the Church responded to the Arian temptation. Already St. Alexander of Alexandria, in denouncing Arius, in the words of Socrates, "theologized philosophically." And he theologized first of all about time. St. Alexander also proceeds from the idea of Divine immutability and emphasizes the complete inseparability of the Father and the Son. "God always, the Son always; the Father, the Son; The Son coexists with God"... Αμα and αει — These definitions exclude any gradualness in the Genesis of the Holy Trinity: "Not by the slightest moment does the Father precede the Son." He is always and unchangeably the Father of his Son. The Son is born "from the Father Himself," and therefore is His "indistinct image," He preserves in full and exact the nature of the Father and His perfect likeness to Him in all things. Only one "unbegottenness," which is peculiar only to the Father, as His "own inheritance," is "lacking in the Son." But generation, being eternal, does not dissolve the perfect co-existence of the Son and the Father. St. Alexander was also an Origenist, but he developed other motifs of the Origen system. He completely abstracts himself from the cosmological problem and tries to understand and explain the birth of the Son as an internal moment of the inner divine life, not as a moment of "origin." From his theological confession it is clearly seen what essential importance in the struggle against Arianism the question of time and eternity was acquired at the very beginning, and is brought into close connection with the teaching about the essence or essence of God. In the anathemas attached to the Nicene Creed, on the one hand, all temporal definitions are rejected ("was, when it was not", "from bearers", changeability, creation), on the other, the origin "from another essence or hypostasis". Apparently, Hosius of Corduba, sent by the Emperor to Egypt to pacify the Arian troubles, for the first time, as Socrates reports, "proposed the question of essence and hypostasis, and made it the subject of a new competition."

In philosophical definitions, Arianism is also rejected by the Council of Nicaea. The whole meaning of the Nicene Dogmatic Act, the "dogma of the 318 Holy Fathers," is to be condensed in two words: ομοουσιος and εκ της ουσιας — Consubstantial and "of essence." In the use of these expressions, the teaching authority of the Church was expressed. According to Eusebius of Caesarea, these expressions were subjected to "careful examination" at the council: "questions and answers were given on this occasion, and the meaning of the words was carefully examined." It is possible that the term "consubstantial" was proposed to the council by Hosius, who, as St. Athanasius says, "expounded the faith at Nicaea." According to Philostorgius, even on the way to Nicaea, St. Alexander and Hosius decided to stop at the word ομοουσιος. For the West, this term, or rather its Latin analogue, was a familiar expression. In Trinitarian theology, Tertullian was held here with his definition: tres unius substantiae. In Greek, this had to be translated by ομοουσιος. Novatian also spoke of the "one essence" and the "common in essence" (communio substantiae ad Patrem) in the Holy Trinity. Dionysius of Rome reproached Dionysius of Alexandria for not using the term "consubstantial." In Alexandria, of course, they still remembered this. St. Athanasius later reminded us of this. "The ancient bishops, who lived for almost 130 years, the bishop of great Rome and the bishop of our city, condemned in writing those who assert that the Son is a creature and is not of the same essence with the Father." Alien to Scripture, these sayings are taken from church usage: the Nicene Fathers, St. Athanasius emphasizes, borrowed them "from ancient times, from their predecessors," "having witness to this from the Fathers"... However, the Latin terms did not coincide with the Greek, and the unius substantiae did not protect Tertullian from subordinationism. In the East, the term "consubstantial" had long been known, but it bore a thick shadow and even the seal of conciliar condemnation. In philosophical literature, it was very rare. Only a few quotes can be collected. Aristotle spoke of the consubstantiality of the stars with each other. Porphyry discussed the question of whether the souls of animals are of the same essence with ours. In Porphyry, "consubstantial" means, on the one hand, "of the same material," and on the other, "of the same kind." Plotinus used the word in the same sense. The expression was first introduced into religious language by the Gnostics, the Valentinians, to denote the unity and community between the aeons: they emphasized that within one "nature" the "consubstantial" is born. This term apparently entered the ecclesiastical language primarily for the translation of Gnostic texts, and in Gnostic usage this term had a bright emanatic connotation. This, first of all, explains Origen's negative or, in any case, restrained attitude to the expressions: "from the essence of the Father" or "consubstantial." It seemed to him that they had too coarse and material a meaning, that they introduced a kind of division or fragmentation into the existence of God, "just as one can imagine about pregnant women." Following Origen, Dionysius of Alexandria also avoids the use of this word, probably for the same reasons. Later, the Omiusians emphasized that "consubstantial" denotes material connections, the continuity of matter; therefore, like Origen, they found the term inconvenient in theology. It remains not entirely clear for what reasons the use of the word "consubstantial" was condemned and rejected at the Antiochian assembly of 269, which met against Paul of Samosata. In explaining this fact, St. Athanasius and Hilary of Pictavia differ. Apparently, Hilary was right, and the reason for the Antiochian prohibition was that Paul himself combined this expression with a modalistic meaning, asserting the strict unity of the Godhead with only the nominal difference of persons. The Antiochian anathema and the Omiysian were explained in the same way; Hilary only repeated their explanations... Generally speaking, the word "consubstantial" allowed for a variety of interpretations, and from the history of dogmatic disputes of the fourth century we know what bewilderment it caused. In this respect, the letter attributed to St. Basil the Great to Apollinaris (of Laodicea) is very characteristic; if this letter does not belong to St. Basil, it at any rate refers to his time and well depicts the state of mind of that time. The author asks about the meaning of the term ομοουσιος. Does "consubstantial" mean a "common kind" under which both the Father and the Son fit as its "species," or the unity of the pre-existent "corporeal" substratum, from which the Father and the Son proceed equally, through separation? In his book on the councils, Hilary of Pictavia, defending the Nicene faith, stipulates that ομοουσιος can have and in the past received a "bad meaning." And he points out three cases or types of false and impious understanding of "consubstantiality": first, "consubstantial" can be understood in the monarchian sense of exclusive monotheism, in which the Father and the Son differ only in name, as states of one and the same person. Secondly, "consubstantial" can be interpreted in the sense of the "distribution" of the one divine essence, between the Father and the Son, as "co-heirs", as two lights from the one light... And thirdly, the concept of "consubstantiality" may be mixed with an emanatical motive, the idea of the Son as a part of the Father's substance, as the "cutting off" of the Father, so that the one "thing" is divided and distributed in two and between the two. It should be noted that Tertullian's teaching about the Son as the product and separation of the Father (derivatio or portio) was not devoid of the latter shade. All these false shades in the understanding of "consubstantiality" had to be stipulated, and clearly and precisely excluded from theological language. At the Council of Nicaea, the Arians pointed out precisely these shades. "To call someone consubstantial," in their opinion, "means to indicate that which proceeds from another, either through a shoot, as it grows from a root, or through an outflow, as children from their fathers, or through separation, as two or three golden vessels." In the concept of "consubstantiality" they imagined a taste of co-materiality... All this makes understandable the reserved attitude of the theologians of that time to the Nicene definition. It required explanation and interpretation, and this was possible only in connection with and in the composition of an integral doctrinal system. Only then was its exact meaning revealed, limited from doubtful interpretations. To do this, first of all, it was necessary to define the concept of "essence", ουσια. In ancient philosophy, this concept received different shades for different schools. For Platonism and Neoplatonism, "essence" denotes the general. In the same way, for the Stoics, the term "essence" (Latin substantia) denotes a general and non-qualitative substratum (i.e., matter) as opposed to distinguishing forms. For Aristotle and the Aristotelians, on the contrary, ουσια means first of all an indivisible, individual being, an individual and individual thing in the fullness of its immutable determinations, πρωτη ουσια. And only secondarily can the general genus be called essence; uniting and embracing individual existences, according to Aristotle: δευτερα ουσια, "second essence". However, in Aristotle himself, the word ουσια does not have a precisely limited meaning, and sometimes merges in meaning with the concept of being or "subject". At the same time, the concept of essence for Aristotle is connected with the concept of emergence or becoming, γενεσις. By the fourth century, it was precisely the narrow Aristotelian meaning of the word ουσια that was established in broad usage. In this sense, ουσια is not only an essence, but also a being. — Another term of the Nicene definition of faith, υποστασις, came into philosophical use relatively late, after Aristotle in any case. And for a long time this word was used in the literal sense: "standing under"; but a certain shade can be noticed: καθ'υποστασιν already in Aristotle means: actual, — in contrast: in appearance. In the seventy, υποστασις has a different meaning, meaning, among other things, "foundation" (the foundation of a house, the foundation of hope), composition, etc. — In Philo. "hypostasis" apparently means independence and originality. "Essence" is denoted by the word υποστασις in Ap. For the first time in Neoplatonism, the concept of "hypostasis" acquires terminological definiteness. Plotinus calls the forms of self-revelation of the One "hypostases" and, perhaps, distinguishes as if ουσια as το είναι from υποστασις as τι είναι. In any case, Pophyrius made such a distinction. Characteristically, Plotinus considered the concept of "hypostasis" to be inapplicable to the first principle, as well as the concept of "essence": the One "is above all essence". It is as if the concept of "hypostasis" includes for him the moment of origin. At the same time as Plotinus, Origen spoke of the "three hypostases", followed by Dionysius of Alexandria. However, the concept of "hypostasis" remained indistinguishable from the concept of essence, and that is why the theological language of Dionysius so alarmed Roman theologians. In general, it can be said that until the middle of the fourth century, the concepts and terms "essence" and "hypostasis" remained interchangeable; blzh. Jerome said bluntly: "The school of secular sciences knew no other meaning of the word 'hypostasis' than essence." And in the anathemas of the Council of Nicaea, "essence" and "hypostasis" are clearly identified ("from another hypostasis or essence"). St. Athanasius also identified them. It should be noted that only one of the Latin terms corresponded to both Greek terms, both ουσια and υποστασις; were equally translated as substantia. There remained only ambiguity in the Nicene definition of the creed. The confession of "consubstantiality" affirms the perfect "identity of essence" in the Father and the Son. Is it possible to speak of the birth of the Son "from the essence of the Father"? This terminological difficulty was subsequently eliminated — in the Constantinopolitan Creed, "from the essence of the Father" was omitted. On the basis of the works of St. Athanasius, it can be said with certainty that there was no contradiction or hesitation in the thought of the Nicene Fathers; and the expressions "of essence" and "consubstantial" revealed to them one and the same thing from different angles: the sincere and immutable co-belonging of the Father and the Son in the identity of the unchanging and common life. By contrasting the Arian "out of will" or "out of will" with the decisive "out of essence," the Nicene Fathers sought to express the immanent and ontological character of the Divine birth as an internal, eternal, and somehow necessary state (rather than an act) of Divine life and being. "Of essence" meant for them "in essence" or "in essence," and excluded first of all any connection between birth and will or consultation. In the Nicene understanding, birth and "being from essence" coincide and are equally opposed to the conjugated pair of concepts: creation and being by will or will. The inconsistency of the Nicene formula lay in something else: there was no general term for naming the three in the unity of the Godhead. And therefore the unity and inseparability of the Divine being were expressed more sharply and definitely than the Trinity and the differences: the one essence and the three, only a numeral without a noun...

Soon after the council, a tense theological dispute flared up around the Nicene creed. From the historical and dogmatic point of view, those political, social and personal motives are of no interest which complicated it and imparted to it excessive acuteness and passion. Theological grounds were sufficient for the dispute. A great many were confused by the Nicene mode of expression, which was unusual and seemed to be inaccurate. In the use of words at that time, the Nicene formula did not seem to express with sufficient force and clarity the hypostatic distinction of the peculiarities of the Son-Word. To this was added the temptation of Marcellianism, to which the Nicaeans and Athanasius himself reacted, perhaps, with excessive mildness. On the dogmatic side, the composition of the so-called "anti-Nicene opposition" was variegated. On the quantitative side, it was dominated by the conservative bishops of the East, who abstained from the use of Nicene words in the name of the old and customary expressions of Church tradition. They were united by an anti-Sabellian suspicion. The active predominance belonged to the "Eusebians," as St. Athanasius called them, who held fast to Origen and his subbordinatism, and consciously rejected the Nicene language and the Nicene faith. They were joined by already real, but hitherto concealed heretics. According to Socrates, by making the word "consubstantial" the subject of their conversations and researches, the bishops stirred up an internecine war among themselves, and this war "did not differ in any way from a night battle, because both sides did not understand why they were scolding each other." Some evaded the word "consubstantial," believing that those who accepted it introduced the heresy of Sabelius, and therefore called them blasphemers, as if denying the personal existence of the Son of God. Others, who defended the consubstantial, thought that their opponents introduced polytheism, and turned them away from them as from the instigators of paganism." In fear of an imaginary Sabellianism, the conservative anti-Nicaeans became carelessly careless in their attitude towards the Arians. Shielding themselves from them with general and insufficiently clear anathemas, they tried to replace the "Nicene faith" with new definitions. Hence the "labyrinth of definitions of faith," as Socrates puts it. There is no need to follow the details of these disputes. It is enough to emphasize the main motives. First, in all the creeds of this time, a deliberate abstention from Nicene terminology is striking. Secondly, the main task is to reveal the doctrine of the difference and separation of hypostases; Already in the second Antiochian formula (341) there is the expression: three hypostases, to which the too weak one is contrasted: "one by agreement." As a result of a long and vague struggle, entangled by the violence of Caesars, cunning, duplicity and betrayal, it turned out that no Symbol other than the Nicene Creed could be sufficient to express and protect the authentic Orthodox faith. In this sense, St. Athanasius called the Nicene Creed "the writing of truth." He keenly foresaw that the strife and turmoil would not cease until the "anti-Nicaeans" came to their senses and said: "Arise, let us go to our fathers and say to them: 'We anathematize the Arian heresy and recognize the Council of Nicaea.' St. Athanasius clearly saw the danger of theological opposition to Nicene expressions. In the atmosphere of Arian temptations, under the guise of Sabellianism, it shook Orthodoxy. The old and old-fashioned theological systems proved ambiguous. A new and firm system could be built only on the foundation of Nicaea, that is, only on the basis of the concept of "consubstantiality," according to which it was necessary to reconstruct and adjust the entire logical composition of theology. And first of all, it was necessary to reveal the Nicene faith in its presuppositions and conclusions—this was the theological act of St. Athanasius. The great Cappadocians fulfilled what was not completed, and this was again connected with terminological innovation. The distinction between the concepts of "essence" and "hypostasis" and the precise definition of the hypostatic attributes and properties gave the system of Trinitarian theology completeness and flexibility.

By the mid-1860s, the careless and imprudent struggle against Nicene usage had prepared the way for an outward victory and a relapse of extreme Arianism. The outward sign of this victory was the so-called second Sirmium formula (357), "the blasphemy of Hosea and Potamius," as Hilary calls it. It was an imperious and audacious attempt to remove the issue from discussion and declare it settled. The whole force of this "Arian perfidy," inspired not by sincere dogmatic motives, but by the tactics of adaptation, is reduced to the prohibition of Nicene expressions, which are alien to the Scriptures, "incomprehensible to the people," and in general exceed the measure of human knowledge and understanding. The catholic teaching here is reduced to the confession of "two persons" (but not two Gods), whereby the Father is greater in honor, dignity, Divinity, and the very name of the Father, and the Son is subordinate to Him with all that the Father has subjected to Him. "However, this attempt to hush up the controversial issue turned out to be fruitless. The struggle soon flared up with a new acuteness. In 356, Aetius began to preach "anomaeism" ("unlikeness") in Alexandria and managed to form a circle of disciples there. Soon he moved to Antioch. His preaching was a significant success, which was consolidated by his disciple Eunomius. Aetius, in the words of Sozomenos, "was strong in the art of reasoning and experienced in verbal debate." "From morning to evening he sat at his studies," says St. Epiphanius of him, "trying to make definitions about God by means of geometry and figures." For him, dogmatics turned into a game and dialectics of concepts, and he boasted that "he knows God as well as you do not know yourself." Eunomius gave his dialectics logical rigor and completeness. Eunomius proceeded from the concepts of the Father as "infinitely the only God", "from one essence not transformed into three hypostases" and "having no partner in the Godhead". The basic and "essential" and at the same time positive definition of God is His unbegotten αγεννησια, and therefore the essence of God is absolutely incommunicable to anyone. Therefore, the "consubstantial" birth of the Son, the birth "from the essence" of the Father, is impossible, for this would mean the separation or dissolution of the simple and unchangeable. For the same reason, a triplicity of hypostases is impossible that would violate the oneness and uniqueness of God. Therefore the Son is "alien" and "unlike" to the Father—any comparison or comparability is incompatible with the uniqueness of the Father who surpasses all. The Son is a creature and did not exist before his origin. However, for Eunomius, the concepts of "birth" and "creation" coincide. The Son stands out from all creatures in that he is the direct creation of the Father, while all the others (including the Holy Spirit) are created indirectly through the Son. In view of this, the Son is similar to the Father "in preeminent likeness", just as a perfect work bears the image of the artist and is the image and seal of the Almighty energy or will... In the face of this revived strict Arianism, the shaky formulas of the opponents of the "Nicene faith" were at once exposed as unsuitable. Alarm began among the Orthodox part of the anti-Nicaeans. It was embodied, first of all, in the movement of the so-called "Omiusians", concentrated around Basil of Ancyra. The Omiusian doctrine was first expressed at the Council of Ancyra in 358. The Fathers of the Council of Ancyra declared that "they want to explain the faith of the Catholic Church as thoroughly as possible," but at the same time to introduce "something of their own" into its exposition. This new or own is reduced to the concept of kinship or kinship union of the Only-begotten and the Father (γνησια). It was a softened consubstantiality. Thus, the attention of the Ancyra Fathers is directed not to the emphasis on separation and difference, but to the revelation of community and unity. Emphasizing the mystery of sonship, Basil of Ancyra (he was apparently the sole author of the dogmatic "Epistle" of the Council of Ancyra) explains the difference between the "generative energy" of the Father and his "creative energy." In birth, not only the will and authority of the Father are manifested, but also His "essence." For birth, similarity in essence is essential: to be a father in general means to be the father of a "similar essence." On the other hand, Basil of Ancyra tries to substantiate the "hypostasis," i.e., the independent existence of the Divine Persons. By the name "hypostasis" attached to the name "person," the Omiccian theologians, according to their later explanation, wanted to express the "independence and really existing properties" of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, in order to avoid Sabellian modalism. Without complete clarity, the distinction between the concepts of "essence" and "hypostasis" is introduced here — "hypostasis" is understood as an "essence" thought from the point of view of its uniqueness. The "originality" of the Second Person is seen in His Sonship, in His birth from the Father. The unity of the Persons is denoted by the general name of "Spirit". On the whole, this theological scheme completely excludes the Arian way of thinking, although the Omiysians have weakened its meaning by anathematizing against "consubstantiality," understood, however, in the sense of the identity of the Father with the Son. In any case, the Anomie and the compromisers met with opposition and hostility to the Omian exposition of the Omian faith (the Third Sirmium Formula of 358). Under violence and pressure, the Omiusians agreed to replace the expression "subservient", ομοιουσιος with the ambiguous "similar in all things", ομοιος κατά παντα, although when signing the so-called "dated faith" Basil of Ancyra made a reservation about the meaning of "similarity in all things" – "that is, not only by willing, but also in hypostasis and being," and added an anathema to those who limit similarity to "one thing." In itself, this "dated faith" (the IV Sirmium formula of 359) repeated the previous expositions; but to it was added a special prohibition to use the name "essence" about God, which is not in the Scriptures and which gives rise to temptation among the people. At the Council of Constantinople in 361, the explanatory κατά παντα was omitted from the new exposition of the faith, and the birth of the Son was declared incomprehensible. The prohibition on the term ουσια was repeated, and a prohibition was added on the term: υποστασις. Thus, to the contrary, non-Orthodox groups bore witness to the Orthodox bias of the Omiusian formulas. Defenders of the Nicene faith gave them the same assessment. Exiled to the East for the struggle against Arianism in Gaul, Bishop Hilary of Pictavia saw a light in the darkness and a ray of hope in the appearance of the Omiusians and in the Council of Ancyra — "subservient" in his interpretation means the same as the Nicene "consubstantial" — the unity of the family, but not of persons. And St. Athanasius himself, in his work "On the Councils," admitted that "people like Basil (of Ancyra) should not be treated as enemies, but should be considered brothers, who differ from us only in one word, but think in the same way as we do." For the "subservient" vague and insufficient in itself, with the proviso of being born "of essence," is equivalent to "consubstantial" in the Nicene sense. The term "similar in all things" was found in St. Alexander, and St. Athanasius himself had previously pointed to "likeness" in explanation of "consubstantiality." This was not hindered by the philological awkwardness of the term "subservient"—in the proper sense, as Aristotle pointed out, "likeness" refers to the "qualities" or properties of objects, but not to "essence." With the unity of essence, it is not similarity that must be said, but identity. This was also pointed out by St. Athanasius. But in terms of meaning, with proper explanations, "subservient" is related to "consubstantial" in the same way as the recognition of the "same" essence to the recognition of "one" — in the first case, the moment of separation of the compared seems to be more sharply emphasized. At the Council of Alexandria in 362, held under the presidency of St. Athanasius, the question of the meaning of the concepts ουσια and υποστασις was again discussed. As a result of an intense analysis, it was recognized that one and the same Orthodox truth is confessed both by those who speak of "one hypostasis" in the sense of "one essence" and "identity of nature," and by those who teach of "three 'hypostases' but of "one principle," in order to express the knowledge of the Trinity, "not only in name, but truly existing and abiding." After the Council of Alexandria, the sayings "consubstantial" and even "of the essence of the Father" came into liturgical use in many churches of the East (in Laodicea, Antioch, Cappadocia, etc.). And at the same time, the distinction between the concepts and terms ουσια and υποστασις as general and particular is affirmed. In the substantiation and disclosure of this new usage lies the historical-dogmatic deed and feat of the great Cappadocians, "the trinity that glorified the Trinity." Since then, the formula "one essence and three hypostases" has been introduced and approved in general church use: μια ουσια, τρεις υποστασις. Unexpectedly, it took a lot of time and labor to prove to the West the legitimacy of this phrase, and its coincidence in meaning with the old Western one: tres personae. As St. Gregory the Theologian said, "the Westerners, because of the poverty of their language and the lack of names, cannot distinguish between essences and hypostases," equally denoting in Latin both as substantia. In the recognition of the three hypostases, the Westerners saw tritheism, the depiction of three essences or three gods. On the other hand, for the Easterners, and in particular for Basil the Great, there remained a dangerous ambiguity in the expression "three faces," both in Greek and Latin. The ancient world did not know the secret of personal existence. And in ancient languages there was no word that would accurately denote a person. The Greek προσωπον meant a mask rather than a face, and it bore the shadow of Sabellian. Therefore, Basil the Great considered it insufficient and dangerous to speak of "three persons" and not of "three hypostases" – for him it sounded too weak. And the same should be said about the Latin: pesrona. In the 70s, blg. Jerome in Antioch was jealous of the faith because of his unwillingness to confess the "three hypostases," and he, for his part, was frightened by this innovation about the "three substances," opposing it to the confession of one substance and three persons. But already in the V century, blg. Augustine objects to Cappadocian theology and seeks other paths.

По своему внутреннему смыслу богословские движения IV-го века имели христологический характер. Живым средоточием церковной мысли был двуединый образ Христа, как Богочеловека, как Слова Воплощенна. Раскрытие единосущия Слова-Сына со Отцом означало исповедание полноты Божества во Христе и было связало с пониманием Воплощения, как основного момента в искупительном деле Христа. Это соотношение и связь догматических истин со всей полнотой и ясностью раскрывается уже в богословской системе св. Афанасия. Отрицание «единосущия» разрушает действительност Искупления, действительность соединения и общения твари с Богом. С этой же точки зрения обсуждается и отвергается возникающее из того же арианского источника «духоборчество», — умаление или отрицание единосущия и полной или совершенной Божественности Духа Святого, — ибо Дух есть начало и сила освящения и обожения твари; и потому, если Он не есть Бог совершенный, то тщетно и недостаточно подаваемое Им освящение… Учение о Святом Духе становится предметом обсуждения с 50-х годов и получает строгое определение уже в творениях св. Афанасия, затем в постановлениях Александрийского собора 362 года и, наконец, у святых Каппадокийцев, в особенности у св. Григория Богослова… — Раскрытие учения о Божестве Слова, таким образом, предполагало ясные суждения о смысле воплощения. Но не сразу был поставлен и получил четкий ответ вопрос об oбразе соединения во Христе Божества и человечества. Этот ответ был дан только в Халкидонском вероопредлении (451 г.); и понадобилось еще более чем два века богословской работы и истолкования, чтобы оно было усвоено до конца. Поставлен «христологический» вопрос был, впрочем, уже в IV-ом веке, в связи с лжеучением Аполлинария Лаодикийского. Из «бесчисленных» сочинений Аполлинария до нашего времени сохранилось немногое: ряд отрывков и цитат в обличительных против него творениях и несколеко сочинений надписанных впоследствии, в целях сохранения, чужими именами, — св. Григория Чудотворца, папы Юлия… В первые годы своей деятельности Аполлинарий был ревностным защитником Никейской веры. Но уже до 362 года он начал высказывать свои христологические взгляды, по-видимому, в противовес учению Диодора Тарсского, стоявшего тогда во главе Антиохийской школы. Аполлинарий старался выяснить условия, при которых Воплощение Слова будет действительным соединением Божества и человечества в совершенном единстве личности Христа. Он не различал при этом «природу» и «ипостась», и потому во Христе находил не только единое лицо и ипостась, но и единую природу. «Бог и плоть составили единую природу, — сложную и составную». Ибо единство лица, по Аполлинарию, возможно только при единстве природы. «Из двух совершенных» не могло образоваться «совершенного единства». Если бы Бог соединился с совершенным (т. е. полным) человеком, состоящим из духа (ума), души и тела, то осталось бы неразрешенное двойство. Более точно, — если бы Слово восприняло ум человеческий, начало свободы и самоопределения, — казалось Аполлинарию, — то действительного соединения не получилось бы: оказалось бы два средоточия и два начала. И не была бы достигнута искупительная цель воплощения: умер бы не Бог, как человек, но некий человек. Кроме того, ум человеческий при сохранении его свободы и «самодвижности», не мог бы победить в душе закваски греха. Это возможно только для Божественного Ума. В виду этого Аполлинарий отрицал полноту или трехчастность человеческого существа в Воплотившемся Слове и утверждал, что «ум» не был воспринят в соединении и его место заняло само Слово, соединившееся с одушевленным телом. Совершилось воплощение, но не вочеловечение. Аполлинарий полагал, что одушевленное тело Христа неразрывно «сосуществилось» и «срослось» со Словом, которое стало в нем началом действия и постольку как бы перешло в новый образ существования, — «в единстве сложной воплощенной божественной природы», μια φυσις του Θεου Λογου σεσαρκωμενη. Аполлинарий имел много последователей. Борьба с его учением началась уже с Александрийского собора 362 года. К 70-ым годам относится сочинение неизвестного автора, «против Аполлинария» в двух книгах, помещаемое среди сочинений св. Афанасия. В то же время его резко осуждает св. Василий: И после ряда соборных осуждений аполлинаризм был отвергнут на Втором Вселенском Соборе. В противовес ему отцы IV-го века (и более всего св. Григорий Нисский и св. Григорий Богослов) раскрывали православное учение оединстве двух природ в одной ипостаси , о полноте воспринятого и тем спасенного человеческого состава во Христе: Христос, — один из двух … Этим было подготовлено позднейшее Халкидонское вероопределение. И при этом снова выдвинулся вопрос об определении понятий: надлежало различить и определить понятие «природы», «лица» и «ипостаси», и четко разъяснить смысл Богочеловческого единства. В IV-ом веке эта богословская работа только начинается. И обнаруживается в Антиохии крайность, противоположная аполлинаризму, — у Диодора Тарсского и Феодора Мопсуестского, опознанных впоследствии, как предшественники несторианства.

В богословских спорах развивается и крепнет верующее сознание. И апостольское предание веры раскрывается и опознается, как благодатная премудрость, как высшее любомудрие (или философия), — как разум истины и истина разума. Через умозрительное постижение и усвоение опыта веры преображается и претворяется самая стихия мысли. Вырабатывается новый строй понятий. И не случайно древние отцы с таким вниманием и настойчивостью занимались терминологическими вопросами. Они старались отыскать, и отчеканить, и утвердить «богоприличные» слова, которые точно и твердо выражали бы и ограждали истины веры. Это не была забота о словах, о пустых словах. Слово есть одеяние мысли. И словесная точность выражает отчетливость и твердость мысленного видения и познания. Отеческое богословие и стремилось к отчетливости умозрительного исповедания, — к закреплению живого предания Церкви в гибких формах богословского мировозрения. Эта богословская работа была трудной и бурной. В отеческом богословии раскрывается множественность типов и направлений. Но все они совпадают в своих основаниях, в едином опыте Церкви, — «вот тайны Церкви, вот предание отцов»…

2. Афанасий Александрийский.

I. Житие.

Святой Афанасий родился в Александрии в греческой христианской семье в последние годы III века, вероятно, в 293 году. В юности он был свидетелем Диоклетианова гонения. На изучение светских наук, на общее образование он, по выражению св. Григория Богослова, употребил «не много времени». Однако, он был достаточно знаком с античной философией и прежде всего с неоплатонизмом. Главное внимание он обратил на изучение Священного Писания, которое знал до тонкости. Может быть, он изучал его в Александрийской дидаскалии. Рано он был замечен св. Александром Александрийским, — жил в его доме, под его руководством получил воспитание у грамматиков и риторов и незадолго до начала арианских смут был рукоположен во диаконы и сделался секретарем епископа. Он сопровождал св. Александра в Никею и здесь «с дерзновением восстал против нечестия apиан». Вскоре после собора св. Александр скончался, по-видимому предуказав на Афанасия как на своего преемника. И «все множество жителей, все, принадлежащие к Кафолической Церкви, собравшиеся вместе и единодушно, как бы в одном теле вопияли, взывали, требуя во епископы Церкви Афанасия, и всенародно молили о сем Христа в продолжение многих дней и многих ночей». (Свидетельство Александрийского собора 339 г.). 8-го июля 326 года многочисленными епископами св. Афанасий был посвящен во епископа Александрийского.