It is very important to note here the following: assuming that we call God by His energies by an intelligent action, Gregory insists that these names are not simply created by our imagination, but properly correspond to something that really exists in God. In any case, each name denotes something special in God, "for if none of the names is understood in a special meaning, but they are all confused with each other through merging in meaning, then it would be an empty matter to use many names for one and the same object, while no difference essentially distinguishes some names from others" [47]. On the contrary, it is Eunomius who seeks to show that "there is no difference in meaning between different names" [48]. Names make it possible to identify certain concepts contemplated in the divine life [49], such as incorruptibility or beginninglessness; they bear witness to them, but do not create them; do not make the divine life incorruptible, but indicate that it is so [50]. Gregory here distinguishes between the object (ύποκείμενον), the concept (νόημα) and the name. "The fact that the Divine life is infinite in both senses," he says, "is inherent in the object, but to express, in one way or another, the concepts seen in the object depends only on the name by which the denoted concept is named... therefore the object remains as it is, above all name and concept; but the fact that it is not of a cause and will not ever turn into non-existence is signified by the invention of given names" [51]. By the multiplicity of names we try to embrace that which is above knowledge: "... for we designate by names only things that are knowable, but those that are above knowledge, they cannot be understood with the help of any that serve to designate names... and since it is impossible to find any suitable name for them capable of depicting the subject, we try, as far as possible, by numerous and different names, to reveal the divinatory concept (υπόνοιαν) that comes to us about God" [52]. And so here Gregory again seems to admit that names help us to discover the unknowable God. But names in themselves do not possess any reality, they are nothing more than signs [53]. Even the name God does not denote His essence, but one of His energies, as Gregory himself says about it: "And the very word God, we know, received its beginning from His edifying activity... and thus, having cognized from this a certain particular action of the Divine nature, we have not reached an understanding of the essence itself with the help of this word" [54].

As we have seen, Gregory often says, when reflecting on names and their application to God, that they are used "κατ επίνοιαν" - by invention. It is necessary to consider what exactly Gregory means by this expression. He himself puts it this way: "Invention (επίνοια) is the path (εφοδος) to the unknown of the searching mind, which, starting from the nearest, advances to the next, discovering the further with the help of the primary understanding of the proximate. Thus, having understood something relating to the object sought, and having reconciled by means of newly found concepts the subsequent with the beginning of what has been captured, we bring the desired operation to an end" [55]. The process of cognition, as we can see, takes place in many stages. St. Gregory places a very high value on that faculty of the mind, which ultimately ascends to God, for the Creator of the intellect is God. "It seems to me," he says, "that if anyone were to judge that invention is the most precious among all the good activities that our soul possesses by the gift of Divine Providence, then such a judgment would not be false" [56]. And he adds: "Where would all that is known about human life come to us, if the mind did not reason and discover each thing in a proper way? But the mind is God's creation. Consequently, everything that the mind gives is given by God" [57]. Nevertheless, Gregory insists, invention is incapable of grasping the incomprehensible and cognizing the Divine nature: "What is the essence itself, which has unborn existence, by its own nature, nothing in its name directs us to a clear vision of this. It would be unnatural if the invention of our thoughts were to have such power as to raise us above the measures of nature, to place us above the incomprehensible, and to enable us to comprehend by knowledge things which are inaccessible to our mental impulses. However, the fact that επίνοια is "the energy of our mind" [59] does not prevent us from using it piously, knowing God by His actions and giving Him κατ επίνοιαν, by invention, various names, which, however, do not express His ineffable nature [60]. Thus, for example, according to various inventions (κατα διαφόρους επινοίας), God is called Light, and Life, and the Incorruptible, and other similar names [61]. Gregory, therefore, evidently admits that our knowledge of God takes place (at least in part)

One could even say that Gregory of Nyssa considers in God, on the one hand, something incomprehensible and unapproachable (at least for any creature), and on the other hand, something comprehensible, which can be approached.

We would like to dwell on these differences in God in more detail. Gregory speaks of them with great clarity in his letter to Aulalius. There he uses (as well as in his other works) one expression which is very important for the understanding of his teaching, namely, concerning the Divine nature (τα περι την θειαν φύσιν) [62]. Thus, expounding his theological convictions concisely, in a few lines, Gregory writes: "But we, following what the Scriptures tell us, have learned that (the Divine nature) is unnameable and ineffable. And of any name, whether it be revealed through habitual use in human speech or transmitted through the Scriptures, we say that it explains what is revealed to the mind in relation to the Divine nature (των περι την θειαν φύσιν νοουμένων), but does not contain in itself the designation of nature itself" [63]. The above text reveals two points: a) there is a distinction between the divine nature and what surrounds it; b) this distinction is revealed by the action of the mind, but it is also confirmed by the Scriptures and, therefore, belongs to Tradition. And Gregory continues: "We find that by means of each name a certain external property is thought and expressed, which is appropriate to the Divine nature, but by no means signifies what nature is in essence" [64]. The impossibility of giving a name to the Divine nature follows, as Gregory believes, from its infinity: "Since we believe that the Divine nature is infinite and indescribable, we do not mentally attach any names to it, but declare that nature must necessarily be thought of in infinity. And that which is absolutely infinite cannot be limited by one thing and not limited by another, for the infinite inevitably escapes from all boundaries. Therefore that which is beyond all limitation cannot be confined to any name whatsoever. And then, in order that the concept of the infinite may remain constant in all that pertains to the divine nature, we say that the Divine is above every name, and that the "Godhead" is one of the names. Consequently, one and the same thing cannot be considered as a name and be above every name" [65]. "It has been proved," says Gregory, "that the name of the Godhead signifies energy, and not nature" [66]. The distinction that Gregory here establishes between the divine nature and energy is quite clear. The first is above every name, and the second can be named. And Gregory exclaims: "The name alone is indicative of the Divine nature: that amazement which fills our soul in the face of it" [67]. As for the expression of the Divine nature, Gregory says that everything that is contemplated near the Divinity has the same quality of immutability as the Divinity Itself: "It is to be believed, we think, that only that which is truly Divine, that which is eternal and infinite in being, and that everything that is contemplated near Him always exists in the same way, without increasing or decreasing in its reality." In the Homilies "On the Beatitudes" Gregory also speaks of what "is seen near the Divine nature" and that "exceeds the measure of human nature" [69]. This expression is undoubtedly familiar to Gregory, he uses it in his theological and spiritual works, and it certainly has a very definite meaning. He gives some explanations in the Great Catechetical Discourse. Discussing the purposes of creation, he says: "It was necessary that neither the light should remain invisible, nor the glory untestified, nor goodness without the one who enjoys it, nor everything else that is contemplated around the Divine nature, should not be inactive in the absence of one who would partake and eat" [70]. It should be noted that Gregory refers Glory and Light to that which is contemplated near the Divine nature.

How, then, is the question of the simplicity of the Divine nature raised in this teaching about God? After all, this question is one of the most important in the theological teaching of Gregory, and he constantly returns to it. This is a fundamental dogma of the Church, and, as we have seen above, it is recognized even by people with the most grounded minds. "But there is not and will not exist," he says, "in the Church of God such a teaching according to which it would be asserted that the simple and uncomplicated are not only manifold and diverse, but are also composed of opposites. The holy simplicity of the dogmas of truth asserts that God, such as He is, is elusive neither in name, nor in concept, nor in any other cognitive conceivation, that He is above not only human understanding, but also angelic and all supercosmic comprehension, remains inexplicable, and ineffable, and surpasses all meaning expressed in words, and has only one name that communicates the knowledge of His nature, - that He alone is above every name" [72]. This is one of the rare passages where Gregory seems to speak not of the simplicity of the divine nature, as he usually does, but of the simplicity of God. But since he speaks of God as He is, and ends by saying that the divine nature is above all name, the meaning seems to change little on closer examination. In general, as we shall see later, Gregory of Nyssa does not consider it necessary, while defending the simplicity of the divine nature, to deny any differences in God. On the contrary, he admits them, but strives to understand them, to interpret them, and, especially, to prove that they do not contradict the simplicity of His nature.

In order to clarify his understanding of the simplicity of the Divine nature, Gregory resorts to a comparison with the human soul, its many and varied abilities and manifestations, which, however, does not make it complex, although its actions are denoted by dissimilar names. And this is all the more true of God: "If the human mind loses nothing of its simplicity from the multitude of names we use when we speak of it, how could anyone think that God, whom we call wise, or righteous, or good, or eternal, or by any other name befitting God (unless a single meaning is implied by all these names)? from this will consist of many parts, or that from the assimilation of them He constitutes the perfection of His nature?" [73] Although, as Gregory asserts here, the divine names are given by man, they correspond to certain things that really exist in God, and different things at that. Nevertheless, it is also true that the human soul, in its weakness, cannot clearly see God's "unity in diversity," and it tends to lose sight of the simplicity of His nature: "The divine nature," writes Gregory, "whatever it may be in essence, is one; it is something simple, and uniform, and uncomplicated, and is in no way conceivable in any diverse multiplicity. But the human soul, rooted in the valley and immersed in this earthly life, since it cannot clearly examine what is sought, tries in a variety of ways, with the help of many concepts, to partially touch the inexplicable nature, without catching in any one concept the One Who is hidden" [74]. St. Gregory also insists that the "qualities" seen in God are not something acquired and to which He participates, but that He is what He possesses: "There is no lack of wisdom, power, or any other good in Him for whom the good is not acquired, but what it is, as it itself is, so is He by nature (καφό εστι τοιουτον πέφυκε), wherefore he who says that he distinguishes in the nature of the Godhead between lesser and greater essences, arranges everything in such a way, without noticing that the Godhead consists of parts unlike each other, so that we may think that the subject is something else, and that what he acquires is still different, and that He is in good by partaking of it, without being originally so." With this important text, which is directed against Eunomius' assertion that the Son is smaller than the Father, Gregory wants to show that it is precisely qualitative and, especially, quantitative differences that introduce a certain complexity into God. God is what He possesses, and we should think of Him as one. St. Gregory once again emphasizes this in the following text: "To desire good and to have what is desired, all are thought to be one and at the same time, if we are talking about a simple and omnipotent Nature." Likewise, the immutability of God is placed in relation to His simplicity: "God," says Gregory, "being one good, in His simple and uncomplicated nature is always turned to one and the same thing, and never changes by any impulses of His will, but always wills what He is, and undoubtedly is what He wills." And here again we see that simplicity is understood rather as the absence of contradictions and as the indivisibility of God. However, all these concepts are derived from the Divine essence and are contemplated in it. "What God-worthy concept does not refer to the very essence of the Son as a righteous, good, eternal being... Then who could say that one (some) good among others is acquired by the Divine essence, and not that everything that exists good originates from it and is contemplated in it" [75]. These concepts, however, differ from the Divine essence itself: "One (αλλο τι) is the concept of unbegottenness," Gregory asserts, "and the other is the meaning (λόγος) of the Divine essence" [76]. And each name means something different in God: "That which is designated belongs to each of these names" [77]. In another place of his polemic against Eunomius, Gregory speaks of "differences in qualities and properties, which are comprehended around the essence by the arguments of invention (τω λόγω της επινοίας) and which are other than the object" [78]. And he explains: "I am talking about the object itself, which is given the name of essence in the literal sense" [79]. True, here Gregory has in mind created things, "that which is seen around the body and soul" [80]. However, as we have seen, Gregory believes that the soul in its properties is an image of Divine simplicity and helps us to understand the latter; therefore, the above text does not lose its meaning even when applied to the divine essence. Be that as it may, Gregory shows that all these differences do not contradict the simplicity of the divine nature. "With these concepts we do not divide the object," he says, "but having believed that it is one, whatever it may be in essence, we have realized that the object of our thought is related to all these ideas" [81]. He understands Divine unity as the absence of contradictions: "Names do not struggle with each other, as is characteristic of the nature of opposites, when it is impossible, since one exists, to contemplate the other together with it" [82]. It is precisely difference in essence that is incompatible with simplicity: "Since the divine nature is simple and immutable, and rejects all difference in essence, it does not accept into itself, as long as it remains one, the meaning of multiplicity" (83). "For how could one suspect in the simple an admixture of the foreign? For that which is thought together with the other would cease to be simple" [84]. In another place, Gregory identifies the simple with the unchangeable: "That which is simple by nature does not consist of parts, and is uncomplicated," he says, "whatever it may be, is wholly so, not becoming different through any change from another, but abiding in eternity in what it is." And Eunomius "grafts on the essence of God each of the names (located) near the Divinity" [86]. Many times we see that Divine simplicity is understood by Gregory as the absence of contradictions in God: "If (the Eunomians) agree that (the Only-begotten) is simple, then how is it possible to contemplate in the simplicity of the object a confluence of opposites?" [87], as the Eunomians do, attributing to His divinity opposite properties, such as creation and uncreation. And Gregory remarks: "Such is the God of Eunomius, some kind of dual in nature or polysyllabic, divisible into himself, possessing a power not in accord with His power" [88]. As can be seen, complexity does not arise from the possession of power, but from the possession of contradictory forces. "For the simple by nature is not torn apart by opposite properties" [89]. And again: "Whoever is devoid of simplicity is evidently revealed to him the diverse and complex" [90]. Gregory, however, never says that divine simplicity could mean the absence of any ontological distinction or distinction in God. On the contrary, and we have already tried to show this, he admits such distinctions, not only between the divine nature and the Trinitarian hypostases, or between the hypostases themselves, but also between the divine nature and that which is around it, between nature and the energies, between the names that denote these energies and the ineffable essence. These are differences communicated to us through Scripture, or discovered in God by our imagination, visible only in part through the weakness of the human mind, but nevertheless they exist in God, or at any rate correspond to the divine reality, and in no way detract from the simplicity of the divine nature. Let's give a few more examples in order to clarify this issue.

St. Gregory often notes that what we distinguish in God - for example, that He is called Light - is not simply our construction, but corresponds to something that really exists in God. "We think," he says, "that the name light is not given to the divine nature without any meaning, but that it indicates some subject" [91] (the Father and the Son, in this case). And if this light is defined by various adjectives - of the Father we say the Unapproachable Light, of the Son the True Light - then this in no way detracts from the simplicity of the Divine essence, for these words do not express the Divine essence itself, but what is contemplated near it: "With these phrases the Scripture in no way violates simplicity, for the general and particular are not essence; Thus the combination of these words might indicate that the object is complex, but that self-essence remains what it is by nature, being what it is. And everyone who participates in the understanding will say that this refers to that which is thought or seen around the essence" [92]. In the same way, God's communication with man in the name of good does not make God a complex being: "God is not complex because He has the name of good in common with man. Consequently, it is clearly confessed that the other is the concept (λόγος) of the community, and the other is the concept of essence, but this, nevertheless, does not give rise to any complexity and multiplicity near the simple and non-quantitative nature, whether it is something contemplated and seen separately or something that has the meaning of the general" [93].

The concepts of Divine energy, or energies, occupy an even more important place in the theology of St. Gregory of Nyssa, like the expression near the Divine nature. Sometimes, following St. Basil the Great [94], he speaks of "the energy of God, which alone descends to us" [95] (distinguishing, of course, it from the Divine nature). On another occasion, speaking of the works of God, of which the prophets testify in the Scriptures, he clarifies, distinguishing between nature, power, and energy: "The prophetic word," he says, "has revealed to us in such sublime words a certain part of the divine energy, but the very power from which (the energy proceeds), not to mention the nature from which the power proceeds, it has not shown or named" [96]. In another place, Gregory clearly distinguishes between the energy of God and His essence: "Just as, having said that God is the Judge, we understand by the word judgment a certain energy near Him, and the word is directs thought to the subject itself, thereby clearly showing that it should not be assumed that the concept (λόγος) of being (του είναι) is the same as the concept of energy, in the same way, having said that He is the begotten or the unbegotten, we divide in our thought two statements, implying by the word there is a subject, and by the word begotten or unborn the belonging of the subject" [97]. The divine energies are many and varied, and it is according to these energies that we invent different names for God, but corresponding to something that really exists in God. The energies belong to nature,[98] and their multiplicity does not prevent the Son of God from being one in His unknowable nature (this is paramount to understanding what Gregory means by the concept of divine simplicity). Thus, Gregory says, borrowing a text from Eunomius, that "the Lord is in Himself what He is by nature, but, named collectively according to differences in actions, He does not have the same name in all cases, but enters into the name according to each concept produced in us by the action... for according to the difference in actions, as well as in relation to those to whom these actions are directed, it is possible to apply many names to the Son of God, Who is one in essence, like the wheat, which, being one, receives different names derived from various concepts about it" [99]. The disagreement between Eunomius and Gregory concerns, as it were, "the meaning of names," "whether they denote nature, or are they named after actions by means of invention" [100]. Gregory refutes Eunomius' slanderous accusation of St. Basil, who, according to Eunomius, identifies the essence and energy of the Only-begotten [101]. Gregory, on the contrary, asserts that the meaning (λόγος) of essence and energy are not the same, and that the two expressions are different. Here the real character of this distinction between essence and energy is very clearly expressed.

In the numerous quotations from St. Gregory that we have considered so far, the question of the simplicity of the nature and essence of God and the question of the energies in God have been treated by him rather on the intellectual plane. It would be interesting to study these questions from a spiritual point of view, both in the totality of his works and, in particular, in those where he writes about the spiritual life. However, it is not easy to draw a line between the intellectual and the spiritual in Gregory. In general, he disputes the efficacy of the intellectual method of knowing God by means of syllogisms, contrasting it with enlightenment by a ray of grace, which warms us, but does not allow us to comprehend the Incomprehensible: "(The Eunomians), seeing that the Divine power enlightens souls by the ways of Providence and miracles in creation, flowing like a ray and warmth from the nature of the sun, do not, however, admire grace and do not revere Him Who is meant by all this, but, stretching beyond what the soul can contain, they seize the sophisms of the Inviolable One and think to hold Him by syllogisms" [103]. Grace for Gregory (by the way, he says the same about energy [104]) is the Divine power that descends to us; it is a manifestation of God, Who, out of love for people, conforms to our weakness; it is the Manifestation of Light, in which, however, the Divine nature remains unknowable and incommunicable. This is not only an invention by which we ascend to God, but also the descent of God to us. Gregory often speaks about this in the traditional language of patristic and Byzantine mysticism. Here are a few examples. "We affirm that love for mankind is the reason why God allows communion with man. Inasmuch as it is impossible for him who is by nature small to rise above his own measure and to touch the height of nature superior to us, so He Himself, inclining to us, as far as we can contain, His loving power, thus distributes the grace that proceeds from Him" [105]. And Gregory cites the example of the sun, whose rays and heat are tempered by the air, while the luminary itself remains by its nature unapproachable to us because of our weakness[106]. In the same way, the unapproachable Divine power descends to us in the Manifestations of God, and we perceive it in the ways of Divine Providence: "Thus the Divine power..., which infinitely surpasses our nature and is inaccessible to any communion (μετουσίαν), bestows upon human nature only that which it is able to receive, like a compassionate mother repeating with her child his senseless babbling. For this reason, appearing to people in various ways, the Divine power takes on a form accessible to man and speaks in an intelligible language, in order to direct our infant life with all these manifestations commensurate with us and allow it to lightly touch the Divine nature by the ways of Divine Providence" [107]. As we see from all these examples, it is a question of the Divine power that descends to us, conforms to our weakness so that we can receive it, and allows us to touch lightly the unapproachable Divine nature.

St. Gregory here speaks of grace as a Divine manifestation. In another place he speaks of light as one of the names of God attested to by the Scriptures. He calls it by its name, in order to make it clear that the name is not applied to the divine nature itself. "Moses, who saw God in the light," he writes, "and John, who called Him the true Light, also Paul, who was all illumined with light at the first Theophany, and then heard voices from the light, saying, 'I am Jesus, Whom you persecute,' are not enough to bear witness?" [108]. Gregory also speaks of the ineffable and pre-eternal glory of the Only-begotten God and is indignant at the Eunomians, who considered it created. "They are impious," he declares, "for, belittling as far as possible the ineffable glory of the Only-begotten God, they place Him on a par with the creature [109]... They are not able to cite the voice of even one saint who would suggest contemplating the eternal glory of the Only-begotten God together with the enslaved creature" [110]. This is obvious, for there can be nothing created in that which is contemplated in God: "It is evident to all without exception that God has in Himself nothing created or brought in from without, neither power, nor wisdom, nor light, nor life, nor truth, nor anything in general that is contemplated in the fullness of the Divine bosom (and all this is the Only-begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father). Thus, it is in no way possible to properly apply the name of the creature to anything that is seen in God" [111]. And Gregory returns to his thought about the difference between the divine nature and that which is around it, considering the first and the second in connection with the degree of their cognizability: "Prophecy says that the greatness of God has no bounds, and preaches quite definitely that there is no limit to the splendor of the glory of His holiness. And if that which surrounds him is infinite, how much more is He Himself in His essence, whoever He may be, in no way grasped by any definition" [112]. It should be noted that here Gregory refers Divine glory to that which is near the Divine nature. When he says that it does not belong to the category of the created, it must be borne in mind that for Gregory the greatest of all the differences that can exist is precisely the difference between the created and the uncreated, as he himself asserts: "The most important division in everything that exists is the gap between the uncreated and the created. The first is the cause of everything that comes into being, and the second takes its origin from the first" [113]. And there is nothing intermediate between the uncreated and the created: "Reason does not know anything intermediate between the two, so that it would be possible to assume, on the border, some newly appeared quality, located between the created and uncreated natures and partaking of both, without being completely neither one nor the other" [114]. And, speaking of God, Gregory uses the expression Uncreated Force (ακτίστου δυνάμεως) [115].

In his treatise On the Holy Spirit, Gregory of Nyssa develops in more detail his doctrine of grace and glory as trinitarian energies common to the three Hypostases, distinct from the Divine nature and belonging to what Gregory usually designates by the expression of the Divine nature. "Scripture teaches," he says, for example, "that faith in the name of the Father, Who gives life to all things, precedes ... that life-giving grace, having in Him its origin (αφορμηθεισαν) and giving birth as from a fountain to life through the Only-begotten Son, Who is true Life, by the works of the Spirit may make perfect those who are vouchsafed it" [116]. This is the Trinitarian movement directed towards people: "Grace pouring out inseparably from the Father through the Son and the Spirit upon the worthy" [117]. And, recalling John 17:15 about the glorification of the Son by the Father Himself, Gregory speaks of the circular glory of the Holy Trinity: "Do you see the circular movement of glory? The Son is glorified by the Spirit; The Father is glorified by the Son. Once again, the Son is glorified by the Father, and the Only-begotten becomes the glory of the Spirit. For with what will the Father be glorified, if not by the true glory of the Only-begotten? In what will the Son be glorified again, if not in the greatness of the Spirit? Thus, according to the Scriptures, the Son is glorified by the Spirit, and by the Son the Father, as in a certain circle" [118]. Nevertheless, this glory is only that which is seen around the divine nature, while it itself remains invisible and unapproachable. St. Gregory puts it very clearly: "(The Prophet) did not praise nature. How could he praise what he does not know? But he glorified something of what is seen around it [119]... Do you see how the prophet quenched his amazement at the things contemplated near the Divine nature? But for thoughts there remains invisible and inaccessible what it is, the Divine and blessed Power, which has left far below itself, even farther than our bodies are removed from the stars, all curiosity of the mind, every power of the word, every movement of the heart and sensual impulses" [120]. This distinction, which Gregory draws between what can be seen around the Divine nature (grace, glory, etc.) and the unapproachable Divine nature itself, does not violate the unity of God precisely because His trinitarian power is one. "Not dividing faith into a multitude of powers and deities, but believing in one power, one good, one life-giving power, in one Godhead, in one life" [121] – this is how he formulates his theological position. And in the following words he briefly expounds the antinomy of the visible and the invisible in God: "The invisible by nature becomes visible through energy, is contemplated in certain things around Him" [122]. In the language of inner experience, Gregory says this: "Purity, holiness, simplicity, all these rays of the Divine nature, through which God is seen" [123]. However, there are two ways of seeing God: the intellectual way, which seeks to know His nature, which is impossible, and the other way, mystical, the only suitable one: to unite with Him. "Since the promise to see God has a double meaning," writes St. Gregory in his Homilies "On the Beatitudes," "one consists in knowing nature, which surpasses all, and the other in mingling with Him in the purity of life, the first way of understanding is declared impossible by the voice of the saints, and the second is promised to human nature by the present commandment of the Lord Himself, Who said: Blessed are the pure in heart, for they see God" [124]. In this way, the distinction between the knowable and the unknowable in God is overcome, as it were, by mystical union with Him. This is deification by grace, when "man goes beyond the limits of his nature, becoming immortal from mortal, from perishable to incorruptible, from the essence of transient life to immortal creation, and, to say everything as it is, from man becoming God" [125]. Or, as he expresses himself in the same Homilies "On the Beatitudes": "... Does not the Word also call you to become God, as created by the attributes of the Godhead?" [126]. By mentioning here the Divine attributes, Gregory, as it seems to us, indicates that deification is not performed by nature. And the sorrow that we do not know God by nature remains in us, although we are comforted abundantly according to the promise given to us by the Lord: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted" [127].

However, the distinction between the divine nature and its energies is set forth with particular clarity by Gregory in the Commentaries on the Song of Songs, and in particular in the eleventh discourse, on the Bridegroom and His hand, and in this place the realism of these differences is most revealed. Thus, after mentioning that it is no longer the voice of the Bridegroom that strikes the heart of the bride, but the Divine hand itself, which has penetrated through the hole into the house,[128] Gregory draws attention to the fact that the hand is not the Bridegroom Himself, although it belongs to Him: [the well] "into which the Bridegroom Himself could not enter, and His hand could hardly be contained, so that with it He only penetrated and touched the one who desired to see the Bridegroom, and from this the bride gained only this benefit, that in the hand that touched she recognized the hand of the Beloved" [129]. Further, Gregory explains (according to the expression of St. Basil, which, as we have already seen, he likes to use) that the hand symbolizes the Divine grace descending to us: "The soul, having set in motion all the powers of the intellect and all its capacity for conceptual investigation, and striving to comprehend what is sought, finds that the limit of the knowledge of God is only one energy, which descends to us and is felt by our life" [131]. What seems most striking to us in this passage is the double movement that brings us into communion with God: the Divine condescension, the energy that descends to us, and our life (more than our imagination: it seems to lead to nothing special), which enables us to feel this condescension of the divine energy. St. Gregory returns once again to this theme, stressing that God is known only by His actions: "When the soul rises from below to the knowledge of that which surpasses us, it comprehends the wonders of His energies and cannot then advance further by the forces of its intellectual curiosity, but admires and worships the Eternal, Who is known only in His actions (δι ων ένεργει)" [132]. It should be noted, however, that in this text, as in the following, the word energy acquires a slightly different meaning. It is no longer a manifestation of His Divinity that unites us with God, but rather His creative power that allows us to know that He exists. "The soul, seeing all this and everything else in which the Divine energy is manifested, mentally admiring everything visible, by analogy reasonably concludes that He Who is understood by His works exists" [133]. Thus, understanding here the knowledge of God by His energies as the knowledge of the Creator by His works, Gregory admits that such an incomplete and indirect knowledge of God comes from our weakness and is characteristic of earthly existence, but that in the future life one can hope for another, higher knowledge of God; such a statement would seem to contradict his other writings, in which he speaks of the utter unknowability of God according to His essence or nature, even in the age to come, even to Angels and all other creatures. Thus, he says: "Perhaps in the age to come... and when we pass into the other world... then we will no longer know the nature of the Good in part and not by His works, as we do now, and we will comprehend that which surpasses reason, not through the energy that creates the visible, but in a completely different way we will comprehend the kind of ineffable Blessedness, and the way of enjoying it will be different, such as cannot now arise in the heart of man" [135].

According to St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the coming age only knowledge by analogy will be perfected. We will then have a different, more direct way of knowing God. But for the time being, be that as it may, we have no other way of knowing God than through His energies, symbolized by the hand: "In any case," he says, "now for the soul the limit of ineffable knowledge is the energy that manifests itself in existing things. And we understood that it is allegorically called a hand" [136]. Explaining this limitation by our weakness, Gregory again insists on the difference between the Bridegroom and the hand: "A pure soul... who intended to receive the Bridegroom Himself, who had fully entered the house, was satisfied for the time being with the fact that she saw only His hand, in which we understand His active power... for human poverty is incapable of containing boundless and incomprehensible nature" [137]. It seems that we are talking here more about mystical experience than about knowledge by analogy. However, Gregory offers another explanation of what the hand means: it symbolizes the grace of the Gospel and the miracles of the Incarnate Word, through which the divinity of Christ manifested itself, "since by the hand we understand His miraculous power" (138). He finds that all these designations are spiritually beneficial, for "one presupposes that the Divine nature, completely incomprehensible, is known by energy alone, and the second speaks of the foreshadowing of the grace of the Gospel" [139].

We could quote St. Gregory of Nyssa for a long time, explaining his teaching about God in general and about the simplicity of the Divine nature and the differences in God in particular, but we will confine ourselves to what has been stated above, so as not to stretch our report immensely. What has been said is probably enough for some conclusions and conclusions. And, first of all, about the simplicity of the Divine nature. We must try to understand what Gregory means by this expression. As we have already seen, he often resorts to it, attaching to it meanings that are not always identical, but they, in our opinion, do not contradict each other, but rather complement each other. Thus, he opposes simplicity to complexity, that is, to something that consists of parts that together make up a certain whole, and which, due to its multiplicity of components, is subject to disintegration. The divine nature, on the contrary, is simple, does not contain parts and, therefore, is indissoluble, cannot be subject to decomposition. It is also simple as having no form, no image expressing it, and thus limiting it. In this case, simplicity is understood as infinity. We see that Gregory often identifies the simplicity of the Divine nature with its infinity, with the absence of any spatial or temporal boundaries in it, with its eternity. All this fundamentally distinguishes the Divine nature from all created things. Sometimes Gregory understands the simplicity of the divine nature as its unity, that is, that it cannot contain any internal contradictions that would fragment its wholeness and, consequently, its simplicity. For this reason it is impossible to ascribe to the Divine nature any contradictory qualities, and Gregory exerts great diligence to prove that what we distinguish in God is not contradictory, but complementary. Simplicity also means that God has no acquired attributes, but that He is what He possesses. Let us add to this that in the writings of St. Gregory we do not find such a concept of Divine simplicity as the absence of any ontological differences. This idea, so close to Latin medieval scholasticism, is alien to St. Gregory of Nyssa.