But this is precisely where the difficulty is encountered. If everything exists in ideas co-eternal with God and in God Himself, and is even nothing but a manifestation of eternal ideas and an eternal God, then everything must be eternal from this point of view. However, the form of its temporal existence seems to be completely inconsistent with the idea of the eternal existence of the world in God. Let the world exist in one way or another from all eternity in the divine mind, let there be no place for the "nothing" out of which, according to some, the world must be created, either in God or outside of God, and let the world be a manifestation of the divine mind itself. But the present form of the accidental existence of the world had a beginning and will have an end, therefore, "it was when there was not" all created things in the form in which they appear now. In this sense, it can be said that everything was created out of nothing, although at the same time everything was always in the Word. How, then, can we reconcile the eternity of the world and its creation in this sense? The eternal can have neither beginning nor end in any respect, and that which has a beginning and an end is no longer eternal. Meanwhile, the world is both eternal in the divine mind, and at the same time it is temporary.

Asking the essentially insoluble question how eternal creative ideas could be transformed, so to speak, into a finite world, while at the same time being a phenomenon in the inner life of the Godhead, Erigena understandably does not solve it; He both begins and ends his discourse with a simple statement of the fact that the finite world really exists as created, being eternal in ideas, however persistently the question haunts him: how can this be understood? and however important this question may seem to him, above which there is no need for students of truth to seek any other question. In order not to be accused of negligence, he does not refuse to try to consider it. But the attempt acquires the significance only of a more vivid formulation of the question, leading in the end to the recognition of the insolubility of the antinomy it represents. The philosopher has in mind, as he himself says, a special goal, namely, to affirm in particular the first half of the antinomy that everything is in God and even is God.

On the basis of reason and authority, the Holy Scriptures. Scriptures and Augustine, as well as Dionysius, and first of all the fact is established that everything is eternal in the Word, or even is the Word itself. Nothing can be assimilated to God as an accident, and therefore the creation of the world is for Him an eternal act; He does not precede creation temporarily, but only as a cause; therefore, all things are eternal for Him and in Him[749]. The Apostle says that in God "we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts 17:28), i.e., insofar as in Him are found the eternal ideas of our being, which do not differ from this being. In the words of Augustine, in the constitution of the Word, all things are "not created, but eternal"—in Him all things are unchangeable, and all things are one—"otherwise there exists under Him that which is created through Him, otherwise there exists in Him that which is Himself," not because the two are different, according to Erigena, but because the same nature of things is otherwise contemplated in the eternity of the Word. otherwise in the temporality of the world[751]. In the words of Dionysius, the One or God is everything and contains and embraces everything in Himself in advance[752].

But, on the other hand, the Scriptures say that everything came into being, created through the Word (John 1:3; Col. 1:16). "Containing in Himself from eternity the causes (or ideas) of what has happened, God, according to Maximus, produced from them from non-existent things a visible and invisible creature" [754].

Thus, everything is eternal in the Logos, and everything is created. But how to reconcile the two? [755]

In order to clarify the question, the philosopher turns to the concept of the Logos, which is the Word, the rational foundation, and the cause of everything. One and the same Logos is also the unity of all, in so far as everything exists in Him in an inseparable unity, and at the same time He contains in Himself the multiplicity of all created things. Considered on the one hand, He is unity (simplex), considered on the other, multiplex. Dionysius says that the Perfect, God, without any limitation, extends into everything, and that everything that exists exists by participation in the divine being, for "being for everything is the Divinity that transcends [all] being"; that Divine Providence (πρόνοια) is the cause of all being, and proceeds into everything, and is in everything, and embraces everything; that the Author of all things, through the abundance of goodness, appears in everything, as if coming out of Himself; that the Divinity of Jesus fills and embraces the parts of the universe[756].

Thus the Word, or the Wisdom of the Father, is also the eternal creative cause of all things, and at the same time creates Himself in all created things, so that the creature, considered in itself, is nothing, as Augustine says; in other words, one and the same divine nature of the Logos is the common, so to speak, substratum both for the second form of being, ideas, and for the third, the finite world. And what is said of the Cause may also be said of its effects: since the Cause itself, which is manifested in everything, is eternal and created, all things may be called both eternal and created.

But not only is the question not solved by all these considerations, but, on the contrary, it is even more difficult to solve when it is asserted, on the basis of the authority of Dionysius, not only that everything is eternal in God, but also that God Himself is manifested in everything, a proposition "unheard of and unknown to many and almost everyone," which will seem strange even to those who are considered wise. In order to explain and prove the possibility of such a conception, Erigena goes on to refer to an example borrowed from arithmetic as the science of numbers, but "not those which we count, but by which we count," and which are not found in any subject, "having themselves as their substance," i.e., as the science of objective laws which underlie the function of counting, and which have meaning independently of any substratum. on which they are carried out[759].

Unity, or the idea of unity, according to Erigene, as an objective "monad", presupposes and in itself includes multiplicity. Just as multiplicity is inconceivable without unity, so unity is always the unity of something many united. In the monad, therefore, all numbers exist from eternity. The eternal existence of numbers and their objective significance is proved by the fact that "in the number 6 the Creator did all His works" and distributed everything that exists in time, and times themselves, and that which is above time, and that God created everything by measure, number, and weight. Existing eternally in their essence in the monad and possessing the potential to reveal themselves, the laws of number are manifested in the function of numbering inherent in the human spirit and in the multiplicity of material objects to be numbered, which is revealed to the external sense of man. In so far as numbers, having themselves an eternal objective meaning, i.e., existing in the divine mind, reveal themselves at the same time, in one way or another, to the human spirit, they can be called both eternal and created. Thus, they are recognized as created, since they manifest themselves for human consciousness.

For Erigena, this is actually more than a simple example. In discussing numbers, he solves the question of the relation of the many in general to the One, and of the origin of the former from the latter, in the sense that the many have always existed in the One as eternal, and in the conditions of temporal existence it is revealed only to the consciousness of finite beings. Remarking that by "monad" he does not mean the Absolute itself, but the "created monad," i.e., the idea of unity existing in the Absolute, he goes on to say that the numbers which have been in it since eternity, when they are manifested even in sensible objects, do not borrow matter for their manifestation from without, but from themselves, and discusses in general the possibility of a purely spiritual being assuming sensible forms when they are discovered. and the question of this does not bother the philosopher, since he resolves all material existence into spiritual elements, as will be said later.

In spite of all these explanations, however, in spite of the student's amazement at the discourse on the Logos, and especially on the teacher's mathematical contemplations, the main question still remains unclear. It is not clear how one and the same thing can be both eternal in the divine Word, and created, manifested in time; for that which existed in the Word as eternal does not cease to be in Him even when it is manifested in time, as Ev. John: All things were there, and without Him nothing was (John 1:3), i.e. everything came through the Word, and at the same time nothing exists outside the Word (χωρίς)[764]. It remains to admit that all reason is powerless to solve it, and that it is above all intellect, even that of the angels, and only to believe that everything that exists in time and from eternity exists in Him who creates time itself, and at the same time is created.

"It surprises me and even makes me agitated," the teacher finally replies to the constantly repeated question, "how can you reconcile with reason the proposition of the eternity and creation of everything, why do you seek a rational foundation for that in relation to which all reason is powerless, or a clear understanding of that which is above all reason? Do you think that the intent of divine wisdom can be clear to human or angelic minds when you read that the mysterious animals (seen by the prophet and signifying seraphim, Isaiah 6:2)

f. From the firstfruits of spiritual creation to the last worm, knowing that the faculties of their nature are not sufficient to comprehend it, why do we, who are still under the burden of the flesh, try to point out a rational basis for divine providence and action? Here we must think only of the divine will, which acts in everything as it wills, because it is omnipotent, and puts into nature hidden and unsearchable foundations, since it is itself the foundation of everything; Nothing is more hidden than it, nothing is so manifest as it is, it is difficult [to understand it] where it is, it is difficult where it is not, the ineffable light that is always present with the mental eyes of all beings, although in itself it is not known by any mind, is spread to infinity in everything, and is all in all, and nothing in nothing." "Let us believe," it is further said, "contemplating and with the eye of the mind, as far as it is granted, that all things visible and invisible, eternal and temporal, and eternity itself, and time, and places, and spaces, and everything that is called as substance or accident, generally speaking, everything that only contains the totality of all nature, — in the only-begotten Word of God, both eternal and created, and neither eternity here precedes creation, nor the creation of eternity, since the eternity of all things named is created, and the creation is eternal in the foundation of the Word; for all that seems to come into being through birth in the order of ages in times and places, from eternity was created together and once in the Word of the Lord." And with regard to phenomena occurring in time, it is impossible to give an account of why they occur in this way and not in another, in this order and not in another. Who, then, can comprehend the eternal creation of all things in the Word? One can only point out the reasons why everything must be recognized as both eternal and created, but this antinomy cannot be resolved.

The basic point of view, however, is fully maintained, and only the position is more firmly established: not only does everything exist in God, but there is even God Himself. To the above references to Dionysius are added new references partly to him,[767] partly to Maximus and Basil the Great, also to St. Scripture, and then especially the arguments of reason.