The most outstanding wrestler at this time was Sophronius of Jerusalem. In spite of his extreme caution and the resulting verbosity, which is quite indifferent, he strikes several blows at Monothelitism so well-aimed that all the structures of the opposing party fall apart. The Synodikon of Sophronius of Jerusalem was of great importance in the history of this dogmatic movement. It came from the pen of a man who understood the state of affairs. The Patriarch of Antioch was absent at that time, the other two – Constantinople and Alexandria – were against the Orthodox exposition of Sophronius. The slightest mistake on the part of Sophronius could lead to the fact that he would be accused of non-Orthodoxy. Consequently, he had to conduct the matter in such a way that the most captious critics could not find fault. As is well known, the novella of Emperor Justinian produced the result unfavorable for theology, that those writings of Cyril of Alexandria, which were not declared exemplary by the Council of Chalcedon, entered into Christian dogmatics. For example, ενωσις [καθ' ύπόστασιν] was no longer the only expression, but was supplemented by ενωσις φυσική. Thus, in addition to the exact dogma of two natures [united in hypostasis], it was necessary to reckon with such a formula as the one indicated. From this it is clear that the omission of any of these formulas, so pleasing to the Monophysites, could lead to accusations of non-Orthodoxy. Sophronius pointed out that in every nature there is a moment of activity, and from this he deduced that each nature, by virtue of its nature, necessarily acts. Thus the question of energies was firmly posed, and all the dangerous points of the doctrine of the two wills were avoided. Sergius could not stand on the dogmatic field against such an opponent as Sophronius, especially since soon Sophronius was elected to the Jerusalem cathedra. But in any case, as a politician, Sergius conducted his business excellently. The epistle of Sophronius did not produce a proper effect in the West precisely because Sergius knew how to take advantage of circumstances and conducted his work extremely skillfully.

Sergius appears with a rather colorless physiognomy, but still definite: little productive in the theological sense, an adherent of patristic traditions, although he apparently seemed not to take part in the movement, he nevertheless understood perfectly well where he was going. Taking his own step towards union with the Monophysites, he did it so skillfully that it seemed as if it was not Sergius who was doing it, but others; In fact, it constituted the hidden center around which the whole work of the union revolved. He seems to be neutral; He cautiously keeps silent about his own steps in the dispute that has begun. According to his epistle, the question of one action arose in the conversation between the emperor and Paul quite accidentally. Sergius himself not only does not introduce μία ενέργεια, but also does not pretend to forbid it. But it is not difficult to see that in reality he holds the dogmatic scales crookedly. He assumes as indubitable that the unity of the will is the same as the unity of the actor. Thus, action, in his opinion, is connected not with the concept of nature, but with the concept of hypostasis. Of one action Sergius says that it is mentioned in some of the Fathers; two actions are not mentioned in any of them. Further, "one action" sounds scary to some, and "two actions" seduces many. The first is all the more inconvenient because it leads the inexperienced into doubts, in essence – in the opinion of Sergius – unfounded; the second leads, as an inevitable consequence, to the recognition of two wills, which from his point of view is impious. This is the dogmatic side of the matter. But next to it there is also a side – so to speak – diplomatic, the attitude towards Honorius as to the bishop of Rome, and here Sergius showed himself to be an expert in the matter. He understood that it was very important for him to win over Honorius of Rome, eo ipso, and all the Western bishops. In this case, Constantinople knew how to be blind, they thought that if a certain definition was signed by the bishop of Rome, then the entire Western Church agreed; In fact, it was not so. And Sergius won a brilliant victory on this basis.

The most pitiful figure among the leaders of this time is Honorius, the Pope of Rome. In consequence of the miserable state of education in Rome, Honorius stood head and shoulders above his contemporaries in education, for which he enjoyed the greatest respect from them. In his funeral orations he was praised with such praise that one could think that the Roman Church in his person had lost a universal luminary no less important than Athanasius. Meanwhile, Sergius managed to carry it out in such a way that he loudly announced those subtle logical strokes and hints that were in the epistle of Sergius. But all the indications and expressions that Sergius made in his epistle were appreciated not by Honorius himself, but thanks to the same Sergius. How little consciousness there was in his writing is evident from the attitude of the Roman clergy to the appearance of the έξθεσις'a, which was only excerpts from the Epistle of Sergius. The Roman clergy were heavily armed against this document, which represented only a part of the epistle which had been approved in its entirety by Pope Honorius. The matter came to such curiosities that a person was brought out who allegedly helped Honorius to compose the epistle, which could hardly have been. How little consciousness there was in the actions of Honorius and therefore the right to leadership in the affairs of the Eastern Church is also confirmed by the anathema placed on him by the Sixth Ecumenical Council. Such a blunder on the part of Honorius, of course, is not favorable to the glory of Peter's cathedra.

Honorius' reply to Sergius is a subject of study for Catholic scholars of all times and nationalities. Cardinal Hergenröther, in his ecclesiastical history, in two pages of the dense corpus Lexicon-Octavo, enumerating only the most important things on this question, counts up to 16 scholars who decide the question against it, and up to 82 who defend this epistle in works of more or less special importance. Interest was especially revived in 1870, when the question of papal infallibility was being decided, and when it was natural to undertake a revision of this epistle, for it was a thorn for the historical recognition of the popes as infallible. Outstanding writers on this question: for Honorius, the Italian Pennacchi, a Roman professor, against Honorius, the German Hefele, Bishop Gregory. Rottenburg, followed by Rackgaber.

The results of the research were as follows. 1) Up to 14 scholars solved the matter in the most radical way: they assumed that the Epistle of Honorius and the Acts of the Sixth Ecumenical Council were interpolated. The view is undoubtedly wrong. There is no doubt that the acts of the council were presented to the legates of Rome, and if they checked the translations and found them correct, then there can be no question of inventing them; and attention was also drawn to the epistle of Honorius in connection with the affair of Maximus the Confessor, so that the legates must have come to the council of 680-1 already prepared for this question, and if in 680-1 there were no objections from the legates, it follows that at that time they were quite impossible. If interpolation is assumed, then it is necessary to assume such in all monuments. Thus, it is not necessary to deny the accusatory documents, but to explain them in some way in order to apologize to the Pope. The question of inauthenticity is a corroded weapon: both the message and the acts are undoubtedly genuine. In order to save the pope's cause, scholars, while agreeing with the fact that Honorius was condemned by the Sixth Ecumenical Council, suggest that the council made an error of facti here: the pope should have been condemned if he had really said what is attributed to him, but the council misunderstood him. (2) In order to excuse the Pope completely, many others say that Honorius, in sending the epistle, as a wise shepherd, did so out of calculations of oikonomia, wishing to extinguish the dispute at the very beginning. But oikonomia, it must be said, was bad! The fact is that when the question was raised, it cannot be considered not posed. Nor does Honorius himself deny this; he gives his decision by taking the wrong side and, moreover, even ridicules the Orthodox side. But ridiculing those who are right is a poor means of appeasement. The conclusion from this is that the pope was really mistaken. (3) But, say others, if the Pope was mistaken, he did not write ex cathedra. In this case, of course, the fall of Honorius will not contradict the Vatican dogma. But the question arises: when else could the Pope write ex cathedra, if not when half the Church turns to him for a solution not of a personal, but of a dogmatic one? (4) Sensing the weakness of this explanation, still others try to soften the harshness of the expressions of Honorius' epistle. It is said that his second epistle does not contain such strong expressions as in the first. But, after all, in the second epistle he does not renounce his former opinions; and the only good thing about it is that there are quotes from the tomos of Leo. But the pope, of course, never denied the entire epistle of Leo, even when he wrote the first epistle. (5) The fifth say that Honorius took the question in a wrong formulation. It is true that Sergius posed the question slyly. But what was Honorius and the pope, if he could not distinguish between Orthodox and heretical teaching? Why did he not give him the right light and then the same solution? 6) Suppose, say the defenders of Honorius, that he allowed the expression heretical εν θέλημα; but he combined with this expression a correct thought, for he recognized two natures in Christ. Honorius did not deny the two actions in Christ, nor did he renounce the expressions of Leo V. Thus his whole fault was that he allowed the expression εν θέλημα. But once it is admitted that Honorius drew a wrong conclusion from correct premises, there can be no justification: neither Sergius nor Cyrus are any more heretics than the pope, because every heresy is precisely an incorrect conclusion from some correct foundations, and a heresy with false premises would be in history truly a miracle of miracles.

It is also pleasant to find in Catholic literature a sober view (Ruckgaber) in the solution of the question of Orthodoxy [113]. Pope Honorius did not renounce the tomos of Leo V., but he did not follow it in all its breadth; on the contrary, he wanted to correct it, as it were. He seems to deliberately avoid the use of the word "person" and substitute "conjunctio utriusque naturae", so that the reader with a Monophysite tendency could be inclined to recognize only a "single complex nature". While Leo V. acknowledges that the God-man-Christ is one, but that one side of Him shines with miracles and the other is humiliated, and thus distinguishes between one hypostasis and two natures, Honorius speaks of the unity of the divine-human life in Christ in such a way that God the Word is the bearer of all manifestations, both divine and human, not only as principium quod = ύπόστασις, but also as principium quo = φύσις, i.e., the divine hypostasis draws near, according to Honorius, to the divine nature. Only by a special interpretation of "ex cathedra," considered separately, does the Catholic scholar save his belief in papal infallibility. The Pope is infallible only when he says "ex cathedra"; And in all such cases, the entire Universal Church necessarily agrees with his words. But the ecumenical council condemned Honorius, ergo Honorius did not speak ex cathedra.

{p. 472}

Honorius was a scholar and considered himself a shrewd dogmatist. Therefore, in maintaining his scholarly authority, he did not confine himself to one colorless epistle, as had sometimes happened before with the Roman high priests; but he was not shrewd enough to subject the Epistle of Sergius to a thorough criticism. He further inflated the difference between the two wills, turning them into moral opposites. True, there is also another epistle from Honorius (in fragments), more Orthodox, there are expressions of Leo V., such as: "both natures act"; but even here he tries to retain at least a part of what he has said before. Thus, the defenders of Honorius are right that Honorius is an unconscious and independent Monothelite, but the fact remains: he confirmed the message of Sergius and joined the ranks of the Monothelites.

Such was the question in the first stage of its development. This question (about the two energies in Christ) has long been ripe both in the dogmatic and historical sense. Only an accidental cause, the will of Justinian I, which forced theologians to deal with the question of three chapters instead of a purely dogmatic explanation of the doctrine of God-manhood, produced what Monothelitism had not appeared a century earlier. The question of the three chapters, which filled the greater part of Justinian's reign, did not give anything for the explanation of the dogma of the union of the two natures, in Christ; Theology now set out on its direct path and set about revealing the truth expressed in the Chalcedonian creed.

That this question is long overdue will become clear if we recall the history of Monophysitism. Already in the dispute between Severus and Julian, the question of energy was posed clearly. Severus approached the Orthodox teaching in that he recognized the difference and non-merging in Christ of the definitions of His divinity and humanity, His attributes, ιδιότητες. Only by posing the question of how these qualities are revealed could the difference between Severus's point of view and the Orthodox one be clarified. Severus did not deny, it is true, but limited the relevance of these definitions. In this limitation the reserve of Monophysitism was manifested. These definitions were thought of as potential, eternally connected, simple possibilities without their discovery. Human qualities were recognized, but human nature was denied, from which, according to Orthodox teaching, these qualities flow as actions, on which they depend as their cause. The impulse to these discoveries always comes only from the divine Word, and human nature is not a factor. For this reason, the Monophysites did not want to recognize in Christ another, human nature (although they recognized human qualities in Him), since the tomos of Leo V. and the Council of Chalcedon depict this nature with a strong moment of actuality, with a postulate to the energy inherent in it: "agit utraque forma quod proprium est." By substituting ίδιότης for φύσις, they wanted to replace the living factor with the abstract concept of form [114].

The question of one or two energies appears in history earlier than the question of one or two wills. This is due to the fact that the latter contains more difficulties for human thought than the former. Ενέργεια is life in general; θέλησις (will) is the life of the spirit (energy in particular); Θέλημα is the result of this energy (θελήσεως). Will is important in a person's personal life near his self-consciousness. The will is the "I" turned ad extra, while consciousness and self-consciousness are the "I" turned to the inner man. The will, standing as a link between our actions (the multitude) and our "I" (unity), had to present special difficulties for Christology, in view of the danger of its complete identification with self-consciousness, with the personality. The question was raised: what will the will follow in the God-man: nature or hypostasis? Sergius and his associates considered it not subject to dispute that the will would follow hypostasis, and from the point of view of "εν θέλημα" as a ready-made datum, they argued against "δύο ένέργειαι", drawing a conclusion from them in the sense of δύο θελήσεις (or δύο θελήματα).

Graphically, their method can be represented as follows.

The wills in Christ are rooted in the one centre of His divine self-consciousness (α') and are revealed in their difference only in so far as is necessary in the unmerged union of the two natures (difference in agreement = bc). The Monophysitists exaggerated this distinction to the point of contradiction (extending the lines to certain points — de, between which there was an enormous distance [d opposite to e — contradict e], from these ends [from the contradictory wills = θελήματα] they looked in the direction of α' and bifurcated this center into β' and γ'), from the two wills they concluded to two volitionists = self-conscious = persons.