Феодор мопсуэстийский возвратился опять к точке зрения Аполлинария, лишь модифицируя ее. Поклонение относится, к естествам, но «идолопоклонство» отстраняется тем, что и поклоняясь человечеству, кланяющийся видит за ним и сквозь него Божество (Диодор: «adoramus purpuram propter indutum»). Графически это будет:

Резкой раздельности природ такое «относительное» поклонение конечно не примиряет.

Особенности сирийского богословского направления сказались полнее в системе Феодора мопсуэстийского [39] — может быть потому, что она нам лучше известна (сохранилось значительное количество отрывков и символ, рассмотренный и осужденный Ефесским I, вселенским III, собором), чем учение, например, Диодора.

{стр. 152}

Для изображения догматического учения Феодора мопсуэстийского мы имеем важный документ; это — символическое изложение его учения, направленное против четыренадесятников, где широко поставлен вопрос о Божестве и человечестве Христа. Вот наиболее важные места. Господь Бог Слово воспринял совершенного человека (άνθρωπον) от семени Давида и Авраама, неизреченно соединил (συνήψεν) его с Собою, воскресив его из мертвых и посадив одесную Бога, так что этот человек, имея неразлучное соприкосновение (άχωριστον συνάφειαν) с божескою природою, вследствие этого приемлет поклонение от всей твари, которая воздает это поклонение ему по отношению к Богу и с мыслию о Боге. Когда мы мыслим о И. Христе, то прежде всего разумеем Бога-Слово; но вместе с ним мы мыслим (συνεπινουντες) и воспринятое: Иисуса человека из Назарета, которого Бог помазал, так что он, вследствие συνάφεια с Богом-Словом, причастен наименованию и чести Сына и Господа.

Таким образом, воспринятого в Божество человека Феодор рассматривает, как совершенного человека, и рассуждает, что Бог-Слово, обитающее в нем, воскресило его из мертвых. Одного называешь Богом-Словом, а другого — человеком Иисусом из Назарета. Разность обоих естеств высказывается вполне ясно.

But what is the beginning of Theodore's unification of them? Theodore examines various conceivable ways of uniting the Divinity and humanity. He counts three such ways: 1) unity in essence, 2) the dwelling of God the Word κατ' ενέργειαν, 3) unity by goodwill.

But (1) the first method of uniting the natures is impossible, because the unity of κατ' ούσίαν is conceivable only where the natures to be united are of the same essence (όμοούσια). In relation to other substances, this means that God is omnipresent and is not encompassed by any place. To say that God dwells in Jesus Christ in essence is to say either too much or too little, i.e., either to say that God dwells only in Christ and nowhere else — but this is impossible, or to express the general idea that God is omnipresent, and therefore dwells in Jesus Christ — but in this sense God is inherent even in inanimate nature.

2) The second method of uniting natures, κατ' ενέργειαν, arouses the same perplexities as the first. To say that He acts in Christ is either to limit the divine action to one place, if He acts only in Christ, which is contrary to the absoluteness of God, or to equate Jesus Christ with all other things in the world in which God acts.

3) There remains a third way, dwelling by good will, the method of which is also spoken of in the Holy Scriptures. In the Scriptures: "I will dwell in them, and I will be like them" (Leviticus XXVI, 12; cf. Ps. CXLVI, 11). Here we stand on the correct dogmatic point of view, and at the same time the highest one. If God lived only in His omnipresence, then He would be bound by the necessity that lies in His being, He would dwell in both the good and the evil; but living by good pleasure, God is completely morally free. Under this category must also be thought the union of the two natures in Jesus Christ. Theodore sees that the "contact of natures" here is thought to be analogous to the indwelling of God in other holy people; he is aware that the modus of union in Christ does not differ toto genere from the form of God's indwelling in the saints; but he admits an undeniable (essentially quantitative) difference in kind. God's favor is able to diversify the form of one's presence. "We have not gone mad," says Theodore, "to think that in Christ God dwells only in the same specific sense as in the prophets. No, He dwells in Christ as in the Son."

In his epistle to Domnus, [later] Bishop. Antiochian, which constitutes a kind of compendium of his theology, he points out the important consequences of "living according to good will." This abode, this union (ενωσις) of natures, assigns to both natures one name, one will and action, authority, power, dominion, and dignity, and this union is by no means separate, for both natures constitute one person (πρόσωπον) and are called one person. The method of union essentially has an application in relation to those of one essence, but in its application to those of other essences such a method is impossible, since it would lead to their merging. Thus, according to the method of benevolence, the two natures are united from the mother's womb, have one person, both are preserved inseparably and inseparably, and reveal in everything the identity of will and action, and it is impossible to imagine anything closer than this union (ών ούδέν εστιν συναφέστερον).

{p. 154}

Thus, we see that the dogmatic language of Theodore rests on a special theoretical underpinning, which cannot be ignored. For example, it is impossible to offer him a direct demand that he recognize ενωσιν κατ' ουσίαν, when he connected with this term a completely different meaning from that which Orthodox dogmatics assimilates to him. Nor can his system be attacked on the simple etymological ground that συνάφεια does not mean unity, but an external and most superficial contact, when Theodore himself believes that his system speaks of a union so complete and close that behind it there is already direct consubstantiality or fusion.