c) We repeat, there are a lot of shades of this basic transcendental proof of the existence of the cosmic Mind in Aristotle. Thus, in addition to the semantic antecedent of this Mind to every human mind and to every factual formation of things in general, this cosmic Mind is also forcefully and energetically antecedent to all finiteness, since everything finite in general can exist only if there is an infinite, and since in all intervals within the finite there is still the infinite, no matter how small these intervals may be. We have already met with this circumstance in the previous exposition and will meet more than once. In the Metaphysics (IX 8) it is pointed out that energy is prior to potency in meaning, time, and essence (cf. XII 2). In the same treatise (XII 6) it is proved that energy is not only not a potentiality, but cannot be contained in a potentiality, because otherwise it would be a partaker of matter. The gods are precisely this immortal energy, and this is eternal life (De coel. II 3, 286a 9). "God has filled the Whole [the universe] by creating [in it] a continuous becoming" (De gen. et corr. II 10, 336 b 31). We have already cited the text above that the mind and striving are the driving principles. But in the primitive mind these two faculties of motion merge into one, since there can be no antagonistic tendencies in it, which require for their recognition that a union of mind and aspiration which is no longer antagonistic (De an. III 10). All living things presuppose a soul, and the soul presupposes a mind which is no longer potential, but energy (II 2), which in general refers to everything potential, which is possible only as the realization of energy (III 7. 9. 10). Ethical virtue presupposes dianoetic virtue, that is, virtue based on reason; and reason, which belongs to transitory things, requires such a reason, which refers to eternal things, to the eternal (Ethic. Nic. VI 2, X 9). The fact that everything presupposes its opposite, and that these opposites can be understood in the most diverse senses, is discussed in detail by Aristotle in his Rhetoric (II 23). The main thing here is that opposites act on one another quite directly. Aristotle speaks of this many times in application to ordinary things (De gen. animal. I 21; De gen. et corr. I 7) and in its application to its cosmic Mind, because the latter is pure activity, energy (Met. XII 6), has no parts and has no magnitude (Phys. VIII 10). At the same time, the best does not need action, since action is twofold, namely, it is both the goal of action and the action itself; and that which is best must be together (De coel. II 12). Thus, the cosmic Mind, according to Aristotle, being the best being, does not need action at all; but this is not to be understood in the sense that his Mind is merely inactive, but in the sense that the effect, the cause of the action, the purpose of the action, the material and form of the action remain indistinguishable in him.

In this sense, a fragment of Aristotle (15 Rose) is curious, referring to a treatise by Aristotle that has not come down to us, which proves the idea that the infinite, that is, the infinite mind and infinite beauty, can experience neither increase nor decrease, just as modern mathematics proves that the addition of units to infinity or the subtraction of these units leaves infinity completely untouched. Here is this fragment, borrowed from the later commentator Aristotle Simplicius:

"Aristotle says in his writings on philosophy that there is something better in the general sense; there he also says that there is something better. For since in the existing one is better than the other, there is therefore something better which is to be regarded as divine. If, therefore, something that changes is changed by another, or by itself, and the other is either stronger or weaker, then the one that strives from itself as something stronger or more beautiful (and the divine has nothing stronger than itself, by which it would change), then the aspirant will become more divine. And it is natural that [in this case] it will not become the strongest by virtue of the strongest, and, on the other hand, it will not accept anything bad from the weakest, and nothing bad will be in it. For it does not change in itself, either as striving for something more beautiful (since it needs none of its beauties), nor for the worse, since even man does not make himself worse by his own will. And therefore it has nothing wrong as if it were changed by a transition to the worse. And this proof Aristotle took from the second book of Plato's Republic."

Thus, that which is divine only to a certain extent, in fact, by striving for the divine as such, becomes both more divine and more beautiful. But that which is divine in itself can be neither worse nor better, just as all infinity does not become greater or less by the addition or subtraction of finite units. For aesthetics, this is important because it preaches absolute and infinite beauty, which by its very essence can become neither more nor less.

Perhaps we would not have quoted this fragment of Aristotle if at the end of this fragment there had not been an indication of Aristotle's borrowing from Plato in one of the most important points of their philosophy. For us, this is a very important reinforcement of our usual thought about Aristotle's numerous borrowings from Plato, and moreover in the most important philosophical problems. Aristotle undoubtedly borrows his idea of the infinity of the deity and the impossibility of this infinity becoming more or less from Plato (R. P. II 380d-383c with explanations from false mythology). We have already met with these texts from Plato's Republic{33}

In the above fragment of Aristotle, the specific shade of Aristotle's main transcendental argument about the relationship between the cosmos and the cosmic mind is not so clear. However, there are texts from Aristotle that directly bring to the fore the physico-teleological aspect of Aristotle's main argument.

Aristotle does not simply assert that "the gods and nature do not create anything in vain" (De coel. I 4, 271a 33), but he has a teaching that directly deduces God and the divine mind precisely from the purposiveness and order that reign in nature. According to Sextus Empiricus (Adv. math. IX 20-22), Aristotle, firstly, proved the existence of God on the basis of various mental phenomena, such as inspiration, prophecy or dreams (frg. 13 R.). Secondly, Aristotle proved the existence of God on the basis of order and harmony in nature (frg. 16 R. from Sext. Emp. Adv. math. IX 26-27). Here we read:

"Some, relying on the invariable and harmonious motion of the heavenly bodies, say that the beginning of thoughts about the gods arose first of all from this movement. For just as if someone, being on the Trojan Ida, saw how the army of the Hellenes was approaching the plain in perfect order, -

Nestor lined up horsemen in front with chariots,

Behind the foot soldiers he put the fighters... [Fig. IV 327 ff.]

he would have come to the idea that there is a commander of such a formation and commanding the soldiers under his command, for example, Nestor or some other hero who knows how to

... to build fast horses and shield-bearing men for battle. [Fig. II 554]