"[Speaking of the general], I mean, for example, that at least everyone must come to the dissolution into parts, and in the same way there are other aspects to which all things participate, in so far as they form a whole. And what impossible or absurd consequences are produced by those who hold different views, what assertions we find in those who are a little more skilful than the first, and with which the least difficulty is associated, must not be concealed from our attention. With all [thinkers] all things are deduced from opposites. However, it is also wrong that these are "all things" and that they are obtained "from opposites"; but in those cases where there are opposites, how things will be made of them is not said: for opposites cannot be affected by each other. For us, this question receives a convincing solution - thanks to the fact that there is something third" (1075a23-31).

Thus, contrary to his own formal-logical laws of contradiction and the excluded middle, Aristotle, simply as a result of the penetration of his philosophical view, comes to the conclusion that opposites cannot be treated as the beginnings of things, but that something "third" is required, that is, such an indissoluble unity of opposites as can only be considered the beginning of things. But this is nothing else than Plato's doctrine of the one or the good, which he develops, as we well know, in Book VI. "States"{34}.

In this regard, Aristotle cannot recognize matter as the opposite of anything, because it is the same each time. But, according to Aristotle, if there is a multitude of matter, it means that matter in general also exists, just as if there is a special idea or a multitude of ideas, it means that there is also an idea in general, the "idea of ideas." And if there is matter in general and idea in general, then there is also that "third" which is no longer either idea or matter, but something higher. And Aristotle is not at all opposed to calling this third thing good. He only asserts that the philosophers who set up this good as a principle developed this doctrine too little, or did not develop it at all (1075a31-1075b1). Empedocles does not like Aristotle at all because he declared love to be the beginning, but only because in this beginning he confused the cause of motion with the matter of motion (1075b 1-7). And Aristotle does not like Anaxagoras not at all because he put the good as the first principle, but because he understands his good as the intellect. The mind, on the other hand, is only the cause of motion, and not anything else, for example, the purpose of motion (1075b 8-10). Hence, according to Aristotle, the good is higher than both the causes of motion and the goals of motion. And the intellect must have its opposite, so that it cannot be regarded as the only good in Anaxagoras (1075b10-11). And the good of which Anaxagoras speaks is not the real good at all, but only the intellect. In Aristotle, the idea of the unity of opposites again arises here (1075b17-19): "And for those who establish two principles, there must be another, more important principle."

Moreover, it is precisely those who accept the doctrine of ideas who must accept the good as something third, which is higher than both ideas and the participation of things in ideas; otherwise this very participation of things in ideas will remain unexplained (1075b 18-20): "And there must also be another more important principle for those who accept ideas: for why have [particular things] taken part [in ideas] or take part [in them]?" which gives everything the opportunity to see and be seen.

Aristotle most vigorously criticizes that one-sided Platonism which presents wisdom as a principle, because wisdom has its opposite in ignorance, and the first principle excludes all opposites. It is unlikely that Aristotle had Plato in mind here specifically. But if he had it in mind, then, according to Plato, wisdom is not the first principle at all, but that one and good which is devoid of all opposites and is higher than them. Aristotle writes as follows (1075b 20-24):

"In the same way, others must come to the conclusion that there is something contrary for wisdom and the most valuable knowledge, but we are years old, because there is nothing contrary to the first principle. For all opposites have matter, and are so in potentiality; and since ignorance is contrary to [wisdom], it must have as its object the opposite [principle], but there is nothing contrary to the first principle."

This is a frank recognition of the principle of coincidentia oppositorum (coincidence of opposites), which in antiquity was most developed precisely in Plato and in Neoplatonism.

Finally, when we study this scandalous chapter of Aristotle's Metaphysics (XII 10), we find that he does not recognize sensible things as the only ones that exist, for the sake of which he has always criticized Platonism alone:

"If, then, besides sensible things, there are no other things, then there will be no first beginning, order, origin, and [eternal] motions in heaven, but there will always be another beginning with the beginning, as we have with theologians and with all those who teach about nature" (1075b24-27).

But Aristotle's basic transcendental principle forbids going to infinity when explaining one motion by another. Aristotle, therefore, postulates a principle which is above all things and depends on itself, presupposing nothing else but itself. However, Aristotle also cannot recognize ideas and numbers, taken by themselves, as the first principle, since they are not characteristic of being the cause of motion (1075 b 27 - 1076 a 2). This means that the true principle is higher than both ideas and things. It is absolutely one; and in order to make his thought sufficiently solemn, Aristotle here (1076a-4-5) even quotes the famous words from Homer (Il. II 204):

There is no good in a multiplicity of power, let there be one ruler.

e) Aristotle has many passages of a purely Platonic character. We would point out, perhaps, only the concept of the whole and the concept of the one.

Aristotle's whole, as any reader of Aristotle can easily notice, is not at all reducible to its parts alone. The whole, embracing its parts, is superior to each part separately, as well as to all the parts taken together (on the different understandings of the whole, Met. V 26). Without analyzing this chapter, we will cite only the following text from the "Physics" (III 6, 207a 11-14):

"The whole is that outside of which there is nothing; but that in which something is absent, being outside it, is not a whole, however small this absence may be. The whole and the complete are either exactly the same thing, or related in nature."