2. A thing is neither the material of a thing, nor its form, nor a combination of the two

1.

Let us peer into the thing in front of us and continue to look for its definition. Let us abstract ourselves from the ways in which it is given in our consciousness or in anyone else's consciousness. We will look closely at it itself.

(a) The first thing that catches everyone's eye is the matter, or, more plainly, the material of which the thing is composed. For example, a violin is made of wood, and a window is made of glass. Is there a violin – a tree? If the violin were a tree and the window was glass, it would mean that violins are growing in my garden now, and I have windows in my pocket now. This means that the violin is wooden, but it is not wood, nor wood in general, nor any given tree. Let me know perfectly well what a beech tree is, for example, I know botanically, I know aesthetically, I know life, I know in every possible way. Do I thereby know what a violin is? It is clear that, knowing the beech tree very well, I may not even have heard of the existence of this or that musical instrument. Let me know what glass is, I know it scientifically, technically, practically, as comprehensively and profoundly as you like. Does this mean that I already know what a clock is, what a glass is, what a window is, etc.? A glass is glass, but it is not glass; a watch consists, by the way, of glass, but is not glass itself, and so on.

(b) Therefore the matter of which every thing is composed is not the thing itself; it is another thing, the other being of a thing. Since the table is made of wood, and at the same time the chair is made of wood, it follows that the tree determines absolutely nothing either in the table or in the chair, or, more precisely, determines in them what they are, in which they are absolutely identical. This point of our reasoning is extremely important. If we define a thing on the basis of its matter, it means that we shall attain only that in which all material things are perfectly indistinguishable. Does this mean to define this individual thing? It is to lose it altogether for the purpose of definition, and not to define, for we seek that in which a given thing differs from every other thing, and not that in which it indistinguishably merges with them.

c) Thus, no material of a thing is the thing itself, much less its essence. He is completely blind; And you can make anything out of it. Rubber can be made into a ball, and in this sense, rubber "defines" the ball. But rubber can be used to make a coat; This means that it "defines" the coat as well. You can make a doll out of rubber; This means that it "defines" the doll as well. But in this case, what is the difference between a ball and a coat and a coat from a doll? Obviously, not with rubber. But with what? Standing on the point of view of rubber, it is impossible to answer this question. Rubber defines all rubber things in exactly the same way. But there are also non-rubber things. What defines them there? Let it be metal things. Obviously, metallicity also has little to do with metallic things. Let's take glass things. Obviously, glassiness will not give us any individual differences in glass things either. Let us take, finally, the generalized concept of material; it is thought of in the word "matter" because it includes rubber, metal, glass, and all sorts of other materials. It is clear that materiality will tell us absolutely nothing about the individuality of material things that we seek, for the same simple reasons.

But there are also immaterial things. Such are consciousness, numbers, laws, and so on. What will we define in them through the material? Moreover, absolutely nothing! To define things through their material, let us repeat once more, means to merge them into one indistinguishable heap, i.e., to deprive them of all definition.

2.

Но что же есть в вещи такого, что могло бы приблизить нас к ее пониманию, к фиксации ее индивидуальной сущности? Материи противостоит форма. Вещи материальны или, по крайней мере, могут быть материальными; и вещи както оформлены, имеют какуюто форму. Пусть стол не отличается от стула материей; зато, скажут, он отличается формой. Пусть материя во всех стеклянных предметах – одна и та же и потому ничего не определяет в их индивидуальности; зато одно и то же стекло получает разную форму, и – вот перед нами часы, очки, чернильницы, стаканы, графины и т. п.

Это рассуждение также малокритично.

a) Прежде всего, форма стакана определяет собою отнюдь не данный стакан, но и все стаканы вообще. Поэтому определить форму стакана не значит определить данный конкретный стакан. Значит, приходится весьма и весьма специфицировать форму стакана. Приходится ее конкретность доводить до реальновидимой формы стакана, т. е. до видимости, до вида стакана. Однако и вид стакана, даже самый реальный, самый конкретный, отнюдь не есть самый стакан.

b) Произведем простейшую операцию – разобьем стакан. Спрашивается: можно ли разбить вид стакана? Если не играть словами и основываться на нормальных человеческих ощущениях, то нужно прямо сказать: стакан разбить можно, но вид стакана разбить нельзя. Пусть я мой стакан совершенно точно нарисовал на бумаге. Будет ли тут вид стакана? Да, мой нарисованный стакан будет иметь вид стакана. Можно ли его разбить? Ясно, что вид нарисованного стакана нельзя разбить. Как же вы в таком случае утверждали, что вид стакана можно разбить? Еще можно было бы в этом сомневаться относительно стеклянного стакана. Но нарисованный стакан, очевидно, нельзя разбить, и тем более нельзя разбить вид нарисованного стакана. Скажут: ваш рисунок нельзя разбить, но его можно разрезать. Значит, сделают вывод, вид стакана все же можно подвергнуть тому или иному ущербу или даже уничтожению, и в этом смысле вид стакана, скажут, ровно ничем не отличается от самого стакана.