Thus, the simple fact of worn-out galoshes, if we take it not from some abstract point of view, but take it as such, i.e., worn-out galoshes as worn-out galoshes, this simplest fact of everyday life alone screams that in living things the infinite and the finite are indistinguishable, that this very difference is already a sign of a departure from the living life of things.

After that, do not tell me that the coincidence of the infinite and the finite in a single symbol was invented by the Church Father Dionysius the Areopagite or the idealist Hegel. Quite independently of either mysticism or idealism, regardless of any world outlook, the finite and the infinite coincide in one indivisible and living thing, which can therefore be considered both a symbol of the finite and a symbol of the infinite. It is clear to everyone that it is not a matter of worldview, but only of the desire or unwillingness to reason.

(i) We shall not develop the other antitheses which are reunited in the things themselves, i.e., in the things themselves. Such, for example, are the antitheses of the general and the particular, the conscious and the unconscious, the personal and the social, of time and eternity. The abstractness of these and similar divisions, as well as the method of overcoming them in the light of things as such, i.e., in the light of the very beginning, is quite clear from the preceding exposition. The general conclusion is self-evident: since all the world views that have dealt with the first principle of all existence are formally similar to each other and even coincide in the doctrine of the self and its symbols—and we emphasize the originality of each such world view and its incompatibility with every other—it follows that the doctrine of the self and its symbols does not depend on any world view. for any world view can be used and, regardless of any world view, must be constructed, assimilated and accepted.

5. In conclusion, however, it must be said that dissociation from any world view is by no means to be understood in an absolute sense. Philosophy should not be reduced to a world view, but it should not completely dissociate itself from it. On the contrary, philosophy should be the foundation of the world view, and the world view alone can be substantiated with the help of philosophy. Let us not dissociate ourselves from the worldview either. But we will also not be in a hurry to recognize or reject certain worldviews. We will try to build our philosophy without any worldview as long as it is possible. We will try to use from philosophical teachings everything that is most general, most objective, and thereby most scientific. And only after all this will we introduce the principle that will transform all these schemes, formally common to all or to the majority of world views, into a new world view, just as in all the teachings listed above we have always noted the special principle that made each such doctrine an original and independent historical and philosophical type.

II Genesis

Prelude

Everything that exists is a symbol of the absolute self. This means that everything that exists is, in a way, this self itself. All the partial moments of existence are only the reproduction and revelation of the self itself. All its fullness and inexhaustibility rested on existence. Being repeats it and reconstructs it. But the very thing is at the same time the greatest incomprehensibility and even unknowability. Therefore, everything that exists, being a symbol of itself, is always fraught with something incomprehensible and unknowable. No matter how distinct and clear the logic that accompanies it, it is at the same time something mysterious and inexplicable once and for all.

Let all people who have normal thinking be convinced of the correctness of the multiplication table; let it be absolutely certain, obvious, let it be verified by an innumerable number of physical and non-physical facts. However, no one will ever answer the question: why two times two is four, and two times three is six. In fact, it is impossible to answer the question: why one and one two. One and two have a certain semantic content, and by virtue of this content, the sum of two units is equal to two. But why this numerical content leads to such a result – no one has ever explained and is unable to explain.

And in mathematics this incomprehensibility of the last foundations is especially noticeable. Let in logic and in philosophy in general people make a lot of fog; And there, if people reasoned more scientifically – let us even assume this vulgar judgment – then everything would be clear to everyone and nothing mysterious would remain. But mathematics is already a real science, and no one doubts its reliability. And yet many of its statements give a decidedly miraculous impression, especially some intricate solutions of higher mathematics. That a new theorem follows from a given axiom or theorem, or from a series of them, is understandable, i.e., the content of this conclusion is clear here. But why thought requires this particular conclusion and not another, no one can explain. As we delve into the content of mathematical analysis, we quickly begin to notice that mathematicians are not doing their own human work, that they are describing their visions of some world they do not understand; And their whole task is to eliminate everything human, subjective, accidental, in order to obey this mysterious command to reason in this way and not otherwise, in order to copy as much and as accurately as possible from the incomprehensible picture revealed to them.

The same must be said about all human knowledge, and in particular about logic. No matter how obvious, convincing and clear it is, behind it there is a certain abyss of incomprehensible, illogical, mysterious things, what it feeds on and where it gets its structure from, but about which it can neither be talked about nor thought. Just as no biologist can ever explain the bizarre forms of plants and animals that go far beyond the biologically investigated factors, and just as no explanation can destroy our wonder at the various bizarre forms of plants and animals, so logic will never explain to us its logical forms and make us stop wondering at them, however clear and obvious they may be in themselves.