Descending to the level of creation, God does not carry any distinguishing ways, means, or forms of action inherent only to Him: at the level of creation, God acts in exactly the same way as the creature itself acts. Otherwise, we would not even feel His action, just as we would not feel His presence. Kenosis is the only and actual state of God and His mode of action. Whoever destroys the ontology of kenosis, considering it to be only a moral idea, denies God reality, but at the same time does not elevate Him, but distances Him so far that we cannot find Him at all, even if we believe, because faith here loses the object, which for it is truth. A God locked in transcendence may be a Power, but we know nothing about Him, and therefore we cannot say to Him, "My God." Of God, who descended to our level, that is, of the kenotic God, we speak of concepts borrowed from the world, because the very existence of God in the world is not ephemeral, it is the very reality of this world, and that is why it can be expressed in our concepts. That is why we speak of God not only by analogy, but literally: anthropomorphisms and our anthropomorphisms are by no means mistakes in relation to the kenotic God, that is, the God who is "just like man." Here it is appropriate to recall the words of S. Kierkegaard, which he wrote in his diary on July 20, 1837: "We desperately fight against anthropomorphisms, forgetting that the birth of Christ is the greatest and most real anthropomorphism." About God, Who is "just like a man", and it is necessary to speak in a completely human way. No one can speak like God. In the face of the Absolute, that is, the abstract God (if only one could be before His Face), only silence, holy silence, and only silence are possible.

      That is why the metaphysics of God, which in its reasoning about God completely excludes His relationship with man, or, as in scholastic metaphysics, even consciously refutes it, is either empty talk, which says nothing about God, because nothing can be said about Him in Himself, or a hidden assumption that God is still a kenotic God, that is, God in relation to man and to the world is God self-diminished and incarnate. – And that is why it is possible to talk about Him without turning the conversation into empty talk. It may be an interesting task for the historian of philosophy to uncover this hidden assumption inherent in the scholastic metaphysics of God, for such an assumption seems to be necessarily contained in it. After all, scholasticism philosophized in the vastness of Christianity, and the Christian God is a completely kenotic God – both as the Creator and as the Savior. Therefore, although kenosis is not mentioned in the scholastic metaphysics of God, it is nevertheless hidden in its foundations as a subterranean source. Otherwise, this metaphysics would have the same value as Aristotle's. However, the development of this theme is beyond the scope of this narrative. I just want to emphasize that my efforts are not to search for God in Myself or to reason about Him as such, but to search for man's relationship with God in order to talk about Him on the basis of this relationship. God in relation to man is a kenotic God, and conversation about Him is always philosophical. This philosophical discourse on God is as effective as it can be in relation to any other reality: it expresses God only from a certain "point of view." For example, in Lithuanian, "God the Father" is by no means identical with the expression "God the Son" or "God the Holy Spirit". The first phrase is linguistically profound, Lithuanian in nature, the second and third are artificial, theologically made to justify the equality of the Persons of the Holy Trinity – "et in majestate adoratur aequalitas"[6].

      The philosophical character of my religious writings was not correctly understood either by church censors or by the majority of readers: both saw in them the teaching of the Church, so they did not use the criteria that are customary to use in evaluating philosophy.

      Those of my books that were published before the Second Vatican Council or almost immediately after it have ecclesiastical approbation. Even such books of mine as "The Grand Inquisitor" (2nd edition, 1950) and "The Drama of Job" have it, which, according to their content, did not need approbation at all, even if the censors in their decisions proceeded from very narrowly interpreted decrees of church law. However, in this case, the publisher Prelate Juras[7] needed approbation, otherwise the books would not have been published. Therefore, I had to make an effort to get it, and I got it. And yet the very receipt of approbation was peculiar, because those who gave it (the corresponding bishops appointed this or that Lithuanian clergyman as a censor) read the manuscript through the eyes of theologians, and the manuscript itself was written by a philosopher. This was the cause of the downright pointless disputes: often the censor behaved as if he had already taken the place of the pope, and could unmistakably determine and understand the meaning of this or that interpretation or this or that statement. (…).

      Poor censor! He tried to ensure that my interpretations would not only not contradict the teaching of the Church (this is the task of the censor), but would also find an appropriate expression characteristic of a theologically thinking person and would not violate the theological tradition. It never occurred to any of the censors that Revelation for a believing philosopher could only be a refutation and never an affirmative prescription. Revelation is affirmative only for the theologian, because it gives him an answer. Yet it only warns the philosopher if the conclusions he draws refute the truth of Revelation. The transfer of Revelation as an affirmative prescription to philosophy causes confusion, for under the pressure of theology philosophy becomes its handmaiden. Something similar happened in the time of Peter Damiani in the 11th century, when this "lady" (theology) demanded that the "maidservant" (philosophy) set the table as the "lady" wished. Our censors were the representatives of this "mistress". They demanded corrections, additions, omissions, clarifications, until all this became across the throat. (…). However, the disputes that arose usually ended peacefully: the censor yielded, and so did I. But the investigation itself did not benefit from this, for the censor's remarks came from above, so that the corrections, as a response to these remarks, became the impoverishment of those thoughts that caused the criticism, and nothing more! For this reason, I consider the establishment of the limits of approbation (excluding the Holy Scriptures, prayer books...) after the Second Vatican Council to be one of the most important achievements of this Council. Since 1970, my books no longer need church approbation: this bear's paw was removed, however, only from lay authors.

      However, it was not only the censors who tried to find the teaching of the Church in my writings, but also many readers. And when they did not find it, they were angry to the depths of their souls. (…).

      So what is my relationship with theology? – If theology is understood traditionally, as a kind of messenger activity of the Church in the field of knowledge (a systematized exposition of doctrine), because only such a theology makes sense, then I am not a theologian and have never been one. Conflicts with the hierarchy, disputes with the censors of my works, with reviewers always revolved around the question of whether I had sinned against the teaching of the Church by interpreting this or that phenomenon. Many people thought that yes, but I myself did not. Accusations of heresy were the most painful for me – in this respect I have always been and remain extremely vulnerable. No one has ever apologized to me for the injustice of such accusations, because this is not characteristic of representatives of the Church at all. They can forget about the accusations thrown – "de memoria delere: erase from memory" (recall the excommunists of 1054 in the Eastern Church), but not remove them. Thus, over time, it was "forgotten" that I was a "born heretic", a "Freemason", a "second Luther"... Only my heart is not yet so petrified that I forget about it. However, in the light of the twilight of my life, I am beginning to understand what the temptation of the answer means. It means to have an answer to one question and assume that you have an answer to everything. I am also beginning to understand the request in the Lord's Prayer – "lead us not into temptation" (by the way, Nashitheologists "corrected" this request as well, because it did not sound orthodox enough to them!). And this request means – do not give me, Lord, such a service for which I am not suitable.

      But if we understand "theology" literally as a conversation about God, then I am a theologian and it seems that I will be one until the end of my life. (…). God has always been and remains the object of my thinking, and in exile He even became the main object of my thinking, not as He is in Himself, for I have never seriously studied the metaphysics of God, but in His relationship with man, that is, as the God of religion. (…). Most likely, this is the desire to give a stronger logical basis to existential experience and thus to rescue this experience from a purely psychological state, raising it to a metaphysical level. Psychologically, the possible reference to God, or, in the words of K. Jaspers, the cipher of God – regardless of whether we are talking about the world or about man – does not satisfy me: a possible cipher points only to a possible God. I would humiliate myself if I worshiped only possibility. Therefore I seek an immutable indication, logically irrefutable, for an immutable indication requires also an immutable indication. I suppose that I found such an immutable reference to God as immutable in the concept of being as creation. If this concept is applied to human existence, then wide, boundless horizons open up for the study of this existence. Perhaps this analysis would have been more abstract than when I studied the Inquisitor, Job, St. Francis, or the Antichrist, but it would have been more metaphysical, logically stronger, and therefore more convincing to withstand the onslaught of criticism.

      … And I would also like to note that (...) the relationship between philosophy and theology can be understood and resolved only in the aspect of the philosophy of religion. And since in religion, in my understanding, it is not man who rises to the level of God, but God descends to the level of man (kenosis), faith also descends to the realm of knowledge, to put it concretely, to the realm of philosophy, assuming the state and mode of action of the latter. Philosophy becomes the kenosis of faith. Faced with the truth of Revelation, it is not philosophy that changes, but faith under the influence of this truth changes its character, obeying the laws of philosophical thought: Divine truth acquires the form of human truth; moreover, divine truth becomes human truth – "et verbum caro factum est" (Jn 1:14). And the more humane the propositions preached by religion become, the truer they are.

At this point I would like to conclude my introductory remarks, for what the philosopher himself said about his relationship with theology needs no addition.

     I am deeply grateful to the Secretary of Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Vilnius and Lithuania, Fr. Vitaly Karikov, for the help rendered to me as a consultant in preparing for publication the Russian translation of A. Maceina's book "The Lamb of God."

Tatyana Korneeva-Maceinienė