4) Pyrrhus then began to dispute the theoretical basis of Diothelitism: the will follows nature, and not hypostasis. This, in his opinion, is impossible, since a) the will is essentially subject to change, and nature is unchangeable; b) if the will follows nature, then from the unity of the will it must also be inferred to the unity of nature, and in this case the saints must also be recognized as consubstantial with God, since their will is one with the will of God. Maximus remarked that Pyrrhus confused the object of will with the will itself, or will, as an inalienable property of the human soul, of human nature. The saints agree with God in the object of will, but do not have one will with God. Desires, in the sense of individual manifestations, are of course varied and changeable; but these are only different applications (modi) of one and the same faculty of will, as an inalienable (and therefore unchangeable) property of human nature. Pyrrhus continued to object: c) what is inherent in nature is necessary; but if the will in Christ follows His nature, it will not be free, and Christ will thus be subject to the law of necessity. Maximus remarked that this is an old song: even the Arians said that if God did not beget the Son of His own free will, then He is subject to necessity. But it is known that they answered this sophism: He is good by nature; but does this mean that He is subject to the law of necessity?

(5) Pyrrhus then made a proposal: instead of two wills, to recognize in Christ a single complex will (έν τό {p. 481} σύνθετον), just as the Church confesses in Christ one complex Person, the God-man. Maximus objected that a complex will is metaphysically inadmissible. There are three categories of objects: some have existence for themselves (υποστάσεις); others, being in hypostasis ('ενυπόστατα, as, for example, nature); still others are being in nature (έμφυτα), to which category the will belongs. Maximus admits the possibility of addition only between hypostases, but not between ενυπόστατα and έμφυτα; otherwise it would be necessary to combine infinity with finiteness, the mortal with the immortal, which is a metaphysical confusion. If, however, the Fathers spoke of the communion of divine and human determinations (hence of the communion of εμφύτων), as, for example, of glory and humiliation, they admitted this only "per antidosin": these are two determinations, and what they have in common is that both belong to one: and if Pyrrhus wishes to recognize the two as something common, κοινόν, in this sense, then he must first recognize the two wills in Christ as two.

(6) Against the recognition of the special human will in Christ, Pyrrhus pointed out that the humanity of Christ was subject to the command of the divinity. Maximus pointed out that David and Moses were subject to the command of the Godhead; that to take this point of view would mean to divide Christ in two. The Orthodox teaching is that Christ, as God, willed the divine, and as man, desired the human: that just as all things have their own δύναμις, so in humanity there is όρμή and αφορμή (natural attraction and natural striving for self-preservation), which were also manifested in Christ (fear of death).

(7) Pyrrhus' suggestion: In the interests of ecclesiastical peace, to be content with acknowledging that Christ is true God and true man, and to mention nothing else, Maximus rejected by pointing to the dogmatic term: "κατ' άλλο καί άλλο," which requires a detailed explanation, and —

(8) the reference to the fact that the councils do not speak of two wills by the remark that (a) the councils do not speak of "μία φύσις του Θεου Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη," and (b) that the doctrine of the two wills is implicit in the doctrine of the preservation of the real properties of both natures, because the will φυσικώς έμπέφυκε is to mankind. As a plant grows, so does the rational will (θέλει).

{p. 482}

(9) Pyrrhus proposed to admit in Christ a single will, the will of γνωμικήν; Maximus replied that the term was unclear, because the word γνώμη had 28 meanings, and that if by γνώμη we meant τρόπος ζωής, then the way of life presupposes choice, and choice presupposes will. —

(10) A hypostatic will, as Pyrrhus proposed, cannot be admitted either: God has three hypostases, and therefore it would follow that there are also three wills in Him. —

(11) A complex will is inadmissible (apart from what has been said ad 5) also because the complex presupposes the simple.

The question of energies was already predetermined by the question of wills. Most interesting in this respect is Pyrrhus's attempt to prove that in Christ there is one ενέργεια, because the action of His divinity and humanity produces a single result, εν αποτέλεσμα; thus, the blow of a red-hot sword produces one effect. Maximus refuted this argument by remarking that (a) αποτέλεσμα — εξω τού Χριστού, and when we speak of energies and wills, we are talking about the fact that έν τώ Χριστώ. But (b) he did not admit a real unity of result: a red-hot sword has two effects: it burns and cuts.

The dispute ended favorably for Maximus. Pyrrhus, defending himself delicately and weakly, expressed a desire to enter into communion with the Orthodox, only not in Africa, but in Rome, where he went and where he was actually received into communion by Pope Theodore I.

In Africa, meanwhile, there was a lively ecclesiastical activity: in Byzacene, Numidia, and proconsular Africa, councils were convened against the Monothelites. The Fathers energetically urged the Pope to oppose the Constantinople Pope. Patriarch. But Pyrrhus did not wear the mask for long: in 647 he arrived in Ravenna and there again accepted the Constantinople faith (Gregory's attempt ended in his death). In Rome Pyrrhus was anathematized for this, and the document to this effect is signed not with ink, but with holy blood from a chalice.

The Patriarch of Constantinople Paul responded to the energy of the Pope of Rome with the following measures: a) he broke the altar on which the Pope's apocrisiaries were worshipped, and forbade them to celebrate the Liturgy; (b) Secondly, it induced the emperor to issue the so-called "Τύπος περι τής πίστεως," which differed from ̓εκθεσις only in that it had the character of an edict, whereas it was a dogmatic treatise. The emperor declared that he was aware of the disturbances taking place in the church: some recognized a single will, asserting that one and the same performed both divine and human actions; others recognize two wills and two actions; the former proceed from the concept of Christ as one in hypostasis, the latter from the concept of two natures that invariably retain their properties. In view of these disputes, the emperor ordered that his subjects should not quarrel with each other about either will: it was necessary to adhere to the status quo that existed in the church before. Amnesty was declared to the perpetrators of disputes, it was forbidden to censure and condemn each other for the past; but those who continue to argue are threatened by the edict with deposition, resignation, confiscation, corporal punishment, and exile.

Typos, of course, could not reconcile the defenders of Orthodoxy with the Monophysites. The edict was mocked for recognizing Jesus Christ as ανενέργητον καί αθέλητον, ανουν, αψοχον και ακίνητον, like soulless idols. In comparison with ekthesis, the typos represents a step backward in the sense of Monothelitism. By juxtaposing the doctrine of the one and two energies in Christ, the ekthesis places greater responsibility on the adherents of the latter teaching; In the typos, the arguments of both sides are reproduced objectively and equally conscientiously. In the Ekthesis, instead of the unpleasant δύο ένέργειαι, the Monothelites introduce εν θέλημα, sacrificing the favorite μία ενέργεια; the typos refuses to carry out this favorite expression εν θέλημα, being content not to dispute it and not to be replaced by directly opposite ones — If we compare the attempts of the Monothelites with those of the Monophysites, then the ekthesis is compared with the εγκύκλιον of the Basilisk, and the typos with the henoticon of Zeno. From this it becomes clear that the Monophysites entered life with greater energy than the Monothelites: the latter (in the εγκύκλιον) could dream of a complete victory over the Chalcedonian faith, but the latter began directly with concessions. Both the typos and the henoticon want to achieve unity by keeping silent about precise dogmatic formulas; but the typos is more moderate than the henoticon: it does not contain that hidden reproach to the Council of Chalcedon that is read between the lines in the edict of Zeno.