Thus, there is no doubt that Harnack's poor depiction of both the teaching of the Founder of Christianity and of the first apostolic time is a deliberate matter, i.e., completely artificial. He expounded the teaching of Jesus Christ, not taking in his hands the Gospel of John, but the teaching of the early Christian time, without taking into account most of the Pauline Epistles. He had no basis for either and no rights, not even from the point of view of his science and his own scientific ideas. But if he had no scientific basis and no right to act as he did, he had an irresistible need to do so. Harnack wanted to "construct" his history as secular historians do, not only without taking into account the actions of supernatural principles, but also imagining history as the development of mankind from the lowest degrees of civilization to the highest degrees of this civilization. We will not talk about whether secular historians who are guided by such views are right. It is important for us to note in the present case only that Harnack adheres to these views, working in such a field as church history. Church history does not fit into the framework in which secular historians confine civil history. Church history has as its point of departure not a minimum of development, but the fullness of religious ideas. This, however, Harnack did not want to take into account, and from this, as a natural consequence, came his distortion of the history of early Christianity. According to the theory of secular historians, the initial historical stage of the development of a given society (state) is simple, uncomplicated, less rich in ideas and institutions than the subsequent stages of the life of society. Therefore, Harnack also had to present the initial era of Christianity as poor in ideas and institutions. But in the development of this preoccupied view, he encountered, after various proscriptions of historical monuments, two of the most important monuments of Christian antiquity, the Gospel of John and the Epistles of Paul. It was impossible to deny the authenticity of all of them. But, on the other hand, it was impossible for Harnack to use these monuments as a testimony to the nature and properties of the teaching of Christ and the Apostles, from the point of view of this teaching. If he had expounded the gospel of Christ and the teaching of the early Christian epoch according to these sources, then the gospel of Christ would have turned out to be immensely broad, and the apostolic preaching and the faith of the first disciples of Christ would have been rich in content and comprehensive. But if the latter had happened, then the first stage of the history of Christianity would have been a progressive way that destroyed Harnack's theory of the development of Christian society, as well as of any human society, from the simpler to the more complex. It was necessary to untie the tightly tightened knot somehow, but instead of untying it, Harnack decided to cut it. And as a result, there are machinations unworthy of a serious historian, with the help of which the German scientist tries to get rid of inconvenient monuments that interfere with the harmony of the development of his theory. And so there appeared his unconvincing and unprovable elucubrations, that the Gospel of John could not be used in the exposition of Christ's preaching, because "it is, in its origin, a most intricate riddle"; that it is necessary to reject the Pauline Epistles as a source from which one can draw information about the beliefs of the "first generation" of Christ's followers, because, allegedly, they remained without influence on the religious-intellectual structure of the apostolic age.

Thus, we see that from the initial points of view Harnack's work is devoid of thoroughness and tendentious. The incorrectness of these points of view is reflected in the incorrectness of the revelation of the church-historical content and the subsequent stages of the historical life of Christianity.

As a matter of fact, we could end our analysis of Harnack's work on the first three centuries here. It is now clear to us why his work is what it is, i.e., it does not correspond to the more fundamental and widespread ideas about the first period of church historical life. The dignity of work is wholly harmed by the method on which it is based, but which is unsuitable for working on ecclesiastical-historical material of the first century of Christianity. If, as the saying goes, a good beginning is half the battle, then a bad beginning, like Harnack's, naturally spoils almost the whole thing. We say: we could conclude the analysis of Harnack's book, limiting ourselves to the criticisms already made, since we have exposed shortcomings that must inevitably have had an unfavorable effect on his entire work; but we considered it best not to leave without critical remarks, at least short ones, the author's further reasoning. We hope that in this way it will be even clearer: what difficulties a historian has to struggle with when he has taken the wrong path in his research.

First of all, let us note that Harnack considers the general principles governing the course of development of ecclesiastical and historical life in post-apostolic times to be Hellenic-Roman culture and Judaism, especially in the form represented by Hellenized Judaism (for example, Jewish Alexandrian philosophy). We will not dwell here on the real meaning of the first of these principles, since we will speak about this question later, when we begin to evaluate Harnack's views on the forms and fruits of the influence of Hellenic-Roman culture on the Christian Church. We will only make a remark about such a factor in the life of the Church as Hellenized Judaism. Harnack ascribes to it a very great importance in the further development of church-historical life. As we already know, he directly says that this Judaism had "a remarkable influence on the emergence of the catholic teaching of faith." From such a decisive statement of Harnack's opinion, it should be concluded that the learned historian knows very well how this influence took place and what evidence there is for it. In fact, Harnack knows as little about it as anyone else. He confesses that "no separate person can be indicated" through whom this influence would be effected (S. 45). On another occasion he declares that "there is almost no direct evidence" on which to assert the opinion that the Christian worldview belonging to the Church depended on Hellenized Judaism as its source (S. 74). And if so, then there is no reason to present Judaism as a principle that governed the development of the Church. This is Harnack's conjecture, which remains a conjecture.

But we turn to the fate of the Church and its doctrine, as Harnack imagines these destinies. A long time, according to the judgment of this scholar, passes before the Church began to possess a system of dogmatic teachings. During the period from 60 to 160 A.D., it was little enriched in the sphere of doctrine in comparison with the early Christian era. We have shown earlier what, in his opinion, distinguished Christian society from 60 to 160 A.D. in the dogmatic respect. These were some fragments of beliefs. True, in some Christian circles, according to his judgment, the awakening of dogmatizing thought began, but there was nothing definite, firm and stable here. In the teaching, one can see hesitation, discrepancies and even outright contradictions. In expounding the contents of Harnack's book under consideration, we have also cited examples from this book, with which he wants to prove his view of the unattractive state of the Church from 60 to 160 AD. Harnack had his own reasons for attributing as little importance as possible to the Church of the time in question. Studying this time, he could not find a source, an indubitable and important source, from which it would be possible to complicate the religious and intellectual life of the Church. He could not ascribe importance in the development of religious and intellectual life to Christianity itself, because Christianity, as he understood it (and we have already seen how he understood it), was only an indefinite energy without a definite content. It remained to deduce the quantitative and qualitative development of Christian ideas from any extraneous influences, but all efforts to find such a source for the development of Christianity were in vain for the epoch of the 60-160s. But since Gnosticism, which appeared in the second century, did not suddenly develop and perfect itself, and could not suddenly exert a beneficial effect on the Church, Harnack had to postpone his speech about changing the circle of views of Christians, about enriching them with new, better ideas, as this scholar thinks, until he began to expound the history of Christian life during the period from 160 to 300 A.D. a completely artificial consideration compels him to try his best to ensure that the Church, for whatever reason, in his opinion, does not prematurely appear richer in ideas than the German scientist needs. He is so zealous in his efforts to present the epoch of Christianity from 60 to 160 A.D. as poor in ideas, that he does not even speak, in the study of this epoch, of the development of the literature of Christian apologists, postponing the discussion of this subject for some reason to a later time in the history of the Church. Of course, such a maneuver somewhat helps him to carry out his views on the course of the development of the Christian life of the time he studied with some (seeming) plausibility. But in essence, by means of such artificial maneuvers, by deliberately concealing the actual state of the dogmatizing thought of Christians from 60 to 160 A.D., Harnack achieves nothing. The facts speak too loudly against him. No matter how much Harnack distorts the actual state of Christian dogmatics of a given epoch in his exposition, this dogmatics clearly says that it was not poor, but rich. Let us see, for example, what incredible troubles and sorrows it cost him to reveal the idea that in this epoch Christians did not yet have a teaching about the divine dignity of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. This, as is known, is a cardinal dogma in Christianity, and the history of the Church clearly proves that this dogma has always been professed by Christians from the very beginning of Christianity. But Harnack finds that it is more in accordance with his historical theory that this dogma should have been established and revealed in Christianity later, after the development of Gnosticism, within the range of 160 to 300 A.D., and he makes every effort to erase this dogma from the history of Christianity in the 60-160s. Harnack, with all his prejudice, could not fail to notice a very striking fact, namely, that from the very beginning Christians regarded the Founder of Christianity with the greatest reverence. This fact seems incomprehensible to the rationalist theologian, and he tries to obscure it in some way. For example, he says: "Jesus, as the Messiah and Lord, was reverently revered, which means," the German scholar thinks, "that name (italics in the original. — A.L.), which Jesus was given by His Father" (S. 56). It's a trick! Harnack encounters in Christian literature from 60 to 160 A.D. innumerable indications that Christ was revered and called "God." The German scholar tries to get rid of all this evidence in a plausible (in fact, not at all plausible) way. In this case, he resorts to a variety of tricks. He hammers into the reader's head the idea that one should not be embarrassed by such a name, "since the concept of Θεός was very variable and elastic, both among educated and uneducated persons" of that time. In general, at that time "they were considered gods – passionless, blissful people who continue to live in eternity" (S. 82). We do not argue, we will say to this; but why did the name of God later retain for Jesus Christ, and all other claimants did not retain this great name? Further, Harnack tries to show that the clearest testimony to the Divinity of Christ is to be found in works of suspicious origin, heretical: in the Apocrypha Acta Iohannis, in Marcion, in the Montanists (S. 140). But surely there is evidence of this teaching among church writers? Eat. Harnack does not want to deny this. But it seems to him that these testimonies should be understood differently from the way they are usually understood. The clear testimony of Justin, who calls Christ God, he strengthens to weaken either by the consideration that this name is given by Justin on the basis of the Old Testament sayings (but is not the Old Testament overflowing with indications of the dignity of the Messiah?), or by the observation that this apologist for the word Θεός, which he uses in relation to Christ, does not precede the term ό (but does not Origen do the same? who directly taught about the consubstantiality of the Son of God, Christ, with God the Father?). With other Christian testimonies of the second century about the Divinity of Christ, Harnack acts even stranger. He asserts that if Christian literature used the name of Jesus as God, it was not "to exalt the dignity of Christ, but often on the contrary, in order to show that the foundation of His dignity does not lie in Himself, but that He is only an independent proclaimer (Offenbarer) of God" (S. 131-133). The interpretation is incongruous. With the help of such supposedly scientific operations as Harnack allows himself, it is easy to transform the clearest dogmatic teaching of ancient times, however, for his own pleasure, into the most obscure. It is remarkable that all these scientific tricks did not give the desired satisfaction to Harnack himself; He feels that he has not been able to dispose of the uncomfortable testimony as he had hoped. Hence we encounter a strange complaint about the "carelessness (die Unbekiimmertheit) of the early Christian writers, who assigned Christ the place of God" (S. 128). Hence, according to Harnack's judgment, they acted unreasonably. But does the modern scholar act judiciously in deliberately distorting the meaning of the words of the first Christian writers?

During the 60-160s, the Church, according to Harnack, was poor in dogmatic content, unstable in its beliefs and as it were dead, but at the end of this phase in the life of the Church, according to the same scientist, a phenomenon arose and developed, which in the very near future was to enrich the Church in the content of her beliefs, to give them firmness and strength, and to call her to life. to revive — in a word, to "renew the face" of the Church. Such a phenomenon was, in Harnack's opinion, Gnosticism. Who could have expected such an opinion from a learned historian? He addresses all his best compliments to the Gnostics. For the German historian, Gnosticism is that "Pandora's box" (see § 12) from which the Christian Church could borrow everything it needed. What is usually said of the Catholic Church is what he now ascribes to Gnosticism. "The Gnostics," he says, "were the only theologians of their time; they raised Christianity to a system of dogmas, they were the first to systematically process traditions," etc. He found plenty of everything among the Gnostics, and their science was excellent: here appeared the first scientific commentaries, philosophical-dogmatic works, and art flourished among them: religious hymns and odes, church songs were born in them like mushrooms after a summer rain. But the reader already knows all this and will certainly ask: is it so? One might think that some kind of rich Gnostic literature has come down to us, before which scholars can only be amazed and reverent. But in reality, there is nothing of the kind. From the literature of the Gnostics, fragments have come down to us, which have been preserved for the most part in the works of ancient Christian polemicists.

That Harnack's view of Gnosticism is not the view of science, but a private opinion, unauthorised by science, is better known than others by the scientist in question. He says bluntly that "no one has hitherto recognized for Gnosticism such an importance in the history of dogmas" as he ascribes to this phenomenon (S. 163). To this it must be added that Harnack's overly original view of the Gnostics will undoubtedly never become a universally recognized scientific truth, because this view was invented by the author for his own personal needs. In his view, Christianity itself, as it appeared on Jewish soil, was almost devoid of any content. And in order to become meaningful, to become a great world power, a catholic Church, Christianity had to absorb the life-giving juices of the Greco-Roman culture. But when did it happen? History clearly indicates that in the third century Christianity became a great world power. Therefore, Harnack, from his point of view, it was absolutely necessary during the second century to indicate the point when Christianity could enter into close communion with Greco-Roman culture. But no matter how much the German scientist strained his eyes, he could not discover anything of any importance that could be recognized as such a point. In order to find a way out of his awkward situation, Harnack, for lack of anything better, recognized in Gnosticism the Greco-Roman factor, which allegedly determined the further development of the Church. But Harnack's difficulties did not end there. For him, for all his biased views, it seemed too bold to admit without any evidence that the culture of the Greco-Roman world of the second century and Gnosticism were one and the same. Therefore, he had to convince the reader that when we deal with Gnosticism, we are actually dealing with Greco-Roman culture. It turned out to be very difficult to convince the reader of this, because science does not think of identifying the Greco-Roman culture of the second century with Gnosticism. In such a state of affairs, the German scholar had no choice but to find in the most extensive German literature some writer who would say a word in favor of the tendency indicated by Harnakov. After many searches, Harnack found a writer, named Joel, who says that "Gnosticism is very much of a Greek character, and that Platonism is especially in the foreground" (S. 165). But Harnack had forgotten to give any information about this to Joel. According to the information, it turns out that Joel never studied the history of Gnosticism, that he was a Jewish writer, not in the least known in science, who wrote two thin pamphlets on the relationship between Christianity and Jewry in the first centuries. It was from these pamphlets that Harnack extracted the above opinions of Joel on Gnosticism. If Joel is at all authoritative for us, we must follow Harnack's views; and if Joel is not authoritative for us, then we can with complete peace of mind reject Harnack's views, built on Joel's fleeting thought. We believe that the choice will not be difficult for the reader.

However fantastic the conception which Harnack formed of the significance of Gnosticism in the history of the Christian Church, he, as we know, explains by the influence of Gnosticism all the subsequent successes, all the further prosperity of the latter.

Harnack asserts that under this or that influence of Gnosticism in the Church: 1) activity began in terms of compiling and authorizing the Creeds, 2) the canon of the New Testament books was formed, and 3) the very concept of the Church was expanded and changed. We will not consider the first and last of these propositions: the first proposition is basically correct, although it is furnished by the German scientist with various accessories that have no real scientific significance; and the latter thesis is nothing new in comparison with what has been expressed more than once in German theological science about the historical development of the concept of the "Church." We will make only a few remarks about Harnack's opinions regarding the formation of the New Testament canon. Harnack could by no means show with scientific clarity and accuracy either that the canon was first formed only around 180 A.D., or that it was created in the Church according to the obligatory example of the Gnostics, or that the canon included more than one apostolic writing. Encyklopadie. Bd. VII; Kanon des Neuen Test. 1880). It is curious, however, to see how confused Harnack is in revealing his views on the origin of the canon. He thinks that the Church, in creating a canon and recognizing some books as canonical, and not recognizing others as canonical, was guided in this case, among other things, by the criterion that the ancient books at the end of the second century were no longer quite understandable to her in content, while the newer books were clear and comprehensible to her, why the Church allegedly authorized books of the first kind as books of truly apostolic origin. and books of the second kind deprived of such authority. But the author, to the consolation of the reader, himself destroys his hypothesis when he asserts that the canon includes books written very shortly before the time of the formation of the canon (ganz junge), as he recognizes the pastoral epistles and the second epistle of Peter (S. 273, 279). Whoever is so confused in his judgments as Harnack betrays that he is on the wrong road and is a stranger to soundness. In general, it must be said that Harnack postponed the origin of the canon to such a late time as the end of the second century, not because of any scientific need, but for the sake of the harmony of his own system. In the works of Irenaeus of Lyons, Christian theology reaches a remarkable degree of revelation. Harnack wanted to find an explanation for this fact, and he finds this explanation in the fact that the canon just formed in the time of Irenaeus allegedly gives this writer an immeasurable number of ideas that have now necessarily occupied the minds of Christian theologians. The German scientist needed a tricky explanation for a simple fact. It is also worth noting that the author, apparently against his own will, inspires the reader to be cautious about his reasoning: about the Symbols of the early Christian Church, about the origin of the canon, and about the development of the concept of the Church as such. He says that in his investigations of these questions he only "ideally constructs development," and "the real course of things often remains hidden to him" (S. 254). And since the expression "to construct (historical) development perfectly" in the Russian translation means to invent, and the remark that "the real course of things remains hidden" in the same translation means to do a deed that one does not sufficiently understand, the reader's caution must naturally pass into skepticism, into legitimate skepticism.

Под влиянием гностицизма явилось и другое благодетельное последствие для Церкви, по Гарнаку. Она получила богословскую науку и привела свои верования в систему. Говоря об этом, как мы знаем, Гарнак пишет трактаты об апологетах, Иринее с Тертуллианом и Ипполитом и об Александрийской школе.

Что касается апологетов, то мы замечали выше: прав ли автор, перемещая их деятельность из эпохи от 60 до 160 г. в эпоху от 160 до 300 г. Нет надобности рассуждать и о ценности взглядов Гарнака на сущность апологетической миссии Иустина и других писателей того же рода. Немецкий ученый сам назвал эти взгляды парадоксальными (S. 373). Мы в этом случае вполне согласны с автором. Но с другой стороны, мы решительно не соглашаемся с немецким ученым, что будто догматическое учение апологетов и в самом деле было так несложно и несовершенно, каким оно представляется в их литературных произведениях (S. 372). Можно утверждать, и притом с полной основательностью, что апологеты, предназначая свои сочинения главным образом для язычников, не имели ни побуждений, ни цели излагать полного христианского учения: они преимущественно говорили о таких истинах, которые могли быть понятны и язычнику. Верования апологетов, несомненно, отличались большим богатством содержания, чем как можно думать на основании их апологий.

К основным мнениям Гарнака относительно Иринея, Тертуллиана и Ипполита нужно относиться отрицательно. Не должно соглашаться с мнением Гарнака, что будто богатство и полнота христианского учения у них по сравнению с апологетами зависели от того, что последние писали до времени образования новозаветного канона, давшего «неизмеримое количество познаний», а Ириней, Тертуллиан и Ипполит — после образования канона. Канон тут ни при чем. Ириней и его преемники в литературе просто потому с большей подробностью говорят о христианских догматах, что они полемизировали с еретиками, а не писали, как апологеты, для язычников; опровергать еретиков можно было только через раскрытие сущности многих христианских догматов. Нельзя считать хоть сколько–нибудь основательным и тот взгляд Гарнака, что будто не только Тертуллиан (писатель, действительно, не чуждый тех недостатков, какие приписывает ему немецкий ученый. См.: S. 426–427), но и Ириней не могли совладать с богатством представлений, данных вдруг каноном, путались в них, не имели объединяющего принципа в изложении христианского вероучения. Конечно, у Иринея нет систематического изложения догматов, но это и понятно: он не писал догматической системы, а ратовал против слишком нестройных систем своих врагов. И тем не менее один Ириней, как христианский богослов, заставляет забыть, что до него были такие quasi–теологи, как Маркион, Валентин и пр. Достоинств его творений могут не признавать только люди, увлеченные гностицизмом и видящие в нем какую–то эру христианского богословия. Мы должны отметить очень странные отношения немецкого ученого к богословию таких писателей, как Ириней, Тертуллиан, Ипполит — по сравнению с богословием гностиков. У гностиков для Гарнака все хорошо: неясное — ясно, намек принимается за раскрытие истины, он любезно вкладывает в уста гностиков истинно ученые речи, все будто у них так стройно и научно. А напротив, у православных писателей, сейчас названных нами, Гарнаку все както не нравится. Везде у них старается отыскать недостатки, в их мыслях он не находит ни единства, ни целесообразности. Нетрудно видеть, что Гарнак к гностикам относится как к любимым детищам, а к православным писателям — как к нелюбимым пасынкам. Наконец, следует признать несомненной ошибкой взгляд Гарнака на идейную зависимость Иринея и продолжателей его дела — от гностиков. Ничего общего между первыми и последними нет. К каким невероятным натяжкам прибегает Гарнак, чтобы доказать этот свой тезис, видно из двух следующих примеров. Он утверждает, что «различные зоны гностиков превратились у Иринея в различные степени и теории спасения, под руководством Логоса» (в Ветхом и Новом Заветах. S. 434). Но что сходного между эманацией эонов и историей откровения Ветхого и Нового Заветов? Или Гарнак находит, что православное учение Иринея и Тертуллиана о двух природах во Христе есть только перенесение в Церковь гностических представлений об Иисусе «страждущем» и Христе «бесстрастном»? (S. 474). Но опять–таки: есть ли тут сходство? Гностики говорят о двух лицах, а православные писатели об одном лице, хотя и двоякой природы. Каждому понятно, что при подобных натяжках и ухищрениях можно различное представлять сходным, а сходное различным, — и во всяком случае нет трудности навязать Иринею и Тертуллиану идейную зависимость от гностиков.

Менее спорного в суждениях Гарнака о Клименте и Оригене. Нам кажется, что этот ученый прав, когда допускает их идейную зависимость от гностиков. И нужно ставить в заслугу Гарнаку, что он оттенил эту сторону в истории древнеалександрийской школы. Учение Климента и Оригена тот же ученый излагает, почти не отступая от истины. Но рядом с этим во взгляде на древних александрийцев у Гарнака много преувеличений. Напрасно он смотрит на Климента и Оригена как на каких–то завершителей в развитии древнехристианской догматики. Климент и в особенности Ориген старались дать христианскому учению систематическую форму. Но значит ли это, что они создали христианскую догматику? Ориген не привнес ничего нового в христианское учение. Он вложил его в гностико–неоплатоническую форму. Но это было его личное дело, которое не было и не сделалось достоянием Церкви. Напрасно Гарнак слишком преувеличивает значение Оригена для последующей Церкви. В Церкви последующего времени мы не находим ничего, что можно было бы назвать в строгом смысле школой Оригена. Его идеи сделались известны в Церкви, но нельзя указать ни одного христианского ученого древности, который бы учил, как сам Ориген. Критика Оригеновых мнений преобладала над увлечением оригенизмом и в III, и в IV вв.

В количественном отношении очень видное место занимает в книге Гарнака исследование о монархианах. Около 150 страниц отведено этому предмету. Но сказать о характере исследования им монархианства почти нечего. Трактат о монархианах приклеен в книге совершенно внешним образом. По–видимому, автор не знал, какое место отвести монархианству как особому явлению среди других явлений, а потому трактат о монархианах отнес к концу книги. Что касается воззрений Гарнака на сущность и значение монархиан, то эти воззрения имеют смысл при предположении, что Евангелие Иоанново стало влиять на умы христианского общества раньше середины II в. А как скоро такого предположения не допускать, все суждения Гарнака теряют всякий интерес. Это соображение делает излишним дальнейшее рассмотрение суждений Гарнака по поводу монархианства и сопряженных с ним явлений (например, церковного учения о Логосе).