Therefore, I think that the writer himself could not easily say that it was he who wrote this; The meaning of what has been said is so obscured by the impenetrability of the expression that no one will be able to discern comfortably in this mud what is the purpose of those who express themselves in this way. For the expression: "they come to such a difference as things reach," some recognize as the saying of some pagan fable, a soothsayer, who confuses words in order to deceive his hearers.

If, following what has been discussed so far, it is necessary to guess what Eunomius wants to prove here, then this is proved: as many differences as there are between one deed and another, so much will be recognized as a mutual difference in actions. Therefore, what matters are spoken of here cannot be found in what has been said. For if Eunomius speaks of what is seen in creation, then I do not know what connection this has with the previous one.

Since the question is about the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is it appropriate for Eunomius to speak naturally about earth, water, air, fire, about the differences of animals, to describe them in words, to depict deeds that are older and preferable to other works, and not without reason to assert that one action is more excellent than another? If, however, he calls the Only-begotten Son and the Holy Spirit works, then of what again does he speak of the differences of actions by which these works are accomplished?

And what are the very actions by which others are exceeded? For he did not explain what he meant by ascent, by which one action, as he says, is superior to another; Nothing is said about the nature of actions either, but even now he has not reached anything definite, just as he does not assert that action is something realized, just as he does not prove that it is a certain unrealized movement of the will.

For the meaning of what has been said, completely left in the middle between the one and the other supposition, inclines to each of these concepts. Eunomius adds that it is not permissible to call one and the same action by which God created the angels, or the stars, and the heavens, or man. Again, by what necessity or connection did he add this to what has been said, or what is especially proved by this?

Unless actions differ from one another in so far as there is a mutual difference in deeds, he proves that not everything is the work of one and the same, but the other is brought into being by another. But I do not see this. From the Scriptures we have learned that everything is the work of One: the heavens, and the angel, and the stars, and man, and everything that is conceivable in creation. The teaching of their dogma asserts that the Son and the Spirit are not the work of one thing, but just as the Son is the work of the action that follows the first essence, so the Spirit is again another matter of the first thing.

Therefore, what do the heavens, and the man, and the angel, and the star, now united in the word, have in common with what they affirm, let Eunomius himself or one of the accomplices of his ineffable wisdom say. For this impiety is clearly revealed in what has been said, and on what this impiety is based is even disagreeable with itself. For it is manifestly impious to think that in the Holy Trinity there is seen as much difference as is observed in the heavens, which encompass all creation, and in one man or in one star visible in heaven.

But the comparison of concepts and the connection of proofs for all this (I affirm this) are incomprehensible neither to me, nor perhaps to my father himself. If he had reasoned in the same way about creation, namely, that heaven is the work of a higher action, and the star is the product of the action that follows the heavens, and the product of the stars is an angel, and the angel is man, then his speech by comparing such things would serve to confirm the dogma somewhat.

But if all these things are brought into being by one, of which he himself agrees, unless he goes entirely contrary to the word of the Scriptures, and in the origin of the Son and the Spirit determines some other way, then what has the following to do with the former? But let us admit that there is something in common in this to the proof of the difference of essences, because it is desirable for him to prove it by what he says.

But let us hear how he connected what follows with what he said. "As much as some Deeds," he says, "are older and preferable than other Deeds, so much is action, some pious thinkers will say, superior to action." If he says this about the subject of the senses, then his speech is far from what he has assumed, for what is the need for one who has proposed to reason about dogmas to speculate about the order of creation and to assert that the higher and lower actions of the Creator are commensurate with the magnitude of each created thing?

And if he does not speak of this, and calls the deeds that he has now invented in the dogma, that is, the Son and the Holy Spirit, the oldest and preferable to other deeds, then it may be better to be indignant at this thought in silence, than to enter into a struggle with it, thereby apparently proving that it has significance. For how can the most preferable be found where there is nothing disrespectful?

If in Eunomius the inclination and readiness for evil has extended to such an extent that the naming and concept of disrespectful presupposes something that according to our belief is in the Holy Trinity, then we must close our ears and, as much as we can, flee from evil hearing, so that in the listener there will be no communion with impurity, when, as from a vessel full of impurity, the word will pour into the hearts of those who hear.

For how can anyone dare to say anything about the Divine and supreme nature, which in comparison in the word leads the thought to something less worthy of respect? "Yes, in cu," it is said, "they honor the Son as they honor the Father" (John 5:23). Since this saying legitimizes equality, since the divine word is the law, Eunomius will reject both the law and the Lawgiver himself, he gives to one a greater honor, and to the other a lesser honor, I do not know where, having found the measure of that which is abundant in honor.

For according to human custom, the differences of merit also determine the honors of those who possess them, so that the subject are not presented in the same and equal form to kings and inferior principalities, but the greater and weakest manifestation of fear and respect in those who present themselves shows the lack or excess of honor before the honored. And therefore the most preferable can be found according to the disposition of the ruled, when someone is most feared by his neighbors and, apparently, is honored with greater respect than others.