Anyone who has sufficiently studied the history of philosophy or aesthetics must admit that in the course of his research he has often met with terms which are generally regarded as commonly understood, and which are usually translated without any effort into any other language, while remaining everywhere the same word. For the time being, we leave these terms without any analysis; and if they are found in ancient philosophy, then often and for a very long time, when translating them into new languages, we leave them in Greek or Latin form. Such, for example, are the terms "structure", "element", "idea", "form", "text" and "context". However, this kind of illusion of general intelligibility in the study of ancient texts begins to be gradually destroyed, so that the researcher is forced to part with this illusion and subject this term or concept to a special historical study. "Symbol" is one of these terms. It would seem that what could be simpler than the fact that A points to B and is its symbol? After all, everyone understands that the national flag, for example, is an indication of a given country, that a dark cloud is a harbinger of rain that is about to fall, that a good vegetable garden is a sign that someone has diligently tended it. Unfortunately, however, the history of the term "symbol" quite disappoints us in this general intelligibility, no matter how much we are told that coughing is a symbol of the cold, and no matter how well this expression is understood by everyone. Already on closer examination it turns out that a symbol, whether it is taken in this terminological shell, as a "symbol", or taken as a concept expressed in other words or by a set of words, is one of the central concepts of philosophy and aesthetics and requires extremely painstaking research. At the present time, it is true, in our philosophy and epistemology we almost do without such a term as "symbol". But it is impossible to expound modern philosophy and poetics alone without taking into account their historical origin. As for the history of philosophy, this term is extremely rich, diverse, flexible, and (4) comes across in systems of philosophy that are completely different from each other.

The concept of a symbol in both literature and art is one of the most vague, confusing and contradictory concepts. This term is often used even in the most ordinary everyday sense, when one generally wants to say that one thing indicates something else, that is, the term "symbol" is used simply in the sense of "sign". Almost everyone confuses the term "symbol" with such terms as "allegory," "emblem," "personification," "type," "myth," etc. And yet all the cultural languages of the world invariably use this term and preserve it in every possible way, in spite of dozens of other terms with which, it would seem, it was quite possible to replace it. In mathematics, there are also "symbols". In politics, when one wants to say that something is not being done in earnest, not in reality, but only to indicate the possibility of peaceful or hostile relations, one also speaks of "symbolic actions."

In Soviet literature, the study of this term and concept is almost entirely absent. But there were important reasons for this, which we will talk about in more detail below. It should be borne in mind, however, that in the last half century the majority of researchers and critics have not had any need to deal with the concept of symbol. True, one of the rather significant trends in literature and art of the late 19th and early 20th centuries called itself "symbolism", and its representatives called themselves "symbolists". But this trend in literature and art for the most part understood the symbol very narrowly, namely, as a mystical reflection of the other world in each separate object and being of this world. Naturally, the majority of critics and logicians, especially in the period of the revolution, did not consider it necessary to use the term "symbol", because they no longer believed in the other world and few people needed a mystical understanding of the symbol. This circumstance did not at all contribute to the fact that the concept of the symbol was investigated in its essence and not necessarily in the subjectivist or mystical sense of the word.

It seems to us that at the present time it is high time to give an analysis of this difficult concept of the symbol, without the study of which many aesthetic theories and even entire philosophical systems of the historical past cannot be deeply understood and sufficiently correctly expounded. On the other hand, however, a purely objectivist analysis of this term does not suit us very well either. In order to understand it in all its depth, it is necessary to translate it into the language of modern philosophical and aesthetic consciousness, that is, to determine both (5) its healthy kernel and all the historical husks that have so often clung to it and still prevent us from making a scientific analysis of it.

Two circumstances have done a great deal to harm the clarification of the concept of symbol.

The first circumstance is Plekhanov's theory of hieroglyphs. G. V. Plekhanov asserted that our sensations and ideas are not at all a reflection of the objective world, but subjective symbols that do not give any accurate idea of the material world. According to Plekhanov, it turned out that every symbol is necessarily subjective and does not contribute anything to the cognition of objective reality. In many circles, a careless, or rather, downright negative attitude was established towards the "symbol". Many began to understand any doctrine of the symbol not only idealistically, but also subjectivistly, agnosticly. It so happened that whoever does not want to recognize the objective world or recognizes it, but does not recognize its knowability, must necessarily use "symbol" as his basic term, and whoever uses the term "symbol" is necessarily a subjectivist and agnostic. In fact, a purely subjectivist understanding of the symbol contradicts all common sense; and in this respect he has no place either in general philosophy or in the theory of literature and art. However, a study of the history of this term and this concept testifies to the fact that Plekhanov's hieroglyphism in this case is, one might say, only an exception, and the true understanding of the symbol is quite different.

Another circumstance that in recent decades has constantly led the terms "symbol" or "symbolism" to complete discrediting is the activity of many of those writers who, beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, specifically called themselves "symbolists" and their trend "symbolism." This trend failed to explain and formulate what was contained in the theory of symbolism. If we take, for example, Russian or French symbolism, then for half a century there was not a single author who would have given a detailed theory of the symbol, except for individual remarks or small arguments. And since symbolism was too refined and unpopular in wide circles, the term "symbolism" itself also turned out to be unpopular, almost unstudied and, from the point of view of most readers, simply unnecessary and negative. However, even here the history of aesthetic doctrines protests against such a narrow and so little analyzed concept of symbol, which we find in the symbolism of recent decades. The understanding of the symbol, as the history of science shows, is extremely broad and diverse, and in a certain sense even necessary for both science and art, and moreover, not in the case of any backward state, but at the stages of their advanced and flourishing development. Here we must abandon not only Plekhanov's hieroglyphs, but all theoretical narrowness in general, and consider this subject simply in its essence, consider it historically and consider it freely theoretically.

It is necessary to assimilate most clearly the theory of symbolism, which is strong in physics, mathematics and other sciences, and which, under the influence of Mach and Avenarius, turned out to be a fairly popular theory among natural scientists. These latter wanted at all costs to renounce the obligatory recognition of the objective world, or rather, simply not to take it into account.

They reasoned as follows. Whether the world exists or does not exist is your own business; And think as you want here. As for us, natural scientists, we only care about what is in our sense perceptions, and that at the present moment; All these laws of nature, and nature itself, are nothing more than a complex of human sensations, which yesterday were one, today another, and tomorrow there will be a third, and so on ad infinitum. There is no truth, but only subjective images, hypotheses, equations, fictions, symbols.

This kind of philosophy is a complete distortion of ordinary, natural, and purely human experience. The latter has always said, is saying, and will continue to say, that although we do not possess absolute truth, we are always striving for it, and that scientific constructions are not at all only our illusions, only our fictions, supposedly created only "for the convenience" of thought itself, and are not at all only subjective symbols.

The famous mathematician A. Poincaré said that the laws of nature are created by us only for the "convenience" of our own thought.

Symbols in science or in art must not transform nature and the entire objective world into mere subjectivist symbols. Otherwise, all our study of world symbolism, from primitive thinking to the present day, will remain an empty and useless exercise.

If we agree to understand by symbol first of all the reflection of objective reality, and only then everything else, then there will be quite a lot of this rest.